length standard in Washington

2007"Further, because the trial court was mistaken about the period of community placement required by law, resentencing is appropriate to allow the trial judge to reconsider the length of the standard range sentence in light of the correct period of community placement required." Id. ¶ 11 The trial court and the parties were mistaken about the required period of *829 community placement.

2007“Further, because the trial court was mistaken about the period of community placement required by law, resentencing is appropriate to allow the trial judge to reconsider the length of the standard range sentence in light of the correct period of community placement required.” Id. ¶11 The trial court and the parties were mistaken about the required period of community placement.

2021ANALYSIS Hatt contends that the trial court exceeded its “statutory authority” in imposing the “mandatory minimum sentence” for first degree murder and therefore, his “judgment and sentence [is] facially invalid.”6 As a general rule, we do not review the length of a standard range criminal sentence imposed by a trial court.7 But we can review a trial court’s “underlying legal conclusions and determinations” in imposing a sentence for an abuse of discretion.8 A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is based on untenable grounds or untenable reasons.9 A sentence is facially invalid i

2018State v. Williams, 149 Wn.2d 143, 146 , 65 P.3d 1214 (2003).

2021ANALYSIS Hatt contends that the trial court exceeded its “statutory authority” in imposing the “mandatory minimum sentence” for first degree murder and therefore, his “judgment and sentence [is] facially invalid.”6 As a general rule, we do not review the length of a standard range criminal sentence imposed by a trial court.7 But we can review a trial court’s “underlying legal conclusions and determinations” in imposing a sentence for an abuse of discretion.8 A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is based on untenable grounds or untenable reasons.9 A sentence is facially invalid i

2018State v. Williams, 149 Wn.2d 143, 146 , 65 P.3d 1214 (2003).

2019State v. Freitag, 127 Wn.2d 141, 144-145 , 896 P.2d 1254 , 905 P.2d 355 (1995).

2019State v. Freitag, 127 Wn.2d 141, 144-145 , 896 P.2d 1254 , 905 P.2d 355 (1995).

2019State v. Freitag, 127 Wn.2d 141, 144-145 , 896 P.2d 1254 , 905 P.2d 355 (1995).

2019State v. Freitag, 127 Wn.2d 141, 144-145 , 896 P.2d 1254 , 905 P.2d 355 (1995).

2004We said, "While we sympathize with the court's concern over the length of the hearing, the welfare of the child always remains paramount." In re Hansen, 24 Wash.App. at 36 , 599 P.2d 1304 .

2004We said, “While we sympathize with the court’s concern over the length of the hearing, the welfare of the child always remains paramount.” Hansen, 24 Wn.

1997Cf. In re Habbitt, 96 Wash.2d 500 , 636 P.2d 1098 (1981) (where the trial court improperly applied firearm findings to enhance first degree robbery convictions, remand for resentencing, rather than simply striking firearm enhancements, is the appropriate remedy).

1997Cf. In re Habbitt, 96 Wash.2d 500 , 636 P.2d 1098 (1981) (where the trial court improperly applied firearm findings to enhance first degree robbery convictions, remand for resentencing, rather than simply striking firearm enhancements, is the appropriate remedy).

2024“By limiting judges’ discretion to sentence a defendant outside the standard range and precluding appeals regarding the length of a standard range sentence, the Legislature sought to ensure that punishment for each criminal offense would be commensurate with that imposed on others with similar criminal histories committing a similar offense.” Id. at 328 (citing RCW 9.94A.010(3)).

2021ANALYSIS Hatt contends that the trial court exceeded its “statutory authority” in imposing the “mandatory minimum sentence” for first degree murder and therefore, his “judgment and sentence [is] facially invalid.”6 As a general rule, we do not review the length of a standard range criminal sentence imposed by a trial court.7 But we can review a trial court’s “underlying legal conclusions and determinations” in imposing a sentence for an abuse of discretion.8 A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is based on untenable grounds or untenable reasons.9 A sentence is facially invalid i

2021App. 669, 681 , 924 P.2d 27 (1996). 10In re Pers.

2016Id. ¶54 Emeritus’s response is that the arbitrator can reject the presumptions about the amount of discovery and the length of the hearing and even “jettison [the] rules altogether.” Br. of Appellant at 15 (citing Rule R-l(e) at 11, under which, if the AAA makes the decision to apply the consumer rules, either party may object and “the arbitrator shall have the authority to make the final decision on which AAA rules will apply”).

1999State v. Onefrey, 119 Wn.2d 572 , 574 n.1, 835 P.2d 213 (1992); State v. Akin, 77 Wn.

1999State v. Onefrey, 119 Wn.2d 572 , 574 n.1, 835 P.2d 213 (1992); State v. Akin, 77 Wn.

1999State v. Onefrey, 119 Wn.2d 572 , 574 n.1, 835 P.2d 213 (1992); State v. Akin, 77 Wn.

1999App. 596, 602 , 744 P.2d 1096 (1987), review denied, 110 Wn.2d 1007 (1988), overruled on other grounds by State v. Moavenzadeh, 135 Wn.2d 359 , 956 P.2d 1097 (1998), this prohibition refers to challenges to the length of a standard range sentence and does not prevent an appeal of this type, which involves statutory construction.

1999App. 596, 602 , 744 P.2d 1096 (1987), review denied, 110 Wn.2d 1007 (1988), overruled on other grounds by State v. Moavenzadeh, 135 Wn.2d 359 , 956 P.2d 1097 (1998), this prohibition refers to challenges to the length of a standard range sentence and does not prevent an appeal of this type, which involves statutory construction.

1999App. 596, 602 , 744 P.2d 1096 (1987), review denied, 110 Wn.2d 1007 (1988), overruled on other grounds by State v. Moavenzadeh, 135 Wn.2d 359 , 956 P.2d 1097 (1998), this prohibition refers to challenges to the length of a standard range sentence and does not prevent an appeal of this type, which involves statutory construction.

1997Unlike offender history which is proved at sentencing pursuant to State v. Jones, 110 Wash.2d 74, 77 , 750 P.2d 620 (1988), when the crime was committed is a factual question which must be put to the jury. [15] Given the fact that a correct standard range is intended as the departure point, we cannot imagine many instances where it could be shown that the resulting exceptional sentence would have been the same regardless of the length of the standard range.

1997Unlike offender history which is proved at sentencing pursuant to State v. Jones, 110 Wash.2d 74, 77 , 750 P.2d 620 (1988), when the crime was committed is a factual question which must be put to the jury. [15] Given the fact that a correct standard range is intended as the departure point, we cannot imagine many instances where it could be shown that the resulting exceptional sentence would have been the same regardless of the length of the standard range.