ground for asserting error in Texas

2023“On appeal, we presume that the trial court exercised this discretion properly and will reverse the cause only where there is a clear abuse of discretion.” Ashraf v. Ashraf, No. 03-11-00467-CV, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 4345 , at *21 (Tex. App.—Austin May 24, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Bell v. Bell, 513 S.W.2d 20, 22 (Tex. 1974)); see, e.g., Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 700 (Tex. 1981) (observing that “[m]athematical precision in dividing property in a divorce is usually not possible” and that “[w]ide latitude and discretion rests in these trial courts and that discretion should only be d

2023“Under the abuse of discretion standard, a lack of legally or factually sufficient evidence does not constitute an independent ground for asserting error; instead, it is a relevant 3 factor in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion.” Mathis v. Mathis, No. 01-17- 00449-CV, 2018 WL 6613864 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 18, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Pickens v. Pickens, 62 S.W.3d 212, 214 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, pet. denied); accord O’Carolan I, 71 S.W.3d at 532 .

2009Id. (citing Seidel , 10 S.W.3d at 368 ).

2009Id. (citing Seidel , 10 S.W.3d at 368 ).

2023“When a sufficiency review overlaps the abuse-of-discretion standard, we engage in a two-pronged inquiry: (1) whether the trial court had sufficient information to exercise its discretion and (2) whether the trial court erred in its application of discretion.” Mathis, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 10432 , at *7 (citing Sandone v. Miller-Sandone, 116 S.W.3d 204, 206 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2003, no pet.)).

2023“When a sufficiency review overlaps the abuse- of-discretion standard, we engage in a two-pronged inquiry: (1) whether the trial court had sufficient information to exercise its discretion and (2) whether the trial court erred in its application of discretion.” Mathis, 2018 WL 6613864 , at *2 (citing Sandone v. Miller-Sandone, 116 S.W.3d 204, 206 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2003, no pet.)).

2023“On appeal, we presume that the trial court exercised this discretion properly and will reverse the cause only where there is a clear abuse of discretion.” Ashraf v. Ashraf, No. 03-11-00467-CV, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 4345 , at *21 (Tex. App.—Austin May 24, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Bell v. Bell, 513 S.W.2d 20, 22 (Tex. 1974)); see, e.g., Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 700 (Tex. 1981) (observing that “[m]athematical precision in dividing property in a divorce is usually not possible” and that “[w]ide latitude and discretion rests in these trial courts and that discretion should only be d

2023“Under the abuse of discretion standard, a lack of legally or factually sufficient evidence does not constitute an independent ground for asserting error; instead, it is a relevant 3 factor in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion.” Mathis v. Mathis, No. 01-17- 00449-CV, 2018 WL 6613864 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 18, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Pickens v. Pickens, 62 S.W.3d 212, 214 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, pet. denied); accord O’Carolan I, 71 S.W.3d at 532 .

2002See Seidel v. Seidel, 10 S.W.3d 365, 368 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1999, no pet.); In re A.D.H., 979 S.W.2d 445, 447 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1998, no pet.).

2002See Seidel v. Seidel, 10 S.W.3d 365, 368 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1999, no pet.); In re A.D.H., 979 S.W.2d 445, 447 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1998, no pet.).

2026“A factual sufficiency challenge is not an independent ground for asserting error under the abuse of discretion standard but is a relevant factor in assessing whether the trial court abused its discretion.” Id. (citing Moroch v. Collins, 174 S.W.3d 849, 857 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. denied)).

2007Moroch v. Collins, 174 S.W.3d 849, 857 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, pet. denied).

2017See Day v. Day, 452 S.W.3d 430, 433 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied).

2015Day v. Day, 452 S.W.3d 430, 433 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied).

2023“On appeal, we presume that the trial court exercised this discretion properly and will reverse the cause only where there is a clear abuse of discretion.” Ashraf v. Ashraf, No. 03-11-00467-CV, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 4345 , at *21 (Tex. App.—Austin May 24, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Bell v. Bell, 513 S.W.2d 20, 22 (Tex. 1974)); see, e.g., Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 700 (Tex. 1981) (observing that “[m]athematical precision in dividing property in a divorce is usually not possible” and that “[w]ide latitude and discretion rests in these trial courts and that discretion should only be d

2023“On appeal, we presume that the trial court exercised this discretion properly and will reverse the cause only where there is a clear abuse of discretion.” Ashraf v. Ashraf, No. 03-11-00467-CV, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 4345 , at *21 (Tex. App.—Austin May 24, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Bell v. Bell, 513 S.W.2d 20, 22 (Tex. 1974)); see, e.g., Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 700 (Tex. 1981) (observing that “[m]athematical precision in dividing property in a divorce is usually not possible” and that “[w]ide latitude and discretion rests in these trial courts and that discretion should only be d

2015See In re T.D.C., 91 S.W.3d 865, 872 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, pet. denied) (op. on reh'g).

2014Beck v. Walker, 154 S.W.3d 895, 902 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.).

2005Code Ann. § 153.256 (Vernon 2002). "[B]ecause the trial court is in the best situation to observe the demeanor and personalities of the witnesses and can feel the forces, powers, and influences that cannot be discerned by merely reading the record," In re H.S.N ., 69 S.W.3d 829, 831 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.), and because factual sufficiency of the evidence is not an independent ground for asserting error, but one of the relevant factors we review in making our determination, see Niskar , 136 S.W.3d at 753 , we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it deviate