law governing claim in California

2017Indeed, the legal error misconstrued the procedural framework under which the parties agreed the arbitration was to be conducted, rather than misinterpreting the law governing the claim itself. [Footnote omitted.] It is difficult to imagine a more paradigmatic example of when 'granting finality to an arbitrator's decision would be inconsistent with the protection of a party's statutory rights' ( Moncharsh , supra , 3 Cal.4th at p. 32 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 183 , 832 P.2d 899 ] ) than the present case, in which, as a result of allowing the procedural error to stand, and through no fault of the employ

2017Indeed, the legal error misconstrued the procedural framework under which the parties agreed the arbitration was to be conducted, rather than misinterpreting the law governing the claim itself. [Footnote omitted.] It is difficult to imagine a more paradigmatic example of when 'granting finality to an arbitrator's decision would be inconsistent with the protection of a party's statutory rights' ( Moncharsh , supra , 3 Cal.4th at p. 32 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 183 , 832 P.2d 899 ] ) than the present case, in which, as a result of allowing the procedural error to stand, and through no fault of the employ

2022Absent a clear expression of illegality or public policy undermining this strong presumption in favor of private arbitration, an arbitral award should ordinarily stand immune from judicial scrutiny.” (Moncharsh, at p. 32, italics added; SingerLewak LLP v. Gantman, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at pp. 610, 620 [courts refuse to apply the exception for statutory violation absent an explicit legislative expression of public policy].) Where the sole issue is merely an alleged error in the interpretation or application of the law governing the claim properly subject to arbitration, the exception is inappl

2018Pearson Dental emphasized that its legal error standard did not mean that all legal errors are reviewable. [Citation.] The arbitrator had committed clear legal error by (1) ignoring a statutory mandate, and (2) failing to explain in writing why the plaintiff would not benefit from the statutory tolling period.” ( Richey, 4 supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 918 .) In SingerLewak, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th 610 , the court rejected the claim that the unwaivable right exception applied.

2015Thus, in Jones v. Humanscale Corp. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 401 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 881 ] (Jones), the plaintiff’s employment agreement with the defendant contained noncom-petition and arbitration clauses.

2015Thus, in Jones v. Humanscale Corp. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 401 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 881 ] (Jones), the plaintiff’s employment agreement with the defendant contained noncom-petition and arbitration clauses.

2021The court shall not dismiss a charge pursuant to subdivision (b) unless required to do so by the Constitution of the United States.” In People v. Lewis (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 257 (Lewis), the Court of Appeal summarized the relevant law governing a claim under Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 (Brady): “Under Brady, the prosecution violates a defendant’s federal due process rights when it suppresses evidence material to the defendant’s guilt or punishment, regardless of the good faith belief of the prosecution.

2021(Brady, supra, 373 U.S. at p. 87 .) Prosecutors have a duty to disclose ‘material exculpatory evidence whether the defendant makes a specific request [citation], a general request, or none at all [citation].’ [Citation.] There are three elements to a Brady violation: (1) the state withholds evidence, either willfully or inadvertently, (2) the evidence at issue is favorable to the defendant, either because it is exculpatory 53 or impeaching, and (3) the evidence is material. [Citation.]” ( Lewis, supra, at p. 263 .) “Evidence actually presented at trial is not considered suppressed for Brady pu

2021(Brady, supra, 373 U.S. at p. 87 .) Prosecutors have a duty to disclose ‘material exculpatory evidence whether the defendant makes a specific request [citation], a general request, or none at all [citation].’ [Citation.] There are three elements to a Brady violation: (1) the state withholds evidence, either willfully or inadvertently, (2) the evidence at issue is favorable to the defendant, either because it is exculpatory 53 or impeaching, and (3) the evidence is material. [Citation.]” ( Lewis, supra, at p. 263 .) “Evidence actually presented at trial is not considered suppressed for Brady pu

2021The court shall not dismiss a charge pursuant to subdivision (b) unless required to do so by the Constitution of the United States.” In People v. Lewis (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 257 (Lewis), the Court of Appeal summarized the relevant law governing a claim under Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 (Brady): “Under Brady, the prosecution violates a defendant’s federal due process rights when it suppresses evidence material to the defendant’s guilt or punishment, regardless of the good faith belief of the prosecution.

