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10 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1932–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Waldrip v. Headgreen2 sentences2019We noted that "[t]he purpose of the certificate requirement is to permit trial courts, rather than parties, to regulate the litigation." Id. at 575 (1), 532 S.E.2d 380 (citing Scruggs v. Ga. Dept. of Human Resources , 261 Ga. 587 , 408 S.E.2d 103 (1991) ). 2019However, without reference to any authority, this Court went on to state that the purpose of the certificate requirement "is not to permit trial courts to deprive appellate courts of their jurisdiction." Waldrip , 272 Ga. at 575 (1), 532 S.E.2d 380 . | 3 | 4 |
State v. Caffeegreen2 sentences2015The [Criminal Justice Act of 2005] plainly provides that an appeal may be taken by the State from the grant of a new trial or the denial of a motion to recuse, but just as clearly refrains from adding any new exception whatsoever to the requirement for a certificate of immediate review in OCGA § 5-7-2.”); but see State v. Caffee, 291 Ga. 31, 33 (2) ( 728 SE2d 171 ) (2012) (“In 2011, the Georgia General Assembly amended OCGA § 5-7-2 to eliminate the certificate requirement when the State appeals the superior court’s grant of a new trial in favor of a criminal defendant.”). 2015The [Criminal Justice Act of 2005] plainly provides that an appeal may be taken by the State from the grant of a new trial or the denial of a motion to recuse, but just as clearly refrains from adding any new exception whatsoever to the requirement for a certificate of immediate review in OCGA § 5-7-2.”); but see State v. Caffee, 291 Ga. 31, 33 (2) ( 728 SE2d 171 ) (2012) (“In 2011, the Georgia General Assembly amended OCGA § 5-7-2 to eliminate the certificate requirement when the State appeals the superior court’s grant of a new trial in favor of a criminal defendant.”). | 2 | 3 |
Sosniak v. Stategreen2 sentences2015The [Criminal Justice Act of 2005] plainly provides that an appeal may be taken by the State from the grant of a new trial or the denial of a motion to recuse, but just as clearly refrains from adding any new exception whatsoever to the requirement for a certificate of immediate review in OCGA § 5-7-2.”); but see State v. Caffee, 291 Ga. 31, 33 (2) ( 728 SE2d 171 ) (2012) (“In 2011, the Georgia General Assembly amended OCGA § 5-7-2 to eliminate the certificate requirement when the State appeals the superior court’s grant of a new trial in favor of a criminal defendant.”). 15 Gable v. State, 29 2015The [Criminal Justice Act of 2005] plainly provides that an appeal may be taken by the State from the grant of a new trial or the denial of a motion to recuse, but just as clearly refrains from adding any new exception whatsoever to the requirement for a certificate of immediate review in OCGA § 5-7-2.”); but see State v. Caffee, 291 Ga. 31, 33 (2) ( 728 SE2d 171 ) (2012) (“In 2011, the Georgia General Assembly amended OCGA § 5-7-2 to eliminate the certificate requirement when the State appeals the superior court’s grant of a new trial in favor of a criminal defendant.”). 15 Gable v. State, 29 | 1 | 1 |
Gable v. Stategreen2 sentences2015The [Criminal Justice Act of 2005] plainly provides that an appeal may be taken by the State from the grant of a new trial or the denial of a motion to recuse, but just as clearly refrains from adding any new exception whatsoever to the requirement for a certificate of immediate review in OCGA § 5-7-2.”); but see State v. Caffee, 291 Ga. 31, 33 (2) ( 728 SE2d 171 ) (2012) (“In 2011, the Georgia General Assembly amended OCGA § 5-7-2 to eliminate the certificate requirement when the State appeals the superior court’s grant of a new trial in favor of a criminal defendant.”). 15 Gable v. State, 29 2015The [Criminal Justice Act of 2005] plainly provides that an appeal may be taken by the State from the grant of a new trial or the denial of a motion to recuse, but just as clearly refrains from adding any new exception whatsoever to the requirement for a certificate of immediate review in OCGA § 5-7-2.”); but see State v. Caffee, 291 Ga. 31, 33 (2) ( 728 SE2d 171 ) (2012) (“In 2011, the Georgia General Assembly amended OCGA § 5-7-2 to eliminate the certificate requirement when the State appeals the superior court’s grant of a new trial in favor of a criminal defendant.”). 15 Gable v. State, 29 | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. Virginiared2 sentences2013See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III) (B) ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979) (instructing that, on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt”) (emphasis in original); Vega v. State, 285 Ga. 32, 33 ( 673 SE2d 223 ) (2009) (“It was for the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses and to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies 2013See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III) (B) ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979) (instructing that, on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt”) (emphasis in original); Vega v. State, 285 Ga. 32, 33 ( 673 SE2d 223 ) (2009) (“It was for the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses and to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies | 1 | 1 |
