18 California opinions name it 2 courts 1947–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2019Before considering the merits of the state's argument, the Court of Appeal first addressed the plaintiff's preliminary contention that prohibition was inappropriate to address this issue and that the state should instead be required to raise the issue on appeal. ( Rodenhuis , at p. 398, 69 Cal.Rptr. 683 .) In rejecting this argument, the Rodenhuis court reasoned that "[i]t is well established that the defense of sovereign immunity *815 presents a jurisdictional question properly raised by prohibition." ( Ibid. ) For that proposition, it relied on this court's decision in People v. Superior Cou 2019Before considering the merits of the state's argument, the Court of Appeal first addressed the plaintiff's preliminary contention that prohibition was inappropriate to address this issue and that the state should instead be required to raise the issue on appeal. ( Rodenhuis , at p. 398, 69 Cal.Rptr. 683 .) In rejecting this argument, the Rodenhuis court reasoned that "[i]t is well established that the defense of sovereign immunity *815 presents a jurisdictional question properly raised by prohibition." ( Ibid. ) For that proposition, it relied on this court's decision in People v. Superior Cou | 7 | 8 |
McPheeters v. Board of Medical Examinersgreen2 sentences1962(People v. Superior Court, 29 Cal.2d 754, 756-757 [ 178 P.2d 1 , 40 A.L.R.2d 919 ]; McPheeters v. Board of Medical Examiners, 74 Cal.App.2d 46, 49 [ 168 P.2d 65 ].) This immunity protects public officers and employees acting within the scope of their duties, even against charges of malicious personal torts, such as libel, slander, and false prosecution. 1962(People v. Superior Court, 29 Cal.2d 754, 756-757 [ 178 P.2d 1 , 40 A.L.R.2d 919 ]; McPheeters v. Board of Medical Examiners, 74 Cal.App.2d 46, 49 [ 168 P.2d 65 ].) This immunity protects public officers and employees acting within the scope of their duties, even against charges of malicious personal torts, such as libel, slander, and false prosecution. | 3 | 3 |
State of California v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2019Before considering the merits of the state's argument, the Court of Appeal first addressed the plaintiff's preliminary contention that prohibition was inappropriate to address this issue and that the state should instead be required to raise the issue on appeal. ( Rodenhuis , at p. 398, 69 Cal.Rptr. 683 .) In rejecting this argument, the Rodenhuis court reasoned that "[i]t is well established that the defense of sovereign immunity *815 presents a jurisdictional question properly raised by prohibition." ( Ibid. ) For that proposition, it relied on this court's decision in People v. Superior Cou 2019Before considering the merits of the state's argument, the Court of Appeal first addressed the plaintiff's preliminary contention that prohibition was inappropriate to address this issue and that the state should instead be required to raise the issue on appeal. ( Rodenhuis , at p. 398, 69 Cal.Rptr. 683 .) In rejecting this argument, the Rodenhuis court reasoned that "[i]t is well established that the defense of sovereign immunity *815 presents a jurisdictional question properly raised by prohibition." ( Ibid. ) For that proposition, it relied on this court's decision in People v. Superior Cou | 1 | 1 |
State of California v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2007(See State of California v. Superior Court (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 848, 853, fn. 4 [ 197 Cal.Rptr. 914 ] [granting writ relief where trial court overruled demurrer filed by real estate commissioner because “relief by extraordinary writ is an appropriate remedy where, as here, it is desirable that an important jurisdictional question presented by the defense of governmental immunity be speedily determined”]; County of Sacramento v. Superior Court (1972) 8 Cal.3d 479, 481 [ 105 Cal.Rptr. 374 , 503 P.2d 1382 ] [writ relief “is an appropriate remedy where ... it is desirable that an important jurisd 2007(See State of California v. Superior Court (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 848, 853, fn. 4 [ 197 Cal.Rptr. 914 ] [granting writ relief where trial court overruled demurrer filed by real estate commissioner because “relief by extraordinary writ is an appropriate remedy where, as here, it is desirable that an important jurisdictional question presented by the defense of governmental immunity be speedily determined”]; County of Sacramento v. Superior Court (1972) 8 Cal.3d 479, 481 [ 105 Cal.Rptr. 374 , 503 P.2d 1382 ] [writ relief “is an appropriate remedy where ... it is desirable that an important jurisd | 1 | 1 |
