irreparable harm requirement in Florida

2026Our certiorari jurisdiction is thus properly invoked in this case."); Paylan v. Fitzgerald, 223 So. 3d 431, 434 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) ("Orders that require disclosure of confidential medical information meet the irreparable harm requirement for certiorari review because once such information is 4 improperly disclosed, the harm caused by that disclosure cannot be undone.").

2025See, e.g., Tanner v. Hart, 313 So. 3d 805 , 807 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) (“[A]n order that compels production of a party’s medical records satisfies the jurisdictional element of irreparable harm.”); Paylan v. Fitzgerald, 223 So. 3d 431, 434 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (“Orders that require disclosure of confidential medical information meet the irreparable harm requirement for certiorari review because once such information is improperly disclosed, the harm caused by that disclosure cannot be undone.”); Zarzaur v. Zarzaur, 213 So. 3d 1115, 1117 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (“Erroneous disclosure of medical records q

2023“The fact that a petitioner will incur litigation expenses is normally not enough to meet the irreparable harm test.” AVCO Corp. v. Neff, 30 So. 3d 597, 601 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).

2011We have repeatedly declined to grant certiorari review to orders that petitioners claim will cause irreparable harm due to payment of unnecessary litigation and defense expenses.” Id.

2025Cal. June 1, 2017) (determining that a claim was unripe, as “the harm [was] highly speculative because Plaintiff ha[d] not presented any evidence that USCIS will wrongfully deny Plaintiff’s . . . application”); Sakthivel v. Jaddou, No. 21- 1207, 2023 WL 2888565 , at *4 n.2 (4th Cir. Apr. 11, 2023) (rejecting appellants’ argument that they would “suffer harm because USCIS might deny their adjustment of status petitions,” as such “alleged harm is too speculative” for purposes of Article III standing requirements); Recarey v. Rader, 320 So. 2d 28 , 29–30 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975) (“[T]he appointment of

2025See Rodriguez, 117 So. 3d at 404 . -7- III With these background principles in mind, we turn to the statute at issue here, which begins with a statement of legislative intent: It is the public policy of this state that a person or governmental entity not engage in SLAPP suits because such actions are inconsistent with the right of persons to exercise such constitutional rights of free speech in connection with public issues. . . .

2025See, e.g., Tanner v. Hart, 313 So. 3d 805 , 807 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) (“[A]n order that compels production of a party’s medical records satisfies the jurisdictional element of irreparable harm.”); Paylan v. Fitzgerald, 223 So. 3d 431, 434 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (“Orders that require disclosure of confidential medical information meet the irreparable harm requirement for certiorari review because once such information is improperly disclosed, the harm caused by that disclosure cannot be undone.”); Zarzaur v. Zarzaur, 213 So. 3d 1115, 1117 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (“Erroneous disclosure of medical records q

2025See, e.g., Tanner v. Hart, 313 So. 3d 805 , 807 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) (“[A]n order that compels production of a party’s medical records satisfies the jurisdictional element of irreparable harm.”); Paylan v. Fitzgerald, 223 So. 3d 431, 434 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (“Orders that require disclosure of confidential medical information meet the irreparable harm requirement for certiorari review because once such information is improperly disclosed, the harm caused by that disclosure cannot be undone.”); Zarzaur v. Zarzaur, 213 So. 3d 1115, 1117 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (“Erroneous disclosure of medical records q

2022See CVS Caremark Corp. v. Latour, 109 So. 3d 1232, 1234 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (explaining that the irreparable harm inquiry is jurisdictional).

2019See Loewenstein, Inc. v. Draheim, 898 So. 2d 1129, 1130 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (dismissing petition for writ of certiorari because the petitioner failed to establish irreparable harm). 2 JURISDICTION We have jurisdiction, as we have previously held that a trial court’s order vacating an arbitration award and remanding the matter for a new arbitration constitutes irreparable harm.