2021(Brady, supra, 373 U.S. at p. 87 .) Prosecutors have a duty to disclose ‘material exculpatory evidence whether the defendant makes a specific request [citation], a general request, or none at all [citation].’ [Citation.] There are three elements to a Brady violation: (1) the state withholds evidence, either willfully or inadvertently, (2) the evidence at issue is favorable to the defendant, either because it is exculpatory 53 or impeaching, and (3) the evidence is material. [Citation.]” ( Lewis, supra, at p. 263 .) “Evidence actually presented at trial is not considered suppressed for Brady pu

2021The law governing error in jury instructions “When considering a claim of instructional error, we view the challenged instruction in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the instruction in an impermissible manner.” (People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1229 .) In that context, we must then “determine whether it is reasonably likely the jurors understood the instruction[s] as [defendant] suggests. [Citation.] In making that determination, we must consider several factors including the language

2021Governing law and standard of review In Pfeiffer v. City of Sunnyvale City Council (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1552 (Pfeiffer), the Court of Appeal described the law governing a claim that a city’s land use decision is inconsistent with the city’s general plan: “Under the Government Code, every county and city is required to adopt ‘ “a comprehensive, long-term general plan for the physical development of the county or city. . . .” (Gov.

2021The law governing error in jury instructions “When considering a claim of instructional error, we view the challenged instruction in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the instruction in an impermissible manner.” (People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1229 .) In that context, we must then “determine whether it is reasonably likely the jurors understood the instruction[s] as [defendant] suggests. [Citation.] In making that determination, we must consider several factors including the language

2018(Id. at p. 920.) 9 did not contravene a public policy indicating that certain issues not be subject to resolution by the arbitrator. [Citation.]” (Ibid.) Further, “[i]n contrast to Pearson, any arbitrator error did not ‘[misconstrue] the procedural framework under which the parties agreed the arbitration was to be conducted, rather than misinterpreting the law governing the claim itself.’ [Citation.] Indeed, [the defendant’s] argument is precisely that the arbitrator misinterpreted the law governing the claim itself.” (Ibid.) Recent case law, therefore, stands “for the proposition that where a

2018(Id. at p. 675.) “We held that when ‘an employee subject to a mandatory employment arbitration agreement is unable to obtain a hearing on the merits of his FEHA claims, or claims based on other unwaivable statutory rights, because of an arbitration award based on legal error, the trial court does not err in vacating the award.’ [Citation.]” (Richey, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 918 .) In Richey, the California Supreme Court went on to recognize the limited application of the unwaivable right exception: “The arbitrator [in Pearson Dental] ‘misconstrued the procedural framework under which the partie

2018Pearson Dental emphasized that its legal error standard did not mean that all legal errors are reviewable. [Citation.] The arbitrator had committed clear legal error by (1) ignoring a statutory mandate, and (2) failing to explain in writing why the plaintiff would not benefit from the statutory tolling period.” ( Richey, 4 supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 918 .) In SingerLewak, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th 610 , the court rejected the claim that the unwaivable right exception applied.

2015Background The facts underlying this lawsuit are related in a previous opinion, Kerkeles v. City of San Jose (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1001 [ 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 143 ] (Kerkeles I).

2015Background The facts underlying this lawsuit are related in a previous opinion, Kerkeles v. City of San Jose (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1001 [ 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 143 ] (Kerkeles I).

2014Agnes Medical Center v. PacifiCare of California (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1187 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 517 , 82 P.3d 727 ] (St.

2014Agnes Medical Center v. PacifiCare of California (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1187 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 517 , 82 P.3d 727 ] (St.

