judicial powers clause in California

2022Such actions do not contravene the state constitution’s judicial powers doctrine so long as those decisions are subject to judicial review by the courts. ( McHugh, supra, at pp. 359, 372 ; Cal. Const., art.

2011VI, § 1.) “[Ajgencies not vested by the Constitution with judicial powers may not exercise such powers.” (McHugh v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd. (1989) 49 Cal.3d 348, 356 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 318 , 111 P.2d 91 ] (McHugh).) In McHugh, the Supreme Court considered whether the power of Santa Monica’s rent board to adjudicate excess rent claims and award treble damages violated the judicial powers clause.

2011(Id. at p. 379.) “Most significantly,” the power to award treble damages posed “a risk of producing arbitrary, disproportionate results that magnify, beyond acceptable risks, the possibility of arbitrariness inherent in any scheme of administrative adjudication.” (Ibid.) The Supreme Court elaborated further on the judicial powers clause in Walnut Creek Manor v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 245 [ 284 Cal.Rptr. 718 , 814 P.2d 704 ] (Walnut Creek Manor).

2011(Id. at p. 379.) “Most significantly,” the power to award treble damages posed “a risk of producing arbitrary, disproportionate results that magnify, beyond acceptable risks, the possibility of arbitrariness inherent in any scheme of administrative adjudication.” (Ibid.) The Supreme Court elaborated further on the judicial powers clause in Walnut Creek Manor v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 245 [ 284 Cal.Rptr. 718 , 814 P.2d 704 ] (Walnut Creek Manor).

1994(See Welfare Rights Organization v. Crisan (1983) 33 Cal.3d 766, 770 [ 190 Cal.Rptr. 919 , 661 P.2d 1073 , 31 A.L.R.4th 1214 ].) The right to interest on retroactive public assistance benefits would become meaningless if public assistance claimants did not have an administrative forum to raise such a claim, given their limited access to legal services.

1994(See Welfare Rights Organization v. Crisan (1983) 33 Cal.3d 766, 770 [ 190 Cal.Rptr. 919 , 661 P.2d 1073 , 31 A.L.R.4th 1214 ].) The right to interest on retroactive public assistance benefits would become meaningless if public assistance claimants did not have an administrative forum to raise such a claim, given their limited access to legal services.

2002The Commission, which has candidly admitted having awarded emotional distress damages since 1992, has undoubtedly gained considerable experience in that regard. [8] This experience, along with the Commission's expertise in housing discrimination cases, may go far towards ensuring that its proceedings remain "streamlined and economical." (Walnut Creek Manor, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 264 , 284 Cal.Rptr. 718 , 814 P.2d 704 .) These factors support our conclusion that the Commission's authority to award emotional distress damages to housing discrimination complainants—in light of the judicial option

2002The Commission, which has candidly admitted having awarded emotional distress damages since 1992, has undoubtedly gained considerable experience in that regard. [8] This experience, along with the Commission's expertise in housing discrimination cases, may go far towards ensuring that its proceedings remain "streamlined and economical." (Walnut Creek Manor, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 264 , 284 Cal.Rptr. 718 , 814 P.2d 704 .) These factors support our conclusion that the Commission's authority to award emotional distress damages to housing discrimination complainants—in light of the judicial option

2002(See § 12987.) Among the authorized forms of relief available to complainants, the Commission may award "actual damages." (§ 12987, subd. (a)(4).) Actual damages are "compensatory damages [that] include nonquantifiable general damages for emotional distress and pecuniarily measurable special damages for out-of-pocket losses." ( Walnut Creek Manor, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 255 , 284 Cal.Rptr. 718 , 814 P.2d 704 .) In Walnut Creek Manor , however, we held that the Commission's award of unlimited compensatory damages for emotional distress and other intangible injury violated the judicial powers cl

2002(See § 12987.) Among the authorized forms of relief available to complainants, the Commission may award "actual damages." (§ 12987, subd. (a)(4).) Actual damages are "compensatory damages [that] include nonquantifiable general damages for emotional distress and pecuniarily measurable special damages for out-of-pocket losses." ( Walnut Creek Manor, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 255 , 284 Cal.Rptr. 718 , 814 P.2d 704 .) In Walnut Creek Manor , however, we held that the Commission's award of unlimited compensatory damages for emotional distress and other intangible injury violated the judicial powers cl

2002(See ante, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d at p. 8 , 50 P.3d at p. 724 .) Were we to hold that the Commission's authority to award emotional distress damages violated the judicial powers clause— in light of the judicial option provision (Gov.Code, § 12989), which effectively requires the parties' agreement to resolve the issue either judicially or administratively [6] —we would create an unjustified distinction between the authority of arbitrators and that of administrative adjudicators.

