child hearsay hearing in Indiana

2009Cf. In re J.Q., 836 N.E.2d 961 , 965 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (reversing CHINS determination where parent was not given adequate notice or opportunity to respond regarding admission of child hearsay statement and was not informed that child would be unavailable to testify until the day of trial); Roark v. Roark, 551 N.E.2d 865, 869 (Ind.Ct.App.1990) (holding that trial court erred in admission of children's hearsay statements based solely on the opinion of the guardian ad litem that it would be too traumatic for children to testify).

2007Townsley v. Marion County Dep't of Child Servs., 848 N.E.2d 684, 688-89 (Ind.Ct.App.2006); In re J.Q., 836 N.E.2d 961 , 965 (Ind.Ct.App.2005); cf. Roark v. Roark, 551 N.E.2d 865, 869 (Ind.Ct.App.1990) (noting that the predecessor to the current CHINS child hearsay statute, Ind.Code § 31-6-15-3, is "identical in substance to the child hearsay statute enacted to protect children involved in criminal proceedings"). [4] Again arguing that there was only one hearing, the State contends there was no "incorporation." This argument ignores that at the November 2, 2006, hearing, the State made a specif

2017In addition, a party “would clearly approach a child hearsay hearing differently than he would a trial as far as the making of objections and the scope of his questioning.” L.H., 878 N.E.2d at 430 . [12] We find that the same logic applies in this instance.

2009In that case, the trial court incorporated evidence from the child hearsay hearing into the fact-finding hearing over the juvenile's objection. 878 N.E.2d at 430 .

2009See, e.g., M.T. v. State, 787 N.E.2d 509, 511 (Ind.Ct.App.2008) (noting without comment that testimony from child hearsay hearing was incorporated into the fact-finding hearing); Casselman v. State, 582 N.E.2d 432, 437 (Ind.Ct.App.1991) (rejecting defendant's argument that he was entitled to separate hearing on admissibility of evidence under child hearsay statute where trial court held hearing during bench trial).

2009See, e.g., M.T. v. State, 787 N.E.2d 509, 511 (Ind.Ct.App. 2003) (noting without comment that testimony from child hearsay hearing was incorporated into the fact-finding hearing); Casselman v. State, 582 N.E.2d 432, 437 (Ind.Ct.App.1991) (rejecting defendant's argument that he was entitled to separate hearing on admissibility of evidence under child hearsay statute where trial court held hearing during bench trial).

2009See, e.g., M.T. v. State, 787 N.E.2d 509, 511 (Ind.Ct.App.2008) (noting without comment that testimony from child hearsay hearing was incorporated into the fact-finding hearing); Casselman v. State, 582 N.E.2d 432, 437 (Ind.Ct.App.1991) (rejecting defendant's argument that he was entitled to separate hearing on admissibility of evidence under child hearsay statute where trial court held hearing during bench trial).

2009See, e.g., M.T. v. State, 787 N.E.2d 509, 511 (Ind.Ct.App. 2003) (noting without comment that testimony from child hearsay hearing was incorporated into the fact-finding hearing); Casselman v. State, 582 N.E.2d 432, 437 (Ind.Ct.App.1991) (rejecting defendant's argument that he was entitled to separate hearing on admissibility of evidence under child hearsay statute where trial court held hearing during bench trial).

2018Nussbaum argues that “the sexual innocence inference theory made the testimony from S.G. admissible, and in turn would allow the defense to connect S.G. to the other girls to demonstrate that they all had been exposed to this knowledge about sex acts.”3 Id. [26] The State counters that this evidence is inadmissible under Indiana Evidence Rule 412, sometimes referred to as the “Rape Shield Rule.” See Oatts v. State, 899 N.E.2d 714, 720 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (citing State v. Walton, 715 N.E.2d 824, 826 (Ind. 1999)).4 Evidence Rule 412(a) governs the admissibility of evidence of past sexual conduc

2018Nussbaum argues that “the sexual innocence inference theory made the testimony from S.G. admissible, and in turn would allow the defense to connect S.G. to the other girls to demonstrate that they all had been exposed to this knowledge about sex acts.”3 Id. [26] The State counters that this evidence is inadmissible under Indiana Evidence Rule 412, sometimes referred to as the “Rape Shield Rule.” See Oatts v. State, 899 N.E.2d 714, 720 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (citing State v. Walton, 715 N.E.2d 824, 826 (Ind. 1999)).4 Evidence Rule 412(a) governs the admissibility of evidence of past sexual conduc

2015Cross-Examination [60] Crittenden also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to cross- examine D.M. and failing to sufficiently cross-examine the forensic child interviewer during the child-hearsay hearing. [61] “‘It is well settled that the nature and extent of cross-examination is a matter of strategy delegated to trial counsel.’” Waldon v. State, 684 N.E.2d 206, 208 (Ind. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1405-PC-227 | June 30, 2015 Page 29 of 38 Ct. App. 1997) (citing Osborne v. State, 481 N.E.2d 376, 380 (Ind. 1985)), trans. denied. [62] In regard

2015Cross-Examination [60] Crittenden also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to cross- examine D.M. and failing to sufficiently cross-examine the forensic child interviewer during the child-hearsay hearing. [61] “‘It is well settled that the nature and extent of cross-examination is a matter of strategy delegated to trial counsel.’” Waldon v. State, 684 N.E.2d 206, 208 (Ind. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1405-PC-227 | June 30, 2015 Page 29 of 38 Ct. App. 1997) (citing Osborne v. State, 481 N.E.2d 376, 380 (Ind. 1985)), trans. denied. [62] In regard

2014Indiana Code section 35-37-4-6, known as the “protected person statute” or the “child hearsay statute,” provides a list of certain conditions under which evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible will be allowed in cases involving certain crimes, including child molesting, committed against “protected persons.” J.A. v. State, 904 N.E.2d 250, 255 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).

2007Townsley v. Marion County Dep't of Child Servs., 848 N.E.2d 684, 688-89 (Ind.Ct.App.2006); In re J.Q., 836 N.E.2d 961 , 965 (Ind.Ct.App.2005); cf. Roark v. Roark, 551 N.E.2d 865, 869 (Ind.Ct.App.1990) (noting that the predecessor to the current CHINS child hearsay statute, Ind.Code § 31-6-15-3, is "identical in substance to the child hearsay statute enacted to protect children involved in criminal proceedings"). [4] Again arguing that there was only one hearing, the State contends there was no "incorporation." This argument ignores that at the November 2, 2006, hearing, the State made a specif