diversion hearing in California

2025On remand, the trial court should order RCRC to provide a new report for the hearing that complies with the mandates of section 1001.22, subdivision (a), and the court shall consider that report at the diversion hearing. 7 Additional Amici Curiae Arguments Amici curiae also contend in this appeal that the trial court’s ruling violates: (1) the Racial Justice Act (RJA), and (2) Olmstead v. L.C. (1999) 527 U.S. 581 , which held that unnecessary institutionalization of individuals with disabilities is a form of discrimination prohibited by Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.

2025On remand, the trial court should order RCRC to provide a new report for the hearing that complies with the mandates of section 1001.22, subdivision (a), and the court shall consider that report at the diversion hearing. 7 Additional Amici Curiae Arguments Amici curiae also contend in this appeal that the trial court’s ruling violates: (1) the Racial Justice Act (RJA), and (2) Olmstead v. L.C. (1999) 527 U.S. 581 , which held that unnecessary institutionalization of individuals with disabilities is a form of discrimination prohibited by Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.

2021In contrast to Yeoman, the People have not raised a claim, under alternative legal principles, that is “otherwise identical to one that was properly preserved by a timely motion that called upon the trial court to consider the same facts and to apply a legal standard similar to that which would also determine the claim raised on appeal.” (Yeoman, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 117 .) Instead, the People have raised a completely different argument that was never addressed by either the court or Rodriguez at the diversion hearing.

2021In contrast to Yeoman, the People have not raised a claim, under alternative legal principles, that is “otherwise identical to one that was properly preserved by a timely motion that called upon the trial court to consider the same facts and to apply a legal standard similar to that which would also determine the claim raised on appeal.” (Yeoman, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 117 .) Instead, the People have raised a completely different argument that was never addressed by either the court or defendant over the three days of the diversion hearing. 32.

2025But the relevant question under section 1001.36 is whether Valentine would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety “during or after inpatient or outpatient mental health treatment” (People v. Burns (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 776, 789 ), not whether she posed such risk prior to the treatment she would receive through diversion.

2022(Cf., Whitman v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1063 , 1070–1071, 1083 [approving statutory limitation on defendant’s right to call witnesses in pre-trial preliminary hearings]; People v. Arbuckle (1978) 22 Cal.3d 749, 754 [criminal defendant has no constitutional right in post-trial sentencing hearing to present live testimony of person who prepared written probation report].) This is not surprising, since such hearings are often intended to be much more informal than trials.

2022Simmons’s argument is premised on his claim that he had a “vested right to a diversion hearing.” Simmons relies on Strauss v. Horton (2009) 46 Cal.4th 364 , which held that the retroactive application of Proposition 8 to invalidate previously lawful same-sex marriages would conflict with principles of due process by depriving a person “ ‘of a vested right without due process of law.’ ” (Id. at p. 473.) Simmons, however, had no vested right in pretrial mental health diversion.

2021Rodriguez notes that at the diversion hearing in this case, the district attorney objected to Ms. Alves-McAuley’s testimony for an entirely different reason – that Rodriguez’s diversion motion asserted he 21 In drug diversion cases, for example, the Legislature has expressly limited the defendant’s ability to appeal, and states “[t]he sole remedy of a defendant who is found ineligible for pretrial diversion is a postconviction appeal” (§ 1000, subd. (b), as amended by Stats. 1996, c. 1132, § 2; Butler v. Superior Court (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 64, 69 ), arguably a more serious limitation on a def

2021According to defendant, given the record of his apparent mental health issues, “[t]here is simply no satisfactory explanation for counsel’s failure to request a diversion hearing.” When challenging a conviction on grounds of ineffective assistance, “[a defendant] ‘must show that counsel’s performance was deficient, and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.’ [Citations.] On direct appeal, a finding of deficient performance is warranted where ‘(1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had no rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was asked for a reas

2021(See, e.g., In re Figueroa (2018) 4 Cal.5th 576, 587 [“This court evaluates a [habeas corpus] petition ‘by asking whether, assuming the petition’s factual allegations are true, the petitioner would be entitled to relief” (italics added)]; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 [applying habeas corpus prima facie standard to § 1170.95 hearings].) He thus contends the court erred by weighing evidence and making credibility determinations.

