third-stage evidentiary hearing in Illinois

2026The defendant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, “a substantial showing of a constitutional violation.” Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d at 473 . ¶ 40 When a petition advances to the third stage evidentiary hearing, we will not reverse a trial court’s decision of fact finding or credibility determinations unless “manifestly erroneous.” Id.

2026The defendant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, “a substantial showing of a constitutional violation.” Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d at 473 . ¶ 40 When a petition advances to the third stage evidentiary hearing, we will not reverse a trial court’s decision of fact finding or credibility determinations unless “manifestly erroneous.” Id.

2026At the second stage, like the first stage, all well-pleaded facts that are not positively rebutted by the original trial record are to be taken as true for purposes of the State’s motion to dismiss, and “ ‘[t]he inquiry into whether a [postconviction] petition contains sufficient allegations of constitutional deprivations does not require the circuit court to engage in any fact-finding or credibility determinations.’ ” People v. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 35 (quoting People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 385 (1998)); People v. Sanders, 2016 IL 118123, ¶ 42 . ¶ 50 At a third-stage evidentiary he

2026People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 384-85 (1998) (at a third-stage evidentiary hearing, credibility determinations are made by the trial court, which hears and observes witnesses, and such findings will not be reversed unless manifestly erroneous).

2026At this stage, the circuit court must determine whether the petition and its accompanying documentation make a “ ‘substantial showing of a constitutional violation.’ ” People v. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 33 (quoting People v. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239, 246 (2001)). ¶ 36 If the petition survives the second stage, the defendant is entitled to a third-stage evidentiary hearing, where the circuit court acts as factfinder, determines the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to evidence, resolves any evidentiary conflicts, and determines whether the evidence demonstrates that the def

2026“At this stage, the circuit court must determine whether the petition and any accompanying documentation make a ‘substantial showing of a constitutional violation.’” People v. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 33 (quoting People v. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239, 246 (2001)). ¶ 51 If the petitioner makes the requisite substantial showing that his constitutional rights were violated, he is entitled to a third-stage evidentiary hearing.

2026People v. Sanders, 2016 IL 118123, ¶ 47 (citing People v. Washington, 171 Ill. 2d 475, 489 (1996)). ¶ 42 Upon review, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s dismissal of defendant’s third amended successive postconviction petition following a third stage evidentiary hearing was manifestly erroneous.

2026Id. ¶ 24 When a postconviction petition proceeds to a third-stage evidentiary hearing, the reviewing court will disturb the trial court’s ruling only if it is manifestly erroneous.

2026At the second stage, like the first stage, all well-pleaded facts that are not positively rebutted by the original trial record are to be taken as true for purposes of the State’s motion to dismiss, and “ ‘[t]he inquiry into whether a [postconviction] petition contains sufficient allegations of constitutional deprivations does not require the circuit court to engage in any fact-finding or credibility determinations.’ ” People v. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 35 (quoting People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 385 (1998)); People v. Sanders, 2016 IL 118123, ¶ 42 . ¶ 50 At a third-stage evidentiary he

2026“At this stage, the circuit court must determine whether the petition and any accompanying documentation make a ‘substantial showing of a constitutional violation.’” People v. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 33 (quoting People v. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239, 246 (2001)). ¶ 51 If the petitioner makes the requisite substantial showing that his constitutional rights were violated, he is entitled to a third-stage evidentiary hearing.

2020Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 29 (expressing a desire not to “render the entire three-stage postconviction process superfluous”). ¶ 29 If the defendant makes a “substantial showing” at the second stage, then the petition advances to a third-stage evidentiary hearing.

2020Cf. Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 37 (in considering issue of whether defendant was properly denied leave to file successive postconviction petition, declining to address cause where defendant failed to show prejudice). ¶ 73 Directing the circuit court to conduct a third stage evidentiary hearing countermands the statutory bar on Johnson’s ineffective assistance claim.

2025Id.; 725 ILCS 5/122-6 (West 2016). ¶ 47 In determining whether to grant a third-stage evidentiary hearing, the circuit court takes all well-pleaded facts in the petition and in any accompanying affidavits as true, unless they are positively rebutted by the record (Evans, 186 Ill. 2d at 89 ), and does not make findings of fact or credibility determinations (People v. Childress, 191 Ill. 2d 168, 174 (2000)).

