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15 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 2002–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Vest v. Stategreen2 sentences2025Therefore, “[i]n a single, continuous episode of resisting arrest by flight, only one offense is committed regardless of the number of Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2333 | August 8, 2025 Page 18 of 21 officers involved.” Vest v. State, 930 N.E.2d 1221, 1223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (rejecting Vest’s argument that he was entitled to a unanimity instruction that required all jurors to agree that Vest had fled the same one of the three alleged officers, when two officers blocked the hallway to an exit door and another officer blocked exit through a window), reh’g denied, trans. denied. 2023See Benson v. State, 73 N.E.3d 198 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (one count of attempted murder based on evidence that defendant shot at police officer twice during a continuous ninety-second pursuit), trans. denied; see also Vest v. State, 930 N.E.2d 1221 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that a specific unanimity instruction wasn’t required where the State charged the defendant with one count of resisting law enforcement and presented evidence that the defendant fled from three officers during a continuous two-minute pursuit), reh’g denied, trans. denied. [16] In this case, the State charged Baker with t | 2 | 2 |
Baker v. Stategreen2 sentences2025Baker v. State, 948 N.E.2d 1169, 1173-74 (Ind. 2011). 2025See id. at 1177-78 (a specific unanimity instruction is not required when the State designates the specific act upon which it relies to prove a particular charge); compare with Lainhart v. State, 916 N.E.2d 924, 942-3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (reversing the defendant’s conviction for lack of unanimity because the State offered three potential victims at distinct periods in time under one charge of intimidation). [34] Notwithstanding the above, Bryant asserts that the State charged the items stolen in the disjunctive and the State’s evidence was insufficient to prove that Bryant stole Szamlewski’s | 1 | 4 |
Lainhart v. Stategreen2 sentences2025See id. at 1177-78 (a specific unanimity instruction is not required when the State designates the specific act upon which it relies to prove a particular charge); compare with Lainhart v. State, 916 N.E.2d 924, 942-3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (reversing the defendant’s conviction for lack of unanimity because the State offered three potential victims at distinct periods in time under one charge of intimidation). [34] Notwithstanding the above, Bryant asserts that the State charged the items stolen in the disjunctive and the State’s evidence was insufficient to prove that Bryant stole Szamlewski’s 2025Hence, he contends that the trial court committed fundamental error by failing to give the specific unanimity instruction. [35] Due process does “not require jurors to agree on the means by which a crime was carried out, but it does require them to render a unanimous verdict as to which actual offense was perpetrated.” Lainhart, 916 N.E.2d at 941 . | 1 | 3 |
Charles A. Benson v. State of Indianagreen1 sentence2023See Benson v. State, 73 N.E.3d 198 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (one count of attempted murder based on evidence that defendant shot at police officer twice during a continuous ninety-second pursuit), trans. denied; see also Vest v. State, 930 N.E.2d 1221 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that a specific unanimity instruction wasn’t required where the State charged the defendant with one count of resisting law enforcement and presented evidence that the defendant fled from three officers during a continuous two-minute pursuit), reh’g denied, trans. denied. [16] In this case, the State charged Baker with t | 1 | 1 |
Walker v. Stategreen1 sentence2023Under the continuous-crime doctrine, “actions that are sufficient in themselves to constitute separate criminal offenses may be so compressed in Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1340 | November 22, 2023 Page 6 of 10 terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction.” Walker v. State, 932 N.E.2d 733, 735 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), reh’g denied. | 1 | 1 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2020Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 729 N.E.2d 102, 106 (Ind. 2000) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984)), reh’g denied, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 830 , 122 S. Ct. 73 (2001). 2020Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 729 N.E.2d 102, 106 (Ind. 2000) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984)), reh’g denied, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 830 , 122 S. Ct. 73 (2001). | 1 | 1 |
Ben-Yisrayl v. Stategreen1 sentence2020Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 729 N.E.2d 102, 106 (Ind. 2000) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984)), reh’g denied, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 830 , 122 S. Ct. 73 (2001). | 1 | 1 |
