19 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1999–2026 15 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Earlgreen2 sentences2024However, the Legislature’s intent will be rejected only when “a party challenging the statute provides the clearest proof that the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate the State’s intention to deem it civil.” Kansas v Hendricks, 521 US 346, 361 ; 117 S Ct 2072 ; 138 L Ed 2d 501 (1997) (quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted; emphasis added). because we ultimately conclude that defendant has satisfied the “punishment” inquiry outlined in People v Earl, 495 Mich 33, 38 ; 845 NW2d 721 (2014). 10 The United States Supreme Court has provided the followin 2024However, the Legislature’s intent will be rejected only when “a party challenging the statute provides the clearest proof that the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate the State’s intention to deem it civil.” Kansas v Hendricks, 521 US 346, 361 ; 117 S Ct 2072 ; 138 L Ed 2d 501 (1997) (quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted; emphasis added). because we ultimately conclude that defendant has satisfied the “punishment” inquiry outlined in People v Earl, 495 Mich 33, 38 ; 845 NW2d 721 (2014). 10 The United States Supreme Court has provided the followin | 4 | 4 |
Kansas v. Hendricksgreen2 sentences2024However, the Legislature’s intent will be rejected only when “a party challenging the statute provides the clearest proof that the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate the State’s intention to deem it civil.” Kansas v Hendricks, 521 US 346, 361 ; 117 S Ct 2072 ; 138 L Ed 2d 501 (1997) (quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted; emphasis added). because we ultimately conclude that defendant has satisfied the “punishment” inquiry outlined in People v Earl, 495 Mich 33, 38 ; 845 NW2d 721 (2014). 10 The United States Supreme Court has provided the followin 2024However, the Legislature’s intent will be rejected only when “a party challenging the statute provides the clearest proof that the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate the State’s intention to deem it civil.” Kansas v Hendricks, 521 US 346, 361 ; 117 S Ct 2072 ; 138 L Ed 2d 501 (1997) (quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted; emphasis added). because we ultimately conclude that defendant has satisfied the “punishment” inquiry outlined in People v Earl, 495 Mich 33, 38 ; 845 NW2d 721 (2014). 10 The United States Supreme Court has provided the followin | 3 | 4 |
Board of Trustees of the City of Pontiac v. City of Pontiacgreen1 sentence2026People v Uribe, 499 Mich 921, 921 (2016). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Certified Questiongreen2 sentences2024See In re Certified Question, 447 Mich 765 , 776 & n 13; 527 NW2d 468 (1994). 6 traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. [Kennedy v Mendoza-Martinez, 372 US 144, 168-169 ; 83 S Ct 554 ; 9 L Ed 2d 644 (1963) (citations omitted). 2024See In re Certified Question, 447 Mich 765 , 776 & n 13; 527 NW2d 468 (1994). 6 traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. [Kennedy v Mendoza-Martinez, 372 US 144, 168-169 ; 83 S Ct 554 ; 9 L Ed 2d 644 (1963) (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc.green2 sentences2015Marshall v Jerrico, Inc, 446 US 238, 242 ; 100 S Ct 1610 ; 64 L Ed 2d 182 (1980) (“The Due Process Clause entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal in both civil and criminal cases.”). 6 The Court of Appeals majority concluded that defendant “failed to preserve all, but one, of his claims” and therefore applied plain-error review to the judicial questioning of defendant’s expert. 2015Marshall v Jerrico, Inc, 446 US 238, 242 ; 100 S Ct 1610 ; 64 L Ed 2d 182 (1980) (“The Due Process Clause entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal in both civil and criminal cases.”). 6 The Court of Appeals majority concluded that defendant “failed to preserve all, but one, of his claims” and therefore applied plain-error review to the judicial questioning of defendant’s expert. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez
green
2 sentences2024To address this question, Michigan courts consider the nonexhaustive factors set forth in Kennedy v Mendoza-Martinez, 372 US 144 (1963): (1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, (2) whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, (3) whether the sanction comes into play only on a finding of scienter, (4) whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—i.e., retribution and deterrence, (5) whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, (6) whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is ass 2024However, the Legislature’s intent will be rejected only when “a party challenging the statute provides the clearest proof that the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate the State’s intention to deem it civil.” Kansas v Hendricks, 521 US 346, 361 ; 117 S Ct 2072 ; 138 L Ed 2d 501 (1997) (quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted; emphasis added). because we ultimately conclude that defendant has satisfied the “punishment” inquiry outlined in People v Earl, 495 Mich 33, 38 ; 845 NW2d 721 (2014). 10 The United States Supreme Court has provided the followin | 6 | 2021–2025 |
Vicencio v. Ramirez
green
