David claim in California

2018Properly so. *632 David's brief argument cites, with little discussion, two cases: In re Marriage of Nadkarni (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1483 , 93 Cal.Rptr.3d 723 and In re Marriage of Evilsizor & Sweeney (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1416 , 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 .

2018Properly so. *632 David's brief argument cites, with little discussion, two cases: In re Marriage of Nadkarni (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1483 , 93 Cal.Rptr.3d 723 and In re Marriage of Evilsizor & Sweeney (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1416 , 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 .

2018Properly so. *632 David's brief argument cites, with little discussion, two cases: In re Marriage of Nadkarni (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1483 , 93 Cal.Rptr.3d 723 and In re Marriage of Evilsizor & Sweeney (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1416 , 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 .

2018Properly so. *632 David's brief argument cites, with little discussion, two cases: In re Marriage of Nadkarni (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1483 , 93 Cal.Rptr.3d 723 and In re Marriage of Evilsizor & Sweeney (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1416 , 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 .

2018(Burnham v. Superior Court (1990) 495 U.S. 604, 628 .) But she instead effected service through certified mail in Connecticut. 10 Given our result, we need not address David's arguments that: (1) the 2003 pregnancy and other Mariana-related contacts were too remote to the 2017 paternity action to affect the jurisdictional inquiry; (2) as a matter of statutory interpretation the place of conception during a prior pregnancy is jurisdictionally irrelevant under section 5700.201, subdivision (c)(8); and (3) jurisdiction was unreasonable because Mariana was married, meaning another man was presumed

2018(Burnham v. Superior Court (1990) 495 U.S. 604, 628 .) But she instead effected service through certified mail in Connecticut. 10 Given our result, we need not address David's arguments that: (1) the 2003 pregnancy and other Mariana-related contacts were too remote to the 2017 paternity action to affect the jurisdictional inquiry; (2) as a matter of statutory interpretation the place of conception during a prior pregnancy is jurisdictionally irrelevant under section 5700.201, subdivision (c)(8); and (3) jurisdiction was unreasonable because Mariana was married, meaning another man was presumed

2014In doing so, we recognized that each petition in the probate matter might itself be considered a separate action or special proceeding, rather than the incident of an action or proceeding: "[I]n a case of indefinite duration involving multiple and successive proceedings and causes, a late appearing party may, within 10 days of appearing, challenge an all purpose, assigned judge under section 170.6 if no trial has commenced and no contested fact determinations have been made in the proceeding in which the party appears, and that proceeding is not a continuation of an earlier proceeding in which

2013In doing so, we recognized that each petition in the probate matter might itself be considered a separate action or special proceeding, rather than the incident of an action or proceeding: “[I]n a case of indefinite duration involving multiple and successive proceedings and causes, a late appearing party may, within 10 days of appearing, challenge an all purpose, assigned judge under section 170.6 if no trial has commenced and no contested fact determinations have been made in the proceeding in which the party appears, and that proceeding is not a continuation of an earlier proceeding in which

2026(See generally Goehring v. Superior Court (Bernier) (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 894, 905-906 ; Taylor-Rush v. Multitech Corp. (1990) 8 Plaintiff noticed its appeal of the order granting Simon and David’s motion to quash.

2026It subsequently requested, and this Court ordered, dismissal of the appeal as to David only. 10 217 Cal.App.3d 103, 115-118 ; see also Calder v. Jones (1984) 465 U.S. 783, 790 [“[defendants’] status as employees does not somehow insulate them from jurisdiction.

2025A. Standard of Review “ ‘The elements of a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty are: (1) existence of a fiduciary duty; (2) breach of the fiduciary duty; and (3) damage proximately caused by the breach.’ ” (Williamson v. Brooks (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1294, 1300 .) The court’s determination of whether a fiduciary breached their duty is a factual finding reviewed under the substantial evidence standard.

