18 California opinions name it 3 courts 1985–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Yount v. City of Sacramentogreen2 sentences2022“If a defendant delays, obstructs, or resists a police officer who is engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties, the defendant may be convicted of violating section 148[, subdivision ](a)(1) even if the officer uses excessive 9 force subsequent to the completed violation.” (People v. Williams (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 71, 74 ; accord Yount, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 899 .) In sum, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt that A.R. violated subdivision (a)(1) of Penal Code section 148. 2022“If a defendant delays, obstructs, or resists a police officer who is engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties, the defendant may be convicted of violating section 148[, subdivision ](a)(1) even if the officer uses excessive 9 force subsequent to the completed violation.” (People v. Williams (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 71, 74 ; accord Yount, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 899 .) In sum, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt that A.R. violated subdivision (a)(1) of Penal Code section 148. | 3 | 3 |
In Re Chavezgreen2 sentences2018Thus, the Olguin case also is not authority for the proposition that a defendant cannot be convicted of violating section 148(a)(1) if an officer uses any excessive force at any time , including after a completed violation of section 148(a)(1), since that proposition was not "actually considered and decided" by the Olguin court. ( In re Chavez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 643 , 656, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 54 , 68 P.3d 347 ; see ibid . ["a case is authority only for a proposition actually considered and decided therein"].) Defendant contends that the trial court erroneously relied on dicta from Yount , supra , 4 2018Thus, the Olguin case also is not authority for the proposition that a defendant cannot be convicted of violating section 148(a)(1) if an officer uses any excessive force at any time , including after a completed violation of section 148(a)(1), since that proposition was not "actually considered and decided" by the Olguin court. ( In re Chavez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 643 , 656, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 54 , 68 P.3d 347 ; see ibid . ["a case is authority only for a proposition actually considered and decided therein"].) Defendant contends that the trial court erroneously relied on dicta from Yount , supra , 4 | 1 | 2 |
People v. Mosesgreen1 sentence2026Section 236.1, subdivision (c), provides, in relevant part: “A person who causes, induces, or persuades, or attempts to cause, induce, or persuade, a person who is a minor at the time of commission of the offense to engage in a commercial sex act, with the intent to effect or maintain a violation of Section 266, 266h, 266i, 266j, 267, 311.1, 311.2, 311.3, 311.4, 311.5, 311.6, or 518 is guilty of human trafficking.” Under the statute, “the word ‘attempts’ operates to modify all of the elements of the statute, making it unnecessary to prove that the defendant targeted an actual minor victim.” (P | 1 | 1 |
People v. Johnsengreen2 sentences2024And while counsel the next day “express[ed] [his] concern” about Juror No. 2’s inattentiveness, counsel stopped short of any objection to the court’s indication it was “confident that she has been and will continue to be a valid member of the jury.” Counsel’s identification of a concern—untethered from any request for reconsideration of the ruling, for further inquiry, or for a mistrial—is insufficient to preserve a claim of juror misconduct when “defense counsel thereafter expressed no dissatisfaction with the [court’s] inquiry or with the jurors’ continued service.” (People v. Foster (2010) 2024And while counsel the next day “express[ed] [his] concern” about Juror No. 2’s inattentiveness, counsel stopped short of any objection to the court’s indication it was “confident that she has been and will continue to be a valid member of the jury.” Counsel’s identification of a concern—untethered from any request for reconsideration of the ruling, for further inquiry, or for a mistrial—is insufficient to preserve a claim of juror misconduct when “defense counsel thereafter expressed no dissatisfaction with the [court’s] inquiry or with the jurors’ continued service.” (People v. Foster (2010) | 1 | 1 |
People v. Medinagreen1 sentence2024Therefore, there is not sufficient evidence “substantial enough to merit consideration” from which reasonable jurors could conclude Sussman’s actions and statements amounted to an attempted criminal threat instead of a completed act.7 (People v. Taylor, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 623 ; see also 7 Because we find no error, we do not address whether there was prejudice. 14 Medina, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 700 .) Indeed, the evidence presented overwhelmingly supported that Sussman committed a completed violation of section 422. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Fostergreen1 sentence2024And while counsel the next day “express[ed] [his] concern” about Juror No. 2’s inattentiveness, counsel stopped short of any objection to the court’s indication it was “confident that she has been and will continue to be a valid member of the jury.” Counsel’s identification of a concern—untethered from any request for reconsideration of the ruling, for further inquiry, or for a mistrial—is insufficient to preserve a claim of juror misconduct when “defense counsel thereafter expressed no dissatisfaction with the [court’s] inquiry or with the jurors’ continued service.” (People v. Foster (2010) | 1 | 1 |
