Attorney General contends defense in California

2017That is to say, the issue is "whether the ... verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error." [Citation.]' " ( People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393 , 463, 154 Cal.Rptr.3d 541 , 297 P.3d 793 ( Pearson ).) The Attorney General contends the error was harmless because Deputy Mull's opinions were "not based in significant part" on the prior contacts described in the police reports.

2017That is to say, the issue is "whether the ... verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error." [Citation.]' " ( People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393 , 463, 154 Cal.Rptr.3d 541 , 297 P.3d 793 ( Pearson ).) The Attorney General contends the error was harmless because Deputy Mull's opinions were "not based in significant part" on the prior contacts described in the police reports.

2023“Evidence Code section 664 provides that ‘[i]t is presumed that official duty has been regularly performed’ and scores of appellate decisions, relying on this provision, have held that ‘in the absence of any contrary evidence, we are entitled to presume that the trial court . . . properly followed established law.’” (Ross v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 899, 913 .) However, that presumption does not apply where, as here, “the law in question was unclear or uncertain when the lower court acted.” (People v. Jeffers (1987) 43 Cal.3d 984, 1000 ; see People v. Esparza (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 726,

2023“Evidence Code section 664 provides that ‘[i]t is presumed that official duty has been regularly performed’ and scores of appellate decisions, relying on this provision, have held that ‘in the absence of any contrary evidence, we are entitled to presume that the trial court . . . properly followed established law.’” (Ross v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 899, 913 .) However, that presumption does not apply where, as here, “the law in question was unclear or uncertain when the lower court acted.” (People v. Jeffers (1987) 43 Cal.3d 984, 1000 ; see People v. Esparza (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 726,

2021(United States v. White (1944) 322 U.S. 694, 699 [“Since the privilege against self-incrimination is a purely personal one, it cannot be utilized by or on behalf of any organization, such as a corporation.”].) The Attorney General contends this principle applies equally to defendants as individual persons because they acted as agents of San Jose Organics.

2015(Murphy, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 435, fn. 7 .) Furthermore, if defendant refuses to answer questions posed to him as part of the treatment program, the state can use his silence as “ ‘one of a number of factors to be considered by a finder of fact’ in deciding whether other conditions of probation have been violated.” (Ibid.) Nonetheless, the Attorney General contends the waiver condition is necessary to compel the probationer to participate in the treatment program.

2014(See People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 756 [“trial counsel’s failure to object to claimed evidentiary error on the same ground asserted on appeal results in a forfeiture of the issue on appeal”].) In response, defendant argues any objection to Officer Hitchcock’s testimony on the basis that her opinion invaded the province of the jury would have been futile because, despite his limited objection, the trial court asked the prosecutor what the opinion would be and ruled the opinion admissible.

2013(People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1311 .) An instructional error that improperly describes or omits an element of an offense constitutes federal constitutional error that is subject to review under the standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 87 S.Ct. 824 ]: the error is harmless if it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not contribute to the jury’s verdict.

2013(People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1311 .) An instructional error that improperly describes or omits an element of an offense constitutes federal constitutional error that is subject to review under the standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 87 S.Ct. 824 ]: the error is harmless if it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not contribute to the jury’s verdict.

2013In support, she cites the general proposition that “ ‘[t]he reasonableness of counsel’s actions may be determined or substantially influenced by . . . information supplied by the defendant. . . . [W]hat investigation decisions are reasonable depends critically on such information.’ [Citation.] Thus, a defendant can hinder counsel’s investigation not only through affirmative statements, but also by remaining silent or failing to disclose pertinent information to counsel.” (In re Crew (2011) 52 Cal.4th 126, 148 [ 127 Cal.Rptr.3d 285 , 254 P.3d 320 ] (Crew).) Courts have generally utilized these

2013In support, she cites the general proposition that “ ‘[t]he reasonableness of counsel’s actions may be determined or substantially influenced by . . . information supplied by the defendant. . . . [W]hat investigation decisions are reasonable depends critically on such information.’ [Citation.] Thus, a defendant can hinder counsel’s investigation not only through affirmative statements, but also by remaining silent or failing to disclose pertinent information to counsel.” (In re Crew (2011) 52 Cal.4th 126, 148 [ 127 Cal.Rptr.3d 285 , 254 P.3d 320 ] (Crew).) Courts have generally utilized these

2012(See People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 704-705, fn. 18 [ 268 Cal.Rptr. 706 , 789 P.2d 887 ] [counsel’s “defensive acts” in light of a court ruling “do not waive an objection on appeal”].) In any event, no substantial evidence supported a manslaughter instruction as to victim Watchman.

2012(See People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 704-705, fn. 18 [ 268 Cal.Rptr. 706 , 789 P.2d 887 ] [counsel’s “defensive acts” in light of a court ruling “do not waive an objection on appeal”].) In any event, no substantial evidence supported a manslaughter instruction as to victim Watchman.

