13 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Aero Toy Store, LLC v. Grievesgreen2 sentences2018(Punctuation omitted.) Aero Toy , supra, 279 Ga. App. at 518 (1), 631 S.E.2d 734 . 2018(Punctuation omitted.) Aero Toy , supra, 279 Ga. App. at 518 (1), 631 S.E.2d 734 . | 2 | 2 |
Humphrey v. Langfordgreen2 sentences1995"Corporate presence can only be manifested by corporate activity and therefore a minimum contacts analysis seems appropriate." Humphrey v. Langford, 246 Ga. 732, 733 , 273 S.E.2d 22 . 1995"Corporate presence can only be manifested by corporate activity and therefore a minimum contacts analysis seems appropriate." Humphrey v. Langford, 246 Ga. 732, 733 , 273 S.E.2d 22 . | 2 | 2 |
Green v. Advance Ross Electronics Corp.green2 sentences1984See Green v. Advance Ross Electronics Corp., 86 Ill.2d 431 ( 427 NE2d 1203 ) (1981); Cook Assoc. v. Lexington United Corp., 87 Ill.2d 190 ( 429 NE2d 847 ) (1981). 1984See Green v. Advance Ross Electronics Corp., 86 Ill.2d 431 ( 427 NE2d 1203 ) (1981); Cook Assoc. v. Lexington United Corp., 87 Ill.2d 190 ( 429 NE2d 847 ) (1981). | 2 | 2 |
Hammack v. Hammackgreen2 sentences2025Accordingly, pretermitting whether the trial court based its ruling only on a minimum contacts analysis as Chironsoft alleges, Chironsoft contractually consented to personal jurisdiction in the Superior Court of Gwinnett County.13 See Hammack v. Hammack, 13 Given that Chironsoft is in the position of having admitted each and every material allegation of Plaintiffs’ complaint, there is no merit in its claim that the trial court could not consider the forum-selection clause because “[t]here is no verification of the [c]omplaint.” Cf. U. S. Foodservice v. Gourmet Services, 332 Ga. App. 379, 380-3 2025Accordingly, pretermitting whether the trial court based its ruling only on a minimum contacts analysis as Chironsoft alleges, Chironsoft contractually consented to personal jurisdiction in the Superior Court of Gwinnett County.13 See Hammack v. Hammack, 13 Given that Chironsoft is in the position of having admitted each and every material allegation of Plaintiffs’ complaint, there is no merit in its claim that the trial court could not consider the forum-selection clause because “[t]here is no verification of the [c]omplaint.” Cf. U. S. Foodservice v. Gourmet Services, 332 Ga. App. 379, 380-3 | 1 | 1 |
U.S. Foodservice, Inc. v. Gourmet Services, Inc.green2 sentences2025Accordingly, pretermitting whether the trial court based its ruling only on a minimum contacts analysis as Chironsoft alleges, Chironsoft contractually consented to personal jurisdiction in the Superior Court of Gwinnett County.13 See Hammack v. Hammack, 13 Given that Chironsoft is in the position of having admitted each and every material allegation of Plaintiffs’ complaint, there is no merit in its claim that the trial court could not consider the forum-selection clause because “[t]here is no verification of the [c]omplaint.” Cf. U. S. Foodservice v. Gourmet Services, 332 Ga. App. 379, 380-3 2025Accordingly, pretermitting whether the trial court based its ruling only on a minimum contacts analysis as Chironsoft alleges, Chironsoft contractually consented to personal jurisdiction in the Superior Court of Gwinnett County.13 See Hammack v. Hammack, 13 Given that Chironsoft is in the position of having admitted each and every material allegation of Plaintiffs’ complaint, there is no merit in its claim that the trial court could not consider the forum-selection clause because “[t]here is no verification of the [c]omplaint.” Cf. U. S. Foodservice v. Gourmet Services, 332 Ga. App. 379, 380-3 | 1 | 1 |
Levey v. Hamilton (In Re Teknek, LLC)green1 sentence2011In re Teknek, 354 B.R. 181, 194 (A) (1) (Bankr. | 1 | 1 |
Kronstadt v. Kronstadtgreen1 sentence1993See also Kronstadt v. Kronstadt, 570 A2d 485, 487 (N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Mayacamas Corp. v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp.green1 sentence1993There was no subsequent course of dealing established between the parties as a result of the contract, nor did the future consequences of the contract come to fruition. [Appellee] did nothing beyond entering into the contract that constituted a purposeful engagement of activities within the forum.” Mayacamas Corp. v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., supra at 894 (1). | 1 | 1 |
Aiken Asphalt Paving Co. v. Winngreen2 sentences1991Co. v. Winn, 133 Ga. App. 3, 5 (2 b) ( 209 SE2d 700 ) (evidence demanded a finding appellant was “doing business” in this state)). 1991Co. v. Winn, 133 Ga. App. 3, 5 (2 b) ( 209 SE2d 700 ) (evidence demanded a finding appellant was “doing business” in this state)). | 1 | 1 |
Hart v. DeLowe Partners, Ltd.green2 sentences1990Appellant, like the defendant in Hart v. DeLowe Partners, 147 Ga. App. 715, 716 (2) ( 250 SE2d 169 ) (1978), invoked the benefits and protection of this state’s real property law, and this privilege included “the concomitant obligation to defend a suit in Georgia concerning an alleged breach of the [lease] contract. [Cit.]” Id. at 716-717 (2) (B). 2. 1990Appellant, like the defendant in Hart v. DeLowe Partners, 147 Ga. App. 715, 716 (2) ( 250 SE2d 169 ) (1978), invoked the benefits and protection of this state’s real property law, and this privilege included “the concomitant obligation to defend a suit in Georgia concerning an alleged breach of the [lease] contract. [Cit.]” Id. at 716-717 (2) (B). 2. | 1 | 1 |
Regante v. Reliable-Triple Cee of North Jersey, Inc.green2 sentences1990The leasing of real property in Georgia for operation of a retail establishment and execution of a lease agreement that contained a Georgia choice of law clause created the “substantial connection . . . between the controversy, [appellant], and property within this state” to satisfy the minimum contacts requirement as described in Regante v. Reliable-Triple Cee, 251 Ga. 629, 630 (1) ( 308 SE2d 372 ) (1983). 1990The leasing of real property in Georgia for operation of a retail establishment and execution of a lease agreement that contained a Georgia choice of law clause created the “substantial connection . . . between the controversy, [appellant], and property within this state” to satisfy the minimum contacts requirement as described in Regante v. Reliable-Triple Cee, 251 Ga. 629, 630 (1) ( 308 SE2d 372 ) (1983). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Morton v. Environmental Land Systems, Ltd.