People v. Hollowaygreen2 sentences2024And while counsel the next day “express[ed] [his] concern” about Juror No. 2’s inattentiveness, counsel stopped short of any objection to the court’s indication it was “confident that she has been and will continue to be a valid member of the jury.” Counsel’s identification of a concern—untethered from any request for reconsideration of the ruling, for further inquiry, or for a mistrial—is insufficient to preserve a claim of juror misconduct when “defense counsel thereafter expressed no dissatisfaction with the [court’s] inquiry or with the jurors’ continued service.” (People v. Foster (2010) 2024(People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 124 (Holloway).) After the trial court completed its inquiry into Juror No. 2’s ability to serve, trial counsel neither sought further inquiry nor objected to Juror No. 2’s continued service. | 1 | 1 |
Chavez v. Martinezgreen1 sentence2016“Martinez claims more than evidentiary protection in asking this Court to hold that the questioning alone was a completed violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments subject to redress by an action for damages under [section] 1983. [¶] To recognize such a constitutional cause of action for compensation would, of course, be well outside the core of Fifth Amendment protection . . . .” ( Chavez, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 777 (cone. opn. of Souter, J., Breyer, J., joining).) Indeed, if the court did recognize such a damages claim it “would revolutionize Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment law,” a resu | 1 | 1 |
People v. Abregogreen1 sentence2015Thus, evidence of one punch to the face resulting in a black eye would constitute a completed violation of section 273.5.” (People v. Johnson (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1477 .) Section 273.5 is violated if there is evidence of bruising (People v. Beasley (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1085 ) or redness (People v. Wilkins (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 761, 771 ), but not by evidence of pain without any physical manifestation (see People v. Abrego (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 133, 138 [“soreness and tenderness” without any physical manifestation of injury does not constitute requisite traumatic condition].) de | 1 | 1 |
People v. Boltongreen2 sentences1997“The Court: Lack of foundation, Mr. Conn. Sustained, stricken. “[Counsel for Marti]: Ask to approach to side bar, your honor.” 30 After the court completed this instruction, counsel for Marti asked to approach the bench and requested that the court give the following which he represented was based upon People v. Bolton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 208, 216, fn. 5 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 141 , 589 P.2d 396 ]: “ ‘Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury, the prosecutor has just made certain uncalled for insinuations about the defendant. 1997“The Court: Lack of foundation, Mr. Conn. Sustained, stricken. “[Counsel for Marti]: Ask to approach to side bar, your honor.” 30 After the court completed this instruction, counsel for Marti asked to approach the bench and requested that the court give the following which he represented was based upon People v. Bolton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 208, 216, fn. 5 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 141 , 589 P.2d 396 ]: “ ‘Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury, the prosecutor has just made certain uncalled for insinuations about the defendant. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Staplesgreen2 sentences1985(People v. Staples (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 61, 68 [ 85 Cal.Rptr. 589 ].) But for Carl Jr.’s abrupt decision to leave the apartment, it is likely that these steps would have resulted in a completed violation of section 288. 1985(People v. Staples (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 61, 68 [ 85 Cal.Rptr. 589 ].) But for Carl Jr.’s abrupt decision to leave the apartment, it is likely that these steps would have resulted in a completed violation of section 288. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Dillongreen1 sentence1985As to the Carl Jr. killing, resolution *700 of this claim is unnecessary, since the verdict rests on sufficient evidence under felony murder. ( People v. Dillon, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 477, fn. 24.) As to the 1976 Bell Gardens killings, the contention must fail. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Williams
green
