unanimity requirement in Maryland

2022Id.

2022Id. at 419 .

1992The complexities created by a unanimity requirement for all of the questions which a jury might be required to answer in a capital sentencing proceeding were fully exposed in the majority and dissenting opinions in Mills v. State, 310 Md. 33 , 527 A.2d 3 (1987), sentence vacated, 486 U.S. 367 , 108 S.Ct. 1860 , 100 L.Ed.2d 384 (1988).

1992The complexities created by a unanimity requirement for all of the questions which a jury might be required to answer in a capital sentencing proceeding were fully exposed in the majority and dissenting opinions in Mills v. State, 310 Md. 33 , 527 A.2d 3 (1987), sentence vacated, 486 U.S. 367 , 108 S.Ct. 1860 , 100 L.Ed.2d 384 (1988).

1992The purpose of the unanimity requirement has been described as “help[ing] effectuate the reasonable doubt standard[.]” Rice v. State, 311 Md. 116 , 126 n. 4, 532 A.2d 1357 (1987), quoting United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453 , 457 n. 7 (5th Cir.1977).

1987In Gipson , the court reasoned that the unanimity rule imposed by the sixth amendment “requires jurors to be in substantial agreement as to just what a defendant did as a step preliminary to determining whether the defendant is guilty of the crime charged.” 553 F.2d at 457-58 .

2018Id.

2018Rather than utilizing Lamb or Robinson to advance his argument, Petitioner instead turns to Ford v. State , 330 Md. 682 , 625 A.2d 984 (1993).

2018Rather than utilizing Lamb or Robinson to advance his argument, Petitioner instead turns to Ford v. State , 330 Md. 682 , 625 A.2d 984 (1993).

2008Id.

2008Id.

2005Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410-12 , 92 S.Ct. 1628 , 32 L.Ed.2d 184 (1972) (holding that a state law providing that a criminal defendant could be convicted by a non-unanimous verdict, as long as ten jurors agreed, did not violate the Sixth Amendment).

2005Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410-12 , 92 S.Ct. 1628 , 32 L.Ed.2d 184 (1972) (holding that a state law providing that a criminal defendant could be convicted by a non-unanimous verdict, as long as ten jurors agreed, did not violate the Sixth Amendment).

2000Relying on out-of-State cases, the court concluded that that *7 problem could be solved by requiring, at the end of the case, “either ... an election by the prosecution of the single act upon which it is relying for a conviction, or ... a specific unanimity instruction.” Id. at 355 , 738 A.2d at 311 .

2000Relying on out-of-State cases, the court concluded that that *7 problem could be solved by requiring, at the end of the case, “either ... an election by the prosecution of the single act upon which it is relying for a conviction, or ... a specific unanimity instruction.” Id. at 355 , 738 A.2d at 311 .

1999State v. Patrich, 101 Wash.2d 566 , 683 P.2d 173, 177 (1984), modified *356 by, State v. Kitchen, 110 Wash.2d 403 , 756 P.2d 105 (1988); State v. Hayes, 81 Wash.App. 425 , 914 P.2d 788 (1996), review denied, 130 Wash.2d 1013 , 928 P.2d 413 (1996).

1999State v. Patrich, 101 Wash.2d 566 , 683 P.2d 173, 177 (1984), modified *356 by, State v. Kitchen, 110 Wash.2d 403 , 756 P.2d 105 (1988); State v. Hayes, 81 Wash.App. 425 , 914 P.2d 788 (1996), review denied, 130 Wash.2d 1013 , 928 P.2d 413 (1996).

1999State v. Patrich, 101 Wash.2d 566 , 683 P.2d 173, 177 (1984), modified *356 by, State v. Kitchen, 110 Wash.2d 403 , 756 P.2d 105 (1988); State v. Hayes, 81 Wash.App. 425 , 914 P.2d 788 (1996), review denied, 130 Wash.2d 1013 , 928 P.2d 413 (1996).

1999State v. Patrich, 101 Wash.2d 566 , 683 P.2d 173, 177 (1984), modified *356 by, State v. Kitchen, 110 Wash.2d 403 , 756 P.2d 105 (1988); State v. Hayes, 81 Wash.App. 425 , 914 P.2d 788 (1996), review denied, 130 Wash.2d 1013 , 928 P.2d 413 (1996).

