recommitment hearing in California

2025Therefore, at the recommitment hearing, the trial court was required to release Mendez to outpatient status if there was “reasonable cause to believe [Mendez] can be safely and effectively treated on an outpatient basis.” (§ 2972, subd. (d); see People v. May (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 350, 363 (May) [“By authorizing the court to order outpatient placement as a disposition at annual civil recommitment hearings, the Legislature avoided the need for separate hearings devoted to outpatient release issues during an [OHMD’s] term of commitment.”]; cf. Gregerson, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 315 [“the c

2025Therefore, at the recommitment hearing, the trial court was required to release Mendez to outpatient status if there was “reasonable cause to believe [Mendez] can be safely and effectively treated on an outpatient basis.” (§ 2972, subd. (d); see People v. May (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 350, 363 (May) [“By authorizing the court to order outpatient placement as a disposition at annual civil recommitment hearings, the Legislature avoided the need for separate hearings devoted to outpatient release issues during an [OHMD’s] term of commitment.”]; cf. Gregerson, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 315 [“the c

2014(People v. Olivas (1976) 17 Cal.3d 236, 251 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 55 , 551 P.2d 375 ] [when legislative classification affects a fundamental interest, the state must establish a compelling interest that justifies the law and that the distinctions drawn by the law are necessary to further that state interest].) The trial court denied Greenshields’s habeas corpus petition before it heard evidence of his current dangerousness adduced at the recommitment hearing.

2014(People v. Olivas (1976) 17 Cal.3d 236, 251 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 55 , 551 P.2d 375 ] [when legislative classification affects a fundamental interest, the state must establish a compelling interest that justifies the law and that the distinctions drawn by the law are necessary to further that state interest].) The trial court denied Greenshields’s habeas corpus petition before it heard evidence of his current dangerousness adduced at the recommitment hearing.

1985“That the victim did not in fact suffer bodily harm does not diminish the high potential of such harm inherent in [appellant’s] conduct.” (In re Fuller (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 251, 255-256 [ 177 Cal.Rptr. 233 ].) Consequently, Penal Code section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(1), in effect at the time of appellant’s recommitment hearing, is applicable to his criminal offense of assault with a deadly weapon.

1985“That the victim did not in fact suffer bodily harm does not diminish the high potential of such harm inherent in [appellant’s] conduct.” (In re Fuller (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 251, 255-256 [ 177 Cal.Rptr. 233 ].) Consequently, Penal Code section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(1), in effect at the time of appellant’s recommitment hearing, is applicable to his criminal offense of assault with a deadly weapon.

2025Therefore, at the recommitment hearing, the trial court was required to release Mendez to outpatient status if there was “reasonable cause to believe [Mendez] can be safely and effectively treated on an outpatient basis.” (§ 2972, subd. (d); see People v. May (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 350, 363 (May) [“By authorizing the court to order outpatient placement as a disposition at annual civil recommitment hearings, the Legislature avoided the need for separate hearings devoted to outpatient release issues during an [OHMD’s] term of commitment.”]; cf. Gregerson, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 315 [“the c

2025The court responded, ‘We are not there yet,’ and refused to allow questions from May’s counsel about conclusions in a CONREP report.” (May, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 356 .) After the court granted the recommitment order, May sought reconsideration, “argu[ing] that the court had authority to address at the recommitment hearing whether May should be placed in outpatient treatment.” (Ibid.) The court “decid[ed] that the matter should be referred to CONREP for a recommendation and further hearing,” and it continued the matter “for 30 days in anticipation of a CONREP report.” (Id. at p. 357.) Ba

2023(See People v. Pace (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 795, 799 [a mental health professional, when assessing a defendant’s risk of physical harm to others, “should take into account the prisoner’s entire history . . . .

2013(See People v. Cobb (2010) 48 Cal.4th 243, 252 ; People v. Bell (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1705, 1710 [MDO criteria must be shown to exist as of the date of the recommitment hearing].) For purposes of MDO status, a severe mental disorder does not include a personality disorder, mental retardation or other developmental disabilities, or substance addiction or abuse. (§ 2962, subd. (a)(2).) The disorder is in remission when its overt signs and symptoms are controlled either by psychotropic medication or psychosocial support. (§ 2962, subd. (a)(3).) When the disorder is in remission, it is deemed to b

2013Section 2972, subdivision (d) states: “A person shall be released on outpatient status if the committing court finds that there is reasonable cause to believe that the committed person can be safely and effectively treated on an outpatient basis.” Section 2972, subdivision (d) describes “a disposition available to the trial court at the conclusion of a recommitment hearing.” (People v. May (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 350, 359 ; see also People v. Rish (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1382 [section 2972, subdivision (d) “describes an alternative disposition that is available to the court” upon sustainin

2009But settled canons of statutory construction require us to "consider the statute read as a whole, harmonizing the various elements by considering each clause and section in the context of the overall statutory framework," and to construe the Act in a way "that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute, and avoid an interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences." ( People v. Jenkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 234, 246 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 903 , 893 P.2d 1224 ].) The overall statutory framework

2009But settled canons of statutory construction require us to "consider the statute read as a whole, harmonizing the various elements by considering each clause and section in the context of the overall statutory framework," and to construe the Act in a way "that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute, and avoid an interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences." ( People v. Jenkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 234, 246 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 903 , 893 P.2d 1224 ].) The overall statutory framework

2008(See, e.g., People v. Miller (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 913, 919-920 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 423 ] [the same standard of review used in determining a claim of insufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case applies to appellate review of mentally disordered offender proceedings].) The only evidence offered at the recommitment hearing that remotely related to the issue of outpatient treatment was Rish’s testimony that, if released from the hospital, he would take all prescribed medications and would seek outpatient treatment on his own.

