portions instruction in California

2025The remaining portions of the instruction appear to derive from People v. Brady (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1314, 1327 (Brady).

2024(People v. Ponce (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1388 ; People v. Modesto (1967) 66 Cal.2d 695, 708 [“defendant’s failure to take the stand does not entitle his attorney to engage in purely speculative argument, substituting his own testimony for that of the defendant in order to insulate the theory of the defense from the scrutiny of cross-examination”].) Here, the trial court properly sustained the prosecution’s objections to the portions of defense counsel’s closing argument that purported to tell the jury what appellant was thinking or feeling before he shot Asghedom.

2014The Court of Appeal found the foreperson’s reminder insufficient to demonstrate that prejudice did not exist because the jury’s discussion “was expressly linked to the adverse inference *686 of guilt to be drawn from the failure to testify. . . . [W]hen a jury chooses to place that inference on the table notwithstanding the court’s express prior instruction not to consider the same inference, we have difficulty understanding why the foreman’s repetition of that instruction would have any curative effect on a jury that has already evinced a willingness to disregard the court’s instructions.” Th

2014The Court of Appeal found the foreperson’s reminder insufficient to demonstrate that prejudice did not exist because the jury’s discussion “was expressly linked to the adverse inference *686 of guilt to be drawn from the failure to testify. . . . [W]hen a jury chooses to place that inference on the table notwithstanding the court’s express prior instruction not to consider the same inference, we have difficulty understanding why the foreman’s repetition of that instruction would have any curative effect on a jury that has already evinced a willingness to disregard the court’s instructions.” Th

2014The Court of Appeal found the foreperson’s reminder insufficient to demonstrate that prejudice did not exist because the jury’s discussion “was expressly linked to the adverse inference *686 of guilt to be drawn from the failure to testify. . . . [W]hen a jury chooses to place that inference on the table notwithstanding the court’s express prior instruction not to consider the same inference, we have difficulty understanding why the foreman’s repetition of that instruction would have any curative effect on a jury that has already evinced a willingness to disregard the court’s instructions.” Th

2014The Court of Appeal found the foreperson’s reminder insufficient to demonstrate that prejudice did not exist because the jury’s discussion “was expressly linked to the adverse inference *686 of guilt to be drawn from the failure to testify. . . . [W]hen a jury chooses to place that inference on the table notwithstanding the court’s express prior instruction not to consider the same inference, we have difficulty understanding why the foreman’s repetition of that instruction would have any curative effect on a jury that has already evinced a willingness to disregard the court’s instructions.” Th

2014The Court of Appeal found the foreperson’s reminder insufficient to demonstrate that prejudice did not exist because the jury’s discussion “was expressly linked to the adverse inference *686 of guilt to be drawn from the failure to testify. . . . [W]hen a jury chooses to place that inference on the table notwithstanding the court’s express prior instruction not to consider the same inference, we have difficulty understanding why the foreman’s repetition of that instruction would have any curative effect on a jury that has already evinced a willingness to disregard the court’s instructions.” Th

2014The Court of Appeal found the foreperson’s reminder insufficient to demonstrate that prejudice did not exist because the jury’s discussion “was expressly linked to the adverse inference *686 of guilt to be drawn from the failure to testify. . . . [W]hen a jury chooses to place that inference on the table notwithstanding the court’s express prior instruction not to consider the same inference, we have difficulty understanding why the foreman’s repetition of that instruction would have any curative effect on a jury that has already evinced a willingness to disregard the court’s instructions.” Th

2000Co. (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 593, 599 [ 178 Cal.Rptr. 908 ].) The portions of the clause relevant to the present case provide: “If other valid and collectible insurance is available to the insured for a loss we cover . . . , our obligations are limited as follows: [ft] a.

2000Co. (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 593, 599 [ 178 Cal.Rptr. 908 ].) The portions of the clause relevant to the present case provide: “If other valid and collectible insurance is available to the insured for a loss we cover . . . , our obligations are limited as follows: [ft] a.

1991(See Soderling v. City of Santa Monica (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 501, 506 [ 191 Cal.Rptr. 140 ] [Subdivision Map Act case].) The negative declaration provisions of rule 15162 satisfy the same purpose as the portions of rule 15162—and section 21166, its enabling statute—that apply to EIR’s.

1991(See Soderling v. City of Santa Monica (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 501, 506 [ 191 Cal.Rptr. 140 ] [Subdivision Map Act case].) The negative declaration provisions of rule 15162 satisfy the same purpose as the portions of rule 15162—and section 21166, its enabling statute—that apply to EIR’s.

1978However, an industry cannot set its own standards,” Plaintiff’s challenge is limited to' the portion of the instruction which provides that “strict liability for the defect in design of a product is based on a finding that the product was unreasonably dangerous for its intended use,” and accordingly we express no opinion as to the propriety of the remaining portions of the instruction. 5 Section 402A provides, inter alia, that one is strictly liable in tort if he “sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property....” 6 See, e.g., Jimi

1978However, an industry cannot set its own standards,” Plaintiff’s challenge is limited to' the portion of the instruction which provides that “strict liability for the defect in design of a product is based on a finding that the product was unreasonably dangerous for its intended use,” and accordingly we express no opinion as to the propriety of the remaining portions of the instruction. 5 Section 402A provides, inter alia, that one is strictly liable in tort if he “sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property....” 6 See, e.g., Jimi

1978Hough Co. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 465, 475-477 [85 Cal.Rptr, 629, 467 P.2d 229 ]; Putensen v. Clay Adams, Inc. (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 1062, 1072 [ 91 Cal.Rptr. 319 ]. 7 This is not to say that the expectations of the ordinary consumer are irrelevant to the determination of whether a product is defective, for as we point out below we believe that ordinary consumer expectations are frequently of direct significance to the *426 defectiveness issue.

