19 Alaska opinions name it 1 courts 1980–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alaska courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ketchikan Gateway Borough v. Salinggreen2 sentences1997If his benefit rate is based on the 1989 injury, it will be governed by the law in effect in 1989 and computed according to his lower earnings in 1987 and 1988. 2 The Board and the superior court analyzed this dispute by applying the “last injurious exposure rule.” The last injurious exposure rule, announced in Ketchikan Gateway Borough v. Saling, 604 P.2d 590 (Alaska 1979), imposes full liability for a disability on the employer at the time of the most recent injury that bears a causal relation to the disability. 1993Application of the Last Injurious Exposure Rule to Lawson’s 1984 Injury In Ketchikan Gateway Borough v. Saling, 604 P.2d 590 (Alaska 1979), we adopted the last injurious exposure rule, which holds that when an employee suffers successive injuries while working for different employers, both of which contribute to the employee’s disability, full liability is imposed on the later employer. | 6 | 14 |
Fairbanks N. Star Bor. v. Rogers & Bablergreen2 sentences2020Rogers & Babler involved successive injuries and the last injurious exposure rule.34 There we rejected an employer’s argument that “application of the ‘but for’ test would make the last injurious exposure rule a nullity” because if a worker had a degenerative condition that would inevitably make him disabled, he could never show that work was a cause-in-fact of his disability.35 We instructed that a “claimant need only prove that ‘but for’ the subsequent 31 Id. (quoting Williams v. State, Dep’t of Revenue, 938 P.2d 1065, 1072 (Alaska 1997)). 32 Cf. id. at 919 (“[S]omething cannot be ‘the subst 2020Rogers & Babler involved successive injuries and the last injurious exposure rule.34 There we rejected an employer’s argument that “application of the ‘but for’ test would make the last injurious exposure rule a nullity” because if a worker had a degenerative condition that would inevitably make him disabled, he could never show that work was a cause-in-fact of his disability.35 We instructed that a “claimant need only prove that ‘but for’ the subsequent 31 Id. (quoting Williams v. State, Dep’t of Revenue, 938 P.2d 1065, 1072 (Alaska 1997)). 32 Cf. id. at 919 (“[S]omething cannot be ‘the subst | 2 | 2 |
United Asphalt Paving v. Smithgreen2 sentences2011United Asphalt Paving v. Smith, 660 P.2d 445, 447 (Alaska 1983) (quoting Saling, 604 P.2d at 590 ). 28 . 604 P.2d at 597 . 29 . 1993Two determinations must be made under the last injurious exposure rule in order to impose liability on the second employer: (1) whether employment with the subsequent employer “aggravated, accelerated, or combined with” a pre-existing condition; and, if so, (2) whether the aggravation, acceleration, or combination was a “legal cause” of the disability, i.e., “a substantial factor in bringing about the harm.” United Asphalt Paving v. Smith, 660 P.2d 445, 447 (Alaska 1983) (quoting Saling, 604 P.2d at 597, 598 ). | 2 | 2 |
Williams v. State, Department of Revenuegreen1 sentence2020Rogers & Babler involved successive injuries and the last injurious exposure rule.34 There we rejected an employer’s argument that “application of the ‘but for’ test would make the last injurious exposure rule a nullity” because if a worker had a degenerative condition that would inevitably make him disabled, he could never show that work was a cause-in-fact of his disability.35 We instructed that a “claimant need only prove that ‘but for’ the subsequent 31 Id. (quoting Williams v. State, Dep’t of Revenue, 938 P.2d 1065, 1072 (Alaska 1997)). 32 Cf. id. at 919 (“[S]omething cannot be ‘the subst | 1 | 1 |
DeYonge v. Nana/Marriottgreen1 sentence2019See DeYonge v. NANA/Marriott , 1 P.3d 90 , 96 (Alaska 2000) (holding that employment that worsens symptoms can be an aggravation "even when the job does not actually worsen the underlying condition"). | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Boardgreen1 sentence2000Steffey argues that the Board erroneously applied the last injurious exposure rule test and required him to show "an objective change to the underlying preexisting condition." Steffey cites Jones v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 600 P.2d 738, 740 (Alaska 1979), for the proposition that the Board should have awarded compensation upon a showing of "an increase in symptoms caused by the current employment." But the Board denied benefits on the proper basis. | 1 | 1 |
Parker Drilling Co. v. Westergreen1 sentence1997Saling, 604 P.2d at 595 ; see also Parker Drilling Co. v. Wester, 651 P.2d 842, 843-44 (Alaska 1982) (applying the rule to successive insurers). | 1 | 1 |
Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Bonnergreen1 sentence1997Bonner, 680 P.2d at 98-99 (Alaska 1984). | 1 | 1 |
Olsen Logging Co. v. Lawsongreen1 sentence1994E.g., Olsen Logging Co. v. Lawson, 856 P.2d 1155, 1159 (Alaska 1993). 3 . | 1 | 1 |
Veco, Inc. v. Wolfergreen2 sentences1990See Veco, Inc. v. Wolfer, 693 P.2d 865, 868 (Alaska 1985); Providence Washington Ins. 1990See Veco, Inc. v. Wolfer, 693 P.2d 865, 868 (Alaska 1985); Providence Washington Ins. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alaska. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Morrison v. Alaska Interstate Constr. Inc.