2021(Del Castillo v. Superior Court (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1117, 1121 .) 6Unless otherwise indicated, all further citations to the “DSM-5” are to the fifth and current edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (2013), which the trial court and the parties discussed at the diversion hearing.

2020Rocco’s broad argument assumes that “a law is being applied retrospectively if it is applied to the prosecution of a crime committed before the law’s effective date.” (Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 288 (Tapia).) This is not necessarily so; “it is the law’s effect, not its form or label, which is important.” (Id. at p. 289.) Here, Rocco committed her crime in 2009, years before section 1001.36 was conceived of and enacted, and the corrective amendment to section 1001.36 categorically excluding certain defendants from eligibility under the recently enacted statute addresses not R

2020Rocco’s broad argument assumes that “a law is being applied retrospectively if it is applied to the prosecution of a crime committed before the law’s effective date.” (Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 288 (Tapia).) This is not necessarily so; “it is the law’s effect, not its form or label, which is important.” (Id. at p. 289.) Here, Rocco committed her crime in 2009, years before section 1001.36 was conceived of and enacted, and the corrective amendment to section 1001.36 categorically excluding certain defendants from eligibility under the recently enacted statute addresses not R

2020Rocco’s broad argument assumes that “a law is being applied retrospectively if it is applied to the prosecution of a crime committed before the law’s effective date.” (Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 288 (Tapia).) This is not necessarily so; “it is the law’s effect, not its form or label, which is important.” (Id. at p. 289.) Here, Rocco committed her crime in 2009, years before section 1001.36 was conceived of and enacted, and the corrective amendment to section 1001.36 categorically excluding certain defendants from eligibility under the recently enacted statute addresses not R

2020Rocco’s broad argument assumes that “a law is being applied retrospectively if it is applied to the prosecution of a crime committed before the law’s effective date.” (Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 288 (Tapia).) This is not necessarily so; “it is the law’s effect, not its form or label, which is important.” (Id. at p. 289.) Here, Rocco committed her crime in 2009, years before section 1001.36 was conceived of and enacted, and the corrective amendment to section 1001.36 categorically excluding certain defendants from eligibility under the recently enacted statute addresses not R

2020The court dismissed the petitions for review on August 26, 2020. 23. on entry of a guilty plea, which was not required under the prior version of the statute. ( Perez, supra, at pp. 350–352.) The court in Perez concluded that the diversion statute at issue was analogous to a probation statute and made “punishment more burdensome than the applicable punishment at the time of commission of the alleged conduct.” (Id. at p. 356.) To avoid a possible ex post facto application, the court interpreted the amendment to apply only prospectively.

2020Rocco’s broad argument assumes that “a law is being applied retrospectively if it is applied to the prosecution of a crime committed before the law’s effective date.” (Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 288 (Tapia).) This is not necessarily so; “it is the law’s effect, not its form or label, which is important.” (Id. at p. 289.) Here, Rocco committed her crime in 2009, years before section 1001.36 was conceived of and enacted, and the corrective amendment to section 1001.36 categorically excluding certain defendants from eligibility under the recently enacted statute addresses not R

2020Rocco’s broad argument assumes that “a law is being applied retrospectively if it is applied to the prosecution of a crime committed before the law’s effective date.” (Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 288 (Tapia).) This is not necessarily so; “it is the law’s effect, not its form or label, which is important.” (Id. at p. 289.) Here, Rocco committed her crime in 2009, years before section 1001.36 was conceived of and enacted, and the corrective amendment to section 1001.36 categorically excluding certain defendants from eligibility under the recently enacted statute addresses not R

