mistaken instruction in California

2015The STEP Act describes "primary activities" as the commission of one or more of the offenses enumerated in section 186.22, subdivision (e)(1)-(25) or subdivision (e)(31)-(33). (§ 186.22, subd. (f).) As the People appropriately concede, pimping is not included among these enumerated offenses. 2 A trial court's mistaken instruction on an element of an offense or enhancement allegation is subject to federal harmless error analysis under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [ 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 ].

2015The STEP Act describes "primary activities" as the commission of one or more of the offenses enumerated in section 186.22, subdivision (e)(1)-(25) or subdivision (e)(31)-(33). (§ 186.22, subd. (f).) As the People appropriately concede, pimping is not included among these enumerated offenses. 2 A trial court's mistaken instruction on an element of an offense or enhancement allegation is subject to federal harmless error analysis under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [ 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 ].

2013Although he urges this court to reconsider these past decisions, arguing they are based on the mistaken analysis first set forth in People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833 [ 251 Cal.Rptr. 227 , 760 P.2d 423 ], we have rejected that precise claim as well.

2013Although he urges this court to reconsider these past decisions, arguing they are based on the mistaken analysis first set forth in People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833 [ 251 Cal.Rptr. 227 , 760 P.2d 423 ], we have rejected that precise claim as well.

2024In Williams I, supra, 30 Cal.3d 470 , we held a trial court could dismiss, after trial in a murder case, an evidence- supported special circumstance finding that would have subjected a defendant to a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole.

2019True: We and the United States Supreme Court have said that "removing an element of the crime from the jury's consideration" can be harmless "where the defendant concedes or admits that element." ( People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470 , 504, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180 , 957 P.2d 869 ; see Hurst v. Florida (2016) --- U.S. ----, 136 S. Ct. 616 , 623, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 [describing Neder as "holding that the failure to submit an uncontested element of an offense to a jury may be harmless," italics added]; Connecticut v. Johnson (1983) 460 U.S. 73 , 87, 103 S.Ct. 969 , 74 L.Ed.2d 823 (plur. opn. of Blackmun

2019True: We and the United States Supreme Court have said that "removing an element of the crime from the jury's consideration" can be harmless "where the defendant concedes or admits that element." ( People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470 , 504, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180 , 957 P.2d 869 ; see Hurst v. Florida (2016) --- U.S. ----, 136 S. Ct. 616 , 623, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 [describing Neder as "holding that the failure to submit an uncontested element of an offense to a jury may be harmless," italics added]; Connecticut v. Johnson (1983) 460 U.S. 73 , 87, 103 S.Ct. 969 , 74 L.Ed.2d 823 (plur. opn. of Blackmun

2014(People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 173 .) A trial court’s mistaken instruction to a jury that a crime required only a general intent, rather than a specific intent, is subject “‘to harmless error analysis [when] it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to [the] jury’s verdict.’” (People v. Haley, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 314 , quoting People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 504 .) Further, an instruction “that omits a required definition of or misdescribes an element of an offense is harmless only if ‘it appears “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error com

2014(People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 173 .) A trial court’s mistaken instruction to a jury that a crime required only a general intent, rather than a specific intent, is subject “‘to harmless error analysis [when] it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to [the] jury’s verdict.’” (People v. Haley, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 314 , quoting People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 504 .) Further, an instruction “that omits a required definition of or misdescribes an element of an offense is harmless only if ‘it appears “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error com

2014(People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 173 .) A trial court’s mistaken instruction to a jury that a crime required only a general intent, rather than a specific intent, is subject “‘to harmless error analysis [when] it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to [the] jury’s verdict.’” (People v. Haley, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 314 , quoting People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 504 .) Further, an instruction “that omits a required definition of or misdescribes an element of an offense is harmless only if ‘it appears “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error com

2014(People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 1028 .) Further, jurors are presumed to be sufficiently capable of understanding and “‘correlating’” all jury instructions given.