2014Such procedure would make it possible for litigants to gamble on obtaining a favorable decision from one judge, and then, if confronted with an adverse judgment, allow them to disqualify him . . . in the hope of securing a different ruling from another judge in supplementary proceedings involving substantially the same issues.' [Citation.]" ( Stephens, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at pp. 59-60.) The gravamen of the doctrine is the principle that "'a proceeding is a continuation of the original action out of which it arises if it involves "substantially the same issues" as the original action.' [Citat

2014The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying David’s Motion for Reconsideration A motion for reconsideration under Code of Civil Procedure section 1008 must be “based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law.” “[F]acts of which the party seeking reconsideration was aware at the time of the original ruling are not ‘new or different.’” (In re Marriage of Herr (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1468 .) In addition to demonstrating there are new or different facts, circumstances or law, the party seeking reconsideration must provide a satisfactory explanation for the failure to offer the

2014As noted ante, “the child of a wife cohabitating with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is conclusively presumed to be a child of the marriage.” (§ 7540.) The parties agree that “the words ‘wife cohabitating with her husband’ have been judicially construed to mean cohabitating at the time of conception, not cohabitating at the time of birth.” (Brian C. v. Ginger K. (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1198, 1203 ; Dawn D. v. Superior Court (1998) 17 Cal.4th 932, 937, fn. 4 (Dawn D.).) The trial court made no express finding on David’s claim to presumed father status under section 7540.

2014(Reynolds v. City of Calistoga (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 865, 871 .) David’s motion for reconsideration of the court’s November 29, 2012 order was not based upon any new or different facts of which he was unaware before that hearing (for example, that he had defaulted on his mortgage payments, the percentage of his net pay the temporary spousal support constituted and the amount of his outstanding debt).

2013(Stoltenberg v. Newman (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 287, 292 .) Here the executrix argues that section 366.3 applies here because it expressly applies to “trusts” and does not differentiate between express and resulting trusts, and because David argues that he is entitled to a distribution of a life estate from Eileen’s estate by virtue of an oral trust agreement with her, his claim is squarely within the statute.

2013Further, under Estate of Ziegler, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th 1357 , she argues David’s claim fails because there the claimant similarly attempted to argue his claim did not apply to property of the estate because his interest vested immediately upon the death of the decedent, yet the court found a claim for a distribution of a life estate is subject to 366.3.

2013Further, under Estate of Ziegler, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th 1357 , she argues David’s claim fails because there the claimant similarly attempted to argue his claim did not apply to property of the estate because his interest vested immediately upon the death of the decedent, yet the court found a claim for a distribution of a life estate is subject to 366.3.

2013(Shamblin v. Brattain, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 478 .) Further, when a trial court’s record does not disclose the reasons for a court’s ruling, it nevertheless “ ‘is presumed to be correct on appeal, and all intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of its correctness.’ ” (Schnabel v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 704, 718 .) We have no power to disturb the trial court’s denial of David’s motion unless there is a clear showing of an abuse of discretion.

2013(Shamblin v. Brattain, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 478 .) Further, when a trial court’s record does not disclose the reasons for a court’s ruling, it nevertheless “ ‘is presumed to be correct on appeal, and all intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of its correctness.’ ” (Schnabel v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 704, 718 .) We have no power to disturb the trial court’s denial of David’s motion unless there is a clear showing of an abuse of discretion.

1993Following a lengthy trial, the judge rejected Barbara’s arguments and applied the apportionment formula of Pereira v. Pereira, supra, 156 Cal. 1 .

1984(People v. Wickersham, supra, 32 Cal.3d 307, 325 ; People v. Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d 668, 684-685, fn. 12.) Thus, even though David’s defense theory was to deny knowledge of the presence of narcotics and intent to sell, he is still entitled to the lesser included offense instruction since there was substantial evidence to prove constructive possession.

1984(See People v. Perry (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 251, 265 [ 161 Cal.Rptr. 108 ] [failure to object to inadmissible hearsay evidence held not ineffective assistance of counsel].) In People v. Frausto (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 129 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 314 ], the court noted that it is the burden of a defendant to show affirmatively that the omission of defense counsel involved a crucial issue and that the omission cannot be explained on the basis of any knowledgeable choice of facts.

1984(See People v. Perry (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 251, 265 [ 161 Cal.Rptr. 108 ] [failure to object to inadmissible hearsay evidence held not ineffective assistance of counsel].) In People v. Frausto (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 129 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 314 ], the court noted that it is the burden of a defendant to show affirmatively that the omission of defense counsel involved a crucial issue and that the omission cannot be explained on the basis of any knowledgeable choice of facts.