6 California opinions name it 3 courts 1941–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Hitchingsgreen1 sentence2023Code, § 1122, subd. (b); see also People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1194 .) Where a juror is shown to have engaged in misconduct—and in particular by prematurely forming or expressing an opinion on guilt—“the defendant is afforded the benefit of a rebuttable 7 The majority opinion suggests that the juror “did not say that he had already made up his mind,” but merely “expressed his frustration regarding the length of defense counsel’s closing argument.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 28.) That might be a fair reading if the juror had simply said, “ ‘This argument is never going to end.’ ” 13 pr | 1 | 1 |
People v. Lintongreen1 sentence2023Code, § 1122, subd. (b); see also People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1194 .) Where a juror is shown to have engaged in misconduct—and in particular by prematurely forming or expressing an opinion on guilt—“the defendant is afforded the benefit of a rebuttable 7 The majority opinion suggests that the juror “did not say that he had already made up his mind,” but merely “expressed his frustration regarding the length of defense counsel’s closing argument.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 28.) That might be a fair reading if the juror had simply said, “ ‘This argument is never going to end.’ ” 13 pr | 1 | 1 |
People v. Cissnagreen1 sentence2023Code, § 1122, subd. (b); see also People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1194 .) Where a juror is shown to have engaged in misconduct—and in particular by prematurely forming or expressing an opinion on guilt—“the defendant is afforded the benefit of a rebuttable 7 The majority opinion suggests that the juror “did not say that he had already made up his mind,” but merely “expressed his frustration regarding the length of defense counsel’s closing argument.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 28.) That might be a fair reading if the juror had simply said, “ ‘This argument is never going to end.’ ” 13 pr | 1 | 1 |
Pepper v. Littongreen2 sentences1985(Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 405, 419 [ 241 P.2d 66 ].) Well-established principles of corporations law hold that a “director cannot, by reason of his position, drive a harsh and unfair bargain with the corporation he is supposed to represent.” (Id., at p. 418.) “[Directors’] dealings with the corporation are *32 subjected to rigorous scrutiny and where any of their contracts or engagements with the corporation is challenged the burden is on the director . . . not only to prove the good faith of the transaction but also to show its inherent fairness from the 1985(Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 405, 419 [ 241 P.2d 66 ].) Well-established principles of corporations law hold that a “director cannot, by reason of his position, drive a harsh and unfair bargain with the corporation he is supposed to represent.” (Id., at p. 418.) “[Directors’] dealings with the corporation are *32 subjected to rigorous scrutiny and where any of their contracts or engagements with the corporation is challenged the burden is on the director . . . not only to prove the good faith of the transaction but also to show its inherent fairness from the | 1 | 1 |
Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co.green2 sentences1985(Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 405, 419 [ 241 P.2d 66 ].) Well-established principles of corporations law hold that a “director cannot, by reason of his position, drive a harsh and unfair bargain with the corporation he is supposed to represent.” (Id., at p. 418.) “[Directors’] dealings with the corporation are *32 subjected to rigorous scrutiny and where any of their contracts or engagements with the corporation is challenged the burden is on the director . . . not only to prove the good faith of the transaction but also to show its inherent fairness from the 1985(Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 405, 419 [ 241 P.2d 66 ].) Well-established principles of corporations law hold that a “director cannot, by reason of his position, drive a harsh and unfair bargain with the corporation he is supposed to represent.” (Id., at p. 418.) “[Directors’] dealings with the corporation are *32 subjected to rigorous scrutiny and where any of their contracts or engagements with the corporation is challenged the burden is on the director . . . not only to prove the good faith of the transaction but also to show its inherent fairness from the | 1 | 1 |
