19 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1970–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Carroll v. Konitsgreen2 sentences2018Carroll , 400 Md. at 181 , 929 A.2d 19 ("[W]e conclude that the filing of a proper [c]ertificate operates as a condition precedent to filing a claim in a [c]ircuit [c]ourt ...."). 9 The Act further requires the filing of a supplemental certificate of qualified expert "[w]ithin 15 days after the date that discovery is required to be complete[d]." *883 CJP § 3-2A-06D(b). 10 *167 As we and the Court of Appeals have explained repeatedly, the purpose of the health claims arbitration process in general and the certificate requirement in particular is "to weed out non-meritorious claims and reduce th 2018Carroll , 400 Md. at 181 , 929 A.2d 19 ("[W]e conclude that the filing of a proper [c]ertificate operates as a condition precedent to filing a claim in a [c]ircuit [c]ourt ...."). 9 The Act further requires the filing of a supplemental certificate of qualified expert "[w]ithin 15 days after the date that discovery is required to be complete[d]." *883 CJP § 3-2A-06D(b). 10 *167 As we and the Court of Appeals have explained repeatedly, the purpose of the health claims arbitration process in general and the certificate requirement in particular is "to weed out non-meritorious claims and reduce th | 3 | 6 |
D'ANGELO v. St. Agnes Healthcare, Inc.green2 sentences2013The purpose of the certificate requirement is to “weed out, shortly' after suit is filed, non-meritorious medical malpractice claims.” D’Angelo, 157 Md. 2011Agnes Healthcare, Inc., 157 Md.App. 631, 645 , 853 A.2d 813 (2004) (“The obvious purpose of the certificate requirement reflects the General Assembly’s desire to weed out, shortly after suit is filed, nonmeritorious medical malpractice claims.”). | 2 | 8 |
Walzer v. Osbornegreen2 sentences2018Carroll , 400 Md. at 181 , 929 A.2d 19 ("[W]e conclude that the filing of a proper [c]ertificate operates as a condition precedent to filing a claim in a [c]ircuit [c]ourt ...."). 9 The Act further requires the filing of a supplemental certificate of qualified expert "[w]ithin 15 days after the date that discovery is required to be complete[d]." *883 CJP § 3-2A-06D(b). 10 *167 As we and the Court of Appeals have explained repeatedly, the purpose of the health claims arbitration process in general and the certificate requirement in particular is "to weed out non-meritorious claims and reduce th 2018Carroll , 400 Md. at 181 , 929 A.2d 19 ("[W]e conclude that the filing of a proper [c]ertificate operates as a condition precedent to filing a claim in a [c]ircuit [c]ourt ...."). 9 The Act further requires the filing of a supplemental certificate of qualified expert "[w]ithin 15 days after the date that discovery is required to be complete[d]." *883 CJP § 3-2A-06D(b). 10 *167 As we and the Court of Appeals have explained repeatedly, the purpose of the health claims arbitration process in general and the certificate requirement in particular is "to weed out non-meritorious claims and reduce th | 2 | 5 |
Oxtoby v. McGowangreen2 sentences2018See Kearney v. Berger , 416 Md. 628 , 660 n.13, 7 A.3d 593 (2010) ("We have ... explicitly rejected the notion that failure to satisfy the [Act's] procedures divests a trial court of subject matter jurisdiction." (citing Oxtoby v. McGowan , 294 Md. 83 , 91, 447 A.2d 860 (1982) ) ). 10 The supplemental certificate shall attest to: (i) The certifying expert's basis for alleging what is the specific standard of care; (ii) The certifying expert's qualification to testify to the specific standard of care; (iii) The specific standard of care; (iv) For the plaintiff: 1. 2018See Kearney v. Berger , 416 Md. 628 , 660 n.13, 7 A.3d 593 (2010) ("We have ... explicitly rejected the notion that failure to satisfy the [Act's] procedures divests a trial court of subject matter jurisdiction." (citing Oxtoby v. McGowan , 294 Md. 83 , 91, 447 A.2d 860 (1982) ) ). 10 The supplemental certificate shall attest to: (i) The certifying expert's basis for alleging what is the specific standard of care; (ii) The certifying expert's qualification to testify to the specific standard of care; (iii) The specific standard of care; (iv) For the plaintiff: 1. | 1 | 3 |