2022If such a showing is made—i.e., if support for the allegations exists in the record or in accompanying affidavits—the petition advances to a third-stage evidentiary hearing on the merits. 725 ILCS 5/122-6 (West 2018); People v. Silagy, 116 Ill. 2d 357, 365 (1987). ¶ 65 In determining whether to grant a third-stage hearing, the circuit court takes all well- pleaded facts in the petition and in any accompanying affidavits as true, unless they are positively rebutted by the record (People v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 89 (1999)), and does not make findings of fact or credibility determinations (Peopl

2024See Carter, 2013 IL App (2d) 110703, ¶¶ 85, 87-88 . ¶ 36 Defendant relies on People v. Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d 319 (2009) and People v. Coleman, 2013 IL 11307 to argue that he was entitled to postconviction relief following the third-stage evidentiary hearing.

2024A manifest error is one that is “clearly evident, plain, and indisputable.” People v. Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d 319, 333 (2009). - 16 - No. 1-23-0879 ¶ 51 A. Actual Innocence ¶ 52 We address first defendant’s argument that the trial court erred when it denied defendant’s actual innocence claim following a third-stage evidentiary hearing. ¶ 53 To establish a claim of actual innocence, the supporting evidence must be: (1) newly discovered; (2) material and not cumulative; and (3) of such conclusive character that it would probably change the result on retrial.

2025People v. Coleman, 206 Ill. 2d 261, 277 (2002). ¶ 68 Although the defendant’s petition received a third-stage evidentiary hearing, and his petition was denied by the trial court, the defendant is not appealing from the third-stage ruling.

2021At a third- stage evidentiary hearing, “the burden is on the defendant to make a substantial showing of a deprivation of constitutional rights and the circuit court’s decision will not be disturbed unless it 8 is manifestly erroneous.” People v. Coleman, 206 Ill. 2d 261, 277 (2002).

2026Importantly, because defendant bears the burden of presenting evidence that is (1) new, (2) material, (3) noncumulative, and (4) conclusive (Coleman, 2013 IL 113307, ¶ 96 ), we affirm the trial court’s judgment that the evidence was not conclusive. ¶ 43 The trial court, comparing the evidence presented at the third stage evidentiary hearing with the evidence presented at defendant’s trial, determined that a different result on retrial would not occur.

2026See Id. ¶ 56 In this case, the circuit court “considered all the claims, arguments, filings, trial transcripts, the facts contained within the record, as well as the testimony [and] exhibits presented at the third-stage evidentiary hearing” before finding the evidence of actual innocence was not of such a conclusive character that it would probably change the results upon retrial. ¶ 57 In reaching its decision, the court made factfinding and credibility determinations as to the relevant evidence, such as where it found the affidavits and testimony at the evidentiary hearing of Millighan were “

2026Id.; see Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶¶ 80-83 . - 11 - “By contrast, if a petition advances to a third-stage evidentiary hearing, a defendant will ‘no longer enjoy[ ] the presumption that the allegations in his petition and accompanying affidavits are true.’ [Citation.] Instead, as to a claim of actual innocence, the postconviction court at the third stage is to decide the weight to be given the testimony and evidence, make credibility determinations, and resolve any evidentiary conflicts. [Citation.] In determining the weight to be given the new evidence and whether all the evidence, new and ol

2025Carter, 2013 IL App (2d) 110703, ¶ 74 ; Velasco, 2018 IL App (1st) 161683, ¶ 118 . ¶ 36 Thus, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court dismissing defendant’s claim of actual innocence and remand for a third-stage evidentiary hearing. ¶ 37 Reversed; cause remanded. - 10 -

2026“Thus, a decision is manifestly erroneous when the opposite conclusion is clearly evident.” Id. ¶ 51 In this case, petitioner’s successive postconviction petition was denied after a third-stage evidentiary hearing.