2 sentences2022“If a defendant delays, obstructs, or resists a police officer who is engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties, the defendant may be convicted of violating section 148[, subdivision ](a)(1) even if the officer uses excessive 9 force subsequent to the completed violation.” (People v. Williams (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 71, 74 ; accord Yount, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 899 .) In sum, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt that A.R. violated subdivision (a)(1) of Penal Code section 148. 2021In People v. Williams (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 71, 73 , the court held, “[I]f a defendant delays, obstructs, or resists an officer who is engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties, the defendant may be convicted of violating section 148(a)(1) even if the officer uses excessive force subsequent to the completed violation.” The same rule should apply when a defendant is charged with violating section 69. | 3 | 2018–2022 |
People v. Memro
green
2 sentences2013These acts, therefore, constituted the „actual commencement of his plan‟ and were sufficient to support an attempt. [Citation.] But for [the boy‟s] abrupt decision to leave the apartment, it is likely that these steps would have resulted in a completed violation of section 288.” (Memro, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 699 .) Defendant focuses his argument on defendant‟s action of removing the pillow from Jane Doe 3‟s face, and contends that this is evidence that he intended only to have Jane Doe 3 watch the movie. 2002These acts, therefore, constituted the `actual commencement of his plan' and were sufficient to support an attempt. [Citation.] But for [the victim's] abrupt decision to leave the apartment, it is likely that these steps would have resulted in a completed violation of section 288." ( Ibid. ) *214 Defendant cites the case for its statement that accompanying the victim to the defendant's home "probably" constituted mere preparation. | 3 | 1998–2013 |
People v. Shields
green
2 sentences2020He cites People v. Shields (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 1242 (Shields) for the proposition that the attempt provision of subdivision (c) “is distinct from the separate crime of attempt [defined under section 21a] because a completed violation of the statute requires a person under the age of 18 while an attempt to violate the statute does not.” (Shields, at p. 1257.) On the other hand, the People urge that the word “attempts” modifies all elements of section 236.1(c), including the requirement of “a person who is a minor.” Because the longstanding law of attempt does not require completion of any oth 2019As the court explained, "[t]he statute requires that the other person must be a minor under the age of 18, but it does not require that the defendant specifically intend or even know that his victim is a minor." ( Id. at p. 1250, 233 Cal.Rptr.3d 701 .) The court concluded the attempt prong of the human trafficking statute was distinct from the separate crime of attempt "because a completed violation of the statute requires a person under the age of 18 while an attempt to violate the statute does not." ( Id. at p. 1257, 233 Cal.Rptr.3d 701 .) The Shields court explained if there was an actual m | 2 | 2019–2020 |
People v. Olguin
green
2 sentences2018An opinion is not authority for propositions not considered." ' [Citations.]" ( People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139 , 154-155, 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 157 , 158 P.3d 731 .) Defendant also relies on People v. Olguin (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 39 , 173 Cal.Rptr. 663 ( Olguin ), but that case also did not consider the question of whether a defendant can be validly convicted of violating section 148(a)(1) if excessive force is used subsequent to a completed offense. 2018An opinion is not authority for propositions not considered.” ’ [Citations.]” (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 154-155 .) Defendant also relies on People v. Olguin (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 39 (Olguin), but that case also did not consider the question of whether a defendant can be validly convicted of violating section 148(a)(1) if excessive force is used subsequent to a completed offense. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Knoller
green
2 sentences2018An opinion is not authority for propositions not considered." ' [Citations.]" ( People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139 , 154-155, 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 157 , 158 P.3d 731 .) Defendant also relies on People v. Olguin (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 39 , 173 Cal.Rptr. 663 ( Olguin ), but that case also did not consider the question of whether a defendant can be validly convicted of violating section 148(a)(1) if excessive force is used subsequent to a completed offense. 2018An opinion is not authority for propositions not considered." ' [Citations.]" ( People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139 , 154-155, 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 157 , 158 P.3d 731 .) Defendant also relies on People v. Olguin (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 39 , 173 Cal.Rptr. 663 ( Olguin ), but that case also did not consider the question of whether a defendant can be validly convicted of violating section 148(a)(1) if excessive force is used subsequent to a completed offense. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Manuel G.
