18 California opinions name it 3 courts 1983–2024 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Estradagreen2 sentences2022(In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 744 .) However, in the case of In re Pedro T. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1041 (Pedro T.), the Supreme Court held there is no such presumption when a statute is repealed under a sunset clause. 2021(Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 744 .) The Pedro T. court, in holding that Estrada does not apply to a repeal by sunset provision, observed that “when an amendment lessens the punishment for a crime, one may reasonably infer the Legislature has determined imposition of a lesser punishment on offenders thereafter will sufficiently serve the public interest.” (Pedro T., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1045 .) It distinguished that situation, addressed in Estrada, from legislative inclusion of “a ‘sunset’ provision attached to a temporary enhancement of penalty,” from which “the same inference cannot so | 3 | 7 |
People v. Pedro T.green2 sentences2024(Pedro T., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1046 .) The court also observed that “the very nature of a sunset clause, as an experiment in enhanced penalties, establishes—in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative purpose—a legislative intent the enhanced punishment apply to offenses committed throughout its effective period.” (Id. at p. 1049.) The court further considered the practical effect of retroactivity and concluded the Legislature did 68 not intend the planned repeal of the statute to apply retroactively. 2022(In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 744 .) However, in the case of In re Pedro T. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1041 (Pedro T.), the Supreme Court held there is no such presumption when a statute is repealed under a sunset clause. | 2 | 9 |
Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIVgreen2 sentences1998We further note the legislative activity occurred after the Supreme Court’s decision in Pedro T. and the Legislature presumably was aware of the Pedro T. decision (see Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1142, 1155 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 614 , 805 P.2d 873 ]), including the majority’s position in Pedro T. that a statute containing a period of increased penalties and a sunset clause shows a legislative intent that all persons who committed crimes before the sunset date were too vulnerable to the increased penalties. 1998We further note the legislative activity occurred after the Supreme Court’s decision in Pedro T. and the Legislature presumably was aware of the Pedro T. decision (see Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1142, 1155 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 614 , 805 P.2d 873 ]), including the majority’s position in Pedro T. that a statute containing a period of increased penalties and a sunset clause shows a legislative intent that all persons who committed crimes before the sunset date were too vulnerable to the increased penalties. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Nasalgagreen2 sentences2021(See Medeiros, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1151.) The sunset clause evinced “an intent by the Legislature to ensure punishment under section 12022.6 [would] continue to be commensurate with culpability in terms of the ‘real’ value of the dollar.” (People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 784, 796-797 [construing a nearly identical sunset provision in an earlier version of section 12022.6].) “It is clear from this language that the Legislature planned the conditional repeal as a mechanism to review the effects of inflation, not because it determined enhancements should no longer apply for excessive 2020We agree the fine is mandatory and remand is appropriate. 18 Roland relies on People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 784 , but that case “did not address the retroactive or prospective effect of the statute’s sunset clause and, accordingly, it is of no assistance” to Roland. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Enlowgreen1 sentence2020(See People v. Enlow (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 850, 858 [“applying the reasoning of Pedro T., we conclude that since Penal Code section 666.5 . . . provides for a period of increased penalties and contains a sunset clause, the legislative intent was that persons such as Enlow who committed 9 See In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 , 745: “When the Legislature amends a statute so as to lessen the punishment it has obviously expressly determined that its former penalty was too severe and that a lighter punishment is proper as punishment for the commission of the prohibited act. | 1 | 1 |
