18 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
International Shoe Co. v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2006Appellants Mackey and Severino argue before this Court that Maryland law does not recognize the conspiracy theory of jurisdiction because it is inconsistent with the plain language of the Maryland “long-arm” statute, Md.Code (1974, 2002 Repl.Vol., 2005 Cum.Supp.), § 6-103(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. 1 They argue further that the conspiracy theory violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by not satisfying the minimum contacts test required by Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) 2006Appellants Mackey and Severino argue before this Court that Maryland law does not recognize the conspiracy theory of jurisdiction because it is inconsistent with the plain language of the Maryland “long-arm” statute, Md.Code (1974, 2002 Repl.Vol., 2005 Cum.Supp.), § 6-103(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. 1 They argue further that the conspiracy theory violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by not satisfying the minimum contacts test required by Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) | 3 | 5 |
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewiczgreen2 sentences1993The minimum contacts test of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 , 66 S.Ct. 154, 158 , 90 L.Ed. 95, 102 (1945), rests on “ ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 , 105 S.Ct. 2174 , 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985), held that, to be subject to a foreign court’s jurisdiction, nonresidents must have purposefully-availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activity within that state and of the benefits and protection of the laws of that state. 1993The minimum contacts test of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 , 66 S.Ct. 154, 158 , 90 L.Ed. 95, 102 (1945), rests on “ ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 , 105 S.Ct. 2174 , 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985), held that, to be subject to a foreign court’s jurisdiction, nonresidents must have purposefully-availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activity within that state and of the benefits and protection of the laws of that state. | 2 | 4 |
Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist.green2 sentences2024Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, 592 U.S. at ___ , 141 S. Ct. at 1031. 2024Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, 592 U.S. at ___ , 141 S. Ct. at 1031. | 2 | 2 |
Shaffer v. Heitnergreen2 sentences2011The Supreme Court’s decision in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 , 97 S.Ct. 2569 , 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977), eliminated all doubt that the minimum contacts standard in International Shoe governs in rem and quasi in rem actions as well as in personam actions. 2011The Supreme Court’s decision in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 , 97 S.Ct. 2569 , 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977), eliminated all doubt that the minimum contacts standard in International Shoe governs in rem and quasi in rem actions as well as in personam actions. | 1 | 5 |
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodsongreen2 sentences2000See Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253 [, 78 S.Ct. 1228 ]; Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 , 105 S.Ct. 2174 ; World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297 [, 100 S.Ct. 559 ], And if that initial tost is met, a court must still determine whether the exercise of such jurisdiction would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 2000See Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253 [, 78 S.Ct. 1228 ]; Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 , 105 S.Ct. 2174 ; World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297 [, 100 S.Ct. 559 ], And if that initial tost is met, a court must still determine whether the exercise of such jurisdiction would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. | 1 | 2 |
Hanson v. Dencklagreen2 sentences2000See Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253 [, 78 S.Ct. 1228 ]; Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 , 105 S.Ct. 2174 ; World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297 [, 100 S.Ct. 559 ], And if that initial tost is met, a court must still determine whether the exercise of such jurisdiction would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 1986In applying the minimum contacts rule in Hanson , the Court noted that a defendant’s contact with a forum state would vary with the quality and nature of the defendant’s activity, and stated that: [I]t is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. 357 U.S. at 253 , 78 S.Ct. at 1239 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). | 1 | 2 |
