quantitative analysis in California

2021As our high court has explained, “[a] project opponent or reviewing court can always imagine some additional study or analysis that might provide helpful information.” (Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of California, 26 supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 415 .) But “[i]t is not for them to design the EIR” and “[t]hat further study . . . might be helpful does not make it necessary.” (Ibid.) Seventh, Sierra Watch contends the EIR’s conclusions relied on the improper assumption “that evacuations would proceed in an orderly fashion and often have ‘[d]ays of lead time.’ ” Its objection

2021As our high court has explained, “[a] project opponent or reviewing court can always imagine some additional study or analysis that might provide helpful information.” (Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of California, 26 supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 415 .) But “[i]t is not for them to design the EIR” and “[t]hat further study . . . might be helpful does not make it necessary.” (Ibid.) Seventh, Sierra Watch contends the EIR’s conclusions relied on the improper assumption “that evacuations would proceed in an orderly fashion and often have ‘[d]ays of lead time.’ ” Its objection

2015Mere fortuitous or attenuated contacts will not sustain a finding that the unlicensed lawyer practiced law ‘in California.’ The primary inquiry is whether the unlicensed lawyer engaged in sufficient activities in the state, or created a continuing relationship with the California client that included legal duties and obligations.” (Id. at p. 128.) The court explained its definition did not “necessarily depend on or require the unlicensed lawyer’s physical presence in the state.” (Birbrower, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 128 .) Rather, physical presence in California is one factor to consider in deci

1998Mere fortuitous or attenuated contacts will not sustain a finding that the unlicensed lawyer practiced law ‘in California.’ The primary inquiry is whether the unlicensed lawyer engaged in sufficient activities in the state, or created a continuing relationship with the California client that included legal duties and obligations.” (Birbrower, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 128 , italics added.) In fleshing out the definition of the practice of law in California the Supreme Court in Birbrower states: “Our definition does not necessarily depend on or require the unlicensed lawyer’s physical presence in

2024(See, e.g., Carmona v. Lincoln Millennium Car Wash, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 74, 90 ; Ontiveros, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 515 ; Murphy, 43 RAMIREZ v. CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC.

2024(See, e.g., Carmona v. Lincoln Millennium Car Wash, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 74, 90 ; Ontiveros, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 515 ; Murphy, 43 RAMIREZ v. CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC.

2022(Guidelines, § 15145.)” (National Parks & Conservation Assn. v. County of Riverside (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1364 .) “Agencies are not required to engage in ‘sheer speculation’ as to future environmental consequences of the project.” (Chaparral Greens v. City of Chula Vista (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1134, 1145 , quoting Kings County Farm Bureau v. City of Hanford (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 692, 738 .) CEQA also does not require an analysis to be exhaustive.

2022(Guidelines, § 15145.)” (National Parks & Conservation Assn. v. County of Riverside (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1364 .) “Agencies are not required to engage in ‘sheer speculation’ as to future environmental consequences of the project.” (Chaparral Greens v. City of Chula Vista (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1134, 1145 , quoting Kings County Farm Bureau v. City of Hanford (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 692, 738 .) CEQA also does not require an analysis to be exhaustive.

2022(Guidelines, § 15145.)” (National Parks & Conservation Assn. v. County of Riverside (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1364 .) “Agencies are not required to engage in ‘sheer speculation’ as to future environmental consequences of the project.” (Chaparral Greens v. City of Chula Vista (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1134, 1145 , quoting Kings County Farm Bureau v. City of Hanford (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 692, 738 .) CEQA also does not require an analysis to be exhaustive.

2016Anthony C., is inapposite because, as noted by Zimmerman, in that case the expert’s opinion “fail[ed] to satisfy the quantitative requirement that [the defendant had] ‘serious difficulty’ in controlling his behavior.” (Anthony C., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 1507 .) Here, Dr. Maqsood testified that Zimmerman’s mental disorder caused him to have serious difficulty in controlling his behavior, his opinion is supported by the record, and as noted ante, one expert’s opinion is sufficient to support the court’s finding as to this issue.

2011Regarding the quantitative analysis of defendant and the dissent, the salient point of the high court's decisions is that a "lawful custodial arrest justifies the infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee may have" in property immediately associated with his or her person at the time of arrest ( ibid., italics added), even if there is no reason to believe the property contains weapons or evidence ( Robinson, supra, 414 U.S. at p. 235 ).