Nordyke v. Kinggreen2 sentences2013Thus, a common-sense reading of the sunset clause means that, if triggered, it would require all collectives of four or more qualified persons to cease operation. 35 Nordyke v. King (2002) 27 Cal.4th 875, 883-884 (Nordyke), is instructive in this regard. 2013Thus, a common-sense reading of the sunset clause means that, if triggered, it would require all collectives of four or more qualified persons to cease operation. 35 Nordyke v. King (2002) 27 Cal.4th 875, 883-884 (Nordyke), is instructive in this regard. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Lapaillegreen2 sentences2008(People v. Lapaille (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1165 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 390 ].) This term was intended to refer to electronic home detention programs authorized by section 1203.016. (15 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1169-1170.) The inclusion of “home detention programs” in section 2900.5 was subject to a sunset clause. 2008(People v. Lapaille (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1165 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 390 ].) This term was intended to refer to electronic home detention programs authorized by section 1203.016. (15 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1169-1170.) The inclusion of “home detention programs” in section 2900.5 was subject to a sunset clause. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Harrisongreen2 sentences1994(See Charrot v. Municipal Court, supra, 260 Cal. App.2d at p. 210.) "The Legislature, of course, is deemed to be aware of statutes and judicial decisions already in existence, and to have enacted or amended a statute in light thereof." ( People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 329 [ 256 Cal. Rptr. 401 , 768 P.2d 1078 ].) Not only did the Legislature omit the obvious expedient of an express saving clause, it also did not extend the operative effect of the amendment or repeal the sunset clause. 1994(See Charrot v. Municipal Court, supra, 260 Cal. App.2d at p. 210.) "The Legislature, of course, is deemed to be aware of statutes and judicial decisions already in existence, and to have enacted or amended a statute in light thereof." ( People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 329 [ 256 Cal. Rptr. 401 , 768 P.2d 1078 ].) Not only did the Legislature omit the obvious expedient of an express saving clause, it also did not extend the operative effect of the amendment or repeal the sunset clause. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Rossi
green
2 sentences2021(Id. at p. 1049.) 12 Hail also argues his position is supported by People v. Rossi (1976) 18 Cal.3d 295 , 298 and In re Fink (1967) 67 Cal.2d 692 . 2020(Ibid.) A statutory amendment imposing lighter punishment generally operates retroactively (In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 748 ), and in the absence of a savings clause, the repeal of a criminal statute prevents charging a person with a statutory crime (People v. Rossi (1976) 18 Cal.3d 295, 304 ). | 3 | 1994–2021 |
Halbert's Lumber, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc.
green
2 sentences2018Section 226.2(b) Is Not Ambiguous In resolving the question of the scope of the safe harbor defense, we begin by "examin[ing] ... the actual language of the statute. [Citations.]" ( Halbert's Lumber, supra , 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1238 , 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 298 .) The statute provides that, if the employer complies with certain requirements (including payment to current and former piece-rate employees) on or before December 15, 2016, it may assert "an affirmative defense to " any claim or cause of action ... based solely on the employer's failure to pay the employee for [rest/NP time] for time periods 2018Section 226.2(b) Is Not Ambiguous In resolving the question of the scope of the safe harbor defense, we begin by "examin[ing] ... the actual language of the statute. [Citations.]" ( Halbert's Lumber, supra , 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1238 , 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 298 .) The statute provides that, if the employer complies with certain requirements (including payment to current and former piece-rate employees) on or before December 15, 2016, it may assert "an affirmative defense to " any claim or cause of action ... based solely on the employer's failure to pay the employee for [rest/NP time] for time periods | 2 | 2018–2018 |
In Re Fink
green
1 sentence2021(Id. at p. 1049.) 12 Hail also argues his position is supported by People v. Rossi (1976) 18 Cal.3d 295 , 298 and In re Fink (1967) 67 Cal.2d 692 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Avila
green
1 sentence2020(People v. Frandsen (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1126, 1153-1155 ; People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 728-729 ; People v. Bipialaka (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 455, 464 ; People v. Gutierrez (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 1027, 1033 .) Even if appellant had not forfeited the issue, Dueñas does not apply to victim restitution under section 1202.4, subdivision (f). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Bipialaka
green
1 sentence2020(People v. Frandsen (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1126, 1153-1155 ; People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 728-729 ; People v. Bipialaka (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 455, 464 ; People v. Gutierrez (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 1027, 1033 .) Even if appellant had not forfeited the issue, Dueñas does not apply to victim restitution under section 1202.4, subdivision (f). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Frandsen
