19 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Perkins v. Wilkinson Sword, Inc.green2 sentences2025However, the trial court erred when it treated this one factor as dispositive of the entire design-defect analysis. {¶52} Under R.C. 2307.75, “a product liability plaintiff may recover under two theories: the risk-benefit standard and the consumer-expectation standard.” Kerg v. Atlantic Tool & Die Co., 2008-Ohio-2364, ¶ 40 (8th Dist.), citing Perkins v. Wilkinson Sword, Inc., 83 Ohio St.3d 507, 508 (1998). “[A] product is defective in design ‘if it is more dangerous than an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner or if the benefits of the challe 2001Perkins v. Wilkinson Sword, Inc. (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 507, 508 , 700 N.E.2d 1247, 1248 . | 1 | 2 |
Kerg v. Atlantic Tool & Die Co.green1 sentence2025However, the trial court erred when it treated this one factor as dispositive of the entire design-defect analysis. {¶52} Under R.C. 2307.75, “a product liability plaintiff may recover under two theories: the risk-benefit standard and the consumer-expectation standard.” Kerg v. Atlantic Tool & Die Co., 2008-Ohio-2364, ¶ 40 (8th Dist.), citing Perkins v. Wilkinson Sword, Inc., 83 Ohio St.3d 507, 508 (1998). “[A] product is defective in design ‘if it is more dangerous than an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner or if the benefits of the challe | 1 | 1 |
Melvin Clark v. Wayne Estelle, Warden Attorney General of Californiagreen1 sentence2006See Cicchillo v. A Best Products Co., Cuyahoga App. No. 79288, 2002-Ohio-4 (applying consumer expectation test when the product was sold to a company and the plaintiff-employee used the product in his employment); Colboch v. Uniroyal Tire Co., Inc. (1996), 108 Ohio App.3d 448 , 456 , 670 N.E.2d 1366 ; see, also, Cobos v. Ray-Go Wagner (C.A.9, 1994), 15 F.3d 1083 (stating that the focus of the consumer expectation test is on whether the hazard is unexpected, not whether the consumer is ordinary). {¶ 42} Second, we disagree with appellee that the test is appropriate only for products of simple d | 1 | 1 |
Dennis C. Sours v. General Motors Corporationgreen2 sentences2006The Sours court found that the trial court properly instructed the jury on the consumer-expectation test and held that the risk-benefit test did not `eclipse the consumer-expectation standard; rather it was intended to serve as a refinement of that general principle in those situations where expectations were likely to be distorted.' Id. at 1515 ; see also Colboch v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 108 Ohio App.3d 448 , 670 N.E.2d 1366 , 1371 (Ohio Ct.App. 1996) (applying consumer-expectation test to explosion of vehicle tire and stating that test focuses on `whether the hazard is unexpected'). 2006See Sours, 717 F.2d at 1515 -16 ; Leichtamer, 424 N.E.2d at 576; Colboch, 670 N.E.2d at 1371 ." Hisrich, 226 F.3d at 456 (footnote omitted). {¶ 45} Thus, the consumer expectation test may, in fact, apply to the case at bar and we now consider whether genuine issues of material fact exist regarding that test. {¶ 46} A product is defective in design if it is more dangerous than an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner. | 1 | 1 |
cluster 770388green2 sentences2006"The consumer-expectation test focuses on the expectation of performance, not the technical considerations of the product." Hisrich v. Volvo Cars of N. America (C.A.6, 2000), 226 F.3d 445 , 455 . 2006Thus, "the consumer need not be able to contemplate the technical considerations of the product's design to find the product defective under the consumer-expectation test." Id. {¶ 43} Hisrich rejected an argument similar to the one appellee raises that the consumer expectation test does not apply when the product is a supposedly complicated non-consumer device. | 1 | 1 |
