18 Texas opinions name it 4 courts 2002–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State Department of Highways & Public Transportation v. Paynegreen2 sentences2026York, 284 S.W.3d at 847 ; Payne, 838 S.W.2d at 237 . 2023York, 284 S.W.3d at 847 ; Payne, 838 S.W.2d at 237 . | 3 | 10 |
Texas Department of Transportation v. Yorkgreen2 sentences2018“Under an invitee standard, a plaintiff need only prove that the governmental unit should have known of a condition that created an unreasonable risk of harm.” Id. 2018"Under an invitee standard, a plaintiff need only prove that the governmental unit should have known of a condition that created an unreasonable risk of harm." Id. | 1 | 7 |
Denton County v. Beynongreen1 sentence2018Fallen Light Pole on the Roadway was a Special Defect “The TTCA does not define ‘special defect’ but likens it to ‘excavations or obstructions’ that exist ‘on’ the roadway surface.” Denton Cty. v. Beynon, 283 S.W.3d 329, 331 (Tex. 2009) see TEX. | 1 | 1 |
City of Dallas v. Patrickgreen1 sentence2014Code Ann. § 101.022 (West 2011) (providing that in a premises liability claim against a governmental unit, the governmental unit “owes to the claimant only the duty that a private person owes to a licensee on private property, unless the claimant pays for the use of the premises”); City of Dallas v. Patrick, 347 S.W.3d 452, 457 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.) (explaining that when a plaintiff paid for use of the premises, then under the statute, the governmental unit owes the duty owed to an invitee); see also Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. York, 284 S.W.3d 844, 847 (Tex. 2009) (explaining that und | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Randy Austin v. Kroger Texas, L.P.
green
1 sentence2019Id. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Palais Royal, Inc. v. Gunnels
green
1 sentence2016Palais Royal, Inc. v. Gunnels, 976 S.W.2d 837 , 841–42 (Tex. 1998); Payne, 838 S.W.2d at 237 . 12 The parties disagree about whether the defect alleged in this case was an ordinary or a special defect; this determination, in turn, affects whether Contreras must demonstrate that the City had actual knowledge of flammable gas in its storm sewers at the time of the accident. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Allen v. Connolly
green
1 sentence2014As a result, her status as an employee is immaterial, and appellee’s legal duty to her depended on whether she was an invitee, licensee, or 15 972 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. 1998). 16 Id. at 756 . 17 280 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. 1955). 18 Id. at 240 . 19 Id. 20 See Barton v. Whataburger, Inc., 276 S.W.3d 456 , 466–67 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. denied); Allen v. Connolly, 158 S.W.3d 61 , 65–66 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.). –9– trespasser at the time of the alleged assault.21 Because appellant’s claim fails even under the standard most favorable to her, which is the invitee standa | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Timberwalk Apartments, Partners, Inc. v. Cain
green
2 sentences2014As a result, her status as an employee is immaterial, and appellee’s legal duty to her depended on whether she was an invitee, licensee, or 15 972 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. 1998). 16 Id. at 756 . 17 280 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. 1955). 18 Id. at 240 . 19 Id. 20 See Barton v. Whataburger, Inc., 276 S.W.3d 456 , 466–67 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. denied); Allen v. Connolly, 158 S.W.3d 61 , 65–66 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.). –9– trespasser at the time of the alleged assault.21 Because appellant’s claim fails even under the standard most favorable to her, which is the invitee standa 2014As a result, her status as an employee is immaterial, and appellee’s legal duty to her depended on whether she was an invitee, licensee, or 15 972 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. 1998). 16 Id. at 756 . 17 280 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. 1955). 18 Id. at 240 . 19 Id. 20 See Barton v. Whataburger, Inc., 276 S.W.3d 456 , 466–67 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. denied); Allen v. Connolly, 158 S.W.3d 61 , 65–66 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.). –9– trespasser at the time of the alleged assault.21 Because appellant’s claim fails even under the standard most favorable to her, which is the invitee standa | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Barton v. Whataburger, Inc.
green
1 sentence2014As a result, her status as an employee is immaterial, and appellee’s legal duty to her depended on whether she was an invitee, licensee, or 15 972 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. 1998). 16 Id. at 756 . 17 280 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. 1955). 18 Id. at 240 . 19 Id. 20 See Barton v. Whataburger, Inc., 276 S.W.3d 456 , 466–67 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. denied); Allen v. Connolly, 158 S.W.3d 61 , 65–66 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.). –9– trespasser at the time of the alleged assault.21 Because appellant’s claim fails even under the standard most favorable to her, which is the invitee standa | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Sears, Roebuck & Company v. Robinson
green
2 sentences2014As a result, her status as an employee is immaterial, and appellee’s legal duty to her depended on whether she was an invitee, licensee, or 15 972 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. 1998). 16 Id. at 756 . 17 280 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. 1955). 18 Id. at 240 . 19 Id. 20 See Barton v. Whataburger, Inc., 276 S.W.3d 456 , 466–67 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. denied); Allen v. Connolly, 158 S.W.3d 61 , 65–66 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.). –9– trespasser at the time of the alleged assault.21 Because appellant’s claim fails even under the standard most favorable to her, which is the invitee standa 2014As a result, her status as an employee is immaterial, and appellee’s legal duty to her depended on whether she was an invitee, licensee, or 15 972 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. 1998). 16 Id. at 756 . 17 280 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. 1955). 18 Id. at 240 . 19 Id. 20 See Barton v. Whataburger, Inc., 276 S.W.3d 456 , 466–67 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. denied); Allen v. Connolly, 158 S.W.3d 61 , 65–66 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.). –9– trespasser at the time of the alleged assault.21 Because appellant’s claim fails even under the standard most favorable to her, which is the invitee standa | 1 | 2014–2014 |
The University of Texas at Austin v. Hayes
green
1 sentence2012The Legislature has not provided a precise definition for a “special defect.” Rather, section 101.022(b) merely “likens [a special defect] to conditions ‘such as excavations or obstructions on highways, roads, or streets.’ ” See Hayes, 327 S.W.3d at 116 (quoting Tex. Civ. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Parker v. Highland Park, Inc.
green
1 sentence2002The Ruvalca-bas argue, however, that Johnathan is entitled to the equivalent of invitee status for the following reasons: (1) Johnathan should be treated as an invitee under Restatement (Second) of ToRts § 360 (1965) and Parker v. Highland Park, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 512 (Tex.1978) because he was the guest of a tenant; (2) Johnathan should be treated as an invitee because he was the child of a tenant; (3) Johnathan should be treated as an invitee because he was a visitor to a public building; and (4) Johnathan should be treated as an invitee because all young children are invitees in cases where th | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Southeastern Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Groves
green
1 sentence2002The Ruvalcabas argue, however, that Johnathan is entitled to the equivalent of invitee status for the following reasons: (1) Johnathan should be treated as an invitee under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 360 (1965) and Parker v. Highland Park, Inc., 565 *136 S.W.2d 512 (Tex.1978) because he was the guest of a tenant; (2) Johnathan should be treated as an invitee because he was the child of a tenant; (3) Johnathan should be treated as an invitee because he was a visitor to a public building; and (4) Johnathan should be treated as an invitee because all young children are invitees in cases wher | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.