Breslin v. Powellgreen2 sentences2025Id. at 281–82 (citation omitted). 15 attesting to a breach in the standard of care that proximately caused the alleged injuries in any case in which informed consent was not the sole issue or in which liability was not conceded. 5 As we explained in Debbas, the certificate requirement “was intended to eliminate excessive damages and reduce the frequency of claims” and “consistently has been considered as serving a gatekeeping function.” 389 Md. at 378 (citing Report of the Joint Executive/Legislative Task Force in Medical Malpractice Insurance, at 27 & 30 (Dec. 1985)). 6 As the Appellate Court 2013Contrary to appellant’s argument, "the certificate requirement is in derogation of the common law, intended to place additional requirements on a claimant.” Breslin, 421 Md. at 284 , 26 A.3d 878 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted); see also DeMuth v. Strong, 205 Md.App. 521, 541 , 45 A.3d 898 (2012) (noting that the requirements set forth in subsection (c)(2) of the Act are "qualification prerequisites ” to whether an expert is allowed to testify) (emphasis added). | 1 | 2 |
Kearney v. Bergergreen2 sentences2018Carroll , 400 Md. at 181 , 929 A.2d 19 ("[W]e conclude that the filing of a proper [c]ertificate operates as a condition precedent to filing a claim in a [c]ircuit [c]ourt ...."). 9 The Act further requires the filing of a supplemental certificate of qualified expert "[w]ithin 15 days after the date that discovery is required to be complete[d]." *883 CJP § 3-2A-06D(b). 10 *167 As we and the Court of Appeals have explained repeatedly, the purpose of the health claims arbitration process in general and the certificate requirement in particular is "to weed out non-meritorious claims and reduce th 2018Carroll , 400 Md. at 181 , 929 A.2d 19 ("[W]e conclude that the filing of a proper [c]ertificate operates as a condition precedent to filing a claim in a [c]ircuit [c]ourt ...."). 9 The Act further requires the filing of a supplemental certificate of qualified expert "[w]ithin 15 days after the date that discovery is required to be complete[d]." *883 CJP § 3-2A-06D(b). 10 *167 As we and the Court of Appeals have explained repeatedly, the purpose of the health claims arbitration process in general and the certificate requirement in particular is "to weed out non-meritorious claims and reduce th | 1 | 2 |
Watts v. Kinggreen2 sentences2007App. 293, 306 , 794 A.2d 723, 731 (2002) (stating that claimants are “required to file a certificate of a qualified expert attesting that the licensed professional against whom the claim was filed breached the standard of care.”) (emphasis added); D’Angelo, 157 Md.App. at 646, 853 A.2d at 822 (concluding that the expert’s certificate must include the name of the licensed professional against whom the claims were brought because, without that information, “the certificate requirement would amount to a useless formality that would in no way help weed out non[-]meritorious claims.”). 2004Watts, 143 Md.App. at 309-10 , 794 A.2d 723 . | 1 | 2 |
DeMuth v. Stronggreen2 sentences2013Contrary to appellant’s argument, "the certificate requirement is in derogation of the common law, intended to place additional requirements on a claimant.” Breslin, 421 Md. at 284 , 26 A.3d 878 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted); see also DeMuth v. Strong, 205 Md.App. 521, 541 , 45 A.3d 898 (2012) (noting that the requirements set forth in subsection (c)(2) of the Act are "qualification prerequisites ” to whether an expert is allowed to testify) (emphasis added). 2013Contrary to appellant’s argument, "the certificate requirement is in derogation of the common law, intended to place additional requirements on a claimant.” Breslin, 421 Md. at 284 , 26 A.3d 878 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted); see also DeMuth v. Strong, 205 Md.App. 521, 541 , 45 A.3d 898 (2012) (noting that the requirements set forth in subsection (c)(2) of the Act are "qualification prerequisites ” to whether an expert is allowed to testify) (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Rios v. Montgomery Countygreen2 sentences2010In Carroll , we stated in a footnote that "[a] condition precedent cannot be waived under the common law and a failure to satisfy it can be raised at any time because the action itself is fatally flawed if the condition is not satisfied." 