2013The federal Constitution does not compel retroactive application of overruling decisions. [Citations.] Furthermore, the California Constitution permits an appellate court to restrict retroactive application in the interest of fairness and equity, even though prospective application of the new decision temporarily preserves a mistaken rule of law. [Citations.]” (Kawasaki Motors Corp. v. County of Orange (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 780, 783 .) In this case, the amended cross-complaint alleged causes of action for cancellation of the written documents and declaratory relief as a result of the fraudulen

2000Aside from the fact that one accepted purpose of Proposition 13 was to establish state, as opposed to local, control over local property taxes, the San Miguel court relied on cases as recent as Board of Supervisors v. McMahon (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 286 [ 268 Cal.Rptr. 219 ], which also made it clear that “as against the state, the County has no ‘property’ interest in its revenues. ‘ [A]ll property under the care and control of a county is merely held in trust by the county for the people of the entire state.” (Id. at p. 297, italics omitted [county may not challenge state’s aid to families with

2000Aside from the fact that one accepted purpose of Proposition 13 was to establish state, as opposed to local, control over local property taxes, the San Miguel court relied on cases as recent as Board of Supervisors v. McMahon (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 286 [ 268 Cal.Rptr. 219 ], which also made it clear that “as against the state, the County has no ‘property’ interest in its revenues. ‘ [A]ll property under the care and control of a county is merely held in trust by the county for the people of the entire state.” (Id. at p. 297, italics omitted [county may not challenge state’s aid to families with

2000Aside from the fact that one accepted purpose of Proposition 13 was to establish state, as opposed to local, control over local property taxes, the San Miguel court relied on cases as recent as Board of Supervisors v. McMahon (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 286 [ 268 Cal.Rptr. 219 ], which also made it clear that “as against the state, the County has no ‘property’ interest in its revenues. ‘ [A]ll property under the care and control of a county is merely held in trust by the county for the people of the entire state.” (Id. at p. 297, italics omitted [county may not challenge state’s aid to families with

2000Aside from the fact that one accepted purpose of Proposition 13 was to establish state, as opposed to local, control over local property taxes, the San Miguel court relied on cases as recent as Board of Supervisors v. McMahon (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 286 [ 268 Cal.Rptr. 219 ], which also made it clear that “as against the state, the County has no ‘property’ interest in its revenues. ‘ [A]ll property under the care and control of a county is merely held in trust by the county for the people of the entire state.” (Id. at p. 297, italics omitted [county may not challenge state’s aid to families with

1997As we shall explain, the Court of Appeal’s mistaken analysis of, and conclusion on, the duty question posed here rested in part upon the appellate court’s misapplication of the common law cases concerning liability for injury caused by fright to horses, and in part upon its misunderstanding of our decision in Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th 296 .

1997As we shall explain, the Court of Appeal's mistaken analysis of, and conclusion on, the duty question posed here rested in part upon the appellate court's misapplication of the common law cases concerning liability for injury caused by fright to horses, and in part upon its misunderstanding of our decision in Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th 296 .

1987Justice Grodin provided the fourth vote for reversal, but “[wjith reluctance.” ( 36 Cal.3d at p. 71 .) He agreed that “defendant’s showing [based on total population figures] should be regarded as sufficient to trigger further inquiry.” (Id., at p. 71, fn. omitted (cone, opn.).) He believed, however, that an accused “can at least be expected to refine those statistics on the basis of readily available census information reflecting the relative percentages of majority and minority populations over the age of 18.” (Id., at p. 71, fn. 1.) As to remedy, he preferred that the matter be remanded to

1984Finally, it may be able to justify the underrepresentation by showing “that a significant state interest [is] manifestly and primarily advanced by those aspects of the jury selection process . . . that result in the disproportionate exclusion.” (Duren v. Missouri, supra, 439 U.S. at pp. 367-368 [ 58 L.Ed.2d at p. 589 ].) In the present case, however, the state has not attempted to rebut the defendant’s proof but has shortsightedly rested its entire argument on the mistaken claim that defendant failed to present a prima facie case.

