delivery requirement in California

1978The test of the efficacy of a written instrument as a symbolic delivery of the chose in action giving rise to the trust is whether “the instrument is one upon which delivery of the trust corpus might be compelled.” (Lawson v. Lowengart, supra, 251 Cal.App.2d 98, 110 , and cases cited; Lefrooth v. Prentice, 202 Cal. 215, 224 [ 259 P. 947 ].) As was stated in Lawson v. Lowengart, supra, 251 Cal.App.2d 98 , at page 110: “Defendants refer to cases indicating that the delivery requirement is more strictly applied in relation to outright gifts than to trusts.

1978The test of the efficacy of a written instrument as a symbolic delivery of the chose in action giving rise to the trust is whether “the instrument is one upon which delivery of the trust corpus might be compelled.” (Lawson v. Lowengart, supra, 251 Cal.App.2d 98, 110 , and cases cited; Lefrooth v. Prentice, 202 Cal. 215, 224 [ 259 P. 947 ].) As was stated in Lawson v. Lowengart, supra, 251 Cal.App.2d 98 , at page 110: “Defendants refer to cases indicating that the delivery requirement is more strictly applied in relation to outright gifts than to trusts.

2013On substantial evidence review, we do not “weigh the evidence, consider the credibility of witnesses, or resolve conflicts in the evidence or in the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it.” (Huang v. Board of Directors (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 1286, 1293-1294 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 41 ].) Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, resolving conflicts and drawing inferences in support of the judgment, we conclude that although this was a close case, as the trial court frankly acknowledged, the University provided substantial evidence from which the hearing officer could re

2013On substantial evidence review, we do not “weigh the evidence, consider the credibility of witnesses, or resolve conflicts in the evidence or in the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it.” (Huang v. Board of Directors (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 1286, 1293-1294 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 41 ].) Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, resolving conflicts and drawing inferences in support of the judgment, we conclude that although this was a close case, as the trial court frankly acknowledged, the University provided substantial evidence from which the hearing officer could re

2024Because decedent followed the amendment procedure set forth in the 2020 trust, and Davis, as successor trustee, cooperated with that procedure, decedent did not need to also comply with the Probate Code’s delivery requirement. (§ 15401, subd. (a)(2).) 8 Petitioners next argue that “Page 9 is nothing more than an expression of [decedent’s] desire” to make a gift, and as such, “it is not a testamentary gift,” and “it does not survive [decedent’s] death.” We interpret petitioners’ argument as characterizing page 9’s verbiage as “precatory.” Precatory words8 generally will not create a trust “ ‘un

1998(See People v. Calban (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 578, 585, fn. 6 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 441 ] [“[T]he mere making of the affidavit cannot constitute the crime. . . . [I]t is reasonable to require that the affidavit must be delivered to another person with the intent that it be uttered ór published as true.”]; People v. Hjelm (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 649, 651-652 [ 37 Cal.Rptr. 36 ] [“When a perjury is claimed to have been committed in a written document such as an affidavit or a deposition, it is requisite to allege and to prove that the document had been completed.

1998(See People v. Calban (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 578, 585, fn. 6 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 441 ] [“[T]he mere making of the affidavit cannot constitute the crime. . . . [I]t is reasonable to require that the affidavit must be delivered to another person with the intent that it be uttered ór published as true.”]; People v. Hjelm (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 649, 651-652 [ 37 Cal.Rptr. 36 ] [“When a perjury is claimed to have been committed in a written document such as an affidavit or a deposition, it is requisite to allege and to prove that the document had been completed.

1998In the context of civil litigation, courts have repeatedly acknowledged that section 2015.5 renders “[a] declaration under penalty of perjury . . . the legal equivalent of an affidavit.” (Chronometrics, Inc. v. Sysgen, Inc. (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 597, 603, fn. 2 [ 168 Cal.Rptr. 196 ]; accord, City and County of San Francisco v. Evankovich (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 41, 53 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 883 ]; Aero Properties, Inc. v. Gottlieb (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 711, 713, fn. 1 [ 24 Cal.Rptr. 277 ].) Here, the People contend that section 2015.5 does not equate a declaration with an affidavit for purposes of secti