400 Md. at 182 n. 12, 929 A.2d at 28 n. 12 (quoting Georgia-Pacific v. Benjamin, 394 Md. 59, 84 , 904 A.2d 511, 526 (2006)); see also University System v. Mooney, 407 Md. 390, 412 , 966 A.2d 418, 431 (2009) (explaining that an action is *611 "fatally flawed" if a condition precedent is not met (quoting Rios v. Montgomery County, 386 Md. 104, 127-28 , 872 A.2d 2010In Carroll , we stated in a footnote that "[a] condition precedent cannot be waived under the common law and a failure to satisfy it can be raised at any time because the action itself is fatally flawed if the condition is not satisfied." 400 Md. at 182 n. 12, 929 A.2d at 28 n. 12 (quoting Georgia-Pacific v. Benjamin, 394 Md. 59, 84 , 904 A.2d 511, 526 (2006)); see also University System v. Mooney, 407 Md. 390, 412 , 966 A.2d 418, 431 (2009) (explaining that an action is *611 "fatally flawed" if a condition precedent is not met (quoting Rios v. Montgomery County, 386 Md. 104, 127-28 , 872 A.2d | 1 | 1 |
Georgia Pacific Corp. v. Benjamingreen2 sentences2010In Carroll , we stated in a footnote that "[a] condition precedent cannot be waived under the common law and a failure to satisfy it can be raised at any time because the action itself is fatally flawed if the condition is not satisfied." 400 Md. at 182 n. 12, 929 A.2d at 28 n. 12 (quoting Georgia-Pacific v. Benjamin, 394 Md. 59, 84 , 904 A.2d 511, 526 (2006)); see also University System v. Mooney, 407 Md. 390, 412 , 966 A.2d 418, 431 (2009) (explaining that an action is *611 "fatally flawed" if a condition precedent is not met (quoting Rios v. Montgomery County, 386 Md. 104, 127-28 , 872 A.2d 2010In Carroll , we stated in a footnote that "[a] condition precedent cannot be waived under the common law and a failure to satisfy it can be raised at any time because the action itself is fatally flawed if the condition is not satisfied." 400 Md. at 182 n. 12, 929 A.2d at 28 n. 12 (quoting Georgia-Pacific v. Benjamin, 394 Md. 59, 84 , 904 A.2d 511, 526 (2006)); see also University System v. Mooney, 407 Md. 390, 412 , 966 A.2d 418, 431 (2009) (explaining that an action is *611 "fatally flawed" if a condition precedent is not met (quoting Rios v. Montgomery County, 386 Md. 104, 127-28 , 872 A.2d | 1 | 1 |
Taylor v. Mandelgreen2 sentences2010We have defined "waiver" as "the intentional relinquishment of a known right." Taylor v. Mandel, 402 Md. 109, 135 , 935 A.2d 671, 686 (2007). 2010We have defined "waiver" as "the intentional relinquishment of a known right." Taylor v. Mandel, 402 Md. 109, 135 , 935 A.2d 671, 686 (2007). | 1 | 1 |
University System of Maryland v. Mooneygreen2 sentences2010In Carroll , we stated in a footnote that "[a] condition precedent cannot be waived under the common law and a failure to satisfy it can be raised at any time because the action itself is fatally flawed if the condition is not satisfied." 400 Md. at 182 n. 12, 929 A.2d at 28 n. 12 (quoting Georgia-Pacific v. Benjamin, 394 Md. 59, 84 , 904 A.2d 511, 526 (2006)); see also University System v. Mooney, 407 Md. 390, 412 , 966 A.2d 418, 431 (2009) (explaining that an action is *611 "fatally flawed" if a condition precedent is not met (quoting Rios v. Montgomery County, 386 Md. 104, 127-28 , 872 A.2d 2010In Carroll , we stated in a footnote that "[a] condition precedent cannot be waived under the common law and a failure to satisfy it can be raised at any time because the action itself is fatally flawed if the condition is not satisfied." 400 Md. at 182 n. 12, 929 A.2d at 28 n. 12 (quoting Georgia-Pacific v. Benjamin, 394 Md. 59, 84 , 904 A.2d 511, 526 (2006)); see also University System v. Mooney, 407 Md. 390, 412 , 966 A.2d 418, 431 (2009) (explaining that an action is *611 "fatally flawed" if a condition precedent is not met (quoting Rios v. Montgomery County, 386 Md. 104, 127-28 , 872 A.2d | 1 | 1 |