2025The court concluded the “incredible testimony” presented at the hearing was not reasonably probable to change the result at trial, where defendant’s conviction stemmed from the “consistent and credible eyewitness testimony from Sterling and Brown.” See Morgan, 212 Ill. 2d at 155 ; cf. People v. Burrows, 172 Ill. 2d 169, 182-83, 86-90 (1996) (trial court’s decision awarding a new trial was not against the manifest weight of evidence, where the State’s main witness against the defendant recanted and admitted to murder, and her admission was corroborated by a newly discovered and unbiased witness

2026Id.; see Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶¶ 80-83 . - 11 - “By contrast, if a petition advances to a third-stage evidentiary hearing, a defendant will ‘no longer enjoy[ ] the presumption that the allegations in his petition and accompanying affidavits are true.’ [Citation.] Instead, as to a claim of actual innocence, the postconviction court at the third stage is to decide the weight to be given the testimony and evidence, make credibility determinations, and resolve any evidentiary conflicts. [Citation.] In determining the weight to be given the new evidence and whether all the evidence, new and ol

2025In making that finding, this court may consider whether the evidence in support of a claim of actual innocence “merely adds conflicting evidence to the evidence adduced at the trial.” See Sanders, 2016 IL 118123, ¶¶ 48-52 , see also Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 58 (noting that our supreme court has “made reference to the insufficiency of new evidence that conflicts with trial evidence” “in cases that decided whether a petition should advance to a third-stage evidentiary hearing” (citing Sanders)). ¶ 17 Nonetheless, the supporting evidence “must be taken as true unless [it is] positively rebutte

2025App. 3d 322, 325 (2002) (citing People v. Ruiz, 177 Ill. 2d 368, 384-85 (1997)). ¶ 21 On March 31, 2023, the trial court conducted a third-stage evidentiary hearing on defendant’s claim of actual innocence.

2021To be clear, a judge’s factual findings and credibility determinations made at a third-stage evidentiary hearing of a postconviction proceeding should be disturbed only if “manifestly erroneous,” that is, only if the court committed an error that is “ ‘ “clearly evident, plain, and indisputable.” ’ ” See People v. Morgan, 212 Ill. 2d 148, 155 (2004) (quoting People v. Johnson, 206 Ill. 2d 348, 360 (2002), quoting People v. Ruiz, 177 Ill. 2d 368, 384-85 (1997)).

2025“A reviewing court will not reverse a trial court's findings regarding credibility determinations or fact finding after a third-stage evidentiary hearing unless the findings are manifestly erroneous.” Id. (citing Reed, 2020 IL 124940, ¶ 51 ).

2025“A reviewing court will not reverse a trial court's findings regarding credibility determinations or fact finding after a third-stage evidentiary hearing unless the findings are manifestly erroneous.” Id. (citing Reed, 2020 IL 124940, ¶ 51 ).

2021To be clear, a judge’s factual findings and credibility determinations made at a third-stage evidentiary hearing of a postconviction proceeding should be disturbed only if “manifestly erroneous,” that is, only if the court committed an error that is “ ‘ “clearly evident, plain, and indisputable.” ’ ” See People v. Morgan, 212 Ill. 2d 148, 155 (2004) (quoting People v. Johnson, 206 Ill. 2d 348, 360 (2002), quoting People v. Ruiz, 177 Ill. 2d 368, 384-85 (1997)).

2016"Manifest error is error which is ' "clearly evident, plain, and indisputable." ' " Id. (quoting People v. Johnson, 206 Ill. 2d 348, 360 (2002), quoting People v. Ruiz, 177 Ill. 2d 368, 384-85 (1997)). ¶ 48 The trial court ordered a third stage evidentiary hearing on the issue of Garcia's fitness to stand trial for first-degree murder and to plead guilty to UUWF.

2026Furthermore, “if a court must assess a defendant’s credibility to determine his culpable negligence, ‘[s]uch an assessment is not intended for a second-stage dismissal hearing’ and must wait for a third-stage evidentiary hearing.” People v. Jones, 2021 IL App (1st) 182392, ¶ 56 (quoting Wheeler, 392 Ill.

2025Assessments of credibility are better suited to a third-stage evidentiary hearing ***.” Wheeler, 392 Ill.

2021In reviewing the dismissal of a Brady claim after a third-stage evidentiary hearing, in that case, our supreme court held that the Brady rule “encompasses evidence known to police investigators, but not to the prosecutor.” Beaman, 229 Ill. 2d at 74 (citing Kyles, 514 U.S. at 438 ).