green
1 sentence2020(People v. Frandsen (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1126, 1153-1155 ; People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 728-729 ; People v. Bipialaka (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 455, 464 ; People v. Gutierrez (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 1027, 1033 .) Even if appellant had not forfeited the issue, Dueñas does not apply to victim restitution under section 1202.4, subdivision (f). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Gutierrez
green
1 sentence2020(People v. Frandsen (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1126, 1153-1155 ; People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 728-729 ; People v. Bipialaka (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 455, 464 ; People v. Gutierrez (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 1027, 1033 .) Even if appellant had not forfeited the issue, Dueñas does not apply to victim restitution under section 1202.4, subdivision (f). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Dueñas
green
2 sentences2020It is an inevitable inference that the Legislature must have intended that the new statute imposing the new lighter penalty now deemed to be sufficient should apply to every case to which it constitutionally could apply.” 28 his crime during the experimental period of increased penalties are to be punished pursuant to the increased penalties,” even though their sentences were not final when the sunset clause took effect].) Ability to Pay Victim Restitution In a supplemental brief, appellant argues that, pursuant to People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 , “this Court should remand this ca 2020It is an inevitable inference that the Legislature must have intended that the new statute imposing the new lighter penalty now deemed to be sufficient should apply to every case to which it constitutionally could apply.” 28 his crime during the experimental period of increased penalties are to be punished pursuant to the increased penalties,” even though their sentences were not final when the sunset clause took effect].) Ability to Pay Victim Restitution In a supplemental brief, appellant argues that, pursuant to People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 , “this Court should remand this ca | 1 | 2020–2020 |
City of Claremont v. Kruse
green
1 sentence2013The MMPA does not preclude local action except in the area “of according qualified persons affirmative defenses to enumerated penal sanctions.” ( Kruse, supra, at p. 1176 .) The MMPA simply does not prohibit a sunset clause of the type contained in the Ordinance. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Mendoza
green
2 sentences2002The date set forth in the sunset clause occurred while the case was on appeal The California Supreme Court held that the inclusion of an express, specific sunset clause evidenced an intent that *269 the increased punishment statute be applied to all offenses committed prior to the date set forth in the sunset clause. (8 Cal.4th at pp. 1048-1049, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 74 , 884 P.2d 1022 .) Application to Pending Cases A statute's words are to be given a plain and commonsense meaning. ( People v. Mendoza (2000) 23 Cal.4th 896, 907 , 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 431 , 4 P.3d 265 .) Section 1210.1 itself does not cont 2002The date set forth in the sunset clause occurred while the case was on appeal The California Supreme Court held that the inclusion of an express, specific sunset clause evidenced an intent that *269 the increased punishment statute be applied to all offenses committed prior to the date set forth in the sunset clause. (8 Cal.4th at pp. 1048-1049, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 74 , 884 P.2d 1022 .) Application to Pending Cases A statute's words are to be given a plain and commonsense meaning. ( People v. Mendoza (2000) 23 Cal.4th 896, 907 , 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 431 , 4 P.3d 265 .) Section 1210.1 itself does not cont | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Mundy v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1995(See Mundy v. Superior Court, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th 1396, 1400 .) The previous law had added a sunset clause to one version of section 11470. 1995(See Mundy v. Superior Court, supra, 31 Cal. App.4th 1396, 1400 .) [4] The previous law had added a sunset clause to one version of section 11470. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Charrot v. Municipal Court
green
2 sentences1983In Charrot v. Municipal Court (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 208 [ 66 Cal.Rptr. 903 ], a prosecution on a statute which expired under a sunset clause was barred because the proceeding had not yet been reduced to final judgment. 1983In Charrot v. Municipal Court (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 208 [ 66 Cal.Rptr. 903 ], a prosecution on a statute which expired under a sunset clause was barred because the proceeding had not yet been reduced to final judgment. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.