Sternberg v. O'NEILgreen1 sentence2017Appellants relied on the Supreme Court of Delaware’s decision in Sternberg v. O'Neil, 550 A.2d 1105, 1123 (Del. 1988), to support jurisdiction on these grounds. | 1 | 1 |
Beverly Lesnick, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Stanley S. Lesnick v. Hollingsworth & Vose Co., and Lorillard, Inc.green2 sentences2009To permit a state to assert jurisdiction over any person in the country whose product is sold in the state simply because a person must expect that to happen destroys the notion of individual sovereignties inherent in our system of federalism. 35 F.3d at 945 (emphasis added). 2009To permit a state to assert jurisdiction over any person in the country whose product is sold in the state simply because a person must expect that to happen destroys the notion of individual sovereignties inherent in our system of federalism. 35 F.3d at 945 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Camelback Ski Corp. v. Behninggreen2 sentences2008See id. at 341 , 539 A.2d 1107 . 2008See id. at 341 , 539 A.2d 1107 . | 1 | 1 |
Bank of Babylon v. Quirkgreen2 sentences2007Accord Huggins v. Deinhard, 134 Ariz. 98, 102-03 , 654 P.2d 32, 36-37 (Ariz.App.1982) (citing Shaffer footnote 36, and concluding “there is no unfairness in allowing the [judgment creditor] to realize on that debt in Arizona where the [judgment debtor] has property [viz., an Arizona bank account]”); Bank of Babylon v. Quirk, 192 Conn. 447, 450 , 472 A.2d 21 (1984)(“Having been given fair notice and an opportunity to defend the action on the merits in the state of New York, the defendant cannot be heard to complain because the plaintiff seeks to enforce that judgment against property situated i 2007Accord Huggins v. Deinhard, 134 Ariz. 98, 102-03 , 654 P.2d 32, 36-37 (Ariz.App.1982) (citing Shaffer footnote 36, and concluding “there is no unfairness in allowing the [judgment creditor] to realize on that debt in Arizona where the [judgment debtor] has property [viz., an Arizona bank account]”); Bank of Babylon v. Quirk, 192 Conn. 447, 450 , 472 A.2d 21 (1984)(“Having been given fair notice and an opportunity to defend the action on the merits in the state of New York, the defendant cannot be heard to complain because the plaintiff seeks to enforce that judgment against property situated i | 1 | 1 |
Huggins v. Deinhardgreen2 sentences2007Accord Huggins v. Deinhard, 134 Ariz. 98, 102-03 , 654 P.2d 32, 36-37 (Ariz.App.1982) (citing Shaffer footnote 36, and concluding “there is no unfairness in allowing the [judgment creditor] to realize on that debt in Arizona where the [judgment debtor] has property [viz., an Arizona bank account]”); Bank of Babylon v. Quirk, 192 Conn. 447, 450 , 472 A.2d 21 (1984)(“Having been given fair notice and an opportunity to defend the action on the merits in the state of New York, the defendant cannot be heard to complain because the plaintiff seeks to enforce that judgment against property situated i 2007Accord Huggins v. Deinhard, 134 Ariz. 98, 102-03 , 654 P.2d 32, 36-37 (Ariz.App.1982) (citing Shaffer footnote 36, and concluding “there is no unfairness in allowing the [judgment creditor] to realize on that debt in Arizona where the [judgment debtor] has property [viz., an Arizona bank account]”); Bank of Babylon v. Quirk, 192 Conn. 447, 450 , 472 A.2d 21 (1984)(“Having been given fair notice and an opportunity to defend the action on the merits in the state of New York, the defendant cannot be heard to complain because the plaintiff seeks to enforce that judgment against property situated i | 1 | 1 |
Berger v. Bergergreen2 sentences2007Personal jurisdiction over the defendant would, of course, not be required.”), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1097 , 102 S.Ct. 669 , 70 L.Ed.2d 638 (1981); Hexter v. Hexter, 179 Ind.App. 638, 639 , 386 N.E.2d 1006, 1007 (1979)(interpreting Shaffer footnote 36 to mean that opinion has no application to post-judgment full faith and credit actions); Ruiz v. Lloses, 233 NJ.Super. 608, 611, 559 A.2d 866, 867 (App.Div.l989)(“Footnote 36 in Shaffer makes it clear that ownership of property by the nonresident debtor is sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction in a [post-judgment] Full Faith and Credit situa 2007Personal jurisdiction over the defendant would, of course, not be required.”), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1097 , 102 S.Ct. 669 , 70 L.Ed.2d 638 (1981); Hexter v. Hexter, 179 Ind.App. 638, 639 , 386 N.E.2d 1006, 1007 (1979)(interpreting Shaffer footnote 36 to mean that opinion has no application to post-judgment full faith and credit actions); Ruiz v. Lloses, 233 NJ.Super. 608, 611, 559 A.2d 866, 867 (App.Div.l989)(“Footnote 36 in Shaffer makes it clear that ownership of property by the nonresident debtor is sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction in a [post-judgment] Full Faith and Credit situa | 1 | 1 |