1998In the context of civil litigation, courts have repeatedly acknowledged that section 2015.5 renders “[a] declaration under penalty of perjury . . . the legal equivalent of an affidavit.” (Chronometrics, Inc. v. Sysgen, Inc. (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 597, 603, fn. 2 [ 168 Cal.Rptr. 196 ]; accord, City and County of San Francisco v. Evankovich (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 41, 53 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 883 ]; Aero Properties, Inc. v. Gottlieb (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 711, 713, fn. 1 [ 24 Cal.Rptr. 277 ].) Here, the People contend that section 2015.5 does not equate a declaration with an affidavit for purposes of secti

1998In the context of civil litigation, courts have repeatedly acknowledged that section 2015.5 renders “[a] declaration under penalty of perjury . . . the legal equivalent of an affidavit.” (Chronometrics, Inc. v. Sysgen, Inc. (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 597, 603, fn. 2 [ 168 Cal.Rptr. 196 ]; accord, City and County of San Francisco v. Evankovich (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 41, 53 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 883 ]; Aero Properties, Inc. v. Gottlieb (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 711, 713, fn. 1 [ 24 Cal.Rptr. 277 ].) Here, the People contend that section 2015.5 does not equate a declaration with an affidavit for purposes of secti

1998In the context of civil litigation, courts have repeatedly acknowledged that section 2015.5 renders “[a] declaration under penalty of perjury . . . the legal equivalent of an affidavit.” (Chronometrics, Inc. v. Sysgen, Inc. (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 597, 603, fn. 2 [ 168 Cal.Rptr. 196 ]; accord, City and County of San Francisco v. Evankovich (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 41, 53 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 883 ]; Aero Properties, Inc. v. Gottlieb (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 711, 713, fn. 1 [ 24 Cal.Rptr. 277 ].) Here, the People contend that section 2015.5 does not equate a declaration with an affidavit for purposes of secti

1998In the context of civil litigation, courts have repeatedly acknowledged that section 2015.5 renders “[a] declaration under penalty of perjury . . . the legal equivalent of an affidavit.” (Chronometrics, Inc. v. Sysgen, Inc. (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 597, 603, fn. 2 [ 168 Cal.Rptr. 196 ]; accord, City and County of San Francisco v. Evankovich (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 41, 53 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 883 ]; Aero Properties, Inc. v. Gottlieb (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 711, 713, fn. 1 [ 24 Cal.Rptr. 277 ].) Here, the People contend that section 2015.5 does not equate a declaration with an affidavit for purposes of secti

1998In the context of civil litigation, courts have repeatedly acknowledged that section 2015.5 renders “[a] declaration under penalty of perjury . . . the legal equivalent of an affidavit.” (Chronometrics, Inc. v. Sysgen, Inc. (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 597, 603, fn. 2 [ 168 Cal.Rptr. 196 ]; accord, City and County of San Francisco v. Evankovich (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 41, 53 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 883 ]; Aero Properties, Inc. v. Gottlieb (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 711, 713, fn. 1 [ 24 Cal.Rptr. 277 ].) Here, the People contend that section 2015.5 does not equate a declaration with an affidavit for purposes of secti

1998(See People v. Calban (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 578, 585, fn. 6 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 441 ] [“[T]he mere making of the affidavit cannot constitute the crime. . . . [I]t is reasonable to require that the affidavit must be delivered to another person with the intent that it be uttered ór published as true.”]; People v. Hjelm (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 649, 651-652 [ 37 Cal.Rptr. 36 ] [“When a perjury is claimed to have been committed in a written document such as an affidavit or a deposition, it is requisite to allege and to prove that the document had been completed.

1998(See People v. Calban (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 578, 585, fn. 6 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 441 ] [“[T]he mere making of the affidavit cannot constitute the crime. . . . [I]t is reasonable to require that the affidavit must be delivered to another person with the intent that it be uttered ór published as true.”]; People v. Hjelm (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 649, 651-652 [ 37 Cal.Rptr. 36 ] [“When a perjury is claimed to have been committed in a written document such as an affidavit or a deposition, it is requisite to allege and to prove that the document had been completed.

1996As the court in People v. Profit (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 849, 877 [ 229 Cal.Rptr. 148 ] noted, “. . . the delivery of warnings weighs heavily in favor of finding voluntariness and consent.” Daugherty argues, however, the language used by Gillespie at the end of the warning converted the consensual encounter into a detention because a *284 reasonable person would believe she had no choice but to remain and answer Gillespie’s questions.

1996As the court in People v. Profit (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 849, 877 [ 229 Cal.Rptr. 148 ] noted, “. . . the delivery of warnings weighs heavily in favor of finding voluntariness and consent.” Daugherty argues, however, the language used by Gillespie at the end of the warning converted the consensual encounter into a detention because a *284 reasonable person would believe she had no choice but to remain and answer Gillespie’s questions.