Fisher v. Ford Motor Co.green1 sentence2006See Welch Sand Gravel, Inc. v. O K Trojan, Inc. (1995), 107 Ohio App.3d 218 , 225 , 668 N.E.2d 529 ; see, also, Hisrich v. Volvo Cars of North America, Inc. (C.A.6, 2000), 226 F.3d 445 , 455 (stating that "`the determination of whether a product is more dangerous than an ordinary person would expect is generally a question of fact.'" (quoting Fisher v. Ford Motor Co. (N.D.Ohio 1998), 13 F.Supp.2d 631 , 638 n. 10); Porter v. Gibson Greetings, Inc. (Dec. 2, 1997), Montgomery App. No. 16575. "[U]nder the consumer-expectation standard, evidence of unsafe, unexpected product performance is sufficie | 1 | 1 |
Pruitt v. General Motors Corp.green2 sentences2006The Ohio Supreme Court has stated that the consumer-expectation test may fail to reach product defects when the consumer `is ignorant of the product and has no expectation of its safety, or where a new product is involved and no expectation of safety has developed.' Knitz v. Minster Machine Co., 69 Ohio St.2d 460 , 432 N.E.2d 814 , 818 (Ohio 1982); see also Pruitt v. General Motors Corp., 74 Ohio App.3d 520 , 599 N.E.2d 723 , 726 (Ohio Ct.App. 1991) (finding that the defect must be within the realm of the common consumer understanding in applying consumer-expectation test). 2006The Ohio Supreme Court has stated that the consumer-expectation test may fail to reach product defects when the consumer `is ignorant of the product and has no expectation of its safety, or where a new product is involved and no expectation of safety has developed.' Knitz v. Minster Machine Co., 69 Ohio St.2d 460 , 432 N.E.2d 814 , 818 (Ohio 1982); see also Pruitt v. General Motors Corp., 74 Ohio App.3d 520 , 599 N.E.2d 723 , 726 (Ohio Ct.App. 1991) (finding that the defect must be within the realm of the common consumer understanding in applying consumer-expectation test). | 1 | 1 |
Welch Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. O & K Trojan, Inc.green2 sentences2006See Welch Sand Gravel, Inc. v. O K Trojan, Inc. (1995), 107 Ohio App.3d 218 , 225 , 668 N.E.2d 529 ; see, also, Hisrich v. Volvo Cars of North America, Inc. (C.A.6, 2000), 226 F.3d 445 , 455 (stating that "`the determination of whether a product is more dangerous than an ordinary person would expect is generally a question of fact.'" (quoting Fisher v. Ford Motor Co. (N.D.Ohio 1998), 13 F.Supp.2d 631 , 638 n. 10); Porter v. Gibson Greetings, Inc. (Dec. 2, 1997), Montgomery App. No. 16575. "[U]nder the consumer-expectation standard, evidence of unsafe, unexpected product performance is sufficie 2006See Welch Sand Gravel, Inc. v. O K Trojan, Inc. (1995), 107 Ohio App.3d 218 , 225 , 668 N.E.2d 529 ; see, also, Hisrich v. Volvo Cars of North America, Inc. (C.A.6, 2000), 226 F.3d 445 , 455 (stating that "`the determination of whether a product is more dangerous than an ordinary person would expect is generally a question of fact.'" (quoting Fisher v. Ford Motor Co. (N.D.Ohio 1998), 13 F.Supp.2d 631 , 638 n. 10); Porter v. Gibson Greetings, Inc. (Dec. 2, 1997), Montgomery App. No. 16575. "[U]nder the consumer-expectation standard, evidence of unsafe, unexpected product performance is sufficie | 1 | 1 |
Colboch v. Uniroyal Tire Co., Inc.green2 sentences2006See Cicchillo v. A Best Products Co., Cuyahoga App. No. 79288, 2002-Ohio-4 (applying consumer expectation test when the product was sold to a company and the plaintiff-employee used the product in his employment); Colboch v. Uniroyal Tire Co., Inc. (1996), 108 Ohio App.3d 448 , 456 , 670 N.E.2d 1366 ; see, also, Cobos v. Ray-Go Wagner (C.A.9, 1994), 15 F.3d 1083 (stating that the focus of the consumer expectation test is on whether the hazard is unexpected, not whether the consumer is ordinary). {¶ 42} Second, we disagree with appellee that the test is appropriate only for products of simple d 2006See Cicchillo v. A Best Products Co., Cuyahoga App. No. 79288, 2002-Ohio-4 (applying consumer expectation test when the product was sold to a company and the plaintiff-employee used the product in his employment); Colboch v. Uniroyal Tire Co., Inc. (1996), 108 Ohio App.3d 448 , 456 , 670 N.E.2d 1366 ; see, also, Cobos v. Ray-Go Wagner (C.A.9, 1994), 15 F.3d 1083 (stating that the focus of the consumer expectation test is on whether the hazard is unexpected, not whether the consumer is ordinary). {¶ 42} Second, we disagree with appellee that the test is appropriate only for products of simple d | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Knitz v. Minster Machine Co.
