20 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Nggreen2 sentences2004This court adopted the Powell rule in State v. Ng, 110 Wn.2d 32, 46, 48 , 750 P.2d 632 (1988). 2004This court adopted the Powell rule in State v. Ng, 110 Wn.2d 32, 46, 48 , 750 P.2d 632 (1988). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Powellgreen2 sentences2012In doing so, it overlooks the fact that Powell’s rule does not even apply to this case. ¶25 In State v. Powell, five justices agreed that aggravating factors must be charged in the information and proved to a jury before an enhanced sentence may be imposed. 167 Wn.2d 672, 688 , 223 P.3d 493 (2009) (plurality opinion) (Stephens, J., concurring). 2011See State v. Powell, 167 Wn.2d 672, 684 , 223 P.3d 493 (2009); id. at 689 (Stephens, J., concurring) (“Any facts justifying a sentence above an offense’s standard sentencing range are functionally equivalent to elements of the crime.”); id. at 691 (Owens, J., dissenting) (“Aggravating Circumstances Are Essential Elements of a Crime”). *679 ¶12 But this case does not involve a Powell error, and the State is correct that Apprendi and Ring have little bearing on the question here. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Powellgreen2 sentences2012In doing so, it overlooks the fact that Powell’s rule does not even apply to this case. ¶25 In State v. Powell, five justices agreed that aggravating factors must be charged in the information and proved to a jury before an enhanced sentence may be imposed. 167 Wn.2d 672, 688 , 223 P.3d 493 (2009) (plurality opinion) (Stephens, J., concurring). 2011See State v. Powell, 167 Wn.2d 672, 684 , 223 P.3d 493 (2009); id. at 689 (Stephens, J., concurring) (“Any facts justifying a sentence above an offense’s standard sentencing range are functionally equivalent to elements of the crime.”); id. at 691 (Owens, J., dissenting) (“Aggravating Circumstances Are Essential Elements of a Crime”). *679 ¶12 But this case does not involve a Powell error, and the State is correct that Apprendi and Ring have little bearing on the question here. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Powellgreen1 sentence2018Powell, 150 Wn. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Kirkpatrickgreen1 sentence2011See Kirkpatrick, 160 Wn.2d at 881 (Although Kirkpatrick’s unlawful seizure claim was constitutional, it was not manifest because “[t]he record [wa]s insufficient to determine any practical consequences of the [claim] on the outcome of Kirkpatrick’s trial given other, unchallenged evidence of his guilt.”); Powell, 166 Wn.2d at 85 (Even if our Supreme Court had ruled that Powell’s claim was constitutional in nature, it had no practical and identifiable consequences on the outcome of the trial because “[t]he record shows the jury had ample testimony ... to support its guilty verdict.”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Powellgreen1 sentence2011See Kirkpatrick, 160 Wn.2d at 881 (Although Kirkpatrick’s unlawful seizure claim was constitutional, it was not manifest because “[t]he record [wa]s insufficient to determine any practical consequences of the [claim] on the outcome of Kirkpatrick’s trial given other, unchallenged evidence of his guilt.”); Powell, 166 Wn.2d at 85 (Even if our Supreme Court had ruled that Powell’s claim was constitutional in nature, it had no practical and identifiable consequences on the outcome of the trial because “[t]he record shows the jury had ample testimony ... to support its guilty verdict.”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. O'Haragreen1 sentence2011We note, however, that our Supreme Court’s use of unchallenged evidence in Kirkpatrick and Powell to find a lack of practical and identifiable consequences appears to be a different analysis from that in O’Hara. 167 Wn.2d at 100 (“Thus to determine whether an error is practical and identifiable, the appellate court must place itself in the shoes of the trial court to ascertain whether, given what the trial court knew at that time, the court could have corrected the error.”) We also note that other Supreme Court cases have used the existence of unchallenged evidence to analyze whether an error | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Powell
green
2 sentences2009Thus, the Court of Appeals held, "[i]n light of our disposition [rejecting the sufficiency of the evidence argument], we need not consider Powell's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel." Id. 2009Thus, the Court of Appeals held, “In light of our disposition [rejecting the sufficiency of the evidence argument], we need not consider Powell’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id. | 2 | 2009–2009 |