1997The recent case of Moten v. State, 339 Md. 407 , 663 A.2d 593 (1995), also persuades us that the Court of Appeals would not rely upon a presumption that Bell’s counsel advised him of the unanimity requirement.

1997The recent case of Moten v. State, 339 Md. 407 , 663 A.2d 593 (1995), also persuades us that the Court of Appeals would not rely upon a presumption that Bell’s counsel advised him of the unanimity requirement.

1993After tracing the history of the unanimity requirement through English and American legal history, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that Art. 21 “does not bestow a right but imposes a mandate.” 32 Md.

1993After tracing the history of the unanimity requirement through English and American legal history, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that Art. 21 "does not bestow a right but imposes a mandate." 32 Md.

1992The purpose of the unanimity requirement has been described as “help[ing] effectuate the reasonable doubt standard[.]” Rice v. State, 311 Md. 116 , 126 n. 4, 532 A.2d 1357 (1987), quoting United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453 , 457 n. 7 (5th Cir.1977).

1992The purpose of the unanimity requirement has been described as “help[ing] effectuate the reasonable doubt standard[.]” Rice v. State, 311 Md. 116 , 126 n. 4, 532 A.2d 1357 (1987), quoting United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453 , 457 n. 7 (5th Cir.1977).

1992The complexities created by a unanimity requirement for all of the questions which a jury might be required to answer in a capital sentencing proceeding were fully exposed in the majority and dissenting opinions in Mills v. State, 310 Md. 33 , 527 A.2d 3 (1987), sentence vacated, 486 U.S. 367 , 108 S.Ct. 1860 , 100 L.Ed.2d 384 (1988).

1992The complexities created by a unanimity requirement for all of the questions which a jury might be required to answer in a capital sentencing proceeding were fully exposed in the majority and dissenting opinions in Mills v. State, 310 Md. 33 , 527 A.2d 3 (1987), sentence vacated, 486 U.S. 367 , 108 S.Ct. 1860 , 100 L.Ed.2d 384 (1988).

1989Sanchez, 782 F.2d at 932 .

1987A modern view of the purpose of the unanimity rule contends that it "helps effectuate the reasonable doubt standard," United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453 , 457 n. 7 (5th Cir.1977), which was found to be constitutionally required in all criminal trials, state or federal, in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970).

1987A modern view of the purpose of the unanimity rule contends that it "helps effectuate the reasonable doubt standard," United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453 , 457 n. 7 (5th Cir.1977), which was found to be constitutionally required in all criminal trials, state or federal, in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970).

1986The Ricketts Court declined to opine on those arguments, stating that “regardless of our views on the policy argument made by the State, we may not disregard the clear intent expressed in Rule 735.” 290 Md. at 292 , 429 A.2d at 1027 .

1986The Ricketts Court declined to opine on those arguments, stating that “regardless of our views on the policy argument made by the State, we may not disregard the clear intent expressed in Rule 735.” 290 Md. at 292 , 429 A.2d at 1027 .

1976The Court in Maxwell left no doubt that “jury” as used in the United States Constitution meant twelve persons who could render verdicts only *458 by unanimous consent. 176 U. S. at 586 .

1961Cf. Ford v. State, 12 Md. 514 (1859), where it was indicated that the unanimity requirement would be satisfied by quoting the last clause of Article 21, supra. Moreover, aside from the fact that counsel for the defendant in argument could himself have informed the jury that unanimity was indispensable, the defendant had the absolute right to poll the jury, and did so, in accordance with the rule stated in Biscoe v. State, 68 Md. 294 , 12 Atl. 25 (1888).

1961Cf. Ford v. State, 12 Md. 514 (1859), where it was indicated that the unanimity requirement would be satisfied by quoting the last clause of Article 21, supra. Moreover, aside from the fact that counsel for the defendant in argument could himself have informed the jury that unanimity was indispensable, the defendant had the absolute right to poll the jury, and did so, in accordance with the rule stated in Biscoe v. State, 68 Md. 294 , 12 Atl. 25 (1888).

1961Cf. Ford v. State, 12 Md. 514 (1859), where it was indicated that the unanimity requirement would be satisfied by quoting the last clause of Article 21, supra. Moreover, aside from the fact that counsel for the defendant in argument could himself have informed the jury that unanimity was indispensable, the defendant had the absolute right to poll the jury, and did so, in accordance with the rule stated in Biscoe v. State, 68 Md. 294 , 12 Atl. 25 (1888).