green
2 sentences2025However, the trial court erred when it treated this one factor as dispositive of the entire design-defect analysis. {¶52} Under R.C. 2307.75, “a product liability plaintiff may recover under two theories: the risk-benefit standard and the consumer-expectation standard.” Kerg v. Atlantic Tool & Die Co., 2008-Ohio-2364, ¶ 40 (8th Dist.), citing Perkins v. Wilkinson Sword, Inc., 83 Ohio St.3d 507, 508 (1998). “[A] product is defective in design ‘if it is more dangerous than an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner or if the benefits of the challe 2006The Ohio Supreme Court has stated that the consumer-expectation test may fail to reach product defects when the consumer `is ignorant of the product and has no expectation of its safety, or where a new product is involved and no expectation of safety has developed.' Knitz v. Minster Machine Co., 69 Ohio St.2d 460 , 432 N.E.2d 814 , 818 (Ohio 1982); see also Pruitt v. General Motors Corp., 74 Ohio App.3d 520 , 599 N.E.2d 723 , 726 (Ohio Ct.App. 1991) (finding that the defect must be within the realm of the common consumer understanding in applying consumer-expectation test). | 8 | 1985–2025 |
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Chrysler Corp.
red
2 sentences1995Our holding is consistent with State Farm, which held that: “[U]nder the consumer-expectation standard, evidence of unsafe, unexpected product performance is sufficient to infer the existence of a product defect.” 37 Ohio St.3d at 7 , 523 N.E.2d at 495 . 1995Our holding is consistent with State Farm, which held that: “[U]nder the consumer-expectation standard, evidence of unsafe, unexpected product performance is sufficient to infer the existence of a product defect.” 37 Ohio St.3d at 7 , 523 N.E.2d at 495 . | 8 | 1991–2005 |
Cremeans v. International Harvester Co.
green
2 sentences1990APPELLANT' S REQUESTED CHARGE ON THE CONSUMER EXPECTATION TEST In his first assignment of error, appellant contends: "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO CHARGE THE JURY ON THE CONSUMER EXPECTATION TEST TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE PRODUCT IN QUESTION WAS DEFECTIVE AS THE CONSUMER EXPECTATION TEST IS APPLICABLE IN CASES INVOLVING INDUSTRIAL WORKMEN AND PLAINTIFF DEMONSTRATED EVIDENCE THAT THE PRODUCT WAS MORE DANGEROUS THAN THE ORDINARY CONSUMER WOULD EXPECT.” The consumer expectation standard applies in design defect product liability cases, and comprises the first of a two-prong test as defined 1990Cremeans v. International Harvester Co. (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 232 , 6 OBR 302, 452 N.E.2d 1281 , syllabus, definitively states that: “In determining whether a product design is in a defective condition, a single, two-pronged test should be used: under the consumer expectation standard prong, a defendant will be subject to liability if the plaintiff proves that the product design is in a defective condition because the product fails to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner; under the risk-benefit standard prong, a defenda | 5 | 1985–2007 |
Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp.