Johnathon I. Carter v. State of Indianagreen1 sentence2020See id. at 1179; see also Carter v. State, 31 N.E.3d 17, 28 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Petrichred2 sentences2011When the State chooses not to elect, this jury instruction must be given to ensure the jury’s understanding of the unanimity requirement. 101 Wash.2d 566 , 683 P.2d 173, 178 (1984) 3 (overruled on other grounds by State v. Kitchen, 110 Wash.2d 403 , 756 P.2d 105 (1988)). 2011When the State chooses not to elect, this jury instruction must be given to ensure the jury’s understanding of the unanimity requirement. 101 Wash.2d 566 , 683 P.2d 173, 178 (1984) 3 (overruled on other grounds by State v. Kitchen, 110 Wash.2d 403 , 756 P.2d 105 (1988)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ben-Yisrayl v. Indiana
green
1 sentence2020Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 729 N.E.2d 102, 106 (Ind. 2000) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984)), reh’g denied, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 830 , 122 S. Ct. 73 (2001). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Dulanto-Ancaya v. Ashcroft
green
1 sentence2020Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 729 N.E.2d 102, 106 (Ind. 2000) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984)), reh’g denied, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 830 , 122 S. Ct. 73 (2001). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Johnson v. Louisiana
green
2 sentences2015Instead, as the U.S. Supreme Court said, “when a jury in a federal court, which operates under the unanimity rule and is instructed to acquit a defendant if it has a reasonable doubt about his guilt ... cannot agree unanimously upon a verdict, the defendant is not acquitted, but is merely given a new trial.” Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 363 , 92 S.Ct. 1620 , 32 L.Ed.2d 152 (1972). 2015Instead, as the U.S. Supreme Court said, “when a jury in a federal court, which operates under the unanimity rule and is instructed to acquit a defendant if it has a reasonable doubt about his guilt ... cannot agree unanimously upon a verdict, the defendant is not acquitted, but is merely given a new trial.” Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 363 , 92 S.Ct. 1620 , 32 L.Ed.2d 152 (1972). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Jones
green
2 sentences2013In these circumstances, the modified instruction’s 8 requirement that the jury reach a unanimous verdict as to all of the acts described by the victim within the time period charged safeguards the unanimity requirement because “‘if the jury believes the defendant committed all the acts it necessarily believes he committed each specific act.’” Id. (quoting Jones, 792 P.2d at 659 ). 2013In these circumstances, the modified instruction’s 8 requirement that the jury reach a unanimous verdict as to all of the acts described by the victim within the time period charged safeguards the unanimity requirement because “‘if the jury believes the defendant committed all the acts it necessarily believes he committed each specific act.’” Id. (quoting Jones, 792 P.2d at 659 ). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Rogers v. State
green
1 sentence2012Id. 24 Maxwell neither objected to the trial court’s unanimity instruction nor offered an instruction of his own. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Kitchen
green
2 sentences2011When the State chooses not to elect, this jury instruction must be given to ensure the jury’s understanding of the unanimity requirement. 101 Wash.2d 566 , 683 P.2d 173, 178 (1984) 3 (overruled on other grounds by State v. Kitchen, 110 Wash.2d 403 , 756 P.2d 105 (1988)). 2011When the State chooses not to elect, this jury instruction must be given to ensure the jury’s understanding of the unanimity requirement. 101 Wash.2d 566 , 683 P.2d 173, 178 (1984) 3 (overruled on other grounds by State v. Kitchen, 110 Wash.2d 403 , 756 P.2d 105 (1988)). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Taylor v. State
green
1 sentence2009Taylor, 840 N.E.2d at 333 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Zant v. Stephens
green
2 sentences2002The ones with which Saylor was charged were: that Saylor had intentionally killed the victim while attempting to commit a robbery, § 35-50-2-9(b)(1)(G), and that at the time the murder was committed, Saylor was on probation after receiving a sentence for burglary, § 35-50-2-9(b)(9)(C). [6] Compare my schematic with the "pyramid" with three planes that the Georgia Supreme Court used as an analogy for its state's capital sentencing scheme in responding to the Supreme Court's certified question in Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 871 , 103 S.Ct. 2733 , 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983). [7] This unanimity req 2002The ones with which Saylor was charged were: that Saylor had intentionally killed the victim while attempting to commit a robbery, § 35-50-2-9(b)(1)(G), and that at the time the murder was committed, Saylor was on probation after receiving a sentence for burglary, § 35-50-2-9(b)(9)(C). [6] Compare my schematic with the "pyramid" with three planes that the Georgia Supreme Court used as an analogy for its state's capital sentencing scheme in responding to the Supreme Court's certified question in Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 871 , 103 S.Ct. 2733 , 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983). [7] This unanimity req | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.