2 sentences2022Trial courts should consider the following nonexhaustive factors before imposing the severe sanction of dismissal: (1) whether the violation was wilful or accidental; (2) the party’s history of refusing to comply with previous court orders; (3) the prejudice to the opposing party; (4) whether there exists a history of deliberate delay; (5) the degree of compliance with other parts of the court’s orders; (6) attempts to cure the defect; and (7) whether a lesser sanction would better serve the interests of justice. [Vicencio v Ramirez, 211 Mich App 501, 507 ; 536 NW2d 280 (1995), citing Dean v T 2022Trial courts should consider the following nonexhaustive factors before imposing the severe sanction of dismissal: (1) whether the violation was wilful or accidental; (2) the party’s history of refusing to comply with previous court orders; (3) the prejudice to the opposing party; (4) whether there exists a history of deliberate delay; (5) the degree of compliance with other parts of the court’s orders; (6) attempts to cure the defect; and (7) whether a lesser sanction would better serve the interests of justice. [Vicencio v Ramirez, 211 Mich App 501, 507 ; 536 NW2d 280 (1995), citing Dean v T | 5 | 2021–2022 |
Kalamazoo Oil Co. v. Boerman
green
2 sentences2022Before imposing the severe sanction of dismissal, the trial court should consider the following nonexhaustive factors: (1) whether the violation was wilful [sic] or accidental; (2) the party’s history of refusing to comply with previous court orders; (3) the prejudice to the opposing party; (4) whether there exists a history of deliberate delay; (5) the degree of compliance with other parts of the court’s orders; (6) attempts to cure the defect; and (7) whether a lesser sanction would better serve the interests of justice. [Vicencio v Ramirez, 211 Mich App 501, 507 ; 536 NW2d 280 (1995), citin 2022Trial courts should also consider the following nonexhaustive factors (Dean factors) before imposing the severe sanction of dismissal: (1) whether the violation was wilful or accidental; (2) the party’s history of refusing to comply with previous court orders; (3) the prejudice to the opposing party; (4) whether there exists a history of deliberate delay; (5) the degree of compliance with other parts of the court’s orders; (6) attempts to cure the defect; and (7) whether a lesser sanction would better serve the interests of justice. [Vicencio v Ramirez, 211 Mich App 501, 507 ; 536 NW2d 280 (19 | 4 | 2021–2022 |
Dean v. Tucker
green
2 sentences2022Trial courts should consider the following nonexhaustive factors before imposing the severe sanction of dismissal: (1) whether the violation was wilful or accidental; (2) the party’s history of refusing to comply with previous court orders; (3) the prejudice to the opposing party; (4) whether there exists a history of deliberate delay; (5) the degree of compliance with other parts of the court’s orders; (6) attempts to cure the defect; and (7) whether a lesser sanction would better serve the interests of justice. [Vicencio v Ramirez, 211 Mich App 501, 507 ; 536 NW2d 280 (1995), citing Dean v T 2022Trial courts should consider the following nonexhaustive factors before imposing the severe sanction of dismissal: (1) whether the violation was wilful or accidental; (2) the party’s history of refusing to comply with previous court orders; (3) the prejudice to the opposing party; (4) whether there exists a history of deliberate delay; (5) the degree of compliance with other parts of the court’s orders; (6) attempts to cure the defect; and (7) whether a lesser sanction would better serve the interests of justice. [Vicencio v Ramirez, 211 Mich App 501, 507 ; 536 NW2d 280 (1995), citing Dean v T | 3 | 2022–2022 |
Frankenmuth Mutual Insurance v. ACO, Inc.
green
2 sentences2022Trial courts should also consider the following nonexhaustive factors (Dean factors) before imposing the severe sanction of dismissal: (1) whether the violation was wilful or accidental; (2) the party’s history of refusing to comply with previous court orders; (3) the prejudice to the opposing party; (4) whether there exists a history of deliberate delay; (5) the degree of compliance with other parts of the court’s orders; (6) attempts to cure the defect; and (7) whether a lesser sanction would better serve the interests of justice. [Vicencio v Ramirez, 211 Mich App 501, 507 ; 536 NW2d 280 (19 2022Trial courts should also consider the following nonexhaustive factors (Dean factors) before imposing the severe sanction of dismissal: (1) whether the violation was wilful or accidental; (2) the party’s history of refusing to comply with previous court orders; (3) the prejudice to the opposing party; (4) whether there exists a history of deliberate delay; (5) the degree of compliance with other parts of the court’s orders; (6) attempts to cure the defect; and (7) whether a lesser sanction would better serve the interests of justice. [Vicencio v Ramirez, 211 Mich App 501, 507 ; 536 NW2d 280 (19 | 2 | 2021–2022 |
Pirgu v. United Services Automobile Association
green
2 sentences2021Specifically, the trial court must consider the following nonexhaustive factors: (1) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services, (2) the difficulty of the case, i.e., the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, (3) the amount in question and the results obtained, (4) the expenses incurred, (5) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, (6) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other em 2021Specifically, the trial court must consider the following nonexhaustive factors: (1) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services, (2) the difficulty of the case, i.e., the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, (3) the amount in question and the results obtained, (4) the expenses incurred, (5) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, (6) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other em | 2 | 2020–2021 |
People v. Watkins; People v. Pullen
green
