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15 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Walker v. Stategreen2 sentences2020If, however, the statute is ambiguous, the court must continue to the part of the test that incorporates the common-law continuous-crime doctrine and determine “whether the defendant’s actions are ‘so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction.’” Id. at 264 (quoting Walker v. State, 932 N.E.2d 733, 735 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), reh’g denied). [9] Hill makes no argument that his two convictions constitute double jeopardy under the Powell test. 2020If, however, the statute is ambiguous, the court must continue to the part of the test that incorporates the common-law continuous-crime doctrine and determine “whether the defendant’s actions are ‘so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction.’” Id. at 264 (quoting Walker v. State, 932 N.E.2d 733, 735 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), reh’g denied). [9] Hill makes no argument that his two convictions constitute double jeopardy under the Powell test. | 3 | 3 |
United States v. Rentzgreen2 sentences2026Count IX was enhanced to a Level 6 felony because Robinson had been “operat[ing] a vehicle[,]” and Count X was similarly enhanced because he had “inflicted bodily injury on or otherwise caused bodily injury to Jose Utrera and/or Marcelo Utrera by pain[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 45. [14] The first step in the Powell analysis is to “review the text of the statute to identify the appropriate ‘unit of prosecution.’” Jones v. State, 159 N.E.3d 55 , 63 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Powell, 151 N.E.3d at 265), trans. denied. “[A] unit of prosecution is ‘the minimum amount of activity a defendant 2026Count IX was enhanced to a Level 6 felony because Robinson had been “operat[ing] a vehicle[,]” and Count X was similarly enhanced because he had “inflicted bodily injury on or otherwise caused bodily injury to Jose Utrera and/or Marcelo Utrera by pain[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 45. [14] The first step in the Powell analysis is to “review the text of the statute to identify the appropriate ‘unit of prosecution.’” Jones v. State, 159 N.E.3d 55 , 63 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Powell, 151 N.E.3d at 265), trans. denied. “[A] unit of prosecution is ‘the minimum amount of activity a defendant | 3 | 3 |
Jordan Stafford v. State of Indianagreen1 sentence2020See Mathews v. State, 849 N.E.2d 578, 580 (Ind. 2006) (resolving a unit-of-prosecution case based on “the structure of the statute, not from constitutional limitations”); Stafford v. State, 83 N.E.3d 721, 722 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (characterizing defendant’s unit-of-prosecution claim as a “challenge based on statutory interpretation,” rather than a “challenge based on constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy”). | 1 | 1 |
Mathews v. Stategreen1 sentence2020See Mathews v. State, 849 N.E.2d 578, 580 (Ind. 2006) (resolving a unit-of-prosecution case based on “the structure of the statute, not from constitutional limitations”); Stafford v. State, 83 N.E.3d 721, 722 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (characterizing defendant’s unit-of-prosecution claim as a “challenge based on statutory interpretation,” rather than a “challenge based on constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy”). | 1 | 1 |
Ketcham v. Stategreen1 sentence2017Ketcham v. State, 780 N.E.2d 1171, 1177 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. [13] Waiver notwithstanding, Powell’s claim fails on the merits. | 1 | 1 |
Gb v. Sjhgreen1 sentence2011See, e.g., G.B. v. S.J.H., 167 Ind.App. 175, 177 , 338 N.E.2d 315, 316 (1975) (testimony of party sufficient to support trial court findings). | 1 | 1 |
G. B. v. S. J. H.green1 sentence2011See, e.g., G.B. v. S.J.H., 167 Ind.App. 175, 177 , 338 N.E.2d 315, 316 (1975) (testimony of party sufficient to support trial court findings). | 1 | 1 |
Delaware County v. Powellgreen2 sentences1981Ind., 393 N.E.2d at 192 (emphasis supplied). [6] In Powell , various affirmative acts of the defendant pointed to fulfillment of the statutory purpose, thus generating genuine issues as to the material facts of waiver and estoppel: The county's insurer initiated contact with Powell, admitted the county's liability, promised to "take care of everything," and made substantial payments in satisfaction of Powell's claim. 1981Ind., 393 N.E.2d at 192 (emphasis supplied). 6 In Powell , various affirmative acts of the defendant pointed to fulfillment of the statutory purpose, thus generating genuine issues as to the material facts of waiver and estoppel: The county’s insurer initiated contact with Powell, admitted the county’s liability, promised to “take care of everything,” and made substantial payments in satisfaction of Powell’s claim. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Penry v. Lynaugh
red
2 sentences2007Justice O'Connor, speaking for a majority in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 333 , 109 S.Ct. 2934 , 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989), quoted Justice Powell's standard for insanity with approval, and most state and federal courts have taken this as a definitive endorsement of the Powell insanity formulation by the majority of the Supreme Court. 2007Justice O'Connor, speaking for a majority in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 333 , 109 S.Ct. 2934 , 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989), quoted Justice Powell's standard for insanity with approval, and most state and federal courts have taken this as a definitive endorsement of the Powell insanity formulation by the majority of the Supreme Court. | 2 | 2006–2007 |
Bartlett v. State
green
2 sentences2026The Bartlett Court did so by applying the “continuing crime doctrine,” 711 N.E.2d at 500 , a doctrine the Moyers Court later recognized as having been absorbed by Step 2 of the Powell analysis. 2026The Bartlett Court did so by applying the “continuing crime doctrine,” 711 N.E.2d at 500 , a doctrine the Moyers Court later recognized as having been absorbed by Step 2 of the Powell analysis. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Bell v. Wolfish
green
2 sentences2008Concluding under the factors enunciated in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 , 99 S.Ct. 1861 , 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979)— scope of intrusion, manner of search, justification for search, and place conducted— that the search of Powell’s person was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and finding no other constitutional violations, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Powell’s motion to suppress. 2008Concluding under the factors enunciated in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 , 99 S.Ct. 1861 , 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979)— scope of intrusion, manner of search, justification for search, and place conducted— that the search of Powell’s person was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and finding no other constitutional violations, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Powell’s motion to suppress. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Stanford v. Kentucky
red
2 sentences2006Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 , 109 S.Ct. 2969 , 106 L.Ed.2d 306 (1989) (juveniles); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 , 109 S.Ct. 2934 , 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (mentally retarded); In Penry, Justice O'Connor, writing for herself, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, Scalia, and Kennedy, quoted Justice Powell's standard, and many state and federal courts have taken this as a definitive endorsement of that language by the Supreme Court. 2006Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 , 109 S.Ct. 2969 , 106 L.Ed.2d 306 (1989) (juveniles); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 , 109 S.Ct. 2934 , 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (mentally retarded); In Penry, Justice O'Connor, writing for herself, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, Scalia, and Kennedy, quoted Justice Powell's standard, and many state and federal courts have taken this as a definitive endorsement of that language by the Supreme Court. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Powell v. State
green
1 sentence2006The jury subsequently convicted Powell of all crimes with which he was charged." Powell, 644 N.E.2d at 857 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Fackler v. Powell
green
1 sentence2006Id. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.