green
2 sentences1984App. 3d 369 ( 370 NE2d 1106 ) (1977); Woodfield Ford v. Akins Ford Corp., supra. More recently, however, the Illinois courts have imposed a higher threshold for asserting personal jurisdiction than the minimum contacts test. 1984App.3d 369 ( 370 NE2d 1106 ) (1977); Woodfield Ford v. Akins Ford Corp., supra. More recently, however, the Illinois courts have imposed a higher threshold for asserting personal jurisdiction than the minimum contacts test. | 2 | 1984–1984 |
Cook Associates, Inc. v. Lexington United Corp.
green
2 sentences1984See Green v. Advance Ross Electronics Corp., 86 Ill.2d 431 ( 427 NE2d 1203 ) (1981); Cook Assoc. v. Lexington United Corp., 87 Ill.2d 190 ( 429 NE2d 847 ) (1981). 1984See Green v. Advance Ross Electronics Corp., 86 Ill.2d 431 ( 427 NE2d 1203 ) (1981); Cook Assoc. v. Lexington United Corp., 87 Ill.2d 190 ( 429 NE2d 847 ) (1981). | 2 | 1984–1984 |
Enforce Administrative Subpoenas Duces Tecum of the Securities & Exchange Commission v. Knowles
green
1 sentence2011Application to Enforce Administrative Subpoenas Duces Tecum of the Securities and Exchange Commission v. Knowles, supra. But for the forum selection clause in AmeriSciences’ contract and the related Texas default judgment which must be given full faith and credit, the alleged activities which would form the basis for jurisdiction over AmeriSciences are its transaction of any business within this state pursuant to OCGA § 9-10-91 (1). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
International Shoe Co. v. Washington
green
2 sentences1997For instance, in Shaffer , the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he fiction that an assertion of jurisdiction over property is anything but an assertion of jurisdiction over the owner of the property supports an ancient form without substantial modern justification," [13] and concluded that in rem jurisdiction had to be justified based upon the minimum contacts test set forth for in personam jurisdiction in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). [14] Furthermore, since Shaffer , the Supreme Court has confirmed the melding of the labels of in persona 1997For instance, in Shaffer , the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he fiction that an assertion of jurisdiction over property is anything but an assertion of jurisdiction over the owner of the property supports an ancient form without substantial modern justification," [13] and concluded that in rem jurisdiction had to be justified based upon the minimum contacts test set forth for in personam jurisdiction in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). [14] Furthermore, since Shaffer , the Supreme Court has confirmed the melding of the labels of in persona | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Shaffer v. Heitner
green
2 sentences1980In analyzing the practical effect of in rem jurisdiction, Shaffer recognized that “the phrase ‘judicial jurisdiction over a thing,’ is a customary elliptical way of referring to jurisdiction over the interests of persons in a thing.” 433 U. S. at 207 . *734 Applying this same concept to quasi in rem jurisdiction, when “the only role played by the property is to provide the basis for bringing the defendant into court, ... if a direct assertion of personal jurisdiction over the defendant would violate the Constitution, it would seem that an indirect assertion of that jurisdiction should be equal 1980In analyzing the practical effect of in rem jurisdiction, Shaffer recognized that “the phrase ‘judicial jurisdiction over a thing,’ is a customary elliptical way of referring to jurisdiction over the interests of persons in a thing.” 433 U. S. at 207 . *734 Applying this same concept to quasi in rem jurisdiction, when “the only role played by the property is to provide the basis for bringing the defendant into court, ... if a direct assertion of personal jurisdiction over the defendant would violate the Constitution, it would seem that an indirect assertion of that jurisdiction should be equal | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.