People v. Rodriguezgreen2 sentences1969He complains that he was not given, as were the defendants in *465 Lara, a "long" hearing on the issue of waiver; but the length of that hearing resulted principally from the introduction of conflicting expert testimony on Alvarez' claim of mental retardation, an issue not involved in the present case. [15] Finally, appellant charges that the explicit finding of waiver made in Lara was not made here; but "Although it is good practice for the trial court to make an explicit finding that a defendant waived his constitutional rights, no such finding is required; a finding of waiver may be implied 1969He complains that he was not given, as were the defendants in *465 Lara, a "long" hearing on the issue of waiver; but the length of that hearing resulted principally from the introduction of conflicting expert testimony on Alvarez' claim of mental retardation, an issue not involved in the present case. [15] Finally, appellant charges that the explicit finding of waiver made in Lara was not made here; but "Although it is good practice for the trial court to make an explicit finding that a defendant waived his constitutional rights, no such finding is required; a finding of waiver may be implied | 1 | 1 |
People v. Thomasgreen2 sentences1969He complains that he was not given, as were the defendants in *465 Lara, a "long" hearing on the issue of waiver; but the length of that hearing resulted principally from the introduction of conflicting expert testimony on Alvarez' claim of mental retardation, an issue not involved in the present case. [15] Finally, appellant charges that the explicit finding of waiver made in Lara was not made here; but "Although it is good practice for the trial court to make an explicit finding that a defendant waived his constitutional rights, no such finding is required; a finding of waiver may be implied 1969He complains that he was not given, as were the defendants in *465 Lara, a "long" hearing on the issue of waiver; but the length of that hearing resulted principally from the introduction of conflicting expert testimony on Alvarez' claim of mental retardation, an issue not involved in the present case. [15] Finally, appellant charges that the explicit finding of waiver made in Lara was not made here; but "Although it is good practice for the trial court to make an explicit finding that a defendant waived his constitutional rights, no such finding is required; a finding of waiver may be implied | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Saleeby v. State Bar
green
2 sentences2019(Saleeby v. State Bar (1985) 39 Cal.3d 547, 565 .) Instead, as discussed above, it requires a reasonable opportunity to be heard, taking into account the “specific factual context.” (Hannah, supra, 363 U.S. at p. 442 .) We see nothing in the specific facts of this case to suggest that either the length of the hearing or the lack of cross-examination prevented JMS from meaningfully defending itself. 2018Nor does due process require "full rights of confrontation and cross-examination" at all administrative proceedings. ( Saleeby v. State Bar (1985) 39 Cal.3d 547 , 565, 216 Cal.Rptr. 367 , 702 P.2d 525 .) Instead, as discussed above, it requires a reasonable opportunity to be heard, taking into account the "specific factual context." ( *211 Hannah , supra , 363 U.S. at p. 442 , 80 S.Ct. 1502 .) We see nothing in the specific facts of this case to suggest that either the length of the hearing or the lack of cross-examination prevented JMS from meaningfully defending itself. | 2 | 2018–2019 |
Hannah v. Larche
green
2 sentences2019(Saleeby v. State Bar (1985) 39 Cal.3d 547, 565 .) Instead, as discussed above, it requires a reasonable opportunity to be heard, taking into account the “specific factual context.” (Hannah, supra, 363 U.S. at p. 442 .) We see nothing in the specific facts of this case to suggest that either the length of the hearing or the lack of cross-examination prevented JMS from meaningfully defending itself. 2018Nor does due process require "full rights of confrontation and cross-examination" at all administrative proceedings. ( Saleeby v. State Bar (1985) 39 Cal.3d 547 , 565, 216 Cal.Rptr. 367 , 702 P.2d 525 .) Instead, as discussed above, it requires a reasonable opportunity to be heard, taking into account the "specific factual context." ( *211 Hannah , supra , 363 U.S. at p. 442 , 80 S.Ct. 1502 .) We see nothing in the specific facts of this case to suggest that either the length of the hearing or the lack of cross-examination prevented JMS from meaningfully defending itself. | 2 | 2018–2019 |
Pennsylvania Consol. Min. Co. v. Grass Valley Exploration Co.
neutral
1 sentence1941Co. v. Grass Valley etc. Co., 117 Fed. 509 .) The plaintiffs themselves declare that a patent properly issued and in conformance with the provisions of an Act of Congress relates the title back to the date of that act. [10] Furthermore, the additional length of the claim resulted from the consolidation of three original claims, the lines of which need not be shown to establish the validity of an existing patent to the consolidated claim on collateral attack. | 1 | 1941–1941 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.