fraudulent inducement claim in Colorado

2024Cities Broad., Inc. v. Schueller , 830 P.2d 1074, 1077 (Colo. App. 1991) (“ Actual damage is an essential element ” of a fraudulent inducement claim, and to recover, a plaintiff “ must prove both the value of the consideration he actually received under the fraudulently induced contract and the value that considerati on would have had if the representations had been true. ” ), a ff’d , 849 11 P.2d 44 (Colo. 1993) ; accord Club Matrix, LLC v. Nassi , 284 P.3d 93, 96 (Colo. App. 2011). ¶ 26 We are similarly unconvinced by the Andersons ’ argument that the district court improperly “conflated” Mr

2024Cities Broad., Inc. v. Schueller , 830 P.2d 1074, 1077 (Colo. App. 1991) (“ Actual damage is an essential element ” of a fraudulent inducement claim, and to recover, a plaintiff “ must prove both the value of the consideration he actually received under the fraudulently induced contract and the value that considerati on would have had if the representations had been true. ” ), a ff’d , 849 11 P.2d 44 (Colo. 1993) ; accord Club Matrix, LLC v. Nassi , 284 P.3d 93, 96 (Colo. App. 2011). ¶ 26 We are similarly unconvinced by the Andersons ’ argument that the district court improperly “conflated” Mr

2024Cities Broad., Inc. v. Schueller , 830 P.2d 1074, 1077 (Colo. App. 1991) (“ Actual damage is an essential element ” of a fraudulent inducement claim, and to recover, a plaintiff “ must prove both the value of the consideration he actually received under the fraudulently induced contract and the value that considerati on would have had if the representations had been true. ” ), a ff’d , 849 11 P.2d 44 (Colo. 1993) ; accord Club Matrix, LLC v. Nassi , 284 P.3d 93, 96 (Colo. App. 2011). ¶ 26 We are similarly unconvinced by the Andersons ’ argument that the district court improperly “conflated” Mr

2024Cities Broad., Inc. v. Schueller , 830 P.2d 1074, 1077 (Colo. App. 1991) (“ Actual damage is an essential element ” of a fraudulent inducement claim, and to recover, a plaintiff “ must prove both the value of the consideration he actually received under the fraudulently induced contract and the value that considerati on would have had if the representations had been true. ” ), a ff’d , 849 11 P.2d 44 (Colo. 1993) ; accord Club Matrix, LLC v. Nassi , 284 P.3d 93, 96 (Colo. App. 2011). ¶ 26 We are similarly unconvinced by the Andersons ’ argument that the district court improperly “conflated” Mr

2025Cf. Premier Farm Credit, PCA v. W-Cattle, LLC, 155 P.3d 504, 515-16 (Colo. App. 2006) (a claim does not have to seek affirmative relief to be barred by the CASF; a fraudulent inducement claim seeking to avoid foreclosure of security based on a promise to forbear from declaring a loan in default falls within the statute’s scope). ¶ 72 Indeed, the representations lender is alleged to have made — essentially, that builder was approved for extra projects based on his financials after an extensive background check — are representations of fact.

2018Walker Co. v. Cambria Corp., 159 P.3d 126, 130 (Colo. 2007) (applying this rule to a fraudulent inducement challenge to an arbitration agreement); Archangel Diamond Corp. v. Lukoil, 123 P.3d 1187, 1190 (Colo. 2005), as modified on denial of reh’g (Dec. 19, 2005) (applying this rule in the C.R.C.P. 12(b)(2) context); People v. Wunder, 2016 COA 46, ¶ 34 (“[A] trial court may not, consistent with procedural due process, enter judgments for civil penalties and restitution on disputed facts without holding an evidentiary hearing.”). ¶ 29 Here, the postconviction court relied on some evidence to fin

2018Walker Co. v. Cambria Corp., 159 P.3d 126, 130 (Colo. 2007) (applying this rule to a fraudulent inducement challenge to an arbitration agreement); Archangel Diamond Corp. v. Lukoil, 123 P.3d 1187, 1190 (Colo. 2005), as modified on denial of reh’g (Dec. 19, 2005) (applying this rule in the C.R.C.P. 12(b)(2) context); People v. Wunder, 2016 COA 46, ¶ 34 (“[A] trial court may not, consistent with procedural due process, enter judgments for civil penalties and restitution on disputed facts without holding an evidentiary hearing.”). ¶ 29 Here, the postconviction court relied on some evidence to fin

2018Walker Co. v. Cambria Corp., 159 P.3d 126, 130 (Colo. 2007) (applying this rule to a fraudulent inducement challenge to an arbitration agreement); Archangel Diamond Corp. v. Lukoil, 123 P.3d 1187, 1190 (Colo. 2005), as modified on denial of reh’g (Dec. 19, 2005) (applying this rule in the C.R.C.P. 12(b)(2) context); People v. Wunder, 2016 COA 46, ¶ 34 (“[A] trial court may not, consistent with procedural due process, enter judgments for civil penalties and restitution on disputed facts without holding an evidentiary hearing.”). ¶ 29 Here, the postconviction court relied on some evidence to fin

2014Co., 319 Ill.App.3d 890 , 253 Ill.Dec. 468 , 745 N.E.2d 591, 605 (2001) (holding that the filed rate doctrine barred private right of action for consumer fraud) (applying Colorado law); Richardson, 853 A.2d at 964-65 (holding that the filed rate doctrine precludes insured's fraudulent inducement claim). 23 1 85 Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in holding that a complete or partial refund of UM/UIM premiums for additional vehicles was not a permissible theory of damages on the fraudulent inducement claim.

2014Co., 319 Ill.App.3d 890 , 253 Ill.Dec. 468 , 745 N.E.2d 591, 605 (2001) (holding that the filed rate doctrine barred private right of action for consumer fraud) (applying Colorado law); Richardson, 853 A.2d at 964-65 (holding that the filed rate doctrine precludes insured's fraudulent inducement claim). 23 1 85 Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in holding that a complete or partial refund of UM/UIM premiums for additional vehicles was not a permissible theory of damages on the fraudulent inducement claim.

2014Co., 319 Ill.App.3d 890 , 253 Ill.Dec. 468 , 745 N.E.2d 591, 605 (2001) (holding that the filed rate doctrine barred private right of action for consumer fraud) (applying Colorado law); Richardson, 853 A.2d at 964-65 (holding that the filed rate doctrine precludes insured's fraudulent inducement claim). 23 1 85 Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in holding that a complete or partial refund of UM/UIM premiums for additional vehicles was not a permissible theory of damages on the fraudulent inducement claim.

2007See id. at 9-10, 159 P.3d at 120 .

1989See, e.g., Ponder v. Altura Farms Co., 57 Colo. 519, 525-26 , 143 P. 570 , 572 (1914) (party seeking to rescind contract on ground of fraudulent inducement “must, upon the discovery of the facts, at once announce his purpose” or else will be deemed to have waived the objection and be bound by the contract).

1989See, e.g., Ponder v. Altura Farms Co., 57 Colo. 519, 525-26 , 143 P. 570 , 572 (1914) (party seeking to rescind contract on ground of fraudulent inducement "must, upon the discovery of the facts, at once announce his purpose" or else will be deemed to have waived the objection and be bound by the contract).