green
2 sentences1996Motors Corp. (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 456, 466 , 21 O.O.3d 285, 291-292 , 424 N.E.2d 568 , 576-577 the court adopted a form of the common consumer expectation test as follows: “The concept of ‘unreasonable danger,’ as found in Section 402A, provides implicitly that a product may be found defective in design if it is more dangerous in use than the ordinary consumer would expect. 1996Motors Corp. (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 456, 466 , 21 O.O.3d 285, 291-292 , 424 N.E.2d 568 , 576-577 the court adopted a form of the common consumer expectation test as follows: “The concept of ‘unreasonable danger,’ as found in Section 402A, provides implicitly that a product may be found defective in design if it is more dangerous in use than the ordinary consumer would expect. | 2 | 1991–1996 |
Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission
green
2 sentences2005Comm. (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 145, 147 , 593 N.E.2d 286 . {¶ 10} Appellant sought to prevail on his strict products liability claim under the “consumer expectation test.” Under the consumer-expectation test, a product is defective in design or formulation when it is “more dangerous than an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner.” Former R.C. 2307.75(A)(2). 1 Here, there is no question that appellant demonstrated unsafe, unexpected product performance because he received a severe electric shock by simply pushing the elevator call button. 2005Comm. (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 145, 147 , 593 N.E.2d 286 . {¶ 10} Appellant sought to prevail on his strict products liability claim under the “consumer expectation test.” Under the consumer-expectation test, a product is defective in design or formulation when it is “more dangerous than an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner.” Former R.C. 2307.75(A)(2). 1 Here, there is no question that appellant demonstrated unsafe, unexpected product performance because he received a severe electric shock by simply pushing the elevator call button. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Atkins v. General Motors Corp.
green
1 sentence2004Atkins , supra. {¶ 15} In addition, under the consumer-expectation standard, evidence of unsafe, unexpected product performance is sufficient to infer the existence of a product defect. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Temple v. Wean United, Inc.
green
2 sentences1998Temple v. Wean United, Inc. [ 50 Ohio St.2d 317 , 4 O.O.3d 466 , 364 N.E.2d 267 ], supra. Applicable to both manufacturing and design defects, this standard now states that a product may be proven to be in a defective condition if it is more dangerous than an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner.” Id., 37 Ohio St.3d at 6 , 523 N.E.2d at 494 . *298 Based on the unambiguous language of the warning label, see supra, an “ordinary consumer” would expect the product to do exactly what it did when mixed with water: react violently. 1998Temple v. Wean United, Inc. [ 50 Ohio St.2d 317 , 4 O.O.3d 466 , 364 N.E.2d 267 ], supra. Applicable to both manufacturing and design defects, this standard now states that a product may be proven to be in a defective condition if it is more dangerous than an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner.” Id., 37 Ohio St.3d at 6 , 523 N.E.2d at 494 . *298 Based on the unambiguous language of the warning label, see supra, an “ordinary consumer” would expect the product to do exactly what it did when mixed with water: react violently. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.
green
2 sentences1996Another way of phrasing this proposition is that ‘a product may be found defective in design if the plaintiff demonstrates that the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner.’ Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc. (1978), 20 Cal.3d 413, 429 , 143 Cal.Rptr. 225 [235-236, 573 P.2d 443, 453-454 ]. 1996Another way of phrasing this proposition is that ‘a product may be found defective in design if the plaintiff demonstrates that the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner.’ Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc. (1978), 20 Cal.3d 413, 429 , 143 Cal.Rptr. 225 [235-236, 573 P.2d 443, 453-454 ]. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Deborah J. Birchfield, Administratrix, Estate of William K. Birchfield, Deceased v. International Harvester Company
green
1 sentence1991Harvester Co. (C.A.6, 1984), 726 F.2d 1131, 1136 ; 8 Beasley, American Law of Products Liability (3 Ed.1987) 40-41; Keeton, The Meaning Principles (Fall 1980), 45 Mo.L.Rev. 579. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.