acts rule in California

2007An attempt to commit a crime consists of a specific intent to commit the crime and "`a direct but ineffectual act done towards its commission.'" ( People v. Jones (1999) 75 Cal. App.4th 616, 627 , 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 485 .) "`Although mere preparation such as planning or mere intention to commit a crime is insufficient to constitute an attempt, acts which indicate a certain, unambiguous intent to commit that specific crime, and, in themselves, are an immediate step in the present execution of the criminal design will be sufficient.'" (Ibid.) In People v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1 , 58 Cal.

2007An attempt to commit a crime consists of a specific intent to commit the crime and "`a direct but ineffectual act done towards its commission.'" ( People v. Jones (1999) 75 Cal. App.4th 616, 627 , 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 485 .) "`Although mere preparation such as planning or mere intention to commit a crime is insufficient to constitute an attempt, acts which indicate a certain, unambiguous intent to commit that specific crime, and, in themselves, are an immediate step in the present execution of the criminal design will be sufficient.'" (Ibid.) In People v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1 , 58 Cal.

2026(Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1015; Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1063 .) “‘[T]he mere fact that an action was filed after protected activity took place does not mean the action arose from that activity for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute.’” (Park, at p. 1063.) Allegations which are merely incidental, collateral, or provide context, as opposed to supplying an element of a claim, may not be used as a basis for triggering anti-SLAPP protection.

2025(Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1015; Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1063 .) “‘[T]he mere fact that an action was filed after protected activity took place does not mean the action arose from that activity for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute.’” (Park, at p. 1063.) Allegations which are merely incidental, collateral, or provide context, as opposed to supplying an element of a claim, may not be used as a basis for triggering anti-SLAPP protection.

2022However, the high court described the appellant’s “conduct in concealing the gun on his person and going to the general vicinity” of the theater as “mere acts of preparation.” (Anderson, supra, 1 Cal.2d at p. 690 .) In Vizcarra, the appellant’s movement toward a liquor store while armed with a 10. rifle was deemed “a sufficient direct act toward the accomplishment of the robbery” in light of his effort to “hide on the pathway immediately adjacent to the liquor store when observed by a customer.” (Vizcarra, supra, 110 Cal.App.3d at p. 862 .) In Dillon, the appellant committed attempted robbery

2020However, the high court described the appellant’s “conduct in concealing the gun on his person and going to the general vicinity” of the theater as “mere acts of preparation.” (Anderson, supra, 1 Cal.2d at p. 690 .) In Vizcarra, the appellant’s movement toward a liquor store while armed with a rifle was deemed “a sufficient direct act toward the accomplishment of the robbery” in light of his effort to “hide on the pathway immediately adjacent to the liquor store when observed by a customer.” (Vizcarra, supra, 110 Cal.App.3d at p. 862 .) In Dillon, the 9. appellant committed attempted robbery b

2019Younger v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 30, 42 , the California Supreme Court observed that section 151 of the Harbors and Navigation Code is not a strict liability statute because it requires a showing that oil deposits were intentional or negligent, but the court did not address the meaning of the term “permits.” 19 because the Legislature removed from the statute a requirement to show persons named in a cleanup order for permitting a discharge acted “intentionally or negligently.”15 However, a true strict liability statute would impose liability on an owner whose lessee discharged hazard

2019Younger v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 30, 42 , the California Supreme Court observed that section 151 of the Harbors and Navigation Code is not a strict liability statute because it requires a showing that oil deposits were intentional or negligent, but the court did not address the meaning of the term “permits.” 19 because the Legislature removed from the statute a requirement to show persons named in a cleanup order for permitting a discharge acted “intentionally or negligently.”15 However, a true strict liability statute would impose liability on an owner whose lessee discharged hazard

1989(John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist., supra, 48 Cal.3d 438, 441 .) The issue before the Supreme Court in John R. was “whether the school district that employed the teacher can be held vicariously liable for the teacher’s acts under the doctrine of respondeat superior.” ( 48 Cal.3d at p. 441 .) The court held that: “the doctrine is not applicable in these circumstances and that while the school district may be liable if its own direct negligence is established, it cannot be held vicariously liable for its employee’s torts.” 3 (Ibid.) The instant case is factually distinguishable from John R

1989(John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist., supra, 48 Cal.3d 438, 441 .) The issue before the Supreme Court in John R. was “whether the school district that employed the teacher can be held vicariously liable for the teacher’s acts under the doctrine of respondeat superior.” ( 48 Cal.3d at p. 441 .) The court held that: “the doctrine is not applicable in these circumstances and that while the school district may be liable if its own direct negligence is established, it cannot be held vicariously liable for its employee’s torts.” 3 (Ibid.) The instant case is factually distinguishable from John R

2024Because of the strength of the evidence of Naranjo’s intent, any “slight acts done in furtherance of that design will constitute an attempt.” (Davis, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 606 ; see also Garton, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 510 [“Because there was clear evidence of [the defendant’s] intent to murder [the victim], we review his actions in California under the slight acts rule”].) The evidence is sufficient to meet that standard, showing that Naranjo’s acts went beyond mere preparation and constituted direct but ineffectual acts toward committing the offense.

2013(People v. Williams (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 436, 447 [ 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 ].) Once the referee’s original order terminating parental rights became final, the juvenile court had no power to set it aside or to make a new order *1140 purporting to terminate parental rights thereafter. (§ 366.26, subd. (i)(l); R.S., supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at p. 1152 .) Therefore, the referee’s second order purporting to terminate parental rights was also void.