2019Defendant acknowledges that when a petition has advanced to a third-stage evidentiary hearing where fact-finding and credibility determinations are made, the trial court’s decision will not be reversed unless it is manifestly erroneous, citing People v. Beaman, 229 Ill. 2d 56, 71 (2010).

2023Id. ¶ 18 In our disposition reversing the second-stage dismissal of defendant’s postconviction petition and remanding for a third-stage evidentiary hearing, we attempted to make clear that the issue at the second stage was not whether defendant had come forward with specific facts to establish that the juror was biased.

2023Id. ¶ 18 In our disposition reversing the second-stage dismissal of defendant’s postconviction petition and remanding for a third-stage evidentiary hearing, we attempted to make clear that the issue at the second stage was not whether defendant had come forward with specific facts to establish that the juror was biased.

2026People v. Sanders, 2016 IL 118123, ¶ 47 (citing People v. Washington, 171 Ill. 2d 475, 489 (1996)). ¶ 42 Upon review, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s dismissal of defendant’s third amended successive postconviction petition following a third stage evidentiary hearing was manifestly erroneous.

2021The Robinson court did nothing to alter the requirement that “[t]he conclusive character of the new evidence is the most important element of an actual innocence claim” (id. ¶ 47 (citing People v. Washington, 171 Ill. 2d 475, 489 (1996))) and that “the conclusive character element refers to evidence that, when considered along with the trial evidence, would probably lead to a different result (id. (citing Coleman, 2013 IL 113307 , ¶ 96, citing People v. Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d 319, 336-37 (2009))). ¶ 68 Because this is a review of the dismissal of a successive postconviction petition after a third-

2025App. 3d at 986 . “[A]t a third-stage evidentiary hearing, the defendant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, a substantial violation of a constitutional right. [Citation.] The circuit court *** acts as the finder of fact at the evidentiary hearing, resolving any conflicts in the evidence and determining the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given particular testimony. [Citation.] When a petition is advanced to a third-stage evidentiary hearing, where fact finding and credibility determinations are involved, we will not reverse a circuit court’s - 10 - 1-23-2193 decision u

2025After arguing that the motion to suppress was meritorious, defendant summarily states, without further elaboration or argument, that but for counsel’s failure to file 13 the motion to suppress, the interrogation would not have been admitted and the result of the proceeding would have been different. ¶ 24 “[A]t a third-stage evidentiary hearing, the defendant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, a substantial violation of a constitutional right.” People v. Williams, 2017 IL App (1st) 152021 , ¶ 22.

2022“The State may file a motion to dismiss the petition, and the petition advances to a third-stage evidentiary hearing only if the defendant makes a ‘substantial showing of a constitutional violation.’ ” Id. ¶ 32 (quoting People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 45 , 137 N.E.3d 763 ). ¶ 34 The Illinois Supreme Court has described proceedings at the second stage as follows: “The second stage of postconviction review tests the legal sufficiency of the petition.

2022The State may file a motion to dismiss the petition, and the petition advances to a third-stage evidentiary hearing only if the defendant makes a “substantial showing of a -8- constitutional violation.” Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 45 . ¶ 37 The Illinois Supreme Court has described proceedings at the second stage as follows: “The second stage of postconviction review tests the legal sufficiency of the petition.

2025Accordingly, “[a] judge’s factual findings and credibility determinations made at a third-stage evidentiary hearing of a postconviction proceeding should be disturbed only if manifestly erroneous, that is, only if the court committed an error that is clearly evident, plain, and indisputable.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Eubanks, 2021 IL 126271, ¶ 47 . ¶ 82 A defendant who raises an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim must satisfy the two- prong test promulgated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).

2025People v. Brown, 2020 IL App (1st) 190828, ¶ 43 . -8- No. 1-23-1484 Therefore, the “factual findings and credibility determinations made at a third-stage evidentiary hearing *** should be disturbed only if manifestly erroneous, that is, only if the court committed an error that is clearly evident, plain, and indisputable.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Eubanks, 2021 IL 126271, ¶ 47 . ¶ 28 Claims of ineffective assistance during the plea bargain process are governed by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).