2013(People v. Nguyen (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 518, 528-529 .) “Substantial” evidence is that which is “ ‘of ponderable legal significance . . . reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value.” (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576 .) The argument about corroboration is based on section 1111, which provides: “A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it be corroborated by such other evidence as shall tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense; and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the ci

2013(People v. Nguyen (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 518, 528-529 .) “Substantial” evidence is that which is “ ‘of ponderable legal significance . . . reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value.” (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576 .) The argument about corroboration is based on section 1111, which provides: “A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it be corroborated by such other evidence as shall tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense; and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the ci

1994A. The Defense of Implied Assumption of the Risk After Knight v. Jewett In Knight , the Supreme Court set out to resolve “the question of the proper application of the ‘assumption of risk’ doctrine in light of [that] court’s *1392 adoption of comparative fault principles in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804 . . . .” ( Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 299-300. 1 ) Preliminarily, the court noted that the assumption of the risk doctrine has been confusingly applied to two different types of factual settings involving analytically distinct legal concepts.

1983He made no challenge to appellant’s liability as an aider and abettor; the question he posed to the jury was whether that liability was for first or second degree murder. 15 Responding to the identical argument, Justice Grodin noted: “Undoubtedly certain instructional error is of such a fundamental nature as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, and thus to require reversal even where the evidence of guilt is overwhelming. [Citations.] We would push abstract logic beyond the requirements of justice and common sense, however, were we to apply that principle to a case such as this, where the

1983(See § 190.4, subd. (a); People v. Velasquez (1980) 26 Cal.3d 425, 434, fn. 6 [ 162 Cal.Rptr. 306 , 606 P.2d 341 ], judgment vacated and cause remanded in California v. Velasquez (1980) 448 U.S. 903 [ 65 L.Ed. 1132 , 100 S.Ct. 3042 ], reiterated, 28 Cal.3d 461 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 507 , 622 P.2d 952 ]; People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 52 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 609 P.2d 468 ].) The trial court’s comment in conjunction with that motion—i.e., that it felt that appellant had received a fair trial—does not compel the inference, suggested by the People, that it understood an inherent power to strike. 17

1983(See § 190.4, subd. (a); People v. Velasquez (1980) 26 Cal.3d 425, 434, fn. 6 [ 162 Cal.Rptr. 306 , 606 P.2d 341 ], judgment vacated and cause remanded in California v. Velasquez (1980) 448 U.S. 903 [ 65 L.Ed. 1132 , 100 S.Ct. 3042 ], reiterated, 28 Cal.3d 461 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 507 , 622 P.2d 952 ]; People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 52 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 609 P.2d 468 ].) The trial court’s comment in conjunction with that motion—i.e., that it felt that appellant had received a fair trial—does not compel the inference, suggested by the People, that it understood an inherent power to strike. 17

1983(See § 190.4, subd. (a); People v. Velasquez (1980) 26 Cal.3d 425, 434, fn. 6 [ 162 Cal.Rptr. 306 , 606 P.2d 341 ], judgment vacated and cause remanded in California v. Velasquez (1980) 448 U.S. 903 [ 65 L.Ed. 1132 , 100 S.Ct. 3042 ], reiterated, 28 Cal.3d 461 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 507 , 622 P.2d 952 ]; People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 52 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 609 P.2d 468 ].) The trial court’s comment in conjunction with that motion—i.e., that it felt that appellant had received a fair trial—does not compel the inference, suggested by the People, that it understood an inherent power to strike. 17

1983(See § 190.4, subd. (a); People v. Velasquez (1980) 26 Cal.3d 425, 434, fn. 6 [ 162 Cal.Rptr. 306 , 606 P.2d 341 ], judgment vacated and cause remanded in California v. Velasquez (1980) 448 U.S. 903 [ 65 L.Ed. 1132 , 100 S.Ct. 3042 ], reiterated, 28 Cal.3d 461 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 507 , 622 P.2d 952 ]; People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 52 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 609 P.2d 468 ].) The trial court’s comment in conjunction with that motion—i.e., that it felt that appellant had received a fair trial—does not compel the inference, suggested by the People, that it understood an inherent power to strike. 17