17 California opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Serranogreen2 sentences2005Under the circumstances, we shall independently review the record.” ( Smith, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at pp. 360-361; see In re Serrano (1995) 10 Cal.4th 447, 457 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 695 , 895 P.2d 936 ].) “In Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th 616 , the California Supreme Court addressed the judicial review standard that applies to parole decisions by the Board and the Governor. 2005Under the circumstances, we shall independently review the record.” ( Smith, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at pp. 360-361; see In re Serrano (1995) 10 Cal.4th 447, 457 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 695 , 895 P.2d 936 ].) “In Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th 616 , the California Supreme Court addressed the judicial review standard that applies to parole decisions by the Board and the Governor. | 2 | 2 |
Lois R. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1991(See, e.g., Lois R. v. Superior Court (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 895, 901-902 [ 97 Cal.Rptr. 158 ].) If something happened between the prior judicial review hearing and the September 1989 hearings which warranted adoption rather than returning the child to Mother, should she not be heard to give her side of the story? 1991(See, e.g., Lois R. v. Superior Court (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 895, 901-902 [ 97 Cal.Rptr. 158 ].) If something happened between the prior judicial review hearing and the September 1989 hearings which warranted adoption rather than returning the child to Mother, should she not be heard to give her side of the story? | 2 | 2 |
In Re Rosenkrantzgreen2 sentences2009The Rosenkrantz, Lawrence and Shaputis Decisions In Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th 616 , the California Supreme Court addressed for the first time the judicial review standard that governs a challenge to a Board decision denying parole and concluded an extremely deferential “ ‘some evidence’ ” standard applies. 2005Under the circumstances, we shall independently review the record.” ( Smith, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at pp. 360-361; see In re Serrano (1995) 10 Cal.4th 447, 457 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 695 , 895 P.2d 936 ].) “In Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th 616 , the California Supreme Court addressed the judicial review standard that applies to parole decisions by the Board and the Governor. | 1 | 3 |
Rhee v. El Camino Hospital Districtgreen1 sentence2013(See Rhee, supra, 201 Cal.App.3d at p. 494 [“bias cannot be presumed in the absence of facts establishing the probability of unfairness as a practical matter”].) This is not a situation where “ ‘experience teaches that the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be . . . *996 tolerable.’ [Citation.]” (Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 731, 737 [ 88 Cal.Rptr.3d 610 , 199 P.3d 1142 ].) In the administrative law context, an adjudicator’s impartiality in reviewing the propriety of an adverse action tak | 1 | 1 |
Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. State Water Resources Control Boardgreen2 sentences2013(See Rhee, supra, 201 Cal.App.3d at p. 494 [“bias cannot be presumed in the absence of facts establishing the probability of unfairness as a practical matter”].) This is not a situation where “ ‘experience teaches that the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be . . . *996 tolerable.’ [Citation.]” (Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 731, 737 [ 88 Cal.Rptr.3d 610 , 199 P.3d 1142 ].) In the administrative law context, an adjudicator’s impartiality in reviewing the propriety of an adverse action tak 2013(See Rhee, supra, 201 Cal.App.3d at p. 494 [“bias cannot be presumed in the absence of facts establishing the probability of unfairness as a practical matter”].) This is not a situation where “ ‘experience teaches that the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be . . . *996 tolerable.’ [Citation.]” (Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 731, 737 [ 88 Cal.Rptr.3d 610 , 199 P.3d 1142 ].) In the administrative law context, an adjudicator’s impartiality in reviewing the propriety of an adverse action tak | 1 | 1 |
City of South Gate v. Los Angeles Unified School Districtgreen2 sentences2006(See No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 74 , *1375 fn. 3; City of South Gate v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1416, 1423-1424 [ 229 Cal.Rptr. 568 ] (South Gate); Dehne v. County of Santa Clara (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 827, 835-836 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 753 ].) Judicial review of such challenges is governed by well-established rules. a. 2006(See No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 74 , *1375 fn. 3; City of South Gate v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1416, 1423-1424 [ 229 Cal.Rptr. 568 ] (South Gate); Dehne v. County of Santa Clara (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 827, 835-836 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 753 ].) Judicial review of such challenges is governed by well-established rules. a. | 1 | 1 |
Dehne v. County of Santa Claragreen2 sentences2006(See No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 74 , *1375 fn. 3; City of South Gate v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1416, 1423-1424 [ 229 Cal.Rptr. 568 ] (South Gate); Dehne v. County of Santa Clara (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 827, 835-836 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 753 ].) Judicial review of such challenges is governed by well-established rules. a. 2006(See No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 74 , *1375 fn. 3; City of South Gate v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1416, 1423-1424 [ 229 Cal.Rptr. 568 ] (South Gate); Dehne v. County of Santa Clara (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 827, 835-836 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 753 ].) Judicial review of such challenges is governed by well-established rules. a. | 1 | 1 |
