hsbc defendant in New York

2014Here, much of the detail surrounding the alleged fraud is “ ‘peculiarly within the knowledge’ ” of the individual defendants and the HSBC defendants, and we agree with plaintiffs that an inference of fraud arises from the circumstances alleged in the amended complaint (id.; see Matter of Gordon v Bialystoker Ctr. & Bikur Cholim, 45 NY2d 692, 698-699 [1978]; Sepulveda v Aviles, 308 AD2d 1, 8 [2003]; Spatz v Bajramoski, 214 AD2d 436, 436-437 [1995]).

2014Here, much of the detail surrounding the alleged fraud is “ ‘peculiarly within the knowledge’ ” of the individual defendants and the HSBC defendants, and we agree with plaintiffs that an inference of fraud arises from the circumstances alleged in the amended complaint (id.; see Matter of Gordon v Bialystoker Ctr. & Bikur Cholim, 45 NY2d 692, 698-699 [1978]; Sepulveda v Aviles, 308 AD2d 1, 8 [2003]; Spatz v Bajramoski, 214 AD2d 436, 436-437 [1995]).

2014Here, the amended complaint alleges that the individual defendants “have used some or all of Aida Corey’s $4 million in cas[h] to purchase real and personal property and other tangible assets” and that they “have taken approximately $4 million of Aida Corey’s cash and/or personal property.” The sole focus of the parties, both in Supreme Court and on appeal, however, has been on the money allegedly taken by the HSBC defendants, and we therefore deem abandoned any allegations by plaintiffs concerning personal property (see Ciesinski v Town of Aurora, 202 AD2d 984, 984 [1994]).

2014Here, the amended complaint alleges that the individual defendants “have used some or all of Aida Corey’s $4 million in cas[h] to purchase real and personal property and other tangible assets” and that they “have taken approximately $4 million of Aida Corey’s cash and/or personal property.” The sole focus of the parties, both in Supreme Court and on appeal, however, has been on the money allegedly taken by the HSBC defendants, and we therefore deem abandoned any allegations by plaintiffs concerning personal property (see Ciesinski v Town of Aurora, 202 AD2d 984, 984 [1994]).

2014Here, much of the detail surrounding the alleged fraud is “ ‘peculiarly within the knowledge’ ” of the individual defendants and the HSBC defendants, and we agree with plaintiffs that an inference of fraud arises from the circumstances alleged in the amended complaint (id.; see Matter of Gordon v Bialystoker Ctr. & Bikur Cholim, 45 NY2d 692, 698-699 [1978]; Sepulveda v Aviles, 308 AD2d 1, 8 [2003]; Spatz v Bajramoski, 214 AD2d 436, 436-437 [1995]).

2014Here, much of the detail surrounding the alleged fraud is “ ‘peculiarly within the knowledge’ ” of the individual defendants and the HSBC defendants, and we agree with plaintiffs that an inference of fraud arises from the circumstances alleged in the amended complaint (id.; see Matter of Gordon v Bialystoker Ctr. & Bikur Cholim, 45 NY2d 692, 698-699 [1978]; Sepulveda v Aviles, 308 AD2d 1, 8 [2003]; Spatz v Bajramoski, 214 AD2d 436, 436-437 [1995]).

2014A fraud cause of action must allege that the defendant: (1) made a representation to a material fact; (2) the representation was false; (3) the defendant intended to deceive the plaintiff; (4) the plaintiff believed and justifiably relied on the statement and in accordance with the statement engaged in a certain course of conduct; and (5) as a result of the reliance, the plaintiff sustained damages (see Ross v Louise Wise Servs., Inc., 8 NY3d 478, 488 [2007]).

2014A fraud cause of action must allege that the defendant: (1) made a representation to a material fact; (2) the representation was false; (3) the defendant intended to deceive the plaintiff; (4) the plaintiff believed and justifiably relied on the statement and in accordance with the statement engaged in a certain course of conduct; and (5) as a result of the reliance, the plaintiff sustained damages (see Ross v Louise Wise Servs., Inc., 8 NY3d 478, 488 [2007]).

2014Here, much of the detail surrounding the alleged fraud is “ ‘peculiarly within the knowledge’ ” of the individual defendants and the HSBC defendants, and we agree with plaintiffs that an inference of fraud arises from the circumstances alleged in the amended complaint (id.; see Matter of Gordon v Bialystoker Ctr. & Bikur Cholim, 45 NY2d 692, 698-699 [1978]; Sepulveda v Aviles, 308 AD2d 1, 8 [2003]; Spatz v Bajramoski, 214 AD2d 436, 436-437 [1995]).

2014Here, much of the detail surrounding the alleged fraud is “ ‘peculiarly within the knowledge’ ” of the individual defendants and the HSBC defendants, and we agree with plaintiffs that an inference of fraud arises from the circumstances alleged in the amended complaint (id.; see Matter of Gordon v Bialystoker Ctr. & Bikur Cholim, 45 NY2d 692, 698-699 [1978]; Sepulveda v Aviles, 308 AD2d 1, 8 [2003]; Spatz v Bajramoski, 214 AD2d 436, 436-437 [1995]).

2014On a motion to dismiss a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), “the pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]; see Goshen v Mutual Life Ins.

