mandamus claim in California

2025Paragraph 72 of the operative pleading states, “The injury being addressed by this litigation is not that the fishway was closed fifty years ago, but that Merced [Irrigation District] continues to block the fishway today.” Paragraph 78 explains plaintiff is challenging defendant’s “continuing refusal to provide passage for fish in breach of its present statutory duties ….” (Italics added.) Paragraph 91 cites California Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources Control Bd., supra, 207 Cal.App.3d 585 for the proposition that ongoing breaches of public duties may be viewed as “‘“continuing” and hence

2025Paragraph 72 of the operative pleading states, “The injury being addressed by this litigation is not that the fishway was closed fifty years ago, but that Merced [Irrigation District] continues to block the fishway today.” Paragraph 78 explains plaintiff is challenging defendant’s “continuing refusal to provide passage for fish in breach of its present statutory duties ….” (Italics added.) Paragraph 91 cites California Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources Control Bd., supra, 207 Cal.App.3d 585 for the proposition that ongoing breaches of public duties may be viewed as “‘“continuing” and hence

2025(Ibid.) Therefore, “‘“[a] demurrer based on a statute of limitations will not lie where the action may be, but is not necessarily, barred.… [I]t is not enough that the complaint shows that the action may be barred.”’” (Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara County Bd. of Supervisors (2010) 48 Cal.4th 32, 42 .) The trial court’s stated ground for dismissing the mandamus claim was plaintiff’s failure to plead “a specific action by a specific agency occurring on a specific date that is not time barred.” Defendant argues the ruling is correctly based on an implied determination that plaintif

2025(Ibid.) Therefore, “‘“[a] demurrer based on a statute of limitations will not lie where the action may be, but is not necessarily, barred.… [I]t is not enough that the complaint shows that the action may be barred.”’” (Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara County Bd. of Supervisors (2010) 48 Cal.4th 32, 42 .) The trial court’s stated ground for dismissing the mandamus claim was plaintiff’s failure to plead “a specific action by a specific agency occurring on a specific date that is not time barred.” Defendant argues the ruling is correctly based on an implied determination that plaintif

2017In Doe v. Albany Unified School District (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 668 , 683-684, 118 Cal.Rptr.3d 507 , the court held a child had a beneficial interest in a mandamus claim regarding the district's compliance with a statute regarding physical education because the child was deprived of a portion of the mandated biweekly minutes of physical education.

2017In Doe v. Albany Unified School District (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 668 , 683-684, 118 Cal.Rptr.3d 507 , the court held a child had a beneficial interest in a mandamus claim regarding the district's compliance with a statute regarding physical education because the child was deprived of a portion of the mandated biweekly minutes of physical education.

2022Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (e); Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center v. Superior Court (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 93, 101 ), but did not do so.

2022Proc., 6. § 1094.5, subd. (e); Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center v. Superior Court, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at pp. 101-102), and that undermines this claim.

2014(Gore v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 184, 190 .) "The requirements of due process of law are fully met where, as here, licensee was accorded judicial review of the administrative decision in which the court weighed the evidence and rendered its independent judgment on the merits." (Ibid.) Blanchard did not testify at the mandamus hearing.

2013(Eight Unnamed Physicians v. 14 Medical Executive Com. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 503, 511-512 ; Unnamed Physician v. Board of Trustees, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at pp. 619-620.) E.

2013(Eight Unnamed Physicians v. 14 Medical Executive Com. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 503, 511-512 ; Unnamed Physician v. Board of Trustees, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at pp. 619-620.) E.

2013It is not to reach the merits of the element or to interfere with the exercise of the locality‟s discretion in making substantive determinations and conclusions about local housing issues, needs, and concerns.” (Fonseca, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 1185; see also Black Property Owners Assn. v. City of Berkeley (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 974, 978-980 ; Haro v. City of Solana Beach (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 542, 550 .) 5 On appeal, the appellate court independently determines as a question of law whether the housing element substantially complies with the requirements of the housing element law.

1997Patrick Media stressed the important public policy concerns of allowing the agency to reverse course when its decisions are questioned to avoid liability for inverse condemnation actions “if it determines enforcement of its order does not merit the compensation required to be paid.” ( 9 Cal.App.4th at p. 612 .) Such decisions should be made according to the “deliberate determination of public officials” not at the “election" of private parties.

1986In relevant part, section 19463 provides: “The action of the board in suspending or revoking a license issued under this chapter is final, except that the propriety of the action of suspending or revoking a license or of any other final administrative action of the board is subject to review by any court of competent jurisdiction if the action is commenced in the court within 30 days of the board’s action.” (Italics added.) Aroney v. California Horse Racing Bd. (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 928 [ 193 Cal.Rptr. 708 ] considered a racetrack patron’s mandamus challenge of the Board’s decision upholding h

1986In relevant part, section 19463 provides: “The action of the board in suspending or revoking a license issued under this chapter is final, except that the propriety of the action of suspending or revoking a license or of any other final administrative action of the board is subject to review by any court of competent jurisdiction if the action is commenced in the court within 30 days of the board’s action.” (Italics added.) Aroney v. California Horse Racing Bd. (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 928 [ 193 Cal.Rptr. 708 ] considered a racetrack patron’s mandamus challenge of the Board’s decision upholding h

1980We have concluded that the judgment must be reversed, as Kennedy was deprived of his due process rights to notice and a hearing pursuant to Horn v. County of Ventura (1979) 24 Cal.3d 605 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 718 , 596 P.2d 1134 ], and as the court below applied a traditional mandamus standard of review rather than the applicable administrative mandamus standard ( Horn, supra).

1980We have concluded that the judgment must be reversed, as Kennedy was deprived of his due process rights to notice and a hearing pursuant to Horn v. County of Ventura (1979) 24 Cal.3d 605 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 718 , 596 P.2d 1134 ], and as the court below applied a traditional mandamus standard of review rather than the applicable administrative mandamus standard ( Horn, supra).

1969(See Lacy v. Orr, 276 Cal.App.2d 198 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 276 ]; Lagomarsino v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 276 Cal.App.2d 517 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 193 ].) The arresting officer, of course, must advise on the requirements for the taking of one of the alcoholic tests by reason of the Vehicle Code provisions.

1969(See Lacy v. Orr, 276 Cal.App.2d 198 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 276 ]; Lagomarsino v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 276 Cal.App.2d 517 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 193 ].) The arresting officer, of course, must advise on the requirements for the taking of one of the alcoholic tests by reason of the Vehicle Code provisions.

1969(See Lacy v. Orr, 276 Cal.App.2d 198 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 276 ]; Lagomarsino v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 276 Cal.App.2d 517 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 193 ].) The arresting officer, of course, must advise on the requirements for the taking of one of the alcoholic tests by reason of the Vehicle Code provisions.

1969(See Lacy v. Orr, 276 Cal.App.2d 198 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 276 ]; Lagomarsino v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 276 Cal.App.2d 517 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 193 ].) The arresting officer, of course, must advise on the requirements for the taking of one of the alcoholic tests by reason of the Vehicle Code provisions.