County of Sacramento v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2007(See State of California v. Superior Court (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 848, 853, fn. 4 [ 197 Cal.Rptr. 914 ] [granting writ relief where trial court overruled demurrer filed by real estate commissioner because “relief by extraordinary writ is an appropriate remedy where, as here, it is desirable that an important jurisdictional question presented by the defense of governmental immunity be speedily determined”]; County of Sacramento v. Superior Court (1972) 8 Cal.3d 479, 481 [ 105 Cal.Rptr. 374 , 503 P.2d 1382 ] [writ relief “is an appropriate remedy where ... it is desirable that an important jurisd 2007(See State of California v. Superior Court (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 848, 853, fn. 4 [ 197 Cal.Rptr. 914 ] [granting writ relief where trial court overruled demurrer filed by real estate commissioner because “relief by extraordinary writ is an appropriate remedy where, as here, it is desirable that an important jurisdictional question presented by the defense of governmental immunity be speedily determined”]; County of Sacramento v. Superior Court (1972) 8 Cal.3d 479, 481 [ 105 Cal.Rptr. 374 , 503 P.2d 1382 ] [writ relief “is an appropriate remedy where ... it is desirable that an important jurisd | 1 | 1 |
C & L Enterprises Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahomagreen1 sentence2002An implied waiver would be ineffective in the face of an established standard of federal law that requires a waiver of tribal immunity must be “clear.” (C & L Enterprises, supra, 532 U.S. at p. 412 [ 121 S.Ct. at p. 1594 ], citing Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Potawatomi Tribe (1991) 498 U.S. 505 -509 [ 111 S.Ct. 905, 909 , 112 L.Ed.2d 1112 ].) The court, instead, held the contract language was unambiguous, and by agreeing to submit all disputes to arbitration, to enforcement in any court of competent jurisdiction, and accepting Oklahoma law as the law governing the contract, the tribe had clearly an | 1 | 1 |
Ingraham v. Wrightgreen2 sentences1986The petitioner argued that the state’s negligence “‘deprived’ petitioner of his ‘liberty’ interest in freedom from bodily injury, see Ingraham *1307 v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 , 51 L.Ed.2d 711, 731 , 97 S.Ct. 1401, 1413 (1977); . . .” and that because the state maintained that it was entitled to the defense of sovereign immunity in a state tort suit, he was without an adequate state remedy. 1986The petitioner argued that the state’s negligence “‘deprived’ petitioner of his ‘liberty’ interest in freedom from bodily injury, see Ingraham *1307 v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 , 51 L.Ed.2d 711, 731 , 97 S.Ct. 1401, 1413 (1977); . . .” and that because the state maintained that it was entitled to the defense of sovereign immunity in a state tort suit, he was without an adequate state remedy. | 1 | 1 |
County of Santa Barbara v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1972Yes. (1) Prohibition is an appropriate remedy where, as here, it is desirable that an important jurisdictional question presented by the defense of sovereign immunity from suit should be speedily determined. ( People v. Superior Court, 29 Cal.2d 754, 756 [1] [ 178 P.2d 1 , 40 A.L.R.2d 919 ]; County of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. App.3d 751, 754-755 (1, 2) [ 93 Cal. Rptr. 406 ] (hg. den.).) Second. (2) Does section 845.8, subdivision (b), of the Government Code extend immunity to a governmental entity and its employees with respect to both ministerial and discretionary acts of the 1972Yes. (1) Prohibition is an appropriate remedy where, as here, it is desirable that an important jurisdictional question presented by the defense of sovereign immunity from suit should be speedily determined. ( People v. Superior Court, 29 Cal.2d 754, 756 [1] [ 178 P.2d 1 , 40 A.L.R.2d 919 ]; County of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. App.3d 751, 754-755 (1, 2) [ 93 Cal. Rptr. 406 ] (hg. den.).) Second. (2) Does section 845.8, subdivision (b), of the Government Code extend immunity to a governmental entity and its employees with respect to both ministerial and discretionary acts of the | 1 | 1 |