1984Finally, it may be able to justify the underrepresentation by showing "that a significant state interest [is] manifestly and primarily advanced by those aspects of the jury selection process ... that result in the disproportionate exclusion." ( Duren v. Missouri, supra, 439 U.S. at pp. 367-368 [ 58 L.Ed.2d at p. 589 ].) In the present case, however, the state has not attempted to rebut the defendant's proof but has shortsightedly rested its entire argument on the mistaken claim that defendant failed to present a prima facie case. (9) The error in concluding that defendant had failed to make a

1984Where it has been infringed, no inquiry as to the sufficiency of the evidence to show guilt is indulged and a conviction by a jury so selected must be set aside.'" ( People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 283 , quoting People v. Riggins (1910) 159 Cal. 113, 120 [ 112 P. 862 ].) The foregoing reasoning leads us to conclude that defendant's conviction must be reversed.

1983Code, § 1008), a significant evidentiary fact in most jurisdictions.” (MacDonald Properties, Inc., supra, 72 Cal.App.3d at p. 703 .) The assertion that there was insufficient objective hostile and adverse use to support a mistaken claim of right is likewise incorrect.

1950(Wolfsen v. Hathaway, 32 Cal.2d 632 [ 198 P.2d 1 ]; Maher v. Wilson, 139 Cal. 514 [ 73 P. 418 ].) The judgment is modified by reducing it in the sum of $1,500, being the amount awarded as exemplary damages and, as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.

1950(Wolfsen v. Hathaway, 32 Cal.2d 632 [ 198 P.2d 1 ]; Maher v. Wilson, 139 Cal. 514 [ 73 P. 418 ].) The judgment is modified by reducing it in the sum of $1,500, being the amount awarded as exemplary damages and, as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.

1950(Wolfsen v. Hathaway, 32 Cal.2d 632 [ 198 P.2d 1 ]; Maher v. Wilson, 139 Cal. 514 [ 73 P. 418 ].) The judgment is modified by reducing it in the sum of $1,500, being the amount awarded as exemplary damages and, as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.

1950(Wolfsen v. Hathaway, 32 Cal.2d 632 [ 198 P.2d 1 ]; Maher v. Wilson, 139 Cal. 514 [ 73 P. 418 ].) The judgment is modified by reducing it in the sum of $1,500, being the amount awarded as exemplary damages and, as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.

1927Co., 19 Ky. Law Rep. 1023 [ 42 S. W. 839 ]; Wallace v. Portland Ry., L. & P. Co., 103 Or. 68 [ 204 Pac. 147 ] ; Day v. Kelly, 50 Mont. 306 [ 146 Pac. 930 ]).” The last two eases cited contain vigorous challenges to the mistaken doctrine that the defense of contributory negligence constitutes a plea of confession and avoidance or requires the admission of guilt on the part of the defendant before he may avail himself of the defense.

1927Co., 19 Ky. Law Rep. 1023 [ 42 S. W. 839 ]; Wallace v. Portland Ry., L. & P. Co., 103 Or. 68 [ 204 Pac. 147 ] ; Day v. Kelly, 50 Mont. 306 [ 146 Pac. 930 ]).” The last two eases cited contain vigorous challenges to the mistaken doctrine that the defense of contributory negligence constitutes a plea of confession and avoidance or requires the admission of guilt on the part of the defendant before he may avail himself of the defense.

1927Co., 19 Ky. Law Rep. 1023 [ 42 S. W. 839 ]; Wallace v. Portland Ry., L. & P. Co., 103 Or. 68 [ 204 Pac. 147 ] ; Day v. Kelly, 50 Mont. 306 [ 146 Pac. 930 ]).” The last two eases cited contain vigorous challenges to the mistaken doctrine that the defense of contributory negligence constitutes a plea of confession and avoidance or requires the admission of guilt on the part of the defendant before he may avail himself of the defense.