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6 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Dart v. Wiebe Manufacturing, Inc.green2 sentences2024But “while the consumer expectation test may sometimes work well in design defect cases, it provides no resolution for those cases in which the consumer would not know what to expect, because he would have no idea how safe the product could be made.” Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 147 Ariz. 242, 244 (1985) (internal quotation omitted). 2009State v. Ruggiero, 211 Ariz. 262, 264, ¶ 6 , 120 P.3d 690, 692 (App.2005). *199 ¶ 25 Our supreme court has stated that “while the consumer expectation test may sometimes work well in design defect cases, it provides no resolution for those cases in which ‘the consumer would not know what to expect, because he would have no idea how safe the product could be made.’ ” Dart, 147 Ariz. at 244 , 709 P.2d at 878 (citing John W. | 3 | 5 |
Golonka v. General Motors Corp.green2 sentences2024The consumer expectation test does not apply to this case. ¶9 “Under the consumer expectation test, the fact-finder determines whether the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonable manner.” Golonka, 204 Ariz. at 581 ¶ 14 (quotation omitted). 2009Golonka, 204 Ariz. at 581, ¶ 14 , 65 P.3d at 962 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). ¶ 23 In the present case, the trial court instructed the jury on the consumer expectation test for Brethauer’s manufacturing defect claim, but it instructed the jury only on a form of the risk/benefit analysis for his design defect claim. 4 Brethauer argues the trial court erred by refusing to give the consumer-expectation-test instruction for use in evaluating his claim that GM’s design of the truck’s seatbelt was defective. ¶ 24 “A trial court must give a requested [jury] instruction if: (1) the ev | 1 | 2 |
DeMontiney v. Desert Manor Convalescent Center Inc.green2 sentences2009Inc., 144 Ariz. 6, 10 , 695 P.2d 255, 259 (1985). 2009Inc., 144 Ariz. 6, 10 , 695 P.2d 255, 259 (1985). | 1 | 1 |
Garza v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd.green2 sentences2009See Garza v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd., 161 Cal.App.4th 651 , 74 Cal.Rptr.3d 359, 366 (2008) (holding that “[t]he consumer expectations [sic] test asks if the reasonable minimum safety expectations of the product’s ordinary consumers were violated”) (first alteration in original) (citations omitted); see also Adames v. Sheahan, 378 Ill.App.3d 502 , 316 Ill.Dec.823, 880 N.E.2d 559, 579 (2007) (holding that a plaintiff can show a product’s defectiveness using the consumer expectation test “by introducing evidence that the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when u 2009See Garza v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd., 161 Cal.App.4th 651 , 74 Cal.Rptr.3d 359, 366 (2008) (holding that “[t]he consumer expectations [sic] test asks if the reasonable minimum safety expectations of the product’s ordinary consumers were violated”) (first alteration in original) (citations omitted); see also Adames v. Sheahan, 378 Ill.App.3d 502 , 316 Ill.Dec.823, 880 N.E.2d 559, 579 (2007) (holding that a plaintiff can show a product’s defectiveness using the consumer expectation test “by introducing evidence that the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when u | 1 | 1 |
Adames v. Sheahangreen2 sentences2009See Garza v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd., 161 Cal.App.4th 651 , 74 Cal.Rptr.3d 359, 366 (2008) (holding that “[t]he consumer expectations [sic] test asks if the reasonable minimum safety expectations of the product’s ordinary consumers were violated”) (first alteration in original) (citations omitted); see also Adames v. Sheahan, 378 Ill.App.3d 502 , 316 Ill.Dec.823, 880 N.E.2d 559, 579 (2007) (holding that a plaintiff can show a product’s defectiveness using the consumer expectation test “by introducing evidence that the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when u 2009See Garza v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd., 161 Cal.App.4th 651 , 74 Cal.Rptr.3d 359, 366 (2008) (holding that “[t]he consumer expectations [sic] test asks if the reasonable minimum safety expectations of the product’s ordinary consumers were violated”) (first alteration in original) (citations omitted); see also Adames v. Sheahan, 378 Ill.App.3d 502 , 316 Ill.Dec.823, 880 N.E.2d 559, 579 (2007) (holding that a plaintiff can show a product’s defectiveness using the consumer expectation test “by introducing evidence that the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when u | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ruggierogreen2 sentences2009State v. Ruggiero, 211 Ariz. 262, 264, ¶ 6 , 120 P.3d 690, 692 (App.2005). *199 ¶ 25 Our supreme court has stated that “while the consumer expectation test may sometimes work well in design defect cases, it provides no resolution for those cases in which ‘the consumer would not know what to expect, because he would have no idea how safe the product could be made.’ ” Dart, 147 Ariz. at 244 , 709 P.2d at 878 (citing John W. 2009State v. Ruggiero, 211 Ariz. 262, 264, ¶ 6 , 120 P.3d 690, 692 (App.2005). *199 ¶ 25 Our supreme court has stated that “while the consumer expectation test may sometimes work well in design defect cases, it provides no resolution for those cases in which ‘the consumer would not know what to expect, because he would have no idea how safe the product could be made.’ ” Dart, 147 Ariz. at 244 , 709 P.2d at 878 (citing John W. | 1 | 1 |
Gomulka v. Yavapai MacHine & Auto Parts, Inc.green2 sentences2009L.J. 825 , 829 (1973)); see also Gomulka v. Yavapai Mach. & Arito Parts, Inc., 155 Ariz. 239, 242 , 745 P.2d 986, 989 (App.1987) (holding the consumer expectation test does not apply “when the consumer would have no expectation because he would have no knowledge of how safe the product could be made”). 2009L.J. 825 , 829 (1973)); see also Gomulka v. Yavapai Mach. & Arito Parts, Inc., 155 Ariz. 239, 242 , 745 P.2d 986, 989 (App.1987) (holding the consumer expectation test does not apply “when the consumer would have no expectation because he would have no knowledge of how safe the product could be made”). | 1 | 1 |
Knitz v. Minster Machine Co.green2 sentences1987Co., 69 Ohio St.2d 460, 465 , 432 N.E.2d 814, 818 (1982); Fischer, Products Liability—The Meaning of Defect 39 Mo.L.Rev. 339, 351 (1974); Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict Tort Liability for Defective Products 27 S.C.L.Rev. 803, 823 (1976). 1 *243 Our conclusion that the consumer expectation test does not apply in this case is bolstered by the fact that Dr. Milner’s affidavit stated that the average consumer has no knowledge of the properties of gasoline fumes. 1987Co., 69 Ohio St.2d 460, 465 , 432 N.E.2d 814, 818 (1982); Fischer, Products Liability—The Meaning of Defect 39 Mo.L.Rev. 339, 351 (1974); Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict Tort Liability for Defective Products 27 S.C.L.Rev. 803, 823 (1976). 1 *243 Our conclusion that the consumer expectation test does not apply in this case is bolstered by the fact that Dr. Milner’s affidavit stated that the average consumer has no knowledge of the properties of gasoline fumes. | 1 | 1 |
Phillips v. Kimwood MacHine Companygreen2 sentences1985Phillips v. Kimwood Machine, 269 Or. at 491 , 525 P.2d at 1036 (emphasis in original footnotes omitted); see also, Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61 , 577 P.2d 1322 (1978); Barker v. Lull, supra. We believe, therefore, that the correct test was set forth in Byrns v. Riddell, supra, for determination of “unreasonable danger” in a design defect case in which the consumer expectation test cannot be applied or is uncertain. 1985Phillips v. Kimwood Machine, 269 Or. at 491 , 525 P.2d at 1036 (emphasis in original footnotes omitted); see also, Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61 , 577 P.2d 1322 (1978); Barker v. Lull, supra. We believe, therefore, that the correct test was set forth in Byrns v. Riddell, supra, for determination of “unreasonable danger” in a design defect case in which the consumer expectation test cannot be applied or is uncertain. | 1 | 1 |
Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp.green2 sentences1985Phillips v. Kimwood Machine, 269 Or. at 491 , 525 P.2d at 1036 (emphasis in original footnotes omitted); see also, Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61 , 577 P.2d 1322 (1978); Barker v. Lull, supra. We believe, therefore, that the correct test was set forth in Byrns v. Riddell, supra, for determination of “unreasonable danger” in a design defect case in which the consumer expectation test cannot be applied or is uncertain. 1985Phillips v. Kimwood Machine, 269 Or. at 491 , 525 P.2d at 1036 (emphasis in original footnotes omitted); see also, Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61 , 577 P.2d 1322 (1978); Barker v. Lull, supra. We believe, therefore, that the correct test was set forth in Byrns v. Riddell, supra, for determination of “unreasonable danger” in a design defect case in which the consumer expectation test cannot be applied or is uncertain. | 1 | 1 |