Fraser v. Littlejohngreen1 sentence2007Personal jurisdiction over the defendant would, of course, not be required.”), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1097 , 102 S.Ct. 669 , 70 L.Ed.2d 638 (1981); Hexter v. Hexter, 179 Ind.App. 638, 639 , 386 N.E.2d 1006, 1007 (1979)(interpreting Shaffer footnote 36 to mean that opinion has no application to post-judgment full faith and credit actions); Ruiz v. Lloses, 233 NJ.Super. 608, 611, 559 A.2d 866, 867 (App.Div.l989)(“Footnote 36 in Shaffer makes it clear that ownership of property by the nonresident debtor is sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction in a [post-judgment] Full Faith and Credit situa | 1 | 1 |
Williamson v. Williamsongreen2 sentences2007Accord Huggins v. Deinhard, 134 Ariz. 98, 102-03 , 654 P.2d 32, 36-37 (Ariz.App.1982) (citing Shaffer footnote 36, and concluding “there is no unfairness in allowing the [judgment creditor] to realize on that debt in Arizona where the [judgment debtor] has property [viz., an Arizona bank account]”); Bank of Babylon v. Quirk, 192 Conn. 447, 450 , 472 A.2d 21 (1984)(“Having been given fair notice and an opportunity to defend the action on the merits in the state of New York, the defendant cannot be heard to complain because the plaintiff seeks to enforce that judgment against property situated i 2007Accord Huggins v. Deinhard, 134 Ariz. 98, 102-03 , 654 P.2d 32, 36-37 (Ariz.App.1982) (citing Shaffer footnote 36, and concluding “there is no unfairness in allowing the [judgment creditor] to realize on that debt in Arizona where the [judgment debtor] has property [viz., an Arizona bank account]”); Bank of Babylon v. Quirk, 192 Conn. 447, 450 , 472 A.2d 21 (1984)(“Having been given fair notice and an opportunity to defend the action on the merits in the state of New York, the defendant cannot be heard to complain because the plaintiff seeks to enforce that judgment against property situated i | 1 | 1 |
Tabet v. Tabetgreen1 sentence2007Accord Huggins v. Deinhard, 134 Ariz. 98, 102-03 , 654 P.2d 32, 36-37 (Ariz.App.1982) (citing Shaffer footnote 36, and concluding “there is no unfairness in allowing the [judgment creditor] to realize on that debt in Arizona where the [judgment debtor] has property [viz., an Arizona bank account]”); Bank of Babylon v. Quirk, 192 Conn. 447, 450 , 472 A.2d 21 (1984)(“Having been given fair notice and an opportunity to defend the action on the merits in the state of New York, the defendant cannot be heard to complain because the plaintiff seeks to enforce that judgment against property situated i | 1 | 1 |
Black v. Blackgreen2 sentences2007Personal jurisdiction over the defendant would, of course, not be required.”), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1097 , 102 S.Ct. 669 , 70 L.Ed.2d 638 (1981); Hexter v. Hexter, 179 Ind.App. 638, 639 , 386 N.E.2d 1006, 1007 (1979)(interpreting Shaffer footnote 36 to mean that opinion has no application to post-judgment full faith and credit actions); Ruiz v. Lloses, 233 NJ.Super. 608, 611, 559 A.2d 866, 867 (App.Div.l989)(“Footnote 36 in Shaffer makes it clear that ownership of property by the nonresident debtor is sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction in a [post-judgment] Full Faith and Credit situa 2007Personal jurisdiction over the defendant would, of course, not be required.”), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1097 , 102 S.Ct. 669 , 70 L.Ed.2d 638 (1981); Hexter v. Hexter, 179 Ind.App. 638, 639 , 386 N.E.2d 1006, 1007 (1979)(interpreting Shaffer footnote 36 to mean that opinion has no application to post-judgment full faith and credit actions); Ruiz v. Lloses, 233 NJ.Super. 608, 611, 559 A.2d 866, 867 (App.Div.l989)(“Footnote 36 in Shaffer makes it clear that ownership of property by the nonresident debtor is sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction in a [post-judgment] Full Faith and Credit situa | 1 | 1 |
Ruiz v. Llosesgreen1 sentence2007Personal jurisdiction over the defendant would, of course, not be required.”), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1097 , 102 S.Ct. 669 , 70 L.Ed.2d 638 (1981); Hexter v. Hexter, 179 Ind.App. 638, 639 , 386 N.E.2d 1006, 1007 (1979)(interpreting Shaffer footnote 36 to mean that opinion has no application to post-judgment full faith and credit actions); Ruiz v. Lloses, 233 NJ.Super. 608, 611, 559 A.2d 866, 867 (App.Div.l989)(“Footnote 36 in Shaffer makes it clear that ownership of property by the nonresident debtor is sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction in a [post-judgment] Full Faith and Credit situa | 1 | 1 |