1986Nonetheless, the delivery of such a warning weighs heavily in favor of finding voluntariness and consent. ( People v. James (1977) 19 Cal.3d 99, 118 [ 137 Cal. Rptr. 447 , 561 P.2d *878 1135]; United States v. Mendenhall, supra, 446 U.S. 544, 558-559 [ 64 L.Ed.2d 497, 512 ].) [12] (3f) In the case at bench the record reveals that Agent Wood informed the defendants four times of their right not to talk with him and that they were free to leave. (9) Knowledge of the right to refuse is "highly relevant to the determination that there had been consent." ( United States v. Mendenhall, supra, 446 U.

1986Nonetheless, the delivery of such a warning weighs heavily in favor of finding voluntariness and consent. ( People v. James (1977) 19 Cal.3d 99, 118 [ 137 Cal. Rptr. 447 , 561 P.2d *878 1135]; United States v. Mendenhall, supra, 446 U.S. 544, 558-559 [ 64 L.Ed.2d 497, 512 ].) [12] (3f) In the case at bench the record reveals that Agent Wood informed the defendants four times of their right not to talk with him and that they were free to leave. (9) Knowledge of the right to refuse is "highly relevant to the determination that there had been consent." ( United States v. Mendenhall, supra, 446 U.

1986Nonetheless, the delivery of such a warning weighs heavily in favor of finding voluntariness and consent. ( People v. James (1977) 19 Cal.3d 99, 118 [ 137 Cal. Rptr. 447 , 561 P.2d *878 1135]; United States v. Mendenhall, supra, 446 U.S. 544, 558-559 [ 64 L.Ed.2d 497, 512 ].) [12] (3f) In the case at bench the record reveals that Agent Wood informed the defendants four times of their right not to talk with him and that they were free to leave. (9) Knowledge of the right to refuse is "highly relevant to the determination that there had been consent." ( United States v. Mendenhall, supra, 446 U.

1986Nonetheless, the delivery of such a warning weighs heavily in favor of finding voluntariness and consent. ( People v. James (1977) 19 Cal.3d 99, 118 [ 137 Cal. Rptr. 447 , 561 P.2d *878 1135]; United States v. Mendenhall, supra, 446 U.S. 544, 558-559 [ 64 L.Ed.2d 497, 512 ].) [12] (3f) In the case at bench the record reveals that Agent Wood informed the defendants four times of their right not to talk with him and that they were free to leave. (9) Knowledge of the right to refuse is "highly relevant to the determination that there had been consent." ( United States v. Mendenhall, supra, 446 U.

1980Finally, while Fries reiterates that offenses such as robbery and burglary are somewhat less relevant on the issue of credibility than are crimes such as perjury ( People v. Rollo (1977) 20 Cal.3d 109, 118 [ 141 Cal. Rptr. 177 , 569 P.2d 771 ]), Fries does not portend to diminish much less overrule the guidelines and policy considerations laid down in Beagle . *220 III CALJIC No. 2.62 Instruction (7) Upon request of the prosecution, the trial judge instructed the jury per CALJIC No. 2.62, which permits the jury to draw inferences against the defendant from his failure to explain or deny eviden

1980Finally, while Fries reiterates that offenses such as robbery and burglary are somewhat less relevant on the issue of credibility than are crimes such as perjury ( People v. Rollo (1977) 20 Cal.3d 109, 118 [ 141 Cal. Rptr. 177 , 569 P.2d 771 ]), Fries does not portend to diminish much less overrule the guidelines and policy considerations laid down in Beagle . *220 III CALJIC No. 2.62 Instruction (7) Upon request of the prosecution, the trial judge instructed the jury per CALJIC No. 2.62, which permits the jury to draw inferences against the defendant from his failure to explain or deny eviden

1959That purpose was well expressed in Gordon v. Barr, 13 Cal.2d 596, 601 [ 91 P.2d 101 ], where the Supreme Court stated: “The necessity for delivery in gifts of personal property has its genesis in the archaic doctrine of seisin.

1959That purpose was well expressed in Gordon v. Barr, 13 Cal.2d 596, 601 [ 91 P.2d 101 ], where the Supreme Court stated: “The necessity for delivery in gifts of personal property has its genesis in the archaic doctrine of seisin.