19 Illinois opinions name it 1 courts 2004–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gill v. Fostergreen2 sentences2015"Even relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by such factors as prejudice, confusion, or potential to mislead the jury." Gill v. Foster, 157 Ill. 2d 304, 313 (1993); see also Werner v. Nebal, 377 Ill. 2015“Even relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by such factors as prejudice, confusion, or potential to mislead the jury.” Gill v. Foster, 157 Ill. 2d 304, 313 (1993); see also Werner v. Nebal, 377 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Werner v. Nebalgreen2 sentences2015"Even relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by such factors as prejudice, confusion, or potential to mislead the jury." Gill v. Foster, 157 Ill. 2d 304, 313 (1993); see also Werner v. Nebal, 377 Ill. 2015“Even relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by such factors as prejudice, confusion, or potential to mislead the jury.” Gill v. Foster, 157 Ill. 2d 304, 313 (1993); see also Werner v. Nebal, 377 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Pekin Insurance v. Hallmark Homes, L.L.C.green2 sentences2011See Pekin Insurance Co., 392 Ill. 2011See Pekin Insurance Co., 392 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Wrightgreen2 sentences2008See People v. Wright, 234 Ill.App.3d 880, 893-94 , 176 Ill.Dec. 119 , 601 N.E.2d 817 (1992); People v. Berberena, 265 Ill.App.3d 1033, 1049-50 , 203 Ill. 2008See People v. Wright, 234 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Addison Insurance v. Faygreen1 sentence2026Addison, 232 Ill. 2d at 453 (noting that in such circumstances, “the trial court [i]s in no superior position than any reviewing court to make findings”). ¶ 39 Mr. Wagner urges us to review two of the trial court’s determinations, made implicitly when it adopted his proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, under the more deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. | 1 | 1 |
Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Chicago Title & Trust Co.green1 sentence2017Chicago Title & Trust Co v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 248 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Cable America, Inc. v. Pace Electronics, Inc.green1 sentence2015Id. (“The decision to grant or deny a section 2-1203 motion is within the sound discretion of the circuit court.”). ¶ 68 Notably, Emma does not contend that her section 2-1203 motion raised any “newly discovered evidence” or factual allegations that were not already contained in her amended section 2-1401 petition or its supporting affidavit, and she does not claim that the section 2-1203 motion was premised upon a change in applicable law. | 1 | 1 |
Chicago Investment Corp. v. Dolinsgreen1 sentence2010Rockford Financial's citation to discover Borgetti's assets held by National City was brought pursuant to supplementary proceedings under section 2--1402, which provides in part: "(a) A judgment creditor *** is entitled to prosecute supplementary proceedings for the purposes of examining the judgment debtor or any other person to discover assets or income of the debtor not exempt from the enforcement of the judgment, a deduction order or garnishment, and of compelling the application of non-exempt assets or income discovered toward payment of the amount due under the judgment ***. v. Dolins, 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Michels v. The Illinois Labor Relations Board
green
2 sentences2018Michels, 2012 IL App (4th) 110612, ¶ 44 . ¶ 35 Where, as here, the ILRB dismisses an unfair labor charge because it finds insufficient evidence to warrant a hearing, we review its decision under the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. 2017Michels , 2012 IL App (4th) 110612 , ¶ 44, 360 Ill.Dec. 951 , 969 N.E.2d 996 . ¶ 35 Where, as here, the ILRB dismisses an unfair labor charge because it finds insufficient evidence to warrant a hearing, we review its decision under the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. | 2 | 2017–2018 |
Drakeford v. University of Chicago Hospitals
green
2 sentences2015The deferential abuse of discretion standard of review applies: "The scope of closing argument is within the sound discretion of the trial court and the reviewing court will reverse only if the argument is prejudicial." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Drakeford v. University of Chicago Hospitals, 2013 IL App (1st) 111366, ¶ 50 . ¶ 53 Kayman relies largely on the fact that the parties had stipulated that the records at issue were business records, yet "[t]he court later prevented [her] from using those very same records during closing argument." Kayman argues on appeal that although the tri 2015The deferential abuse of discretion standard of review applies: “The scope of closing argument is within the sound discretion of the trial court and the reviewing court will reverse only if the argument is prejudicial.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Drakeford v. University of Chicago Hospitals, 2013 IL App (1st) 111366, ¶ 50 . ¶ 53 Kayman relies largely on the fact that the parties had stipulated that the records at issue were business records, yet “[t]he court later prevented [her] from using those very same records during closing argument.” Kayman argues on appeal that although the tri | 2 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Strain