In Re Hubert
green
2 sentences2009He argues that he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel, who failed to propose a jury instruction on the "reasonable belief" defense, RCW 9A.44.030(1). [1] Following In re Personal Restraint of Hubert, 138 Wash.App. 924 , 158 P.3d 1282 (2007), we hold that the lack of a "reasonable belief" instruction prejudiced Powell's defense, we reverse, and we remand for a new trial. [2] FACTS I. 2009App. 924 , 158 P.3d 1282 (2007), we hold that the lack of a “reasonable belief” instruction prejudiced Powell’s defense, we reverse, and we remand for a new trial. 2 FACTS I. | 2 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Black
green
2 sentences2009See ER 103(a)(1); State v. Black, 109 Wn.2d 336, 340 , 745 P.2d 12 (1987) (noting ER 103(a)(1) allows appellate review when grounds for objection, though not specifically lodged at trial, are readily apparent from circumstances); 5 Karl B. 2009See ER 103(a)(1); State v. Black, 109 Wn.2d 336, 340 , 745 P.2d 12 (1987) (noting ER 103(a)(1) allows appellate review when grounds for objection, though not specifically lodged at trial, are readily apparent from circumstances); 5 Karl B. | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Geer v. Tonnon
green
2 sentences2008It was Powell’s burden below to show that “the outcome . . . would have been more favorable to [him] than the result actually obtained but for the defendant attorney’s negligence.” Geer, 137 Wn. 2008It was Powell's burden below to show that "the outcome... would have been more favorable to [him] than the result actually obtained but for the defendant attorney's negligence." Geer v. Tonnon, 137 Wash.App. 838, 840 , 155 P.3d 163 (2007), review denied, 162 Wash.2d 1018 , 178 P.3d 1032 (2008); Daugert v. Pappas, 104 Wash.2d 254, 257 , 704 P.2d 600 (1985). | 2 | 2008–2008 |
Schramm v. Steele
green
2 sentences2000The Powell rule was short lived, see Schramm v. Steele, 97 Wash. 309 , overruling Powell , yet despite its discontinued validity, this decision is instructive to the case at bar. 2000The Powell rule was short lived, see Schramm v. Steele, 97 Wash. 309 , overruling Powell , yet despite its discontinued validity, this decision is instructive to the case at bar. | 2 | 2000–2000 |
In Re the Trust Estate of Powell
neutral
2 sentences2016In determining whether a trustee’s fees are reasonable, a superior court should review the fees under the five Powell factors: “(1) [t]he amount of risk and responsibility involved, (2) the time actually required of the trustee in the performance of the trust, (3) the size of the estate, (4) the amount of income received, and (5) the manual and over-all services performed.” In Re Trust Estate of Powell, 68 Wn.2d 38, 41 , 411 P.2d 162 (1966). 2016In determining whether a trustee’s fees are reasonable, a superior court should review the fees under the five Powell factors: “(1) [t]he amount of risk and responsibility involved, (2) the time actually required of the trustee in the performance of the trust, (3) the size of the estate, (4) the amount of income received, and (5) the manual and over-all services performed.” In Re Trust Estate of Powell, 68 Wn.2d 38, 41 , 411 P.2d 162 (1966). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Veliz
green
2 sentences2016Veliz, 76 Wn. 2016Veliz, 76 Wn. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
United States v. Lawrence Antelope, United States of America v. Lawrence Antelope
green
1 sentence2016On October 20, 2014, the State filed a notice of a hearing for Powell’s violation of community custody. *116 ¶4 At the violation hearing, Powell claimed that, based on United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2005), the trial court could not find that he violated his community custody conditions for refusing to complete the psycho-sexual evaluation and disclose his sexual history unless the State granted him immunity. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Barnes
green
2 sentences2012Given that the information can be amended anytime prior to verdict where the defendant's substantial rights are not prejudiced, State v. Barnes, 146 Wash.2d 74, 81-82 , 43 P.3d 490 (2002), it is hard to see how the Powell rule would create extra work. 2012Given that the information can be amended anytime prior to verdict where the defendant's substantial rights are not prejudiced, State v. Barnes, 146 Wash.2d 74, 81-82 , 43 P.3d 490 (2002), it is hard to see how the Powell rule would create extra work. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Barnes