Barber v. Catholic Health Initiatives, Inc.green2 sentences2010The trial judge denied the motion. [5] Section 5-119, enacted following our decision in Walzer v. Osborne, 395 Md. 563 , 911 A.2d 427 (2006), extends the statute of limitations for any "civil action or claim that is dismissed once for failure to file a report in accordance with § 3-2A-04(b)(3) of this article." Among other things, the statute extends the statute of limitations for 60 days beyond the date of the dismissal. § 5-119(b)(2); see also Barber v. Catholic Health, 180 Md.App. 409, 430 , 951 A.2d 857, 869 , cert. denied, 406 Md. 192 , 957 A.2d 999 (2008) (explaining that § 5-119 "permit 2010The trial judge denied the motion. [5] Section 5-119, enacted following our decision in Walzer v. Osborne, 395 Md. 563 , 911 A.2d 427 (2006), extends the statute of limitations for any "civil action or claim that is dismissed once for failure to file a report in accordance with § 3-2A-04(b)(3) of this article." Among other things, the statute extends the statute of limitations for 60 days beyond the date of the dismissal. § 5-119(b)(2); see also Barber v. Catholic Health, 180 Md.App. 409, 430 , 951 A.2d 857, 869 , cert. denied, 406 Md. 192 , 957 A.2d 999 (2008) (explaining that § 5-119 "permit | 1 | 1 |
Moffitt v. RESIDENTIAL FUNDINGgreen1 sentence2010The trial judge denied the motion. [5] Section 5-119, enacted following our decision in Walzer v. Osborne, 395 Md. 563 , 911 A.2d 427 (2006), extends the statute of limitations for any "civil action or claim that is dismissed once for failure to file a report in accordance with § 3-2A-04(b)(3) of this article." Among other things, the statute extends the statute of limitations for 60 days beyond the date of the dismissal. § 5-119(b)(2); see also Barber v. Catholic Health, 180 Md.App. 409, 430 , 951 A.2d 857, 869 , cert. denied, 406 Md. 192 , 957 A.2d 999 (2008) (explaining that § 5-119 "permit | 1 | 1 |
Bell v. Bellgreen1 sentence2010The trial judge denied the motion. [5] Section 5-119, enacted following our decision in Walzer v. Osborne, 395 Md. 563 , 911 A.2d 427 (2006), extends the statute of limitations for any "civil action or claim that is dismissed once for failure to file a report in accordance with § 3-2A-04(b)(3) of this article." Among other things, the statute extends the statute of limitations for 60 days beyond the date of the dismissal. § 5-119(b)(2); see also Barber v. Catholic Health, 180 Md.App. 409, 430 , 951 A.2d 857, 869 , cert. denied, 406 Md. 192 , 957 A.2d 999 (2008) (explaining that § 5-119 "permit | 1 | 1 |
| Edward W. McCready Memorial Hospital v. Hausergreen | 1 | 1 |
Witte v. Azariangreen2 sentences2006Indeed, “[a]t the time plaintiffs filed their certificates, it was well established,” we pointed out, “that the certifying doctor was required to say that he or she was of the opinion that the defendants, who were named in the complaint, deviated from the applicable standard of care and that the deviation proximately caused the plaintiffs injury.” Id. (emphasis in original); see also McCready Mem’l Hosp., 330 Md. at 501 , 624 A.2d 1249 (“[T]he plaintiff must file a certificate of qualified expert ... attesting to a defendant’s departure from the relevant standards of care which proximately cau 2006Indeed, “[a]t the time plaintiffs filed their certificates, it was well established,” we pointed out, “that the certifying doctor was required to say that he or she was of the opinion that the defendants, who were named in the complaint, deviated from the applicable standard of care and that the deviation proximately caused the plaintiffs injury.” Id. (emphasis in original); see also McCready Mem’l Hosp., 330 Md. at 501 , 624 A.2d 1249 (“[T]he plaintiff must file a certificate of qualified expert ... attesting to a defendant’s departure from the relevant standards of care which proximately cau | 1 | 1 |
| Superintendent of Maryland State Reformatory for Males v. Calmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Debbas v. Nelson
green