green
2 sentences2004People v. Strain , 194 Ill. 2d 467 (2000), teaches that, when the trial court errs during voir dire , the degree to which an attorney exacerbates the error during trial is relevant to determining whether the error is an abuse of the court's discretion. 2004People v. Strain, 194 Ill. 2d 467 (2000), teaches that, when the trial court errs during voir dire, the degree to which an attorney exacerbates the error during trial is relevant to determining whether the error is an abuse of the court’s discretion. | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Shawnee Community Unit School District No. 84 v. Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board
green
1 sentence2026An agency abuses its discretion when “no reasonable person would take the position [it] adopted or it has act[ed] arbitrarily, fail[ed] to employ conscientious judgment, [or] ignore[d] recognized principles of law.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Shawnee Community Unit School District No. 84 v. Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board, 2022 IL App (5th) 190266, ¶ 88 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Moehring v. Illinois Labor Relations Board, State Panel
neutral
1 sentence2026Id. ¶¶ 12 n.3, 29. 13 No. 1-24-2531 ¶ 44 The Board invites us to apply the more deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
In Re DT
green
1 sentence2024Id. ¶ 104 . ¶ 22 As support for its argument for de novo review, the special concurrence in Saucedo explains that the Illinois Supreme Court in In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347 (2004), rejected the deferential abuse of discretion standard for a best-interests determination in child custody or parental right termination cases due to the fundamental liberty interest in parental care. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Midas International Corp. v. MESA, S.p.A
green
1 sentence2019Midas International Corp. v. Mesa, S.p.A., 2013 IL App (1st) 122048, ¶ 12 . ¶ 20 KLC presents two issues for our review. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Michels v. ILLINOIS LABOR RELATIONS BD.
green
2 sentences2017Michels , 2012 IL App (4th) 110612 , ¶ 44, 360 Ill.Dec. 951 , 969 N.E.2d 996 . ¶ 35 Where, as here, the ILRB dismisses an unfair labor charge because it finds insufficient evidence to warrant a hearing, we review its decision under the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. 2017Michels , 2012 IL App (4th) 110612 , ¶ 44, 360 Ill.Dec. 951 , 969 N.E.2d 996 . ¶ 35 Where, as here, the ILRB dismisses an unfair labor charge because it finds insufficient evidence to warrant a hearing, we review its decision under the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
CitiMortgage, Inc. v. San Juan
green
1 sentence2015"This court will reverse the trial court's ruling on a section 2-1401 petition only where the trial court abused its discretion. [Citation.] A trial court abuses its discretion where the trial court's decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, such that no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) CitiMortgage, 2012 IL App (1st) 110626, ¶ 21 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Rockford Financial Systems, Inc. v. Borgetti
green
1 sentence2012App.3d 321, 327-28 , 342 Ill.Dec. 691 , 932 N.E.2d 1152 (2010), for the proposition that, in the State's words, "the more deferential abuse-of-discretion standard of review would continue to be applied" despite the holding of Vincent . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Rockford Financial Systems v. Borgetti
green
1 sentence2012App.3d 321, 327-28 , 342 Ill.Dec. 691 , 932 N.E.2d 1152 (2010), for the proposition that, in the State's words, "the more deferential abuse-of-discretion standard of review would continue to be applied" despite the holding of Vincent . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
People v. Berberena
green
2 sentences2008See People v. Wright, 234 Ill.App.3d 880, 893-94 , 176 Ill.Dec. 119 , 601 N.E.2d 817 (1992); People v. Berberena, 265 Ill.App.3d 1033, 1049-50 , 203 Ill. 2008See People v. Wright, 234 Ill.App.3d 880, 893-94 , 176 Ill.Dec. 119 , 601 N.E.2d 817 (1992); People v. Berberena, 265 Ill.App.3d 1033, 1049-50 , 203 Ill. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.