10 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 2021–2026 10 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. District Court of El Paso Countygreen2 sentences2026Ct., 776 P.2d 1083, 1089 (Colo. 1989). ¶7 To determine the reliability of a child’s out-of-court statement, the court should consider the following nonexhaustive factors: (1) whether the statement was made spontaneously; (2) whether the statement was made while the child was still upset or in pain from the alleged abuse; (3) whether the language of the statement was likely to have been used by a child the age of the declarant; 3 (4) whether the allegation was made in response to a leading question; (5) whether either the child or the hearsay witness had any bias against the defendant or any mo 2026Id. at 1089-90 . ¶8 No single factor is mandatory or dispositive. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Kinggreen1 sentence2026A proponent seeking to admit a hearsay statement as an excited utterance must demonstrate, as relevant here, that “(1) the occurrence or event was sufficiently startling to render inoperative the normal reflective thought processes of an observer,” and “(2) the declarant’s statement was a spontaneous reaction to the event.” People v. King, 121 P.3d 234, 237 (Colo. App. 2005). ¶ 11 A court considers the following nonexhaustive factors in determining whether a statement was spontaneous: the lapse of time between the startling event and the out-of-court statement, whether the statement was accomp | 1 | 1 |
People v. Medinagreen1 sentence2025Id. at ¶ 20 (quoting People v. Medina, 25 P.3d 1216, 1222-23 (Colo. 2001)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Solem v. Helm
red
2 sentences2026Id. at ¶ 12 (quoting Solem, 463 U.S. at 292-93 ). 2021Id. at ¶ 12 (quoting Solem v. Helm , 463 U.S. 277, 292-93 , 103 S.Ct. 3001 , 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983) ). | 2 | 2021–2026 |
Todd v. Bear Valley Village Apartments
green
2 sentences2026Under these circumstances, we conclude she failed to meet her burden to establish harmlessness under C.R.C.P. 37(c), despite being afforded an opportunity to do so.3 See Todd, 980 P.2d at 978 . ¶ 33 In her reply brief, Whitt also argues the trial court erred by failing to review the nonexhaustive factors described in Todd to help guide a court in applying C.R.C.P. 37(c). 2025Todd, 980 P.2d at 978 . | 2 | 2025–2026 |
People v. Ramadon
green
1 sentence2026Id. ¶ 33 Both steps require weighing the following nonexhaustive factors: (1) whether the defendant was in custody; (2) whether the defendant was free to leave; (3) whether the defendant was aware of the situation; (4) whether the police read Miranda rights to the defendant; (5) whether the defendant understood and waived Miranda rights; (6) whether the defendant had an opportunity to confer with counsel or 15 anyone else prior to or during the interrogation; (7) whether the statement was made during the interrogation or volunteered later; (8) whether the police threatened [the] defendant or p | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Colorado v. Connelly
green
2 sentences2025Id. at ¶ 20 (quoting People v. Medina, 25 P.3d 1216, 1222-23 (Colo. 2001)). 2025Id. ¶ 42 Both steps of the voluntariness inquiry require that we weigh the following nonexhaustive factors: (1) whether the defendant was in custody; (2) whether the defendant was free to leave; (3) whether the defendant was aware of the situation; (4) whether the police read Miranda rights to the defendant; (5) whether the defendant understood and waived Miranda rights; (6) whether the defendant had an opportunity to confer with counsel or anyone else prior to or during the interrogation; (7) whether the statement was made during the interrogation or volunteered later; (8) whether the police | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Pinkstaff v. Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc.
green
1 sentence2025The court should impose the “least severe sanction” that will ensure compliance with the discovery rules and “is commensurate with the prejudice caused to the opposing party.” Pinkstaff, 211 P.3d at 702 . ¶ 16 In making this determination, the district court may consider the following nonexhaustive factors: (1) the importance of the witness’s testimony; (2) the party’s explanation for its failure to comply with the required disclosure; (3) the potential prejudice or surprise to the party against whom the testimony is offered that would arise from allowing the testimony; (4) the availability of | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Begay
green
1 sentence2025Id. (quoting Begay, ¶ 17). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Nikander v. DIST. CT. IN & FOR FIRST JUD. DIST.
green
1 sentence2022Id. 12 ¶23 An indigency determination must be grounded in what is, not what could be, vis-à-vis a defendant’s financial situation. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.