1 sentence2026In Watkins, our Supreme Court outlined the following nonexhaustive factors that may be addressed when determining the admissibility of other-acts evidence under a closely related statute, MCL 768.27a: (1) the dissimilarity between the other acts and the charged crime, (2) the temporal proximity of the other acts to the charged crime, (3) the infrequency of the other acts, (4) the presence of intervening acts, (5) the lack of reliability of the evidence supporting the occurrence of the other acts, and (6) the lack of need for evidence beyond the complainant’s and the defendant’s testimony. [Wat | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Smith v. Doe
green
1 sentence2025Betts, 507 Mich at 545, 549-562; Smith, 538 US at 97 , citing Kennedy v Mendoza-Martinez, 372 US 144, 168-169 ; 83 S Ct 554 ; 9 L Ed 2d 644 (1963). 22 22 The Mendoza-Martinez Court considered two additional factors: whether a sanction comes into play only on a finding of scienter and whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Reitmeyer v. Schultz Equipment & Parts Co, Inc
green
2 sentences2025The Webster Court then adopted the analysis announced in Reitmeyer v Schultz Equip & Parts Co, Inc, 237 Mich App 332 ; 602 NW2d 596 (1999), for determining whether a current or former court rule should apply, reasoning that “an individualized determination guided by the nonexhaustive factors from Reitmeyer—including timing, purpose of the newly adopted rule, possible gamesmanship, and reliance—is appropriate given that these factors bear on whether injustice would occur.” Webster, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 10. 2025The Webster Court then adopted the analysis announced in Reitmeyer v Schultz Equip & Parts Co, Inc, 237 Mich App 332 ; 602 NW2d 596 (1999), for determining whether a current or former court rule should apply, reasoning that “an individualized determination guided by the nonexhaustive factors from Reitmeyer—including timing, purpose of the newly adopted rule, possible gamesmanship, and reliance—is appropriate given that these factors bear on whether injustice would occur.” Webster, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 10. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People of Michigan v. Alexander Jeremy Steanhouse
green
2 sentences2021A trial court may consider the following nonexhaustive factors when determining whether a sentence is reasonable: (1) the seriousness of the offense; (2) factors that were inadequately considered by the guidelines; and (3) factors not considered by the guidelines, such as the relationship between the victim and the aggressor, the defendant’s misconduct while in custody, the defendant’s expressions of remorse, and the defendant’s potential for rehabilitation. [People v Walden, 319 Mich App 344 , 352-353; 901 NW2d 142 (2017) (quotation marks and citations omitted).] A trial court may impose a de 2021A trial court may consider the following nonexhaustive factors when determining whether a sentence is reasonable: (1) the seriousness of the offense; (2) factors that were inadequately considered by the guidelines; and (3) factors not considered by the guidelines, such as the relationship between the victim and the aggressor, the defendant’s misconduct while in custody, the defendant’s expressions of remorse, and the defendant’s potential for rehabilitation. [People v Walden, 319 Mich App 344 , 352-353; 901 NW2d 142 (2017) (quotation marks and citations omitted).] A trial court may impose a de | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Bass v. Combs
green
1 sentence2021This Court has instructed that a trial court should consider the following nonexhaustive factors before imposing the sanction of dismissal: (1) whether the violation was wilful [sic] or accidental; (2) the party’s history of refusing to comply with previous court orders; (3) the prejudice to the opposing party; (4) whether there exists a history of deliberate delay; (5) the degree of compliance with other parts of the court’s orders; (6) attempts to cure the defect; and (7) whether a lesser sanction would better serve the interests of justice. [Vicencio v Jaime Ramirez, MD, PC, 211 Mich App 50 | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Lockridge
green
1 sentence2021A sentencing court is no longer required to state “substantial and compelling reasons” for a departure sentence, based on the victim’s testimony “that defendant threw her to the ground and partially inserted his penis into her vagina once, and that he then threw her onto the trunk of the car where he inserted his finger into her vagina, partially inserted his penis into her vagina twice, and fully inserted his penis into her vagina once.”). -3- but it “must justify the sentence imposed in order to facilitate appellate review.” Lockridge, 498 Mich at 392 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Rakowski v. Sarb
green
2 sentences2020While we have routinely cited these four-general factors, we have also recognized that “[n]o single factor is controlling and, indeed, the list of factors is nonexclusive and other factors may be considered as each individual case requires.” Rakowski v Sarb, 269 Mich App 619, 625 ; 713 NW2d 787 (2006). 2020While we have routinely cited these four-general factors, we have also recognized that “[n]o single factor is controlling and, indeed, the list of factors is nonexclusive and other factors may be considered as each individual case requires.” Rakowski v Sarb, 269 Mich App 619, 625 ; 713 NW2d 787 (2006). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Adanalic v. Harco National Insurance Company
green
1 sentence2020We recited the same nonexhaustive factors in Adanalic, 309 Mich App at 191 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Sexton
green
2 sentences1999People v Sexton, 458 Mich 43, 66 ; 580 NW2d 404 (1998). 1999People v Sexton, 458 Mich 43, 66 ; 580 NW2d 404 (1998). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.