elements-based test in Massachusetts

2024However, the defendant also contends that the convictions for manslaughter and motor vehicle homicide are duplicative and thus only the most serious crime of manslaughter may stand.3 Although motor vehicle homicide is not a lesser included crime of manslaughter under the traditional elements-based test, see Commonwealth v. Vick, 454 Mass. 418, 431 (2009), and Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433, 434 (1871), in this specific context, Supreme Judicial 1 In 2018, two years after the conduct at issue in the present case, the Legislature amended the motor vehicle homicide statute, G.

2010Pierre represented departures from the traditional elements-based test of Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433 (1871).

2010“The traditional rule in Massachusetts, as embodied in Morey, [supra], and its progeny, is that a defendant may properly be punished for two crimes arising out of the same course of conduct provided that each crime requires proof of an element that the other does not.” Commonwealth v. Valliere, 437 Mass. 366, 371 (2002).

2008Pursuant to this test, “[a]s long as each offense includes an element that the other does not, ‘neither crime is a lesser-included offense of the other, and convictions on both are deemed to have been authorized by the Legislature and hence not [duplicative].’ ” Commonwealth v. Jones, 441 Mass. 73, 75 (2004), quoting from Commonwealth v. Valliere, 437 Mass. 366, 371 (2002).

2016Identical elements are not required, only elements that are “the same or nearly the same.” Doe No. 15164, 456 Mass. at 615 (quotation omitted).

2015The judge found that the plaintiff’s conviction under art. 134, a “non-specific” provision of the code, could not be a like violation under the elements-based test required by Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 151564 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 456 Mass. 612, 615 (2010) (Doe No. 151564). 6 For the reasons *558 explained below, we conclude that the judge’s ruling was erroneous.

2018Under this State's elements-based test, "[t]he actual criminal acts alleged are wholly irrelevant to the application of [the rule]; rather, the elements of the crimes charged are considered objectively, abstracted from the facts ...." Commonwealth v. Cabrera , 449 Mass. 825 , 827 (2007), quoting Commonwealth v. Jones , 441 Mass. 73 , 76 (2004).

2004This form of analysis, a minor departure from a strictly mechanical approach to the elements-based test for defining cognate crimes, nonetheless still examines “the elements of the crimes charged . . . objectively, abstracted from the facts.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 441 Mass. at 76 , quoting from Commonwealth v. Jones, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 157, 162 (2003).

2003See Commonwealth v. Crocker, 384 Mass. at 361 .

1998There, relying on Crocker , the court opined that the elements-based test of Morey “is a principle of statutory construction designed to aid in the judicial interpretation of criminal statutes where the Legislature has not expressed an intent as to consecutive punishments.” Consistent with this rule, and in the absence of other indication of legislative intent, see Commonwealth v. Crocker, 384 Mass. at 360 , we conclude that, even if the indictments here stemmed from the same conduct, the fact that the two offenses have mutually exclusive elements constitutes a sufficient showing of legislativ

2003See Commonwealth v. Arriaga, supra; Commonwealth v. Valliere, supra. See also Commonwealth v. Buckley, 410 Mass. 209, 222 (1991), citing Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433, 434 (1871).

2000The legislative provision, however, is not the basis of our decision; we rely on the principles expressed in Commonwealth v. Arriaga, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 382 (1998), following the elements-based rule of Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433, 434 (1871): “A single act may be an offence against two statutes; and if each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under either statute does not exempt the defendant from prosecution and punishment under the other.” We have no doubt that the same result would be reached under St. 1998, c. 180, § 69,

2024However, the defendant also contends that the convictions for manslaughter and motor vehicle homicide are duplicative and thus only the most serious crime of manslaughter may stand.3 Although motor vehicle homicide is not a lesser included crime of manslaughter under the traditional elements-based test, see Commonwealth v. Vick, 454 Mass. 418, 431 (2009), and Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433, 434 (1871), in this specific context, Supreme Judicial 1 In 2018, two years after the conduct at issue in the present case, the Legislature amended the motor vehicle homicide statute, G.

2013See Bynum v. Commonwealth, 429 Mass. 705, 709 (1999) (“The prior offense is not an element of the crime for which a defendant is charged but concerns the punishment to be imposed if he is convicted . . . and the prior offense is [subsequently] proved”).

2009Multiple convictions of cognate crimes are permissible only where such convictions are based on discrete acts.” Id. at 518 (Brown, J., concurring in result).

2004This form of analysis, a minor departure from a strictly mechanical approach to the elements-based test for defining cognate crimes, nonetheless still examines “the elements of the crimes charged . . . objectively, abstracted from the facts.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 441 Mass. at 76 , quoting from Commonwealth v. Jones, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 157, 162 (2003).

2003See Commonwealth v. Arriaga, supra; Commonwealth v. Valliere, supra. See also Commonwealth v. Buckley, 410 Mass. 209, 222 (1991), citing Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433, 434 (1871).

2003Applying the elements-based test, we effectively overruled Shuman in Commonwealth v. Anolik, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 701, 712 (1989).

1998See Commonwealth v. Smith, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 394 (1998), holding that unarmed robbery and carjacking constitute separate offenses because each requires proof of an element that the other does not, but noting that “where the indictment specifies that a car was the object of the unarmed robbery, carjacking might ... be a lesser included offense of unarmed robbery, even under the elements-based test of Commonwealth v. Morey, [ 108 Mass. 433, 434 (1871)]” (emphasis in original).