2020Rocco’s broad argument assumes that “a law is being applied retrospectively if it is applied to the prosecution of a crime committed before the law’s effective date.” (Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 288 (Tapia).) This is not necessarily so; “it is the law’s effect, not its form or label, which is important.” (Id. at p. 289.) Here, Rocco committed her crime in 2009, years before section 1001.36 was conceived of and enacted, and the corrective amendment to section 1001.36 categorically excluding certain defendants from eligibility under the recently enacted statute addresses not R

2020Rocco’s broad argument assumes that “a law is being applied retrospectively if it is applied to the prosecution of a crime committed before the law’s effective date.” (Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 288 (Tapia).) This is not necessarily so; “it is the law’s effect, not its form or label, which is important.” (Id. at p. 289.) Here, Rocco committed her crime in 2009, years before section 1001.36 was conceived of and enacted, and the corrective amendment to section 1001.36 categorically excluding certain defendants from eligibility under the recently enacted statute addresses not R

2020Rocco’s broad argument assumes that “a law is being applied retrospectively if it is applied to the prosecution of a crime committed before the law’s effective date.” (Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 288 (Tapia).) This is not necessarily so; “it is the law’s effect, not its form or label, which is important.” (Id. at p. 289.) Here, Rocco committed her crime in 2009, years before section 1001.36 was conceived of and enacted, and the corrective amendment to section 1001.36 categorically excluding certain defendants from eligibility under the recently enacted statute addresses not R

2020Rocco’s broad argument assumes that “a law is being applied retrospectively if it is applied to the prosecution of a crime committed before the law’s effective date.” (Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 288 (Tapia).) This is not necessarily so; “it is the law’s effect, not its form or label, which is important.” (Id. at p. 289.) Here, Rocco committed her crime in 2009, years before section 1001.36 was conceived of and enacted, and the corrective amendment to section 1001.36 categorically excluding certain defendants from eligibility under the recently enacted statute addresses not R

2020Remand is appropriate in this case because the record “affirmatively discloses that [Pickens] appears to meet at least one of the threshold requirements,” namely, she suffers from a diagnosed mental health disorder.6 (See § 1001.36, subd. (b)(1)(A).) (Frahs I, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 791 ; accord, Frahs II, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 640– 641.) Based on our review of the record, remand for a diversion hearing under section 1001.36 is required here because we cannot conclude that Pickens is unable to demonstrate the eligibility factors listed in section 1001.36, subdivision (b)(1)(A)–(F).

2020Rocco’s broad argument assumes that “a law is being applied retrospectively if it is applied to the prosecution of a crime committed before the law’s effective date.” (Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 288 (Tapia).) This is not necessarily so; “it is the law’s effect, not its form or label, which is important.” (Id. at p. 289.) Here, Rocco committed her crime in 2009, years before section 1001.36 was conceived of and enacted, and the corrective amendment to section 1001.36 categorically excluding certain defendants from eligibility under the recently enacted statute addresses not R

2020Rocco’s broad argument assumes that “a law is being applied retrospectively if it is applied to the prosecution of a crime committed before the law’s effective date.” (Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 288 (Tapia).) This is not necessarily so; “it is the law’s effect, not its form or label, which is important.” (Id. at p. 289.) Here, Rocco committed her crime in 2009, years before section 1001.36 was conceived of and enacted, and the corrective amendment to section 1001.36 categorically excluding certain defendants from eligibility under the recently enacted statute addresses not R

2002In Sledge, supra, 11 Cal.3d 70 , 113 Cal. Rptr. 28 , 520 P.2d 412 , we held that the district attorney's preliminary determination of eligibility for the program was not a judicial act and therefore did not violate the separation of powers doctrine.

2002In Sledge, supra, 11 Cal.3d 70 , 113 Cal. Rptr. 28 , 520 P.2d 412 , we held that the district attorney's preliminary determination of eligibility for the program was not a judicial act and therefore did not violate the separation of powers doctrine.

1990(Ibid.) Morse v. Municipal Court, supra, 13 Cal.3d at page 153 , again does not deal with the interpretation of Penal Code section 1000, subdivision (a)(3); rather, it concerns the determination of when criminal proceedings have progressed too far for a defendant to be eligible for pretrial diversion.