2011Regarding the quantitative analysis of defendant and the dissent, the salient point of the high court’s decisions is that a “lawful custodial arrest justifies the infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee may have” in property immediately associated with his or her person at the time of arrest (ibid., italics added), even if there is no reason to believe the property contains weapons or evidence (Robinson, supra, 414 U.S. at p. 235 ).

1980R., supra, 41 Cal.App.3d 694 , 698-699; Adoption of Oukes (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 459, 466-467 [ 92 Cal.Rptr. 390 ].) The trial court’s application of such a quantitative test is reflected in its conclusion Dorothy’s communications were token even though she maintained an “honest desire to have the children.” The mother’s “honest desire to have the children” is inconsistent as a matter of logic with an intent to abandon.

1974(Perez v. United States, supra; Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 [ 13 L.Ed.2d 258 , 85 S.Ct. 348 ]; Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 [ 13 L.Ed.2d 290 , 85 S.Ct. 377 ].) However, the recognition that Congress has the power to act does not. ipso facto negate the state’s power to regulate.

1974(Perez v. United States, supra; Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 [ 13 L.Ed.2d 258 , 85 S.Ct. 348 ]; Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 [ 13 L.Ed.2d 290 , 85 S.Ct. 377 ].) However, the recognition that Congress has the power to act does not. ipso facto negate the state’s power to regulate.

1974(Perez v. United States, supra; Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 [ 13 L.Ed.2d 258 , 85 S.Ct. 348 ]; Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 [ 13 L.Ed.2d 290 , 85 S.Ct. 377 ].) However, the recognition that Congress has the power to act does not. ipso facto negate the state’s power to regulate.

1974(Perez v. United States, supra; Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 [ 13 L.Ed.2d 258 , 85 S.Ct. 348 ]; Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 [ 13 L.Ed.2d 290 , 85 S.Ct. 377 ].) However, the recognition that Congress has the power to act does not. ipso facto negate the state’s power to regulate.

1968Citing People v. Leal (1966) 64 Cal.2d 504 [ 50 Cal.Rptr. 777 , 413 P.2d 665 ], and People v. McCarthy (1966) 64 Cal.2d 513 [ 50 Cal.Rptr. 783 , 413 P.2d 671 ], appellant argues that the evidence did not establish that he was in possession of an amount of narcotics “usable for sale or consumption.” It is true that according to the chemist’s testimony 1 the possibility exists that only traces of heroin were present in the mixture.

1968Citing People v. Leal (1966) 64 Cal.2d 504 [ 50 Cal.Rptr. 777 , 413 P.2d 665 ], and People v. McCarthy (1966) 64 Cal.2d 513 [ 50 Cal.Rptr. 783 , 413 P.2d 671 ], appellant argues that the evidence did not establish that he was in possession of an amount of narcotics “usable for sale or consumption.” It is true that according to the chemist’s testimony 1 the possibility exists that only traces of heroin were present in the mixture.

1968Citing People v. Leal (1966) 64 Cal.2d 504 [ 50 Cal.Rptr. 777 , 413 P.2d 665 ], and People v. McCarthy (1966) 64 Cal.2d 513 [ 50 Cal.Rptr. 783 , 413 P.2d 671 ], appellant argues that the evidence did not establish that he was in possession of an amount of narcotics “usable for sale or consumption.” It is true that according to the chemist’s testimony 1 the possibility exists that only traces of heroin were present in the mixture.

1968Citing People v. Leal (1966) 64 Cal.2d 504 [ 50 Cal.Rptr. 777 , 413 P.2d 665 ], and People v. McCarthy (1966) 64 Cal.2d 513 [ 50 Cal.Rptr. 783 , 413 P.2d 671 ], appellant argues that the evidence did not establish that he was in possession of an amount of narcotics “usable for sale or consumption.” It is true that according to the chemist’s testimony 1 the possibility exists that only traces of heroin were present in the mixture.

1955(Del.) 110 [ 131 A. 317 , 42 A.L.R. 1058 ]; State v. Cerfoglio, 46 Nev. 332 [ 205 P. 791 , 213 P. 102 , 27 A.L.R. 848 ]; Wolford v. Commonwealth, 218 Ky. 420 [ 291 S.W. 366 ].) Nevertheless, the California rule represents the view prevailing in the majority of American jurisdictions. *845 (See annos., 15 A.L.R. 634 ; 27 A.L.R. 857 ; 42 A.L.R. 1063 .) Whether or not this quantitative rule of evidence is anachronistic, or has outlived its usefulness," it is deeply implanted in the common law tradition of protecting an honestly mistaken witness from undue harassment from vengeful persons, and was