Hexter v. Hextergreen2 sentences2007Personal jurisdiction over the defendant would, of course, not be required.”), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1097 , 102 S.Ct. 669 , 70 L.Ed.2d 638 (1981); Hexter v. Hexter, 179 Ind.App. 638, 639 , 386 N.E.2d 1006, 1007 (1979)(interpreting Shaffer footnote 36 to mean that opinion has no application to post-judgment full faith and credit actions); Ruiz v. Lloses, 233 NJ.Super. 608, 611, 559 A.2d 866, 867 (App.Div.l989)(“Footnote 36 in Shaffer makes it clear that ownership of property by the nonresident debtor is sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction in a [post-judgment] Full Faith and Credit situa 2007Personal jurisdiction over the defendant would, of course, not be required.”), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1097 , 102 S.Ct. 669 , 70 L.Ed.2d 638 (1981); Hexter v. Hexter, 179 Ind.App. 638, 639 , 386 N.E.2d 1006, 1007 (1979)(interpreting Shaffer footnote 36 to mean that opinion has no application to post-judgment full faith and credit actions); Ruiz v. Lloses, 233 NJ.Super. 608, 611, 559 A.2d 866, 867 (App.Div.l989)(“Footnote 36 in Shaffer makes it clear that ownership of property by the nonresident debtor is sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction in a [post-judgment] Full Faith and Credit situa | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mohamed v. Michael
green
2 sentences2017The Fourth Circuit explained that it need not analyze whether Holland “transacted business” within the meaning of Maryland’s long-arm statute separately from the minimum contacts inquiry under the Due Process Clause, "[bjecause the Maryland legislature designed its long-arm statute to extend personal jurisdiction to the limits allowed by federal due process, our normal two-step inquiry merges into one.” Ellicott, 995 F.2d at 477 (citing Mohamed, 279 Md. at 657 , 370 A.2d 551 (1977). 17 . 2017The Fourth Circuit explained that it need not analyze whether Holland “transacted business” within the meaning of Maryland’s long-arm statute separately from the minimum contacts inquiry under the Due Process Clause, "[bjecause the Maryland legislature designed its long-arm statute to extend personal jurisdiction to the limits allowed by federal due process, our normal two-step inquiry merges into one.” Ellicott, 995 F.2d at 477 (citing Mohamed, 279 Md. at 657 , 370 A.2d 551 (1977). 17 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Ellicott MacHine Corporation, Incorporated v. John Holland Party Limited
green
1 sentence2017The Fourth Circuit explained that it need not analyze whether Holland “transacted business” within the meaning of Maryland’s long-arm statute separately from the minimum contacts inquiry under the Due Process Clause, "[bjecause the Maryland legislature designed its long-arm statute to extend personal jurisdiction to the limits allowed by federal due process, our normal two-step inquiry merges into one.” Ellicott, 995 F.2d at 477 (citing Mohamed, 279 Md. at 657 , 370 A.2d 551 (1977). 17 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Beyond Systems, Inc. v. Realtime Gaming Holding Co., LLC
green
2 sentences2015This Court succinctly explained the difference between the two in Himes Associates, Ltd. v. Anderson: If the defendant’s contacts with the forum state do not form the basis for the plaintiffs suit, then personal jurisdiction, if it exists, “must arise from the defendant’s general, more persistent contacts with the State.” Beyond Systems, supra, 388 Md. at 22 , 878 A.2d 567 . 2015This Court succinctly explained the difference between the two in Himes Associates, Ltd. v. Anderson: If the defendant’s contacts with the forum state do not form the basis for the plaintiffs suit, then personal jurisdiction, if it exists, “must arise from the defendant’s general, more persistent contacts with the State.” Beyond Systems, supra, 388 Md. at 22 , 878 A.2d 567 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
In re Rich
green
1 sentence2007Personal jurisdiction over the defendant would, of course, not be required.”), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1097 , 102 S.Ct. 669 , 70 L.Ed.2d 638 (1981); Hexter v. Hexter, 179 Ind.App. 638, 639 , 386 N.E.2d 1006, 1007 (1979)(interpreting Shaffer footnote 36 to mean that opinion has no application to post-judgment full faith and credit actions); Ruiz v. Lloses, 233 NJ.Super. 608, 611, 559 A.2d 866, 867 (App.Div.l989)(“Footnote 36 in Shaffer makes it clear that ownership of property by the nonresident debtor is sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction in a [post-judgment] Full Faith and Credit situa | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Williamson v. Williamson
