federal law standard in California

2017(Kwikset, at p. 322.) Indeed, loss of money or property—that is, “economic injury”—“is itself a [classic] form of injury in fact.” (Id. at p. 323; see id. at p. 325, fn. 8 [“proof of lost money or property will generally satisfy the element of injury in fact”].) Economic injury may be shown in many ways including a plaintiff “surrendering] in a transaction more, or acquiring] in a transaction less, than he or she otherwise would have”; “having] a present or future property interest diminished”; and “be[ing] required to enter into a transaction, costing money or property, that would otherwise h

2015(Ibid.) Indeed, loss of money or property—that is, “economic injury”— “is itself a classic form of injury in fact.” (Id. at p. 323; see id. at p. 325, fn. 8 [“proof of lost money or property will generally satisfy the element of injury in fact”].) Economic 7 injury may be shown in many ways including a plaintiff “surrender[ing] in a transaction more, or acquir[ing] in a transaction less, than he or she otherwise would have”; “hav[ing] a present or future property interest diminished”; and “be[ing] required to enter into a transaction, costing money or property, that would otherwise have been u

2025(United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., supra, 412 U.S. at p. 594 ; see Clearfield, supra, 318 U.S. at p. 367 ; United States v. Standard Oil Co. (1947) 332 U.S. 301 , 308–309 [ 67 S.Ct. 1604 ].) At the second step, a balance is struck between the need for national uniformity and the disruptive effect of creating a federal law rule on established legal relationships formed in reliance on state law.

2025(United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., supra, 412 U.S. at p. 594 ; see Clearfield, supra, 318 U.S. at p. 367 ; United States v. Standard Oil Co. (1947) 332 U.S. 301 , 308–309 [ 67 S.Ct. 1604 ].) At the second step, a balance is struck between the need for national uniformity and the disruptive effect of creating a federal law rule on established legal relationships formed in reliance on state law.

2025(United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., supra, 412 U.S. at p. 594 ; see Clearfield, supra, 318 U.S. at p. 367 ; United States v. Standard Oil Co. (1947) 332 U.S. 301 , 308–309 [ 67 S.Ct. 1604 ].) At the second step, a balance is struck between the need for national uniformity and the disruptive effect of creating a federal law rule on established legal relationships formed in reliance on state law.

2025(United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., supra, 412 U.S. at p. 594 ; see Clearfield, supra, 318 U.S. at p. 367 ; United States v. Standard Oil Co. (1947) 332 U.S. 301 , 308–309 [ 67 S.Ct. 1604 ].) At the second step, a balance is struck between the need for national uniformity and the disruptive effect of creating a federal law rule on established legal relationships formed in reliance on state law.

2023(Ibid.) The court held that generally the state law harmless error standard under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 applies except that the federal law standard set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 applies where the admission of the gang evidence in the trial on the substantive offenses rendered the trial fundamentally unfair.

2014There is a split of opinion in the Courts of Appeal as to whether the erroneous failure to give a unanimity instruction is analyzed under the state law standard of harmless error of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 or the federal law standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705 ].

2023(Ibid.) The court held that generally the state law harmless error standard under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 applies except that the federal law standard set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 applies where the admission of the gang evidence in the trial on the substantive offenses rendered the trial fundamentally unfair.

2014There is a split of opinion in the Courts of Appeal as to whether the erroneous failure to give a unanimity instruction is analyzed under the state law standard of harmless error of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 or the federal law standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705 ].

2015(Ibid.) The court granted certiorari to consider “‘[w]hether the 15 Federal Arbitration Act permits courts . . . to invalidate arbitration agreements on the ground that they do not permit class arbitration of a federal-law claim.” (Ibid.) The court concluded that courts could not invalidate an arbitration agreement when a claim alleged violation of a federal statute, unless the FAA had been ‘“‘overridden by a contrary congressional command.”’” (Italian Colors, supra, 133 S.Ct. at p. 2309 .) No such command existed, as nothing in the antitrust laws showed an intention to preclude a waiver of a

2015(Ibid.) The court granted certiorari to consider “‘[w]hether the 15 Federal Arbitration Act permits courts . . . to invalidate arbitration agreements on the ground that they do not permit class arbitration of a federal-law claim.” (Ibid.) The court concluded that courts could not invalidate an arbitration agreement when a claim alleged violation of a federal statute, unless the FAA had been ‘“‘overridden by a contrary congressional command.”’” (Italian Colors, supra, 133 S.Ct. at p. 2309 .) No such command existed, as nothing in the antitrust laws showed an intention to preclude a waiver of a

2020Just over one year ago, in a unanimous, published opinion, our division held that for purposes of habeas corpus petitions in California courts, the retroactivity of California appellate court decisions must be evaluated under the state law standard of In re Johnson (1970) 3 Cal.3d 404 (Johnson), not the federal law standard of Teague v. Lane (1989) 489 U.S. 288 .