Vater v. County of Glenngreen2 sentences1972Prior to the 1963 act, several cases emphasized that section 3479 of the Civil Code provided a viable statutory basis for governmental liability and avoided a defense of sovereign immunity. 8 Thus, in Vater v. County of Glenn (1958) 49 Cal.2d 815, 818 [ 323 P.2d 85 ], we repeated the pre- Muskopf “general rule” that “in the absence of a statutory or constitutional provision to the contrary, the state and its agencies are immune from liability for tort in the discharge of governmental duties and activities.” The plaintiff asserted alternative statutory bases of liability in sections 22725-22732 1972Prior to the 1963 act, several cases emphasized that section 3479 of the Civil Code provided a viable statutory basis for governmental liability and avoided a defense of sovereign immunity. 8 Thus, in Vater v. County of Glenn (1958) 49 Cal.2d 815, 818 [ 323 P.2d 85 ], we repeated the pre- Muskopf “general rule” that “in the absence of a statutory or constitutional provision to the contrary, the state and its agencies are immune from liability for tort in the discharge of governmental duties and activities.” The plaintiff asserted alternative statutory bases of liability in sections 22725-22732 | 1 | 1 |
Bricklayers & Masons Union No. 1 v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1968Furthermore, there is no appeal from a denial of summary judgment (Bricklayers & Masons Union No. 1 v. Superior Court, 216 Cal.App.2d 578, 582 [ 31 Cal. Rptr. 115 ]), and thus, the petition here may also be justified on the ground that “there is not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law” (Code Civ. 1968Furthermore, there is no appeal from a denial of summary judgment (Bricklayers & Masons Union No. 1 v. Superior Court, 216 Cal.App.2d 578, 582 [ 31 Cal. Rptr. 115 ]), and thus, the petition here may also be justified on the ground that “there is not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law” (Code Civ. | 1 | 1 |
Cross v. Tustingreen2 sentences1962In Cross v. Tustin, 165 Cal.App.2d 146, 149-150 [ 331 P.2d 785 ], the court said: “It is settled law that the defense of sovereign immunity from suit presents a jurisdictional question; that the state may not be sued without its consent. 1962In Cross v. Tustin, 165 Cal.App.2d 146, 149-150 [ 331 P.2d 785 ], the court said: “It is settled law that the defense of sovereign immunity from suit presents a jurisdictional question; that the state may not be sued without its consent. | 1 | 1 |
Guidi v. State of Californiagreen2 sentences1956(Guidi v. State, 41 Cal.2d 623, 627 [ 262 P.2d 3 ]; cf. Chafor v. City of Long Beach, 174 Cal. 478 [ 163 P. 670 , Ann.Cas. 1918D 106, L.R.A. 1917E 685 ]; Rhodes v. City of Palo Alto, 100 Cal.App.2d 336 [ 223 P.2d 639 ]; Sanders v. City of Long Beach, 54 Cal.App.2d 651 [ 129 P.2d 511 ].) The complaint states a cause of action on the theory of negligence in carrying on a proprietary activity, and, so far as appears from the face of the pleading, there is no lack of personal or subject matter jurisdiction. *211 Defendant raised the defense of sovereign immunity by means of a procedure commonly ca 1956(Guidi v. State, 41 Cal.2d 623, 627 [ 262 P.2d 3 ]; cf. Chafor v. City of Long Beach, 174 Cal. 478 [ 163 P. 670 , Ann.Cas. 1918D 106, L.R.A. 1917E 685 ]; Rhodes v. City of Palo Alto, 100 Cal.App.2d 336 [ 223 P.2d 639 ]; Sanders v. City of Long Beach, 54 Cal.App.2d 651 [ 129 P.2d 511 ].) The complaint states a cause of action on the theory of negligence in carrying on a proprietary activity, and, so far as appears from the face of the pleading, there is no lack of personal or subject matter jurisdiction. *211 Defendant raised the defense of sovereign immunity by means of a procedure commonly ca | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal
green
1 sentence2019Proc., § 1102 ; Abelleira , supra , 17 Cal.2d at pp. 287-291, 109 P.2d 942 [explaining that prohibition lies to restrain judicial acts taken in excess of jurisdiction and without jurisdiction, but not to correct mere errors of law].) In deciding that the state could raise its defense of sovereign immunity by application for writ of prohibition, the Rodenhuis court had no need or occasion to determine whether governmental immunity divests a court of fundamental jurisdiction. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Twenty-Nine Palms Enterprises Corp. v. Bardos
green
1 sentence2015Cadmus [Construction] cannot raise tribal immunity simply because the contract was performed on tribal land— the defense of sovereign immunity is personal to the tribe and its entities. [Citations.] Accordingly, we find Cadmus [Construction's] argument to be unpersuasive." (Twenty-Nine Palms Enterprises, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 1446 .) 26 Division Two's reasoning is clear that it could not consider whether the CSLL applied on tribal land because only the tribe could raise this defense. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Zaman
green
1 sentence2012(Zaman, supra, 946 P.2d at p. 461 ; Three Tribes, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 148 .) Accordingly, we find Cadmus’s argument to be unpersuasive. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, P. C.
green
1 sentence2012(Zaman, supra, 946 P.2d at p. 461 ; Three Tribes, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 148 .) Accordingly, we find Cadmus’s argument to be unpersuasive. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Tribe of Okla.
green
2 sentences2002An implied waiver would be ineffective in the face of an established standard of federal law that requires a waiver of tribal immunity must be “clear.” (C & L Enterprises, supra, 532 U.S. at p. 412 [ 121 S.Ct. at p. 1594 ], citing Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Potawatomi Tribe (1991) 498 U.S. 505 -509 [ 111 S.Ct. 905, 909 , 112 L.Ed.2d 1112 ].) The court, instead, held the contract language was unambiguous, and by agreeing to submit all disputes to arbitration, to enforcement in any court of competent jurisdiction, and accepting Oklahoma law as the law governing the contract, the tribe had clearly an 2002An implied waiver would be ineffective in the face of an established standard of federal law that requires a waiver of tribal immunity must be “clear.” (C & L Enterprises, supra, 532 U.S. at p. 412 [ 121 S.Ct. at p. 1594 ], citing Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Potawatomi Tribe (1991) 498 U.S. 505 -509 [ 111 S.Ct. 905, 909 , 112 L.Ed.2d 1112 ].) The court, instead, held the contract language was unambiguous, and by agreeing to submit all disputes to arbitration, to enforcement in any court of competent jurisdiction, and accepting Oklahoma law as the law governing the contract, the tribe had clearly an | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Gavle v. Little Six, Inc.
green
2 sentences1999Appeals Bd., supra, 60 Cal.App.4th 1340, 1351 .) Accordingly, jurisdiction under section 1360 “does not extend to tribes or tribal entities.” ( Gavle, supra, 555 N.W.2d 284, 289 , italics added.) More fundamentally, even assuming section 1360 conferred jurisdiction over Cabazon Bingo, that fact would not overcome the defense of sovereign immunity at issue in this case. 1999Appeals Bd., supra, 60 Cal.App.4th 1340, 1351 .) Accordingly, jurisdiction under section 1360 “does not extend to tribes or tribal entities.” ( Gavle, supra, 555 N.W.2d 284, 289 , italics added.) More fundamentally, even assuming section 1360 conferred jurisdiction over Cabazon Bingo, that fact would not overcome the defense of sovereign immunity at issue in this case. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Middletown Rancheria of Pomo Indians v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.