2010Moore determined that not only did the combination of these procedures provide “constitutionally sound safeguards against error,” but they affirmatively “welcomed and encouraged [the conservatee’s] participation in the conservatorship decision.” (Moore, supra, 185 Cal.App.3d at p. 730 .) Moreover, by ensuring that counsel would inform the court of any nonopposition to the proposed reestablishment, the procedures allowed the conservatee “to avoid a potentially uncomfortable and disruptive court appearance which, in light of his nonopposition to reestablishment, would have likely been brief and

2010(Moore, at p. 730; cf. In re Gandolfo, supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 899-900 [habeas corpus available only in extraordinary circumstances where the statutory procedures are shown to be inadequate and to result in unreasonable consequences greatly detrimental to conservatee].) In a passage that speaks to the situation here, Moore emphasized the significance of a conservatee’s representation by counsel in determining the validity of the conservatee’s waiver of a hearing or trial: “ ‘When counsel is present, a voluntary and intelligent waiver of known rights may properly be inferred from the record, wi

2010(Moore, at p. 730; cf. In re Gandolfo, supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 899-900 [habeas corpus available only in extraordinary circumstances where the statutory procedures are shown to be inadequate and to result in unreasonable consequences greatly detrimental to conservatee].) In a passage that speaks to the situation here, Moore emphasized the significance of a conservatee’s representation by counsel in determining the validity of the conservatee’s waiver of a hearing or trial: “ ‘When counsel is present, a voluntary and intelligent waiver of known rights may properly be inferred from the record, wi

2007The majority faults Adami for not mentioning the slight acts rule, but since the Adami court concluded no "appreciable fragment of the crime charged was accomplished" ( id. at p. 457, 111 Cal.Rptr. 544 ), the rule had no application.

2007An attempt to commit a crime consists of a specific intent to commit the crime and "`a direct but ineffectual act done towards its commission.'" ( People v. Jones (1999) 75 Cal. App.4th 616, 627 , 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 485 .) "`Although mere preparation such as planning or mere intention to commit a crime is insufficient to constitute an attempt, acts which indicate a certain, unambiguous intent to commit that specific crime, and, in themselves, are an immediate step in the present execution of the criminal design will be sufficient.'" (Ibid.) In People v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1 , 58 Cal.

2007An attempt to commit a crime consists of a specific intent to commit the crime and "`a direct but ineffectual act done towards its commission.'" ( People v. Jones (1999) 75 Cal. App.4th 616, 627 , 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 485 .) "`Although mere preparation such as planning or mere intention to commit a crime is insufficient to constitute an attempt, acts which indicate a certain, unambiguous intent to commit that specific crime, and, in themselves, are an immediate step in the present execution of the criminal design will be sufficient.'" (Ibid.) In People v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1 , 58 Cal.

2007Under the slight acts rule, "`[w]henever the design of a person to commit crime is clearly shown, slight acts in furtherance of the design will constitute an attempt.'" (Decker, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 8 , 58 Cal.Rptr.3d 421 , 157 P.3d 1017 ; see People v. Memro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 658, 698 , 214 Cal.Rptr. 832 , 700 P.2d 446 [attempted lewd conduct]; People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441 , 194 Cal. Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d 697 [attempted robbery]; People v. Anderson, supra, 1 Cal.2d at p. 690 , 37 P.2d 67 [attempted robbery].) In addition, "it is not necessary that the overt act be the last possible

2007Under the slight acts rule, "`[w]henever the design of a person to commit crime is clearly shown, slight acts in furtherance of the design will constitute an attempt.'" (Decker, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 8 , 58 Cal.Rptr.3d 421 , 157 P.3d 1017 ; see People v. Memro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 658, 698 , 214 Cal.Rptr. 832 , 700 P.2d 446 [attempted lewd conduct]; People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441 , 194 Cal. Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d 697 [attempted robbery]; People v. Anderson, supra, 1 Cal.2d at p. 690 , 37 P.2d 67 [attempted robbery].) In addition, "it is not necessary that the overt act be the last possible

2003They do not persuade us, on this record, that the trial court erred in denying their request. 7 Also distinguishable is Heiner v. Kmart Corp. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 335 [ 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 854 ] (Heiner), in which an employer was held vicariously liable for injuries caused to a customer by its employee security guard.

2003They do not persuade us, on this record, that the trial court erred in denying their request. 7 Also distinguishable is Heiner v. Kmart Corp. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 335 [ 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 854 ] (Heiner), in which an employer was held vicariously liable for injuries caused to a customer by its employee security guard.

1970(See Saala v. McFarland, 63 Cal.2d 124 [ 45 Cal.Rptr. 144 , 403 P.2d 400 ].) Thus, in State Comp.

1970(See Saala v. McFarland, 63 Cal.2d 124 [ 45 Cal.Rptr. 144 , 403 P.2d 400 ].) Thus, in State Comp.

1964In People v. Suggs (1956) 142 Cal.App.2d 142 [ 297 P.2d 1039 ], the defendant admitted conviction of two priors charged as felonies.

1964In People v. Suggs (1956) 142 Cal.App.2d 142 [ 297 P.2d 1039 ], the defendant admitted conviction of two priors charged as felonies.