2017See id. at 100 (‘We hold that an inquiry is never permissible unless the moving party has made sworn factual allegations that, if true, would require a trial court to order a new trial .... ”).

2013Bd. of Trustees, 99 So.3d at 454-55 (“A finding that the petitioning party has ‘suffered an irreparable harm that cannot be remedied on direct appeal’ is a ‘condition precedent to invoking a district court’s certiorari jurisdiction.’ ”) (quoting Jaye v. Royal Sax on, Inc., 720 So.2d 214, 215 (Fla.1998)); accord Pepsi Bottling Group, Inc. v. Underwood, 8 So.3d 1260, 1262 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (denying petition for certiorari in workers’ compensation case because petitioner “failed to satisfy the irreparable harm requirement”).

2013Bd. of Trustees, 99 So.3d at 454-55 (“A finding that the petitioning party has ‘suffered an irreparable harm that cannot be remedied on direct appeal’ is a ‘condition precedent to invoking a district court’s certiorari jurisdiction.’ ”) (quoting Jaye v. Royal Sax on, Inc., 720 So.2d 214, 215 (Fla.1998)); accord Pepsi Bottling Group, Inc. v. Underwood, 8 So.3d 1260, 1262 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (denying petition for certiorari in workers’ compensation case because petitioner “failed to satisfy the irreparable harm requirement”).

2013Bd. of Trustees, 99 So.3d at 454-55 (“A finding that the petitioning party has ‘suffered an irreparable harm that cannot be remedied on direct appeal’ is a ‘condition precedent to invoking a district court’s certiorari jurisdiction.’ ”) (quoting Jaye v. Royal Sax on, Inc., 720 So.2d 214, 215 (Fla.1998)); accord Pepsi Bottling Group, Inc. v. Underwood, 8 So.3d 1260, 1262 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (denying petition for certiorari in workers’ compensation case because petitioner “failed to satisfy the irreparable harm requirement”).

2012But see Gray v. State, 13 So.3d 114, 115 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (declining to review the issue by certiorari without prejudice to raise the claim on direct appeal), affirmed on subsequent appeal, Gray v. State, 42 So.3d 341 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010); Montanez v. State, 24 So.3d 799 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (denying a petition for writ of certiorari and expressing doubt as to whether the irreparable harm requirement was met); Darling v. State, 81 So.3d 574, 577 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (reviewing the issue on direct appeal).

2011For example, in North Pointe Insurance Co. v. Tomas, 999 So.2d 728, 728-29 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008), we granted an insurer’s petition and quashed “a non-final order denying a motion to dismiss or abate a bad faith claim arising out of a dispute over homeowners’ insurance coverage,” remanding for “abatement of the bad faith claim pending disposition of the breach of contract action.” While the bad faith claim in the trial court may have been premature in that case, the irreparable harm requirement had not yet been satisfied.

2011For example, in North Pointe Insurance Co. v. Tomas, 999 So.2d 728, 728-29 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008), we granted an insurer's petition and quashed "a non-final order denying a motion to dismiss or abate a bad faith claim arising out of a dispute over homeowners' insurance coverage," remanding for "abatement of the bad faith claim pending disposition of the breach of contract action." While the bad faith claim in the trial court may have been premature in that case, the irreparable harm requirement had not yet been satisfied.

2009Olges v. Dougherty, 856 So.2d 6, 10 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).

2006A federal district court in Florida's Middle District commented upon the irreparable harm presumption in North American Products Corp. v. Moore, 196 F.Supp.2d 1217, 1230-31 (M.D.Fla.2002): The focus of preliminary injunctive relief is on maintaining long standing relationships and preserving the goodwill of a company built up over the course of years of doing business. . . .

1998See Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1431, 1432 (11th Cir.1995) ("The party's failure to demonstrate a `substantial likelihood of success on merits' may defeat the party's claim, regardless of its ability to establish any of the other elements.").

1996See generally, id. at 1306 (Barkdull, J., specially concurring).