fraudulent inducement claim in Florida

2024Affirmed in part, reversed in part. 4 We recognize that Oceanic Villas distinguished between contracts merely disclaiming reliance on representations made prior to execution of the contract and those expressly precluding a party’s ability to bring a fraud claim, finding that only the latter completely forecloses a claim of fraud in the inducement. 4 So. 2d at 691 ; see also NM Residential, LLC v. Prospect Park Dev., LLC, 336 So. 3d 807 , 809 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022); Levitan v. Dancaescu, 347 So. 3d 485 , 491 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022); McIntosh Fish Camp, LLC v. Colwell, 315 So. 3d 784 , 787 (Fla. 5th DCA

2011As early as 1941, our supreme court held in Oceanic Villas, Inc. v. Godson, 148 Fla. 454 , 4 So.2d 689 (1941), that a fraudulent inducement claim cannot be defeated by a contractual agreement unless the contract specifically states a fraud claim is not sufficient to negate the contract.

2016Mazzoni Farms, Inc., 761 So.2d at 316 (concluding the fraudulent inducement claim did not arise from the “use or application of Ben-late,” which qualified and limited the scope of the released claims).

2015DuPont De Nemours & Co., 761 So.2d 306 (Fla.2000), because appellee did not allege it had received payment under the Termination Agreement, and because its fraudulent inducement claim was premised on the unen-forceability of the Termination Agreement: that is, appellee alleges that Newcastle fraudulently misrepresented that the Agreement,was enforceable against Alpha.

2022Courts have construed this decision as standing for the proposition that “one can avoid a fraudulent inducement claim only by contract language which specifically and explicitly negates the right to bring such a claim.” Lower Fees, Inc. v. Bankrate, Inc., 74 So. 3d 517, 519 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011); accord Viridis Corp. v. TCA Global Credit Master Fund, LP, 721 F. App’x 865 , 875 (11th Cir. 2018); Global Quest, LLC v. Horizon Yachts, Inc., 849 F.3d 1022 , 1027–28 (11th Cir. 2017); Onemata Corp. v. Rahman, No. 20-cv-62002-WPD, 2021 WL 5175544 , at *4 (S.D.

2020Fla. July 18, 2016) (dismissing plaintiff’s claims for misappropriation of ideas as preempted by FUTSA where claims not materially distinct), with Fenton, 510 F. Supp. 2d at 893, 908 (denying motion to dismiss plaintiff’s fraudulent inducement claim as there were “material differences between the fraudulent inducement claim and the FUTSA claim”).

2018Gemini Investors III, L.P. v. Nunez, 78 So. 3d 94, 97 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (explaining that fraudulent inducement requires that the party seeking to enforce the contract “(1) made a statement concerning a material fact, (2) knowing that the statement was false, (3) with the intent that the [mistaken party] act on the false statement; and (4) the [mistaken party was] damaged as a result of [its] reasonable reliance on the false statement”). [Footnote 6.] Id. (emphasis supplied) Footnote 6 of DePrince I then explains: We do not hold that the burden to establish inducement for purposes of the first

2018Gemini Investors III, L.P. v. Nunez, 78 So. 3d 94, 97 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (explaining that fraudulent inducement requires that the party seeking to enforce the contract “(1) made a statement concerning a material fact, (2) knowing that the statement was false, (3) with the intent that the [mistaken party] act on the false statement; and (4) the [mistaken party was] damaged as a result of [its] reasonable reliance on the false statement”). [Footnote 6.] Id. (emphasis supplied) Footnote 6 of DePrince I then explains: We do not hold that the burden to establish inducement for purposes of the first

2015See Zikofsky, 904 So.2d at 524 ('[In] a suit on a contract, the failure of a defendant to raise a fraudulent inducement defense will bar the defendant from later raising the defense in a second action on the same contract or from making fraudulent inducement ‘the basis of a subsequent suit by the defendant* against the plaintiff.” (citation omitted)).- However, as with the specific performance claim, we find that the fraudulent inducement claim, as pled, meets the transactional test as it is essentially related to the eviction claim.

2015See Zikofsky, 904 So.2d at 524 ('[In] a suit on a contract, the failure of a defendant to raise a fraudulent inducement defense will bar the defendant from later raising the defense in a second action on the same contract or from making fraudulent inducement ‘the basis of a subsequent suit by the defendant* against the plaintiff.” (citation omitted)).- However, as with the specific performance claim, we find that the fraudulent inducement claim, as pled, meets the transactional test as it is essentially related to the eviction claim.

2015“The elements *436 of a claim for fraudulent inducement are: (1) a false statement of material fact; (2) the maker of the false statement knew or should have known of the falsity of the statement; (3) the maker intended that the false statement induce another’s reliance; and (4) the other party justifiably relied on the false statement to its detriment.” Prieto v. Smook, Inc., 97 So.3d 916, 917 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

2012Martin v. Brown, 566 So.2d 890, 891-92 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990).