2012(People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 830 [ 281 Cal.Rptr. 90 , 809 P.2d 865 ]; People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 332 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 436 , 650 P.2d 311 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 201 [ 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569 , 906 P.2d 531 ].) The Attorney General contends the doctrine applies here because defense counsel expressly withdrew his request for the instruction, and explained that his decision to do so was a tactical decision. 8 (See People v. Wader (1993) 5 *115 Cal.4th 610, 657-658 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 788 , 854 P.2d 80 ].) But given that defense

2012(People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 830 [ 281 Cal.Rptr. 90 , 809 P.2d 865 ]; People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 332 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 436 , 650 P.2d 311 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 201 [ 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569 , 906 P.2d 531 ].) The Attorney General contends the doctrine applies here because defense counsel expressly withdrew his request for the instruction, and explained that his decision to do so was a tactical decision. 8 (See People v. Wader (1993) 5 *115 Cal.4th 610, 657-658 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 788 , 854 P.2d 80 ].) But given that defense

2012(People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 830 [ 281 Cal.Rptr. 90 , 809 P.2d 865 ]; People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 332 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 436 , 650 P.2d 311 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 201 [ 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569 , 906 P.2d 531 ].) The Attorney General contends the doctrine applies here because defense counsel expressly withdrew his request for the instruction, and explained that his decision to do so was a tactical decision. 8 (See People v. Wader (1993) 5 *115 Cal.4th 610, 657-658 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 788 , 854 P.2d 80 ].) But given that defense

2012(People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 830 [ 281 Cal.Rptr. 90 , 809 P.2d 865 ]; People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 332 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 436 , 650 P.2d 311 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 201 [ 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569 , 906 P.2d 531 ].) The Attorney General contends the doctrine applies here because defense counsel expressly withdrew his request for the instruction, and explained that his decision to do so was a tactical decision. 8 (See People v. Wader (1993) 5 *115 Cal.4th 610, 657-658 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 788 , 854 P.2d 80 ].) But given that defense

2012(People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 830 [ 281 Cal.Rptr. 90 , 809 P.2d 865 ]; People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 332 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 436 , 650 P.2d 311 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 201 [ 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569 , 906 P.2d 531 ].) The Attorney General contends the doctrine applies here because defense counsel expressly withdrew his request for the instruction, and explained that his decision to do so was a tactical decision. 8 (See People v. Wader (1993) 5 *115 Cal.4th 610, 657-658 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 788 , 854 P.2d 80 ].) But given that defense

2012(People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 830 [ 281 Cal.Rptr. 90 , 809 P.2d 865 ]; People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 332 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 436 , 650 P.2d 311 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 201 [ 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569 , 906 P.2d 531 ].) The Attorney General contends the doctrine applies here because defense counsel expressly withdrew his request for the instruction, and explained that his decision to do so was a tactical decision. 8 (See People v. Wader (1993) 5 *115 Cal.4th 610, 657-658 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 788 , 854 P.2d 80 ].) But given that defense

2010Thus, if section 4019, as amended, constitutes an "amendatory statute that mitigates punishment" within the meaning of Estrada , it will be given retroactive effect unless the Legislature has "clearly signal[ed] its intent to make the amendment prospective, by the inclusion of either an express saving clause [16] or its equivalent." ( Nasalga, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 793.) The Attorney General contends the rule in Estrada does not apply here because it is not clear that the amendment to section 4019 is an amendatory statute lessening punishment.

2009We need not reach this question because the instruction was not erroneous. (15) A trial court in a capital case does not err when it answers a jury question generally related to the commutation power by instructing that the Governor may commute either a death sentence or a life without possibility of parole sentence, but that the jury must not consider the possibility of commutation in determining the appropriate sentence. ( People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1073 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594 , 938 P.2d 388 ] ( Hines ); People v. Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136, 159, fn. 12 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 800 , 689 P.

2009We need not reach this question because the instruction was not erroneous. (15) A trial court in a capital case does not err when it answers a jury question generally related to the commutation power by instructing that the Governor may commute either a death sentence or a life without possibility of parole sentence, but that the jury must not consider the possibility of commutation in determining the appropriate sentence. ( People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1073 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594 , 938 P.2d 388 ] ( Hines ); People v. Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136, 159, fn. 12 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 800 , 689 P.

2009We need not reach this question because the instruction was not erroneous. (15) A trial court in a capital case does not err when it answers a jury question generally related to the commutation power by instructing that the Governor may commute either a death sentence or a life without possibility of parole sentence, but that the jury must not consider the possibility of commutation in determining the appropriate sentence. ( People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1073 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594 , 938 P.2d 388 ] ( Hines ); People v. Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136, 159, fn. 12 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 800 , 689 P.

2009We need not reach this question because the instruction was not erroneous. (15) A trial court in a capital case does not err when it answers a jury question generally related to the commutation power by instructing that the Governor may commute either a death sentence or a life without possibility of parole sentence, but that the jury must not consider the possibility of commutation in determining the appropriate sentence. ( People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1073 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594 , 938 P.2d 388 ] ( Hines ); People v. Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136, 159, fn. 12 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 800 , 689 P.