acquiescence doctrine in California

2015(People v. Peace (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 996, 1008 (Peace) ["If defense counsel and/or the prosecutor state nothing in regard to the waiver, 'the acquiescence of defense counsel and the prosecutor will be given effect as implied waivers.'"]; accord, People v. Evanson (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 698, 701 (Evanson) ["[I]t is settled that where an express waiver has been received from the defendant, the acquiescence of defense 7 counsel and the prosecutor will be given effect as implied waivers.

1980If defense counsel and/or the prosecutor state nothing in regard to the waiver, “the acquiescence of defense counsel and the prosecutor will be given effect as implied waivers.” {People v. Evanson (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 698, 701 [ 71 Cal.Rptr. 503 ].) However, in the instant case defense counsel stated the waiver was against her advice and it cannot be said that defense counsel impliedly waived the right to a jury trial.

2004Co. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 925, 942 , 266 Cal.Rptr. 231 ; People v. Cabral (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 707, 718 , 124 Cal.Rptr. 418 ), and this acquiescence may bar a later motion in the trial court seeking reconsideration of the ruling.

2004Co. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 925, 942 , 266 Cal.Rptr. 231 ; People v. Cabral (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 707, 718 , 124 Cal.Rptr. 418 ), and this acquiescence may bar a later motion in the trial court seeking reconsideration of the ruling.

2004Co. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 925, 942 , 266 Cal.Rptr. 231 ; People v. Cabral (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 707, 718 , 124 Cal.Rptr. 418 ), and this acquiescence may bar a later motion in the trial court seeking reconsideration of the ruling.

2004Co. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 925, 942 , 266 Cal.Rptr. 231 ; People v. Cabral (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 707, 718 , 124 Cal.Rptr. 418 ), and this acquiescence may bar a later motion in the trial court seeking reconsideration of the ruling.

1933Our own Supreme Court quotes from this authority in the case of City of Alameda v. City of Oakland, 198 Cal. 566 , at page 576 [ 246 Pac. 69, 73 ], and in referring to the facts of the case under consideration the court says: “The issues presented in this case from the standpoint of both the law and the facts were properly the subject of legitimate controversy because of the uncertainty of the location of said boundary line and were therefore the proper subject of the application of the doctrine of acquiescence.” In the cited California case the Supreme Court definitely and unequivocally recog

1933Our own Supreme Court quotes from this authority in the case of City of Alameda v. City of Oakland, 198 Cal. 566 , at page 576 [ 246 Pac. 69, 73 ], and in referring to the facts of the case under consideration the court says: “The issues presented in this case from the standpoint of both the law and the facts were properly the subject of legitimate controversy because of the uncertainty of the location of said boundary line and were therefore the proper subject of the application of the doctrine of acquiescence.” In the cited California case the Supreme Court definitely and unequivocally recog

1948Bank, (Tex.Com.App.) 5 S.W.2d 754 .) The principle is known as the doctrine of acquiescence, often referred to as quasi estoppel.’ (Spohn Co. v. Bender, 18 Cal.App.2d 447, 451 [ 64 P.2d 152 ].) ” While much of the testimony of the two wives is contradictory in many respects, nevertheless, it clearly establishes, as the trial court found, that at no time subsequent to the date of the Mexican decree, i. e., December, 1940, and prior to decedent’s death on December 24, 1945, did appellant Thelma Hensgen Neal question or take any action to assert the invalidity of the Mexican divorce.

1948Bank, (Tex.Com.App.) 5 S.W.2d 754 .) The principle is known as the doctrine of acquiescence, often referred to as quasi estoppel.’ (Spohn Co. v. Bender, 18 Cal.App.2d 447, 451 [ 64 P.2d 152 ].) ” While much of the testimony of the two wives is contradictory in many respects, nevertheless, it clearly establishes, as the trial court found, that at no time subsequent to the date of the Mexican decree, i. e., December, 1940, and prior to decedent’s death on December 24, 1945, did appellant Thelma Hensgen Neal question or take any action to assert the invalidity of the Mexican divorce.

2015(People v. Hernandez (1988) 47 Cal.3d 315, 353 [ 253 Cal.Rptr. 199 , 763 P.2d 1289 ]; People v. Collins (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 690, 694-695 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 768 ].) We ultimately conclude the claimed error could not have been prejudicial on counts one and two due to the strength of the evidence, and was not prejudicial as to count three due to the conviction of a lesser offense on that charge.

2015(People v. Hernandez (1988) 47 Cal.3d 315, 353 [ 253 Cal.Rptr. 199 , 763 P.2d 1289 ]; People v. Collins (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 690, 694-695 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 768 ].) We ultimately conclude the claimed error could not have been prejudicial on counts one and two due to the strength of the evidence, and was not prejudicial as to count three due to the conviction of a lesser offense on that charge.

2015(People v. Peace (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 996, 1008 (Peace) ["If defense counsel and/or the prosecutor state nothing in regard to the waiver, 'the acquiescence of defense counsel and the prosecutor will be given effect as implied waivers.'"]; accord, People v. Evanson (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 698, 701 (Evanson) ["[I]t is settled that where an express waiver has been received from the defendant, the acquiescence of defense 7 counsel and the prosecutor will be given effect as implied waivers.