2 sentences2025Id. at 281–82 (citation omitted). 15 attesting to a breach in the standard of care that proximately caused the alleged injuries in any case in which informed consent was not the sole issue or in which liability was not conceded. 5 As we explained in Debbas, the certificate requirement “was intended to eliminate excessive damages and reduce the frequency of claims” and “consistently has been considered as serving a gatekeeping function.” 389 Md. at 378 (citing Report of the Joint Executive/Legislative Task Force in Medical Malpractice Insurance, at 27 & 30 (Dec. 1985)). 6 As the Appellate Court 2012As the Court in Debbas explained, the Certificate requirement “was intended *539 to eliminate excessive damages and reduce the frequency of claims” and “consistently has been considered as serving a gatekeeping function.” 389 Md. at 378 , 885 A.2d 802 (citing Report of the Joint Exeeutive/Legislative Task Force in Medical Malpractice Insurance, at 27 & 30 (Dec.1985)). | 2 | 2012–2025 |
Wilcox v. Orellano
green
2 sentences2018Carroll , 400 Md. at 181 , 929 A.2d 19 ("[W]e conclude that the filing of a proper [c]ertificate operates as a condition precedent to filing a claim in a [c]ircuit [c]ourt ...."). 9 The Act further requires the filing of a supplemental certificate of qualified expert "[w]ithin 15 days after the date that discovery is required to be complete[d]." *883 CJP § 3-2A-06D(b). 10 *167 As we and the Court of Appeals have explained repeatedly, the purpose of the health claims arbitration process in general and the certificate requirement in particular is "to weed out non-meritorious claims and reduce th 2018Carroll , 400 Md. at 181 , 929 A.2d 19 ("[W]e conclude that the filing of a proper [c]ertificate operates as a condition precedent to filing a claim in a [c]ircuit [c]ourt ...."). 9 The Act further requires the filing of a supplemental certificate of qualified expert "[w]ithin 15 days after the date that discovery is required to be complete[d]." *883 CJP § 3-2A-06D(b). 10 *167 As we and the Court of Appeals have explained repeatedly, the purpose of the health claims arbitration process in general and the certificate requirement in particular is "to weed out non-meritorious claims and reduce th | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Retina Grp. of Wash., P.C. v. Crosetto
green
2 sentences2018The purpose of the health claims arbitration process and the certificate requirement is " 'to weed out non-meritorious claims and reduce the costs of litigation.' " Crosetto , 237 Md.App. at 166 , 183 A.3d 873 (quoting Wilcox v. Orellano , 443 Md. 177 , 184, 115 A.3d 621 (2015) ). 2018The purpose of the health claims arbitration process and the certificate requirement is " 'to weed out non-meritorious claims and reduce the costs of litigation.' " Crosetto , 237 Md.App. at 166 , 183 A.3d 873 (quoting Wilcox v. Orellano , 443 Md. 177 , 184, 115 A.3d 621 (2015) ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Puppolo v. Adventist Healthcare, Inc.
green
1 sentence2018Accord Carroll v. Konits , 400 Md. 167 , 176, 929 A.2d 19 (2007) (the statute is "an attempt by the General Assembly, in substantial part, to limit the filing of frivolous malpractice claims."); Puppolo , 215 Md. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Navarro-Monzo v. Washington Adventist Hospital
green
2 sentences2018See Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 3-2A-04(b)(2),(3) ; Navarro-Monzo v. Washington Adventist Hosp. , 380 Md. 195 , 197, 844 A.2d 406 (2004) (holding that a defendant disputing liability must, within the prescribed time, "file a certificate from a qualified expert attesting either to compliance with the standard of care or that the alleged departure was not the proximate cause of the alleged injury"; otherwise, the "claim may be adjudicated in favor of the plaintiff on the issue of liability"). 9 Although the certificate requirement is a condition precedent to filing a medical malpractice ca 2018See Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 3-2A-04(b)(2),(3) ; Navarro-Monzo v. Washington Adventist Hosp. , 380 Md. 195 , 197, 844 A.2d 406 (2004) (holding that a defendant disputing liability must, within the prescribed time, "file a certificate from a qualified expert attesting either to compliance with the standard of care or that the alleged departure was not the proximate cause of the alleged injury"; otherwise, the "claim may be adjudicated in favor of the plaintiff on the issue of liability"). 9 Although the certificate requirement is a condition precedent to filing a medical malpractice ca | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Baltimore County v. RTKL Associates Inc.