2008In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court should accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true, affording the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference and determining only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Goldfarb v Schwartz, 26 AD3d 462, 463 [2006]; Fast Track Funding Corp. v Perrone, 19 AD3d 362, 362-363 [2005]).

2012Thereafter, the Supreme Court denied that branch of HSBC’s motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it. “ ‘Under New York’s Recording Act (Real Property Law § 291), a mortgage loses its priority to a subsequent mortgage where the subsequent mortgagee is a good-faith lender for value, and records its mortgage first without actual or constructive knowledge of the prior mortgage’ ” (2 Lisa Ct. Corp. v Licalzi, 89 AD3d 721, 722 [2011], quoting Washington Mut.

2012Thereafter, the Supreme Court denied that branch of HSBC’s motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it. “ ‘Under New York’s Recording Act (Real Property Law § 291), a mortgage loses its priority to a subsequent mortgage where the subsequent mortgagee is a good-faith lender for value, and records its mortgage first without actual or constructive knowledge of the prior mortgage’ ” (2 Lisa Ct. Corp. v Licalzi, 89 AD3d 721, 722 [2011], quoting Washington Mut.

2012Bank, FA v Peak Health Club, Inc., 48 AD3d 793, 797 [2008]).

2012Bank, FA v Peak Health Club, Inc., 48 AD3d 793, 797 [2008]).

2012Matter of Schnare, 191 AD2d 859, 860 [1993], lv denied 82 NY2d 653 [1993]; see also Matter of Gallagher, 81 AD3d 825 [2011], and Matter of Campione, 58 AD3d 1032 [2009].) Accordingly, I hereby grant HSBC’s motion in its entirety, and dismiss all objections to the amended accounting, and I hereby deny objectants’ cross motion.

2012Matter of Schnare, 191 AD2d 859, 860 [1993], lv denied 82 NY2d 653 [1993]; see also Matter of Gallagher, 81 AD3d 825 [2011], and Matter of Campione, 58 AD3d 1032 [2009].) Accordingly, I hereby grant HSBC’s motion in its entirety, and dismiss all objections to the amended accounting, and I hereby deny objectants’ cross motion.

2012Matter of Schnare, 191 AD2d 859, 860 [1993], lv denied 82 NY2d 653 [1993]; see also Matter of Gallagher, 81 AD3d 825 [2011], and Matter of Campione, 58 AD3d 1032 [2009].) Accordingly, I hereby grant HSBC’s motion in its entirety, and dismiss all objections to the amended accounting, and I hereby deny objectants’ cross motion.

2011In addition, those defendants established in support of their motion that they had neither actual nor constructive notice of that condition and a reasonable time in which to remedy it (see McKee v State of New York, 75 AD3d 893, 895 [2010]), and *1682 plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition (see generally Gordon v American Museum of Natural History, 67 NY2d 836, 837-838 [1986]).

2011“It is well established that [an entity that controls certain property] is liable for a dangerous or defective condition on [that] property when [the entity] created the condition or had actual or constructive notice of it and a reasonable time within which to remedy it” (Pommerenck v Nason, 79 AD3d 1716, 1716 [2010] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Clifford v Woodlawn Volunteer Fire Co., Inc., 31 AD3d 1102, 1103 [2006]).

2011“It is well established that [an entity that controls certain property] is liable for a dangerous or defective condition on [that] property when [the entity] created the condition or had actual or constructive notice of it and a reasonable time within which to remedy it” (Pommerenck v Nason, 79 AD3d 1716, 1716 [2010] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Clifford v Woodlawn Volunteer Fire Co., Inc., 31 AD3d 1102, 1103 [2006]).

2011We conclude that the HSBC defendants met their initial burden on the motion by the submission of that affidavit (see generally Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]).

2011We conclude that the HSBC defendants met their initial burden on the motion by the submission of that affidavit (see generally Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]).

2011In addition, those defendants established in support of their motion that they had neither actual nor constructive notice of that condition and a reasonable time in which to remedy it (see McKee v State of New York, 75 AD3d 893, 895 [2010]), and *1682 plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition (see generally Gordon v American Museum of Natural History, 67 NY2d 836, 837-838 [1986]).

2009We affirm the order insofar as appealed from. “[T]he lien of a mortgage is extinguished upon the sale of the real property affected thereby unless the purchaser has knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of the mortgage” (Baccari v De Santi, 70 AD2d 198, 201 [1979]).

2008Bank v McMann Enters., 214 AD2d 647, 647-648 [1995]).

2008In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court should accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true, affording the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference and determining only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Goldfarb v Schwartz, 26 AD3d 462, 463 [2006]; Fast Track Funding Corp. v Perrone, 19 AD3d 362, 362-363 [2005]).

2008In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court should accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true, affording the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference and determining only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Goldfarb v Schwartz, 26 AD3d 462, 463 [2006]; Fast Track Funding Corp. v Perrone, 19 AD3d 362, 362-363 [2005]).

2008II The doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, is designed to “relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication” (Allen v McCurry, 449 US 90, 94 [1980]). 3 In federal court, subsequent litigation is prohibited if a prior court ruling “ ‘was (1) a final judgment on the merits, (2) by a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) in a case involving the same parties or their privies, and (4) involving the same cause of action’ ” (EDP Med.