1955(Del.) 110 [ 131 A. 317 , 42 A.L.R. 1058 ]; State v. Cerfoglio, 46 Nev. 332 [ 205 P. 791 , 213 P. 102 , 27 A.L.R. 848 ]; Wolford v. Commonwealth, 218 Ky. 420 [ 291 S.W. 366 ].) Nevertheless, the California rule represents the view prevailing in the majority of American jurisdictions. *845 (See annos., 15 A.L.R. 634 ; 27 A.L.R. 857 ; 42 A.L.R. 1063 .) Whether or not this quantitative rule of evidence is anachronistic, or has outlived its usefulness," it is deeply implanted in the common law tradition of protecting an honestly mistaken witness from undue harassment from vengeful persons, and was

1955(Del.) 110 [ 131 A. 317 , 42 A.L.R. 1058 ]; State v. Cerfoglio, 46 Nev. 332 [ 205 P. 791 , 213 P. 102 , 27 A.L.R. 848 ]; Wolford v. Commonwealth, 218 Ky. 420 [ 291 S.W. 366 ].) Nevertheless, the California rule represents the view prevailing in the majority of American jurisdictions. *845 (See annos., 15 A.L.R. 634 ; 27 A.L.R. 857 ; 42 A.L.R. 1063 .) Whether or not this quantitative rule of evidence is anachronistic, or has outlived its usefulness," it is deeply implanted in the common law tradition of protecting an honestly mistaken witness from undue harassment from vengeful persons, and was

1955(Del.) 110 [ 131 A. 317 , 42 A.L.R. 1058 ]; State v. Cerfoglio, 46 Nev. 332 [ 205 P. 791 , 213 P. 102 , 27 A.L.R. 848 ]; Wolford v. Commonwealth, 218 Ky. 420 [ 291 S.W. 366 ].) Nevertheless, the California rule represents the view prevailing in the majority of American jurisdictions. *845 (See annos., 15 A.L.R. 634 ; 27 A.L.R. 857 ; 42 A.L.R. 1063 .) Whether or not this quantitative rule of evidence is anachronistic, or has outlived its usefulness," it is deeply implanted in the common law tradition of protecting an honestly mistaken witness from undue harassment from vengeful persons, and was

1955(Del.) 110 [ 131 A. 317 , 42 A.L.R. 1058 ]; State v. Cerfoglio, 46 Nev. 332 [ 205 P. 791 , 213 P. 102 , 27 A.L.R. 848 ]; Wolford v. Commonwealth, 218 Ky. 420 [ 291 S.W. 366 ].) Nevertheless, the California rule represents the view prevailing in the majority of American jurisdictions. *845 (See annos., 15 A.L.R. 634 ; 27 A.L.R. 857 ; 42 A.L.R. 1063 .) Whether or not this quantitative rule of evidence is anachronistic, or has outlived its usefulness," it is deeply implanted in the common law tradition of protecting an honestly mistaken witness from undue harassment from vengeful persons, and was

1955(Del.) 110 [ 131 A. 317 , 42 A.L.R. 1058 ]; State v. Cerfoglio, 46 Nev. 332 [ 205 P. 791 , 213 P. 102 , 27 A.L.R. 848 ]; Wolford v. Commonwealth, 218 Ky. 420 [ 291 S.W. 366 ].) Nevertheless, the California rule represents the view prevailing in the majority of American jurisdictions. *845 (See annos., 15 A.L.R. 634 ; 27 A.L.R. 857 ; 42 A.L.R. 1063 .) Whether or not this quantitative rule of evidence is anachronistic, or has outlived its usefulness," it is deeply implanted in the common law tradition of protecting an honestly mistaken witness from undue harassment from vengeful persons, and was

1955(Del.) 110 [ 131 A. 317 , 42 A.L.R. 1058 ]; State v. Cerfoglio, 46 Nev. 332 [ 205 P. 791 , 213 P. 102 , 27 A.L.R. 848 ]; Wolford v. Commonwealth, 218 Ky. 420 [ 291 S.W. 366 ].) Nevertheless, the California rule represents the view prevailing in the majority of American jurisdictions. *845 (See annos., 15 A.L.R. 634 ; 27 A.L.R. 857 ; 42 A.L.R. 1063 .) Whether or not this quantitative rule of evidence is anachronistic, or has outlived its usefulness," it is deeply implanted in the common law tradition of protecting an honestly mistaken witness from undue harassment from vengeful persons, and was