2010In addressing the justifiable reliance element of a fraudulent inducement claim in M/I Schottenstein, the Florida Supreme Court reaffirmed its earlier position in Besett v. Basnett, 389 So.2d 995, 997 (Fla.1980), and recognized that “there may be cases in which the falsity of a statement is obvious, and under those circumstances no cause of action could be stated, [and] it would be entirely proper for a trial court to rule against the plaintiff as a matter of law.” M/I Schottenstein, 813 So.2d at 95 ; see also Wasser, 652 So.2d at 413 (noting that “a negligent purchaser is not justified in rel

2010In addressing the justifiable reliance element of a fraudulent inducement claim in M/I Schottenstein, the Florida Supreme Court reaffirmed its earlier position in Besett v. Basnett, 389 So.2d 995, 997 (Fla.1980), and recognized that “there may be cases in which the falsity of a statement is obvious, and under those circumstances no cause of action could be stated, [and] it would be entirely proper for a trial court to rule against the plaintiff as a matter of law.” M/I Schottenstein, 813 So.2d at 95 ; see also Wasser, 652 So.2d at 413 (noting that “a negligent purchaser is not justified in rel

2010In addressing the justifiable reliance element of a fraudulent inducement claim in M/I Schottenstein, the Florida Supreme Court reaffirmed its earlier position in Besett v. Basnett, 389 So.2d 995, 997 (Fla.1980), and recognized that “there may be cases in which the falsity of a statement is obvious, and under those circumstances no cause of action could be stated, [and] it would be entirely proper for a trial court to rule against the plaintiff as a matter of law.” M/I Schottenstein, 813 So.2d at 95 ; see also Wasser, 652 So.2d at 413 (noting that “a negligent purchaser is not justified in rel

2010In addressing the justifiable reliance element of a fraudulent inducement claim in M/I Schottenstein, the Florida Supreme Court reaffirmed its earlier position in Besett v. Basnett, 389 So.2d 995, 997 (Fla.1980), and recognized that “there may be cases in which the falsity of a statement is obvious, and under those circumstances no cause of action could be stated, [and] it would be entirely proper for a trial court to rule against the plaintiff as a matter of law.” M/I Schottenstein, 813 So.2d at 95 ; see also Wasser, 652 So.2d at 413 (noting that “a negligent purchaser is not justified in rel

2005Nonetheless, the supreme court applied res judicata to bar the fraudulent inducement defense at the second trial. [3] See McGregor v. Provident Trust Co. of Phila., 119 Fla. 718 , 162 So. 323, 328 (1935). [4] McGregor is difficult reading, in part because the supreme court discusses collateral estoppel as one of two rules of the "fundamental doctrine" of "res adjudicata." 162 So. at 327 .

2005Nonetheless, the supreme court applied res judicata to bar the fraudulent inducement defense at the second trial. [3] See McGregor v. Provident Trust Co. of Phila., 119 Fla. 718 , 162 So. 323, 328 (1935). [4] McGregor is difficult reading, in part because the supreme court discusses collateral estoppel as one of two rules of the "fundamental doctrine" of "res adjudicata." 162 So. at 327 .

2005Id. at 130 (citation omitted).

2005NOTES [1] This court upheld the trial court's decision not to allow the counterclaim and third party complaint, because the motion to add these pleadings "came less than three months before trial, over two years after Robby Vapor Systems had last amended its complaint." Zikofsky v. Robby Vapor Sys., Inc., 846 So.2d 684, 685 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). [2] We note that in Equitable Life, before the first trial, the insurance company became aware of the facts that would have supported a fraudulent inducement defense. 178 So. at 128 .

2005NOTES [1] This court upheld the trial court's decision not to allow the counterclaim and third party complaint, because the motion to add these pleadings "came less than three months before trial, over two years after Robby Vapor Systems had last amended its complaint." Zikofsky v. Robby Vapor Sys., Inc., 846 So.2d 684, 685 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). [2] We note that in Equitable Life, before the first trial, the insurance company became aware of the facts that would have supported a fraudulent inducement defense. 178 So. at 128 .

2000For example, although the release at issue in Hold v. Manzini, 736 So.2d 138, 141 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), discharged the party from claims "upon or by reason of any matter, cause or thing whatsoever, from the beginning of the world to the day of these presents," the court held that the release did not bar any claims accruing after the date of execution.

1998Computer Systems, Inc., 517 So.2d 700, 706 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987), where this court held that attorney's fees incurred in defense of a fraudulent inducement claim could not be awarded under an attorney's fee provision in the contract that was supposedly induced by fraud.