1978Hough Co. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 465, 475-477 [85 Cal.Rptr, 629, 467 P.2d 229 ]; Putensen v. Clay Adams, Inc. (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 1062, 1072 [ 91 Cal.Rptr. 319 ]. 7 This is not to say that the expectations of the ordinary consumer are irrelevant to the determination of whether a product is defective, for as we point out below we believe that ordinary consumer expectations are frequently of direct significance to the *426 defectiveness issue.

1978Hough Co. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 465, 475-477 [85 Cal.Rptr, 629, 467 P.2d 229 ]; Putensen v. Clay Adams, Inc. (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 1062, 1072 [ 91 Cal.Rptr. 319 ]. 7 This is not to say that the expectations of the ordinary consumer are irrelevant to the determination of whether a product is defective, for as we point out below we believe that ordinary consumer expectations are frequently of direct significance to the *426 defectiveness issue.

1978Hough Co. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 465, 475-477 [85 Cal.Rptr, 629, 467 P.2d 229 ]; Putensen v. Clay Adams, Inc. (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 1062, 1072 [ 91 Cal.Rptr. 319 ]. 7 This is not to say that the expectations of the ordinary consumer are irrelevant to the determination of whether a product is defective, for as we point out below we believe that ordinary consumer expectations are frequently of direct significance to the *426 defectiveness issue.

1958Whether or not such evidence is sufficient to show that the land can be identified with reasonable certainty is a question of fact for the trial court.” A very satisfactory résumé of most of the portions of the rule here involved is contained in Ellis v. Klaff, 96 Cal.App.2d 471 [ 216 P.2d 15 ], and therein the court quoted the following from Craig v. Zelian, 137 Cal. 105, 106 [ 69 P. 853 ] : “ ‘The whole object of the statute would be frustrated if any substantive portion of the agreement could be established by parol evidence.’ ” Different types of description have been held sufficient, for

1958Whether or not such evidence is sufficient to show that the land can be identified with reasonable certainty is a question of fact for the trial court.” A very satisfactory résumé of most of the portions of the rule here involved is contained in Ellis v. Klaff, 96 Cal.App.2d 471 [ 216 P.2d 15 ], and therein the court quoted the following from Craig v. Zelian, 137 Cal. 105, 106 [ 69 P. 853 ] : “ ‘The whole object of the statute would be frustrated if any substantive portion of the agreement could be established by parol evidence.’ ” Different types of description have been held sufficient, for

1958Whether or not such evidence is sufficient to show that the land can be identified with reasonable certainty is a question of fact for the trial court.” A very satisfactory résumé of most of the portions of the rule here involved is contained in Ellis v. Klaff, 96 Cal.App.2d 471 [ 216 P.2d 15 ], and therein the court quoted the following from Craig v. Zelian, 137 Cal. 105, 106 [ 69 P. 853 ] : “ ‘The whole object of the statute would be frustrated if any substantive portion of the agreement could be established by parol evidence.’ ” Different types of description have been held sufficient, for

1958Whether or not such evidence is sufficient to show that the land can be identified with reasonable certainty is a question of fact for the trial court.” A very satisfactory résumé of most of the portions of the rule here involved is contained in Ellis v. Klaff, 96 Cal.App.2d 471 [ 216 P.2d 15 ], and therein the court quoted the following from Craig v. Zelian, 137 Cal. 105, 106 [ 69 P. 853 ] : “ ‘The whole object of the statute would be frustrated if any substantive portion of the agreement could be established by parol evidence.’ ” Different types of description have been held sufficient, for

1958In Carr v. Howell, 154 Cal. 372, 374 [ 97 P. 885 ], the description was “56 x 155 feet to an alley, on the east side of Broadway between Sixth and Seventh streets, in the city of Los Angeles, Cal., and being a part of lot seven (7) in block 17, Ord’s survey.” The public record showed that this was the only property owned by the seller in the city of Los Angeles, and there was only one property of this description in the city.

1958In Carr v. Howell, 154 Cal. 372, 374 [ 97 P. 885 ], the description was “56 x 155 feet to an alley, on the east side of Broadway between Sixth and Seventh streets, in the city of Los Angeles, Cal., and being a part of lot seven (7) in block 17, Ord’s survey.” The public record showed that this was the only property owned by the seller in the city of Los Angeles, and there was only one property of this description in the city.

1956(See People v. Toledo, 85 Cal.App.2d 577, 581 [ 193 P.2d 953 ], and the *25 other cases heretofore' cited.) The portions of this instruction dealing with burden of proof were fully covered by other instructions on that subject given by the court.

1956(See People v. Toledo, 85 Cal.App.2d 577, 581 [ 193 P.2d 953 ], and the *25 other cases heretofore' cited.) The portions of this instruction dealing with burden of proof were fully covered by other instructions on that subject given by the court.