green
2 sentences2012Given that the information can be amended anytime prior to verdict where the defendant's substantial rights are not prejudiced, State v. Barnes, 146 Wash.2d 74, 81-82 , 43 P.3d 490 (2002), it is hard to see how the Powell rule would create extra work. 2012Given that the information can be amended anytime prior to verdict where the defendant's substantial rights are not prejudiced, State v. Barnes, 146 Wash.2d 74, 81-82 , 43 P.3d 490 (2002), it is hard to see how the Powell rule would create extra work. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Blakely v. Washington
green
2 sentences2011Powell concerned the proper procedure for resentencing to correct an error under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S. Ct. 2531 , 159 L. 2011Powell concerned the proper procedure for resentencing to correct an error under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S. Ct. 2531 , 159 L. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
In re the Personal Restraint of Hubert
green
1 sentence2009He argues that he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel, who failed to propose a jury instruction on the "reasonable belief" defense, RCW 9A.44.030(1). [1] Following In re Personal Restraint of Hubert, 138 Wash.App. 924 , 158 P.3d 1282 (2007), we hold that the lack of a "reasonable belief" instruction prejudiced Powell's defense, we reverse, and we remand for a new trial. [2] FACTS I. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Geer v. Tonnon
green
1 sentence2008It was Powell's burden below to show that "the outcome... would have been more favorable to [him] than the result actually obtained but for the defendant attorney's negligence." Geer v. Tonnon, 137 Wash.App. 838, 840 , 155 P.3d 163 (2007), review denied, 162 Wash.2d 1018 , 178 P.3d 1032 (2008); Daugert v. Pappas, 104 Wash.2d 254, 257 , 704 P.2d 600 (1985). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Daugert v. Pappas
green
2 sentences2008It was Powell's burden below to show that "the outcome... would have been more favorable to [him] than the result actually obtained but for the defendant attorney's negligence." Geer v. Tonnon, 137 Wash.App. 838, 840 , 155 P.3d 163 (2007), review denied, 162 Wash.2d 1018 , 178 P.3d 1032 (2008); Daugert v. Pappas, 104 Wash.2d 254, 257 , 704 P.2d 600 (1985). 2008It was Powell's burden below to show that "the outcome... would have been more favorable to [him] than the result actually obtained but for the defendant attorney's negligence." Geer v. Tonnon, 137 Wash.App. 838, 840 , 155 P.3d 163 (2007), review denied, 162 Wash.2d 1018 , 178 P.3d 1032 (2008); Daugert v. Pappas, 104 Wash.2d 254, 257 , 704 P.2d 600 (1985). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Hahn v. DEPARTMENT OF RETIREMENT SYSTEMS
neutral
1 sentence2008It was Powell's burden below to show that "the outcome... would have been more favorable to [him] than the result actually obtained but for the defendant attorney's negligence." Geer v. Tonnon, 137 Wash.App. 838, 840 , 155 P.3d 163 (2007), review denied, 162 Wash.2d 1018 , 178 P.3d 1032 (2008); Daugert v. Pappas, 104 Wash.2d 254, 257 , 704 P.2d 600 (1985). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Weaver
neutral
1 sentence2008It was Powell's burden below to show that "the outcome... would have been more favorable to [him] than the result actually obtained but for the defendant attorney's negligence." Geer v. Tonnon, 137 Wash.App. 838, 840 , 155 P.3d 163 (2007), review denied, 162 Wash.2d 1018 , 178 P.3d 1032 (2008); Daugert v. Pappas, 104 Wash.2d 254, 257 , 704 P.2d 600 (1985). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Shellabarger v. Phoenix Savings Bank & Trust Co.
neutral
2 sentences1987Furthermore, in its oral opinion, the trial court expressly applied the Powell factors, as well as its underlying authority, In re Estate of Dunlap, 38 Ariz. 525 , 2 P.2d 1045 (1931), to the facts of this case. 1987Furthermore, in its oral opinion, the trial court expressly applied the Powell factors, as well as its underlying authority, In re Estate of Dunlap, 38 Ariz. 525 , 2 P.2d 1045 (1931), to the facts of this case. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.