green
2 sentences2018Here, as in those cases, the jury could have found that defendant committed a violation of section 148(a)(1) because defendant resisted, obstructed, or delayed an officer who was acting in the lawful performance of his duties "at the time." (See Manuel G. , supra , 16 Cal.4th at p. 815 , 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 701 , 941 P.2d 880 .) For instance, the jury could have found a completed violation of section 148(a)(1) based on defendant's resisting, delaying and obstructing the officers when they were trying to write a citation to Johnson. 2018Here, as in those cases, the jury could have found that defendant committed a violation of section 148(a)(1) because defendant resisted, obstructed, or delayed an officer who was acting in the lawful performance of his duties "at the time." (See Manuel G. , supra , 16 Cal.4th at p. 815 , 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 701 , 941 P.2d 880 .) For instance, the jury could have found a completed violation of section 148(a)(1) based on defendant's resisting, delaying and obstructing the officers when they were trying to write a citation to Johnson. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Bailey
green
2 sentences2020(Bailey, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 749 .) “Section 21a states that ‘[a]n attempt to commit a crime consists of two elements: a specific intent to commit the crime, and a direct but ineffectual act done toward its commission.’” (Ibid.) We need not decide whether, under the elements test, an attempt to violate section 475(a) is a lesser included offense of a completed violation of section 475(a). 2020(Bailey, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 749 .) “Section 21a states that ‘[a]n attempt to commit a crime consists of two elements: a specific intent to commit the crime, and a direct but ineffectual act done toward its commission.’” (Ibid.) We need not decide whether, under the elements test, an attempt to violate section 475(a) is a lesser included offense of a completed violation of section 475(a). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Johnson
green
1 sentence2015Thus, evidence of one punch to the face resulting in a black eye would constitute a completed violation of section 273.5.” (People v. Johnson (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1477 .) Section 273.5 is violated if there is evidence of bruising (People v. Beasley (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1085 ) or redness (People v. Wilkins (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 761, 771 ), but not by evidence of pain without any physical manifestation (see People v. Abrego (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 133, 138 [“soreness and tenderness” without any physical manifestation of injury does not constitute requisite traumatic condition].) de | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Wilkins
green
1 sentence2015Thus, evidence of one punch to the face resulting in a black eye would constitute a completed violation of section 273.5.” (People v. Johnson (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1477 .) Section 273.5 is violated if there is evidence of bruising (People v. Beasley (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1085 ) or redness (People v. Wilkins (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 761, 771 ), but not by evidence of pain without any physical manifestation (see People v. Abrego (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 133, 138 [“soreness and tenderness” without any physical manifestation of injury does not constitute requisite traumatic condition].) de | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Beasley
green
1 sentence2015Thus, evidence of one punch to the face resulting in a black eye would constitute a completed violation of section 273.5.” (People v. Johnson (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1477 .) Section 273.5 is violated if there is evidence of bruising (People v. Beasley (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1085 ) or redness (People v. Wilkins (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 761, 771 ), but not by evidence of pain without any physical manifestation (see People v. Abrego (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 133, 138 [“soreness and tenderness” without any physical manifestation of injury does not constitute requisite traumatic condition].) de | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Martinez
green
1 sentence2015(See People v. Martinez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at 237 .) CALCRIM 1215, on the other hand, correctly informs the jury that “[i]n deciding whether the distance was substantial . . . you may also consider other factors such as . . . whether the distance the other person was moved was beyond that merely incidental to the commission of <insert associated crime>.” 11 The evidence here was that the only traumatic injuries Denise sustained – bruising to her arm, leg, back and face – were all inflicted in apartment 25 before she fled to apartment 12, which is where the kidnapping began. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.