Vega v. Stategreen2 sentences2013See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III) (B) ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979) (instructing that, on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt”) (emphasis in original); Vega v. State, 285 Ga. 32, 33 ( 673 SE2d 223 ) (2009) (“It was for the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses and to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies 2013See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III) (B) ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979) (instructing that, on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt”) (emphasis in original); Vega v. State, 285 Ga. 32, 33 ( 673 SE2d 223 ) (2009) (“It was for the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses and to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. Davisgreen2 sentences1967See Davis v. Davis, 222 Ga. 579 ( 151 SE2d 123 ); Avera v. G. 1967See Davis v. Davis, 222 Ga. 579 ( 151 SE2d 123 ); Avera v. G. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Caffeegreen2 sentences2015The [Criminal Justice Act of 2005] plainly provides that an appeal may be taken by the State from the grant of a new trial or the denial of a motion to recuse, but just as clearly refrains from adding any new exception whatsoever to the requirement for a certificate of immediate review in OCGA § 5-7-2.”); but see State v. Caffee, 291 Ga. 31, 33 (2) ( 728 SE2d 171 ) (2012) (“In 2011, the Georgia General Assembly amended OCGA § 5-7-2 to eliminate the certificate requirement when the State appeals the superior court’s grant of a new trial in favor of a criminal defendant.”). 2015The [Criminal Justice Act of 2005] plainly provides that an appeal may be taken by the State from the grant of a new trial or the denial of a motion to recuse, but just as clearly refrains from adding any new exception whatsoever to the requirement for a certificate of immediate review in OCGA § 5-7-2.”); but see State v. Caffee, 291 Ga. 31, 33 (2) ( 728 SE2d 171 ) (2012) (“In 2011, the Georgia General Assembly amended OCGA § 5-7-2 to eliminate the certificate requirement when the State appeals the superior court’s grant of a new trial in favor of a criminal defendant.”). | 1 | 3 |
Gable v. Stategreen2 sentences2015The [Criminal Justice Act of 2005] plainly provides that an appeal may be taken by the State from the grant of a new trial or the denial of a motion to recuse, but just as clearly refrains from adding any new exception whatsoever to the requirement for a certificate of immediate review in OCGA § 5-7-2.”); but see State v. Caffee, 291 Ga. 31, 33 (2) ( 728 SE2d 171 ) (2012) (“In 2011, the Georgia General Assembly amended OCGA § 5-7-2 to eliminate the certificate requirement when the State appeals the superior court’s grant of a new trial in favor of a criminal defendant.”). 15 Gable v. State, 29 2015The [Criminal Justice Act of 2005] plainly provides that an appeal may be taken by the State from the grant of a new trial or the denial of a motion to recuse, but just as clearly refrains from adding any new exception whatsoever to the requirement for a certificate of immediate review in OCGA § 5-7-2.”); but see State v. Caffee, 291 Ga. 31, 33 (2) ( 728 SE2d 171 ) (2012) (“In 2011, the Georgia General Assembly amended OCGA § 5-7-2 to eliminate the certificate requirement when the State appeals the superior court’s grant of a new trial in favor of a criminal defendant.”). 15 Gable v. State, 29 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Scruggs v. Georgia Department of Human Resources
green
2 sentences2019We noted that "[t]he purpose of the certificate requirement is to permit trial courts, rather than parties, to regulate the litigation." Id. at 575 (1), 532 S.E.2d 380 (citing Scruggs v. Ga. Dept. of Human Resources , 261 Ga. 587 , 408 S.E.2d 103 (1991) ). 2019We noted that "[t]he purpose of the certificate requirement is to permit trial courts, rather than parties, to regulate the litigation." Id. at 575 (1), 532 S.E.2d 380 (citing Scruggs v. Ga. Dept. of Human Resources , 261 Ga. 587 , 408 S.E.2d 103 (1991) ). | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Hatley v. State
green
2 sentences2013See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III) (B) ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979) (instructing that, on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt”) (emphasis in original); Vega v. State, 285 Ga. 32, 33 ( 673 SE2d 223 ) (2009) (“It was for the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses and to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies 2013See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III) (B) ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979) (instructing that, on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt”) (emphasis in original); Vega v. State, 285 Ga. 32, 33 ( 673 SE2d 223 ) (2009) (“It was for the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses and to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Camp v. Coweta County
green
2 sentences2007Over two years later, the Department moved the trial court to reconsider the denial of its motion to dismiss based on this court’s opinion in Camp v. Coweta County, 271 Ga. App. 349 ( 609 SE2d 695 ) (2005) (Camp I), in which we affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of a complaint based upon the plaintiffs failure to mail a copy of the complaint to the attorney general as required by OCGA § 50-21-35. 2007Over two years later, the Department moved the trial court to reconsider the denial of its motion to dismiss based on this court’s opinion in Camp v. Coweta County, 271 Ga. App. 349 ( 609 SE2d 695 ) (2005) (Camp I), in which we affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of a complaint based upon the plaintiffs failure to mail a copy of the complaint to the attorney general as required by OCGA § 50-21-35. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Raines
green
1 sentence1932In Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Raines, 171 Ga. 154 (supra), the Supreme Court said: “Where penalties are sought to be recovered, there must be a strict compliance with the statute. . . | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.