green
2 sentences2007Personal jurisdiction over the defendant would, of course, not be required.”), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1097 , 102 S.Ct. 669 , 70 L.Ed.2d 638 (1981); Hexter v. Hexter, 179 Ind.App. 638, 639 , 386 N.E.2d 1006, 1007 (1979)(interpreting Shaffer footnote 36 to mean that opinion has no application to post-judgment full faith and credit actions); Ruiz v. Lloses, 233 NJ.Super. 608, 611, 559 A.2d 866, 867 (App.Div.l989)(“Footnote 36 in Shaffer makes it clear that ownership of property by the nonresident debtor is sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction in a [post-judgment] Full Faith and Credit situa 2007Personal jurisdiction over the defendant would, of course, not be required.”), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1097 , 102 S.Ct. 669 , 70 L.Ed.2d 638 (1981); Hexter v. Hexter, 179 Ind.App. 638, 639 , 386 N.E.2d 1006, 1007 (1979)(interpreting Shaffer footnote 36 to mean that opinion has no application to post-judgment full faith and credit actions); Ruiz v. Lloses, 233 NJ.Super. 608, 611, 559 A.2d 866, 867 (App.Div.l989)(“Footnote 36 in Shaffer makes it clear that ownership of property by the nonresident debtor is sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction in a [post-judgment] Full Faith and Credit situa | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union
green
2 sentences2005The Internet In Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 , 117 S.Ct. 2329 , 138 L.Ed.2d 874 (1997), the Supreme Court provided its explanation of the Internet as: an international network of interconnected computers. 2005The Internet In Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 , 117 S.Ct. 2329 , 138 L.Ed.2d 874 (1997), the Supreme Court provided its explanation of the Internet as: an international network of interconnected computers. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Bahn v. Chicago Motor Club Insurance
green
2 sentences2000Bahn, supra, 98 Md.App. at 571 , 634 A.2d 63 . 2000Bahn, supra, 98 Md.App. at 571 , 634 A.2d 63 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Solano Cty.
green
2 sentences2000Concluding the discussion on the two divergent interpretations of the minimum contacts standard, the O’Connor plurality opinion stated that the more stringent “purposefully directed” test, rather than the “stream of commerce test,” was the position that was “consonant with the requirements of due process.” Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112 , 107 S.Ct. 1026 . 2000Concluding the discussion on the two divergent interpretations of the minimum contacts standard, the O’Connor plurality opinion stated that the more stringent “purposefully directed” test, rather than the “stream of commerce test,” was the position that was “consonant with the requirements of due process.” Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112 , 107 S.Ct. 1026 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Batton v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance
green
1 sentence1993When, as here, “specific jurisdiction is at issue, the minimum-contacts inquiry focuses on the relationship between the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.” Batton, 736 P.2d at 5 (citing Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 775 , 104 S.Ct. 1473, 1478 , 79 L.Ed.2d 790 (1984) and Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 , 97 S.Ct. 2569, 2580 , 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977)). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.
green
2 sentences1993When, as here, “specific jurisdiction is at issue, the minimum-contacts inquiry focuses on the relationship between the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.” Batton, 736 P.2d at 5 (citing Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 775 , 104 S.Ct. 1473, 1478 , 79 L.Ed.2d 790 (1984) and Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 , 97 S.Ct. 2569, 2580 , 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977)). 1993When, as here, “specific jurisdiction is at issue, the minimum-contacts inquiry focuses on the relationship between the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.” Batton, 736 P.2d at 5 (citing Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 775 , 104 S.Ct. 1473, 1478 , 79 L.Ed.2d 790 (1984) and Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 , 97 S.Ct. 2569, 2580 , 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977)). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.