2020Just over one year ago, in a unanimous, published opinion, our division held that for purposes of habeas corpus petitions in California courts, the retroactivity of California appellate court decisions must be evaluated under the state law standard of In re Johnson (1970) 3 Cal.3d 404 (Johnson), not the federal law standard of Teague v. Lane (1989) 489 U.S. 288 .

2020(Ibid.) Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Gingles, three factors are prerequisite to establishing liability under the federal law for a claim of vote dilution. ( Gingles, supra, 478 U.S. at pp. 50-51.) Only 8 We repeat the definition here. “ ‘Racially polarized voting’ means voting in which there is a difference, as defined in case law regarding enforcement of the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965 ( 52 U.S.C.

2017(Kwikset, at p. 322.) Indeed, loss of money or property—that is, “economic injury”—“is itself a [classic] form of injury in fact.” (Id. at p. 323; see id. at p. 325, fn. 8 [“proof of lost money or property will generally satisfy the element of injury in fact”].) Economic injury may be shown in many ways including a plaintiff “surrendering] in a transaction more, or acquiring] in a transaction less, than he or she otherwise would have”; “having] a present or future property interest diminished”; and “be[ing] required to enter into a transaction, costing money or property, that would otherwise h

2017(Kwikset, at p. 322.) Indeed, loss of money or property—that is, “economic injury”—“is itself a [classic] form of injury in fact.” (Id. at p. 323; see id. at p. 325, fn. 8 [“proof of lost money or property will generally satisfy the element of injury in fact”].) Economic injury may be shown in many ways including a plaintiff “surrendering] in a transaction more, or acquiring] in a transaction less, than he or she otherwise would have”; “having] a present or future property interest diminished”; and “be[ing] required to enter into a transaction, costing money or property, that would otherwise h

2012(Cf. Wright, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 89-90, fn. 5.) Leal suggests, albeit without a separate heading to properly flag the issue (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B)), that prohibiting his CUA use affects a fundamental constitutional right, for he quotes this observation in Bianco, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at pages 754-755: “[Tjrial courts may impose conditions of probation that impinge on a defendant’s constitutional rights if they are ‘narrowly drawn’ and ‘ “reasonably related to a compelling state interest in reformation and rehabilitation.” ’ [Citations.]” His briefing elaborates: “A str

2007This is because the federal courts have specifically determined that the jurisdictional statute upon which the parties focus, section 3231, does not apply to a juvenile delinquency claim based on a federal law violation, and instead the governing jurisdictional rules are contained in the federal statutory scheme relating to the federal juvenile justice system. (§ 5001 et seq.; see In re Sealed Case (D.C.Cir.1997) 131 F.3d 208, 211 ; U.S. v. Chambers (6th Cir.1991) 944 F.2d 1253 , 1258-1259 ( Chambers ).) Before 1974, juvenile delinquency matters arising under federal law were subject *616 to u

2007We noted in Venegas III the search of the plaintiffs’ home constituted “a possible Fourth Amendment violation.” 57 Robinson v. Solano County (9th Cir. 2002) 278 F.3d 1007 , 1016-1017 holding officers were entitled to qualified immunity under Saucier on the plaintiff’s federal law claim of excessive force but not on the plaintiff’s California law claim of negligence.

2006A complaint is adequate if its factual allegations are sufficient to support a cause of action on any available legal theory (whether specifically pleaded or not). [Citation.] . . . [T]o the extent [respondents] argue[] on appeal that [appellants] waived [their] violations of [federal law and other theories or liability under the UCL and CLRA] by not expressly raising those theories in [their] complaint, [respondents] misconstrue[] applicable California law . . . ." ( Smith, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 1485 , 38 Cal. Rptr.3d 653 .) [11] In urging this court to uphold the trial court's ruling

2006A complaint is adequate if its factual allegations are sufficient to support a cause of action on any available legal theory (whether specifically pleaded or not). [Citation.] . . . [T]o the extent [respondents] argue[] on appeal that [appellants] waived [their] violations of [federal law and other theories or liability under the UCL and CLRA] by not expressly raising those theories in [their] complaint, [respondents] misconstrue]] applicable California law . . . .” (Smith, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 1485 .) In urging this court to uphold the trial court’s ruling that the OCC regulations pre

1948(Miller v. Municipal Court, supra, 22 Cal.2d 818, 836 .) Therefore, whether concurrent state jurisdiction exists is a matter to be determined from a construction of the act itself.