2002(See ante, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d at p. 8 , 50 P.3d at p. 724 .) Were we to hold that the Commission's authority to award emotional distress damages violated the judicial powers clause— in light of the judicial option provision (Gov.Code, § 12989), which effectively requires the parties' agreement to resolve the issue either judicially or administratively [6] —we would create an unjustified distinction between the authority of arbitrators and that of administrative adjudicators.

1997(Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Superior Court (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 652, 654-660 [ 240 Cal.Rptr. 806 ] (Yamaha II).) Instead of considering the scope of the Board’s jurisdiction by applying the judicial powers clause and other relevant authority, the Yamaha II court simply declared: “We give great weight to the agency’s position here that it did have jurisdiction and that the [franchisee] should have brought the dispute there first.” (Id. at p. 660.) Doing no more than cite and quote parts of Vehicle Code section 3050, Division Three of the Second District of the Court of Appeal relied on the Yamaha c

1997(Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Superior Court (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 652, 654-660 [ 240 Cal.Rptr. 806 ] (Yamaha II).) Instead of considering the scope of the Board’s jurisdiction by applying the judicial powers clause and other relevant authority, the Yamaha II court simply declared: “We give great weight to the agency’s position here that it did have jurisdiction and that the [franchisee] should have brought the dispute there first.” (Id. at p. 660.) Doing no more than cite and quote parts of Vehicle Code section 3050, Division Three of the Second District of the Court of Appeal relied on the Yamaha c

1997(See Bradshaw v. Park (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1275 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 872 ].) Vehicle Code section 3050, subdivision (c), relied on by both the Board and Honda as authority for the Board to exercise jurisdiction over this case, provides the Board shall “[c]onsider any matter concerning the activities or practices of any person applying for or holding a license as a new motor vehicle . . . manufacturer . . . submitted by any person. . . .

1997(See Bradshaw v. Park (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1275 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 872 ].) Vehicle Code section 3050, subdivision (c), relied on by both the Board and Honda as authority for the Board to exercise jurisdiction over this case, provides the Board shall “[c]onsider any matter concerning the activities or practices of any person applying for or holding a license as a new motor vehicle . . . manufacturer . . . submitted by any person. . . .

1991(See Hess v. Fair Employment and Housing Com. (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 232, 237 [ 187 Cal.Rptr. 712 , 33 A.L.R.4th 958 ]; Welder v. Hoffman (M.D.Pa. 1965) 238 F.Supp. 437, 445 [citing 25 C.J.S., Damages, § 2]; see also Oleck, supra, § 12, at pp. 22-23, § 80, at pp. 59-60; 22 Am.Jur.2d, supra, § 23, at p. 50, § 28, at p. 56.) We turn, then, to the question whether an administrative award of general, as opposed to special, compensatory damages violates the judicial powers clause.

1991(See Hess v. Fair Employment and Housing Com. (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 232, 237 [ 187 Cal.Rptr. 712 , 33 A.L.R.4th 958 ]; Welder v. Hoffman (M.D.Pa. 1965) 238 F.Supp. 437, 445 [citing 25 C.J.S., Damages, § 2]; see also Oleck, supra, § 12, at pp. 22-23, § 80, at pp. 59-60; 22 Am.Jur.2d, supra, § 23, at p. 50, § 28, at p. 56.) We turn, then, to the question whether an administrative award of general, as opposed to special, compensatory damages violates the judicial powers clause.

1991(See Hess v. Fair Employment and Housing Com. (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 232, 237 [ 187 Cal.Rptr. 712 , 33 A.L.R.4th 958 ]; Welder v. Hoffman (M.D.Pa. 1965) 238 F.Supp. 437, 445 [citing 25 C.J.S., Damages, § 2]; see also Oleck, supra, § 12, at pp. 22-23, § 80, at pp. 59-60; 22 Am.Jur.2d, supra, § 23, at p. 50, § 28, at p. 56.) We turn, then, to the question whether an administrative award of general, as opposed to special, compensatory damages violates the judicial powers clause.