green
1 sentence1999Appeals Bd., supra, 60 Cal.App.4th 1340, 1351 .) Accordingly, jurisdiction under section 1360 “does not extend to tribes or tribal entities.” ( Gavle, supra, 555 N.W.2d 284, 289 , italics added.) More fundamentally, even assuming section 1360 conferred jurisdiction over Cabazon Bingo, that fact would not overcome the defense of sovereign immunity at issue in this case. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Pacific Fire Insurance v. Kenny Boiler & Manufacturing Co.
green
2 sentences1968Co., 201 Minn. 500 , 277 N.W. 226 (1937), 'Indeed it would be proper to say that the rule is now primarily important as a preamble to the catalog of its exceptions.' " (See also Prosser on Torts (3d ed., 1964) p. 481.) *253 It is clear that the libility of an employer of an independent contractor for the latter's tortious conduct is broad, and it must be assumed that the Legislature was aware of the extent of the liability of employers when, by adopting section 815.4 of the Government Code, it chose with one exception not relevant here to waive the defense of sovereign immunity in cases involv 1968Co., 201 Minn. 500 , 277 N.W. 226 (1937), 'Indeed it would be proper to say that the rule is now primarily important as a preamble to the catalog of its exceptions.' " (See also Prosser on Torts (3d ed., 1964) p. 481.) *253 It is clear that the libility of an employer of an independent contractor for the latter's tortious conduct is broad, and it must be assumed that the Legislature was aware of the extent of the liability of employers when, by adopting section 815.4 of the Government Code, it chose with one exception not relevant here to waive the defense of sovereign immunity in cases involv | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Rhodes v. City of Palo Alto
green
2 sentences1956(Guidi v. State, 41 Cal.2d 623, 627 [ 262 P.2d 3 ]; cf. Chafor v. City of Long Beach, 174 Cal. 478 [ 163 P. 670 , Ann.Cas. 1918D 106, L.R.A. 1917E 685 ]; Rhodes v. City of Palo Alto, 100 Cal.App.2d 336 [ 223 P.2d 639 ]; Sanders v. City of Long Beach, 54 Cal.App.2d 651 [ 129 P.2d 511 ].) The complaint states a cause of action on the theory of negligence in carrying on a proprietary activity, and, so far as appears from the face of the pleading, there is no lack of personal or subject matter jurisdiction. *211 Defendant raised the defense of sovereign immunity by means of a procedure commonly ca 1956(Guidi v. State, 41 Cal.2d 623, 627 [ 262 P.2d 3 ]; cf. Chafor v. City of Long Beach, 174 Cal. 478 [ 163 P. 670 , Ann.Cas. 1918D 106, L.R.A. 1917E 685 ]; Rhodes v. City of Palo Alto, 100 Cal.App.2d 336 [ 223 P.2d 639 ]; Sanders v. City of Long Beach, 54 Cal.App.2d 651 [ 129 P.2d 511 ].) The complaint states a cause of action on the theory of negligence in carrying on a proprietary activity, and, so far as appears from the face of the pleading, there is no lack of personal or subject matter jurisdiction. *211 Defendant raised the defense of sovereign immunity by means of a procedure commonly ca | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Sanders v. City of Long Beach
green
2 sentences1956(Guidi v. State, 41 Cal.2d 623, 627 [ 262 P.2d 3 ]; cf. Chafor v. City of Long Beach, 174 Cal. 478 [ 163 P. 670 , Ann.Cas. 1918D 106, L.R.A. 1917E 685 ]; Rhodes v. City of Palo Alto, 100 Cal.App.2d 336 [ 223 P.2d 639 ]; Sanders v. City of Long Beach, 54 Cal.App.2d 651 [ 129 P.2d 511 ].) The complaint states a cause of action on the theory of negligence in carrying on a proprietary activity, and, so far as appears from the face of the pleading, there is no lack of personal or subject matter jurisdiction. *211 Defendant raised the defense of sovereign immunity by means of a procedure commonly ca 1956(Guidi v. State, 41 Cal.2d 623, 627 [ 262 P.2d 3 ]; cf. Chafor v. City of Long Beach, 174 