green
2 sentences2013Baltimore County v. RTKL Associates, Inc., 380 Md. 670, 689-90 , 846 A.2d 433 (2004). 2013Id. 17 The following year the Legislature responded to that decision by amending the definition of “claim” to extend the certificate requirement to actions against “the employee, partnership, or other entity through which the licensed professional performed professional services.” See Chapter 125, Laws of Maryland 2005. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Brown v. Rabbitt
green
2 sentences2013Cf. Brown v. Rabbitt, 300 Md. 171, 175 , 476 A.2d 1167 (1984) (critical question in applicability of Health Care Malpractice Claims Act is nature of claim, not whether it is labeled tort or contract). 2013Cf. Brown v. Rabbitt, 300 Md. 171, 175 , 476 A.2d 1167 (1984) (critical question in applicability of Health Care Malpractice Claims Act is nature of claim, not whether it is labeled tort or contract). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Cannon v. McKen
green
2 sentences2013Cf. Cannon v. McKen, 296 Md. 27, 36 , 459 A.2d 196 (1983) (Health Care Malpractice Claims Act did not apply when complaint did not allege breach of professional standard of care). 2013Cf. Cannon v. McKen, 296 Md. 27, 36 , 459 A.2d 196 (1983) (Health Care Malpractice Claims Act did not apply when complaint did not allege breach of professional standard of care). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Chow v. State
green
2 sentences2011Chow v. State, 393 Md. 431, 443 , 903 A.2d 388 (2006). 2011Chow v. State, 393 Md. 431, 443 , 903 A.2d 388 (2006). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Clark v. SECURECARE
neutral
2 sentences2010In particular, Petitioners argue that the intermediate appellate court's later decision in Rice v. UMMS, 186 Md.App. 551 , 975 A.2d 193 , cert. granted, 411 Md. 355 , 983 A.2d 431 (2009), demonstrates that the certificate requirement can sometimes be waived. 2010App. 551 , 975 A.2d 193 , cert. granted, 411 Md. 355 , 983 A.2d 431 (2009), demonstrates that the certificate requirement can sometimes be waived. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Dove v. State
neutral
2 sentences2010In particular, Petitioners argue that the intermediate appellate court's later decision in Rice v. UMMS, 186 Md.App. 551 , 975 A.2d 193 , cert. granted, 411 Md. 355 , 983 A.2d 431 (2009), demonstrates that the certificate requirement can sometimes be waived. 2010App. 551 , 975 A.2d 193 , cert. granted, 411 Md. 355 , 983 A.2d 431 (2009), demonstrates that the certificate requirement can sometimes be waived. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Rice v. University of Maryland Medical System Corp.
green
2 sentences2010In particular, Petitioners argue that the intermediate appellate court's later decision in Rice v. UMMS, 186 Md.App. 551 , 975 A.2d 193 , cert. granted, 411 Md. 355 , 983 A.2d 431 (2009), demonstrates that the certificate requirement can sometimes be waived. 2010In particular, Petitioners argue that the intermediate appellate court's later decision in Rice v. UMMS, 186 Md.App. 551 , 975 A.2d 193 , cert. granted, 411 Md. 355 , 983 A.2d 431 (2009), demonstrates that the certificate requirement can sometimes be waived. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Kearney v. Berger
green
2 sentences2010In Kearney I, the Court of Special Appeals focused on this statement, holding "that the filing of a certificate operates as a condition precedent, which cannot be waived, and therefore, [Dr. Berger] did not waive any objection by failing to generally or specifically deny the specific averment [that the parties had satisfied the certificate requirement]." 182 Md. 2010App. at 195 , 957 A.2d at 687 . [11] To decide the present case, we need not determine whether or not a party can ever waive the certificate requirement. [12] Instead, we need only determine whether the actions or inaction of Dr. Berger and his attorney constituted a waiver of the requirement. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Smith v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.
green
2 sentences2009And, unlike a condition precedent which is an integral element of a statutory cause of action, see, e.g., Smith, supra, 266 Md. at 56 , 291 A.2d 452 , the certificate requirement labeled as a condition precedent in Carroll, supra, 400 Md. at 181 , 929 A.2d 19 , is purely procedural and is not part of a statute creating a cause of action. 2009And, unlike a condition precedent which is an integral element of a statutory cause of action, see, e.g., Smith, supra, 266 Md. at 56 , 291 A.2d 452 , the certificate requirement labeled as a condition precedent in Carroll, supra, 400 Md. at 181 , 929 A.2d 19 , is purely procedural and is not part of a statute creating a cause of action. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Halstead v. State green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.