1990All except justice courts are courts of record.” Case law has long taught that agencies not vested by the Constitution with judicial powers may not exercise such powers. “[Article VI disposes of all judicial power not expressly disposed of elsewhere in the Constitution .... [Although the Legislature retains the authority to grant a multitude of powers to local bodies pursuant to article XI, powers of a judicial nature are no longer at its disposal.” (Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 42 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 805 , 520 P.2d 29 ], original italics.) The issue

1990All except justice courts are courts of record.” Case law has long taught that agencies not vested by the Constitution with judicial powers may not exercise such powers. “[Article VI disposes of all judicial power not expressly disposed of elsewhere in the Constitution .... [Although the Legislature retains the authority to grant a multitude of powers to local bodies pursuant to article XI, powers of a judicial nature are no longer at its disposal.” (Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 42 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 805 , 520 P.2d 29 ], original italics.) The issue

1990(Dyna-Med, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1394, fn. 17.) In 1981 the Act was amended to remove the limit on the amount of compensatory damages, while retaining a $1,000 limit, adjusted for inflation, on punitive damages. (§ 12987, subd. (2); Stats. 1981, ch. 899, § 3, p. 3424.) Because we resolve this case on the basis of statutory interpretation, we need not determine whether an administrative agency’s award of unlimited compensatory damages is violative of the judicial powers clause (Cal. Const., art.

1990Fair Emp. & Hous. v. California State University Sacramento (1988) No. 88-08, FEHC Precedential Decisions 1988-1989, CEB 3 (discrimination; $75,000). [6] Until 1981 the Commission's authority to award damages in housing discrimination cases was limited, first to $500 and later to $1,000. ( Dyna-Med, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1394, fn. 17.) In 1981 the Act was amended to remove the limit on the amount of compensatory damages, while retaining a $1,000 limit, adjusted for inflation, on punitive damages. (§ 12987, subd. (2); Stats. 1981, ch. 899, § 3, p. 3424.) [7] Because we resolve this case on the

1989Still other cases touch on the judicial powers clause in the course of discussing the proper procedure for judicial review of administrative decisions. ( Standard Oil Co. v. State Board of Equal. (1936) 6 Cal.2d 557, 561 [ 59 P.2d 119 ]; Whitten v. California State Board, etc., supra, 8 Cal.2d 444, 445-446 ; Drummey v. State Bd. of Funeral Directors (1939) 13 Cal.2d 75, 81-85 [ 87 P.2d 848 ]; Laisne v. Cal. St.

1989Still other cases touch on the judicial powers clause in the course of discussing the proper procedure for judicial review of administrative decisions. ( Standard Oil Co. v. State Board of Equal. (1936) 6 Cal.2d 557, 561 [ 59 P.2d 119 ]; Whitten v. California State Board, etc., supra, 8 Cal.2d 444, 445-446 ; Drummey v. State Bd. of Funeral Directors (1939) 13 Cal.2d 75, 81-85 [ 87 P.2d 848 ]; Laisne v. Cal. St.

1989The opinion concluded that exercise of such power does not violate the "structural interests" that inform the judicial powers clause. (478 U.S. at pp. 850-857 [92 L.Ed.2d at pp. 692-697].) It suggested, however, that had the parties not consented to agency adjudication of the counterclaim, resolution of that matter would have violated the customer's "personal right" under article III, section 1 to a judicial determination of the broker's counterclaim. ( Id. at pp. 848-857 [92 L.Ed.2d at pp. 690-697]; see also Coit Independence Joint Venture v. Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corp. (1989) 489

1989The opinion concluded that exercise of such power does not violate the "structural interests" that inform the judicial powers clause. (478 U.S. at pp. 850-857 [92 L.Ed.2d at pp. 692-697].) It suggested, however, that had the parties not consented to agency adjudication of the counterclaim, resolution of that matter would have violated the customer's "personal right" under article III, section 1 to a judicial determination of the broker's counterclaim. ( Id. at pp. 848-857 [92 L.Ed.2d at pp. 690-697]; see also Coit Independence Joint Venture v. Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corp. (1989) 489

1989Bd. of Optometry (1942) 19 Cal.2d 831, 834-845 [ 123 P.2d 457 ] (but see id. at pp. 859-866 [Gibson, C.J., dis.]); Dare v. Bd. of Medical Examiners (1943) 21 Cal.2d 790, 794-795 [ 136 P.2d 304 ]; Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 138-144 [ 93 Cal. Rptr. 234 , 481 P.2d 242 ].) No case, however, addresses the question posed here, i.e., the constitutional propriety of restitutive money awards by an administrative agency. [8] Plaintiff suggests administrative authority under this statute is distinguishable from the present case because the FEHC — at least when it exercises authority over employ