2008(See, e.g., People v. Miller (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 913, 919-920 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 423 ] [the same standard of review used in determining a claim of insufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case applies to appellate review of mentally disordered offender proceedings].) The only evidence offered at the recommitment hearing that remotely related to the issue of outpatient treatment was Rish’s testimony that, if released from the hospital, he would take all prescribed medications and would seek outpatient treatment on his own.

2007The Attorney General urges us to read into section 2972 the procedural requirements for initiating outpatient placement described in section 1604, but this interpretation would erase the differences between the statutes and render nugatory the directive in section 2972, subdivision (d) that provisions of title 15 shall apply “[e]xcept as provided in this subdivision.” “An appellate court should be ‘loathe to construe a statute which has the effect of “adding” or “subtracting” language.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Pecci (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1500, 1504 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 43 ], fn. omitted; see also

2007The Attorney General urges us to read into section 2972 the procedural requirements for initiating outpatient placement described in section 1604, but this interpretation would erase the differences between the statutes and render nugatory the directive in section 2972, subdivision (d) that provisions of title 15 shall apply “[e]xcept as provided in this subdivision.” “An appellate court should be ‘loathe to construe a statute which has the effect of “adding” or “subtracting” language.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Pecci (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1500, 1504 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 43 ], fn. omitted; see also

2007The Attorney General urges us to read into section 2972 the procedural requirements for initiating outpatient placement described in section 1604, but this interpretation would erase the differences between the statutes and render nugatory the directive in section 2972, subdivision (d) that provisions of title 15 shall apply “[e]xcept as provided in this subdivision.” “An appellate court should be ‘loathe to construe a statute which has the effect of “adding” or “subtracting” language.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Pecci (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1500, 1504 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 43 ], fn. omitted; see also

2007The Attorney General urges us to read into section 2972 the procedural requirements for initiating outpatient placement described in section 1604, but this interpretation would erase the differences between the statutes and render nugatory the directive in section 2972, subdivision (d) that provisions of title 15 shall apply “[e]xcept as provided in this subdivision.” “An appellate court should be ‘loathe to construe a statute which has the effect of “adding” or “subtracting” language.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Pecci (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1500, 1504 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 43 ], fn. omitted; see also

1985Applicability of Penal Code Section 1026.5, Subdivision (b) (4a) At the time of appellant's recommitment hearing, section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(1) provided as follows: "A person may be committed beyond the term prescribed by subdivision (a) only under the procedure set forth in this subdivision and only if such person has been committed under Section 1026 for a felony of murder, mayhem, a violation of Section 207 or 209 in which the victim suffers intentionally inflicted great bodily injury, robbery with a dangerous or deadly weapon or in which the victim suffers great bodily injury, a viola

1985Applicability of Penal Code Section 1026.5, Subdivision (b) (4a) At the time of appellant's recommitment hearing, section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(1) provided as follows: "A person may be committed beyond the term prescribed by subdivision (a) only under the procedure set forth in this subdivision and only if such person has been committed under Section 1026 for a felony of murder, mayhem, a violation of Section 207 or 209 in which the victim suffers intentionally inflicted great bodily injury, robbery with a dangerous or deadly weapon or in which the victim suffers great bodily injury, a viola

1985Applicability of Penal Code Section 1026.5, Subdivision (b) (4a) At the time of appellant's recommitment hearing, section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(1) provided as follows: "A person may be committed beyond the term prescribed by subdivision (a) only under the procedure set forth in this subdivision and only if such person has been committed under Section 1026 for a felony of murder, mayhem, a violation of Section 207 or 209 in which the victim suffers intentionally inflicted great bodily injury, robbery with a dangerous or deadly weapon or in which the victim suffers great bodily injury, a viola

1985Applicability of Penal Code Section 1026.5, Subdivision (b) (4a) At the time of appellant's recommitment hearing, section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(1) provided as follows: "A person may be committed beyond the term prescribed by subdivision (a) only under the procedure set forth in this subdivision and only if such person has been committed under Section 1026 for a felony of murder, mayhem, a violation of Section 207 or 209 in which the victim suffers intentionally inflicted great bodily injury, robbery with a dangerous or deadly weapon or in which the victim suffers great bodily injury, a viola

1985Applicability of Penal Code Section 1026.5, Subdivision (b) (4a) At the time of appellant's recommitment hearing, section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(1) provided as follows: "A person may be committed beyond the term prescribed by subdivision (a) only under the procedure set forth in this subdivision and only if such person has been committed under Section 1026 for a felony of murder, mayhem, a violation of Section 207 or 209 in which the victim suffers intentionally inflicted great bodily injury, robbery with a dangerous or deadly weapon or in which the victim suffers great bodily injury, a viola

1985Applicability of Penal Code Section 1026.5, Subdivision (b) (4a) At the time of appellant's recommitment hearing, section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(1) provided as follows: "A person may be committed beyond the term prescribed by subdivision (a) only under the procedure set forth in this subdivision and only if such person has been committed under Section 1026 for a felony of murder, mayhem, a violation of Section 207 or 209 in which the victim suffers intentionally inflicted great bodily injury, robbery with a dangerous or deadly weapon or in which the victim suffers great bodily injury, a viola