Cal. 478 [ 163 P. 670 , Ann.Cas. 1918D 106, L.R.A. 1917E 685 ]; Rhodes v. City of Palo Alto, 100 Cal.App.2d 336 [ 223 P.2d 639 ]; Sanders v. City of Long Beach, 54 Cal.App.2d 651 [ 129 P.2d 511 ].) The complaint states a cause of action on the theory of negligence in carrying on a proprietary activity, and, so far as appears from the face of the pleading, there is no lack of personal or subject matter jurisdiction. *211 Defendant raised the defense of sovereign immunity by means of a procedure commonly ca | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Chafor v. City of Long Beach
green
2 sentences1956(Guidi v. State, 41 Cal.2d 623, 627 [ 262 P.2d 3 ]; cf. Chafor v. City of Long Beach, 174 Cal. 478 [ 163 P. 670 , Ann.Cas. 1918D 106, L.R.A. 1917E 685 ]; Rhodes v. City of Palo Alto, 100 Cal.App.2d 336 [ 223 P.2d 639 ]; Sanders v. City of Long Beach, 54 Cal.App.2d 651 [ 129 P.2d 511 ].) The complaint states a cause of action on the theory of negligence in carrying on a proprietary activity, and, so far as appears from the face of the pleading, there is no lack of personal or subject matter jurisdiction. *211 Defendant raised the defense of sovereign immunity by means of a procedure commonly ca 1956(Guidi v. State, 41 Cal.2d 623, 627 [ 262 P.2d 3 ]; cf. Chafor v. City of Long Beach, 174 Cal. 478 [ 163 P. 670 , Ann.Cas. 1918D 106, L.R.A. 1917E 685 ]; Rhodes v. City of Palo Alto, 100 Cal.App.2d 336 [ 223 P.2d 639 ]; Sanders v. City of Long Beach, 54 Cal.App.2d 651 [ 129 P.2d 511 ].) The complaint states a cause of action on the theory of negligence in carrying on a proprietary activity, and, so far as appears from the face of the pleading, there is no lack of personal or subject matter jurisdiction. *211 Defendant raised the defense of sovereign immunity by means of a procedure commonly ca | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Kansas v. United States
green
2 sentences1947In the return to the alternative writ it is contended that prohibition is here sought for the purpose of correcting judicial error and that the petitioner should be relegated to the remedy by appeal. [1] The defense of sovereign immunity from suit presents a jurisdictional question (Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 [ 54 S.Ct. 745 , 78 L.Ed. 1282 ]; Kansas v. United States, 204 U.S. 331 [ 27 S.Ct. 388 , 51 L.Ed. 510 ]). 1947In the return to the alternative writ it is contended that prohibition is here sought for the purpose of correcting judicial error and that the petitioner should be relegated to the remedy by appeal. [1] The defense of sovereign immunity from suit presents a jurisdictional question (Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 [ 54 S.Ct. 745 , 78 L.Ed. 1282 ]; Kansas v. United States, 204 U.S. 331 [ 27 S.Ct. 388 , 51 L.Ed. 510 ]). | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi
green
2 sentences1947In the return to the alternative writ it is contended that prohibition is here sought for the purpose of correcting judicial error and that the petitioner should be relegated to the remedy by appeal. [1] The defense of sovereign immunity from suit presents a jurisdictional question (Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 [ 54 S.Ct. 745 , 78 L.Ed. 1282 ]; Kansas v. United States, 204 U.S. 331 [ 27 S.Ct. 388 , 51 L.Ed. 510 ]). 1947In the return to the alternative writ it is contended that prohibition is here sought for the purpose of correcting judicial error and that the petitioner should be relegated to the remedy by appeal. [1] The defense of sovereign immunity from suit presents a jurisdictional question (Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 [ 54 S.Ct. 745 , 78 L.Ed. 1282 ]; Kansas v. United States, 204 U.S. 331 [ 27 S.Ct. 388 , 51 L.Ed. 510 ]). | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.