1989Bd. of Optometry (1942) 19 Cal.2d 831, 834-845 [ 123 P.2d 457 ] (but see id. at pp. 859-866 [Gibson, C.J., dis.]); Dare v. Bd. of Medical Examiners (1943) 21 Cal.2d 790, 794-795 [ 136 P.2d 304 ]; Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 138-144 [ 93 Cal. Rptr. 234 , 481 P.2d 242 ].) No case, however, addresses the question posed here, i.e., the constitutional propriety of restitutive money awards by an administrative agency. [8] Plaintiff suggests administrative authority under this statute is distinguishable from the present case because the FEHC — at least when it exercises authority over employ

1989Bd. of Optometry (1942) 19 Cal.2d 831, 834-845 [ 123 P.2d 457 ] (but see id. at pp. 859-866 [Gibson, C.J., dis.]); Dare v. Bd. of Medical Examiners (1943) 21 Cal.2d 790, 794-795 [ 136 P.2d 304 ]; Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 138-144 [ 93 Cal. Rptr. 234 , 481 P.2d 242 ].) No case, however, addresses the question posed here, i.e., the constitutional propriety of restitutive money awards by an administrative agency. [8] Plaintiff suggests administrative authority under this statute is distinguishable from the present case because the FEHC — at least when it exercises authority over employ

1989Bd. of Optometry (1942) 19 Cal.2d 831, 834-845 [ 123 P.2d 457 ] (but see id. at pp. 859-866 [Gibson, C.J., dis.]); Dare v. Bd. of Medical Examiners (1943) 21 Cal.2d 790, 794-795 [ 136 P.2d 304 ]; Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 138-144 [ 93 Cal. Rptr. 234 , 481 P.2d 242 ].) No case, however, addresses the question posed here, i.e., the constitutional propriety of restitutive money awards by an administrative agency. [8] Plaintiff suggests administrative authority under this statute is distinguishable from the present case because the FEHC — at least when it exercises authority over employ

1989Still other cases touch on the judicial powers clause in the course of discussing the proper procedure for judicial review of administrative decisions. ( Standard Oil Co. v. State Board of Equal. (1936) 6 Cal.2d 557, 561 [ 59 P.2d 119 ]; Whitten v. California State Board, etc., supra, 8 Cal.2d 444, 445-446 ; Drummey v. State Bd. of Funeral Directors (1939) 13 Cal.2d 75, 81-85 [ 87 P.2d 848 ]; Laisne v. Cal. St.

1989Still other cases touch on the judicial powers clause in the course of discussing the proper procedure for judicial review of administrative decisions. ( Standard Oil Co. v. State Board of Equal. (1936) 6 Cal.2d 557, 561 [ 59 P.2d 119 ]; Whitten v. California State Board, etc., supra, 8 Cal.2d 444, 445-446 ; Drummey v. State Bd. of Funeral Directors (1939) 13 Cal.2d 75, 81-85 [ 87 P.2d 848 ]; Laisne v. Cal. St.

1989Appeals Bd. (1980) 26 Cal.3d 770, 781 [ 163 Cal. Rptr. 619 , 608 P.2d 707 ].) [37] Also as noted above, the Board found and assessed interest on those amounts of $97.91 and $51.58, respectively. [38] We are not called on to decide whether an administrative agency's award of general compensatory damages would violate the judicial powers clause and we express no opinion on the issue. [39] Because Smith was no longer a tenant, the Board ordered simply that "Complainant Smith is entitled to total damages" of a specified amount. [40] Defendant responds that we have previously affirmed the constitut

1989Appeals Bd. (1980) 26 Cal.3d 770, 781 [ 163 Cal. Rptr. 619 , 608 P.2d 707 ].) [37] Also as noted above, the Board found and assessed interest on those amounts of $97.91 and $51.58, respectively. [38] We are not called on to decide whether an administrative agency's award of general compensatory damages would violate the judicial powers clause and we express no opinion on the issue. [39] Because Smith was no longer a tenant, the Board ordered simply that "Complainant Smith is entitled to total damages" of a specified amount. [40] Defendant responds that we have previously affirmed the constitut