2015(People v. Hernandez (1988) 47 Cal.3d 315, 353 [ 253 Cal.Rptr. 199 , 763 P.2d 1289 ]; People v. Collins (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 690, 694-695 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 768 ].) We ultimately conclude the claimed error could not have been prejudicial on counts one and two due to the strength of the evidence, and was not prejudicial as to count three due to the conviction of a lesser offense on that charge.

2015(People v. Hernandez (1988) 47 Cal.3d 315, 353 [ 253 Cal.Rptr. 199 , 763 P.2d 1289 ]; People v. Collins (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 690, 694-695 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 768 ].) We ultimately conclude the claimed error could not have been prejudicial on counts one and two due to the strength of the evidence, and was not prejudicial as to count three due to the conviction of a lesser offense on that charge.

2015Generally, failure to object does not waive an instructional error on appeal if the instruction was an incorrect statement of law or the defendant’s substantial rights were affected. (§ 1259; People v. Fiore (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1362, 1377-1378 [ 174 Cal.Rptr.3d 806 ].) The invited error doctrine likewise poses no obstacle to raising a claim of instructional error on appeal, unless there was a conscious, deliberate or tactical reason stated for the appellant’s acquiescence in the instruction at trial.

2015Generally, failure to object does not waive an instructional error on appeal if the instruction was an incorrect statement of law or the defendant’s substantial rights were affected. (§ 1259; People v. Fiore (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1362, 1377-1378 [ 174 Cal.Rptr.3d 806 ].) The invited error doctrine likewise poses no obstacle to raising a claim of instructional error on appeal, unless there was a conscious, deliberate or tactical reason stated for the appellant’s acquiescence in the instruction at trial.

2015“Generally, failure to object does not waive an instructional error on appeal if the instruction was an incorrect statement of law or the defendant’s substantial rights were affected. [Citations.] The invited error doctrine likewise poses no obstacle to raising a claim of instructional error on appeal, unless there was a conscious, deliberate or tactical reason stated for the appellant’s acquiescence in the instruction at trial. [Citations.]” (People v. Vega (2015) 7 236 Cal.App.4th 484, 495 (Vega).) We will address the merits of Kegel’s attack on CALCRIM No. 2111 because he claims giving the

2015(Vega, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 495 .) CALCRIM No. 2111 did not impermissibly reduce the prosecution’s burden of proof.

2000There is much respectable authority holding that public officials and public agencies cannot alienate public rights by mere failure to assert such rights in behalf of the public which they represent.” (Terminal Rys. v. County of Alameda (1924) 66 Cal.App. 77, 83 [ 225 P. 304 ].) PG&E also relies on Porter v. City of Riverside (1968) 261 Cal.App.2d 832 [ 68 Cal.Rptr. 313 ], which involved an ordinance authorizing reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses for city council members.

2000There is much respectable authority holding that public officials and public agencies cannot alienate public rights by mere failure to assert such rights in behalf of the public which they represent.” (Terminal Rys. v. County of Alameda (1924) 66 Cal.App. 77, 83 [ 225 P. 304 ].) PG&E also relies on Porter v. City of Riverside (1968) 261 Cal.App.2d 832 [ 68 Cal.Rptr. 313 ], which involved an ordinance authorizing reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses for city council members.

1958(See 2 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 274-276, § 7.09; Starry v. Lake (1933), 135 Cal. App. 677, 682 [ 28 P.2d 80 ].) That doctrine is properly invoked in fixing a boundary line where, as here, the true location of the line is uncertain. ( City of Alameda v. City of Oakland (1926), 198 Cal. 566, 576 [2] [ 246 P. 69 ].) But, as noted hereinabove, where the location of a boundary line is in dispute because of uncertainty or indefiniteness in the statutory description, primary jurisdiction over the dispute is in the courts rather than the administrative agency.

1958(See 2 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 274-276, § 7.09; Starry v. Lake (1933), 135 Cal. App. 677, 682 [ 28 P.2d 80 ].) That doctrine is properly invoked in fixing a boundary line where, as here, the true location of the line is uncertain. ( City of Alameda v. City of Oakland (1926), 198 Cal. 566, 576 [2] [ 246 P. 69 ].) But, as noted hereinabove, where the location of a boundary line is in dispute because of uncertainty or indefiniteness in the statutory description, primary jurisdiction over the dispute is in the courts rather than the administrative agency.

1933Our own Supreme Court quotes from this authority in the case of City of Alameda v. City of Oakland, 198 Cal. 566 , at page 576 [ 246 Pac. 69, 73 ], and in referring to the facts of the case under consideration the court says: “The issues presented in this case from the standpoint of both the law and the facts were properly the subject of legitimate controversy because of the uncertainty of the location of said boundary line and were therefore the proper subject of the application of the doctrine of acquiescence.” In the cited California case the Supreme Court definitely and unequivocally recog

1933Our own Supreme Court quotes from this authority in the case of City of Alameda v. City of Oakland, 198 Cal. 566 , at page 576 [ 246 Pac. 69, 73 ], and in referring to the facts of the case under consideration the court says: “The issues presented in this case from the standpoint of both the law and the facts were properly the subject of legitimate controversy because of the uncertainty of the location of said boundary line and were therefore the proper subject of the application of the doctrine of acquiescence.” In the cited California case the Supreme Court definitely and unequivocally recog