Byrns v. Riddell, Incorporatedgreen2 sentences1985Where the consumer expectation test is inappropriate, the question of defective and unreasonably dangerous condition may be determined by applying Wade’s risk/benefit factors to decide whether “the benefits of the challenged design ... outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design.” Barker, 20 Cal.3d at 418 , 143 Cal.Rptr. at 228 , 573 P.2d at 446 ; see also, Byrns, 113 Ariz. at 267 , 550 P.2d at 1068 . 1985Where the consumer expectation test is inappropriate, the question of defective and unreasonably dangerous condition may be determined by applying Wade’s risk/benefit factors to decide whether “the benefits of the challenged design ... outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design.” Barker, 20 Cal.3d at 418 , 143 Cal.Rptr. at 228 , 573 P.2d at 446 ; see also, Byrns, 113 Ariz. at 267 , 550 P.2d at 1068 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Brady v. Melody Homes Manufacturer
green
2 sentences1987Second, we assume that Gomulka originally sought to proceed on a strict liability theory under the consumer expectation test because, otherwise, he would have been required to prove negligence under Brady v. Melody Homes Manufacturer, 121 Ariz. 253 , 589 P.2d 896 (App.1979), a decision which Dart later overruled. 1987Second, we assume that Gomulka originally sought to proceed on a strict liability theory under the consumer expectation test because, otherwise, he would have been required to prove negligence under Brady v. Melody Homes Manufacturer, 121 Ariz. 253 , 589 P.2d 896 (App.1979), a decision which Dart later overruled. | 3 | 1985–1987 |
Brethauer v. General Motors Corp.
green
2 sentences2024In design defect cases, “the consumer’s expectation . . . is an expectation of how safely the product could be made to perform—the touchstone of the consumer expectation test.” Brethauer, 221 Ariz. at 199 ¶ 27. 2024For the consumer’s expectation test to apply, an ordinary consumer does not need to know the “specifics of design.” Id. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
David Toner v. Lederle Laboratories
green
2 sentences2003The trial court instructed the jury to follow the consumer expectation test in deciding whether Tri-Immunol was in a “defective condition, unreasonably dangerous.” Toner, 828 F.2d at 513 . 2003Consequently, and in light of the instruction to the jxxry on the consumer expectation test, the court held that the verdicts were consistent because “[i]t is reasonable to read the special verdicts as saying that Lederle’s failure to develop the Tri-Solgen vaccine was unreasonable conduct, although *584 the danger posed by the product [Tri-Immunol] itself was not greater than an ordinary consumer would reasonably expect.” Id. at 513 . ¶ 25 Toner is distinguishable from the case before us because the jury in Toner was only instructed to apply the consumer expectation test in determining whethe | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck
green
1 sentence1985Thus, while the consumer expectation test may sometimes work well in design defect cases (Brady, 121 Ariz. at 256 , 589 P.2d at 899 ), it provides no resolution for those cases in which “the consumer would not know what to expect, because he would have no idea how safe the product could be made.” Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS.L.J., 825, 829 (1973); Caterpillar Tractor v. Beck, 593 P.2d at 882 n. 35; Phillips, The Standard For Determining Defectiveness In Products Liability, 46 U.CIN.L.REV. 101, 105 (1977). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.
green
2 sentences1985Where the consumer expectation test is inappropriate, the question of defective and unreasonably dangerous condition may be determined by applying Wade’s risk/benefit factors to decide whether “the benefits of the challenged design ... outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design.” Barker, 20 Cal.3d at 418 , 143 Cal.Rptr. at 228 , 573 P.2d at 446 ; see also, Byrns, 113 Ariz. at 267 , 550 P.2d at 1068 . 1985Where the consumer expectation test is inappropriate, the question of defective and unreasonably dangerous condition may be determined by applying Wade’s risk/benefit factors to decide whether “the benefits of the challenged design ... outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design.” Barker, 20 Cal.3d at 418 , 143 Cal.Rptr. at 228 , 573 P.2d at 446 ; see also, Byrns, 113 Ariz. at 267 , 550 P.2d at 1068 . | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.