green
1 sentence2020Id. at 230 n.8 (citing Ketchikan Gateway Borough v. Saling, 604 P.2d 590, 595 (Alaska 1979)). 19 Id. at 233-34. 20 Id. at 238, 240. 21 Susceptibility, STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY (28th ed. 2006). -21- 7456 been deteriorating for years,” and that because of the “long history of deterioration,” his work for ARCTEC could not be the most important factor in causing his disability and need for medical care. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Huit v. Ashwater Burns, Inc.
green
1 sentence2020Rogers & Babler involved successive injuries and the last injurious exposure rule.34 There we rejected an employer’s argument that “application of the ‘but for’ test would make the last injurious exposure rule a nullity” because if a worker had a degenerative condition that would inevitably make him disabled, he could never show that work was a cause-in-fact of his disability.35 We instructed that a “claimant need only prove that ‘but for’ the subsequent 31 Id. (quoting Williams v. State, Dep’t of Revenue, 938 P.2d 1065, 1072 (Alaska 1997)). 32 Cf. id. at 919 (“[S]omething cannot be ‘the subst | 1 | 2020–2020 |
STATE, PUB. EMP. RET. BD. v. Cacioppo
green
1 sentence2011Thus, a presumption similar to the last injurious exposure rule would be created for occupational disability claims. 813 P.2d 679 , 683 n. 4 (Alaska 1991). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Alaska Pulp Corp. v. United Paperworkers International Union
green
1 sentence1995Id. at 1009 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Wolfer v. Veco, Inc.
neutral
1 sentence1993Wolfer v. Veco, lnc., 852 P.2d 1171 (Alaska 1993). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Kelaita v. Director
green
2 sentences1993First, the Ninth Circuit allowed use of the last injurious exposure rule as a defense under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 , in Kelaita v. Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 799 F.2d 1308 (9th Cir.1986). 1993First, the Ninth Circuit allowed use of the last injurious exposure rule as a defense under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 , in Kelaita v. Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 799 F.2d 1308 (9th Cir.1986). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
State, Department of Highways v. Burgess Construction Co.
green
1 sentence1993The Board will not have jurisdiction over the State ... [because the State had been dismissed from the case] and thus Benson may find that while he has a com-pensable disability, he will be legally entitled to benefits from no one.” Id. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Estate of Ensley v. Anglo Alaska Construction Inc.
green
2 sentences1993The Board found that the last injurious exposure rule was not applicable in this case because Lawson was permanently totally disabled “at all times after his 1969 head injury.” Therefore the Board concluded that his 1984 back injury while working for Silver Bay “could not be a substantial factor in his disability.” In Estate of Ensley v. Anglo Alaska Construction, Inc., 773 P.2d 955 (Alaska 1989), we were presented with a case in which the worker was unable to continue to work for two independent reasons. 1993The Board found that the last injurious exposure rule was not applicable in this case because Lawson was permanently totally disabled “at all times after his 1969 head injury.” Therefore the Board concluded that his 1984 back injury while working for Silver Bay “could not be a substantial factor in his disability.” In Estate of Ensley v. Anglo Alaska Construction, Inc., 773 P.2d 955 (Alaska 1989), we were presented with a case in which the worker was unable to continue to work for two independent reasons. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Thornton v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Board
green
1 sentence1980This is a rule we adopted some time ago in Thornton v. Alaska Workmen’s Compensation Board, 411 P.2d 209 (Alaska 1966), 4 and which, in the Saling case, we extended to situations where there have been successive work-related injuries. 5 The ultimate question in applying the last injurious exposure rule is what degree or extent of injury in the final employment will suffice to bring the rule into operation. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.