Yao v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2005This concept merely restates another statutory construction canon: we presume the Legislature intended everything in a statutory scheme, and we should not read statutes to omit expressed language or include omitted language.’ ” (People v. Connor (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 669, 691 [ 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 521 ], quoting Jurcoane v. Superior Court (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 886, 894 [ 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 483 ]; accord, Yao v. Superior Court (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 327, 333 [ 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 912 ].) A parent is not entitled to a judicial review hearing under this provision of section 366.3, subdivision (d), unless he 2005This concept merely restates another statutory construction canon: we presume the Legislature intended everything in a statutory scheme, and we should not read statutes to omit expressed language or include omitted language.’ ” (People v. Connor (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 669, 691 [ 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 521 ], quoting Jurcoane v. Superior Court (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 886, 894 [ 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 483 ]; accord, Yao v. Superior Court (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 327, 333 [ 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 912 ].) A parent is not entitled to a judicial review hearing under this provision of section 366.3, subdivision (d), unless he | 1 | 1 |
Jurcoane v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2005This concept merely restates another statutory construction canon: we presume the Legislature intended everything in a statutory scheme, and we should not read statutes to omit expressed language or include omitted language.’ ” (People v. Connor (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 669, 691 [ 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 521 ], quoting Jurcoane v. Superior Court (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 886, 894 [ 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 483 ]; accord, Yao v. Superior Court (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 327, 333 [ 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 912 ].) A parent is not entitled to a judicial review hearing under this provision of section 366.3, subdivision (d), unless he 2005This concept merely restates another statutory construction canon: we presume the Legislature intended everything in a statutory scheme, and we should not read statutes to omit expressed language or include omitted language.’ ” (People v. Connor (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 669, 691 [ 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 521 ], quoting Jurcoane v. Superior Court (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 886, 894 [ 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 483 ]; accord, Yao v. Superior Court (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 327, 333 [ 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 912 ].) A parent is not entitled to a judicial review hearing under this provision of section 366.3, subdivision (d), unless he | 1 | 1 |
People v. Connorgreen2 sentences2005This concept merely restates another statutory construction canon: we presume the Legislature intended everything in a statutory scheme, and we should not read statutes to omit expressed language or include omitted language.’ ” (People v. Connor (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 669, 691 [ 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 521 ], quoting Jurcoane v. Superior Court (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 886, 894 [ 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 483 ]; accord, Yao v. Superior Court (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 327, 333 [ 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 912 ].) A parent is not entitled to a judicial review hearing under this provision of section 366.3, subdivision (d), unless he 2005This concept merely restates another statutory construction canon: we presume the Legislature intended everything in a statutory scheme, and we should not read statutes to omit expressed language or include omitted language.’ ” (People v. Connor (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 669, 691 [ 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 521 ], quoting Jurcoane v. Superior Court (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 886, 894 [ 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 483 ]; accord, Yao v. Superior Court (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 327, 333 [ 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 912 ].) A parent is not entitled to a judicial review hearing under this provision of section 366.3, subdivision (d), unless he | 1 | 1 |
People v. Murphygreen2 sentences2004“As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task here is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. [Citation.] We begin by examining the statute’s words, giving them a plain and commonsense meaning. [Citation.] We do not, however, consider the statutory language ‘in isolation.’ [Citation.] Rather, we look to ‘the entire substance of the statute ... in order to determine the scope and purpose of the provision .... [Citation.]’ [Citation.] That is, we construe the words in question ‘ “in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious pu 2004“As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task here is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. [Citation.] We begin by examining the statute’s words, giving them a plain and commonsense meaning. [Citation.] We do not, however, consider the statutory language ‘in isolation.’ [Citation.] Rather, we look to ‘the entire substance of the statute ... in order to determine the scope and purpose of the provision .... [Citation.]’ [Citation.] That is, we construe the words in question ‘ “in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious pu | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Southern California Edison Co. v. Peevey
green
2 sentences2008Section 1757 provides that the Court of Appeal’s review “shall not extend further than to determine, on the basis of the entire record . . . whether any of the following occurred: “(1) The commission acted without, or in excess of, its powers or jurisdiction. “(2) The commission has not proceeded in the manner required by law. “(3) The decision of the commission is not supported by the findings. “(4) The findings in the decision of the commission are not supported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record. “(5) The order or decision of the commission was procured by fraud or was an 2004“As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task here is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. [Citation.] We begin by examining the statute’s words, giving them a plain and commonsense meaning. [Citation.] We do not, however, consider the statutory language ‘in isolation.’ [Citation.] Rather, we look to ‘the entire substance of the statute ... in order to determine the scope and purpose of the provision .... [Citation.]’ [Citation.] That is, we construe the words in question ‘ “in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious pu | 2 | 2004–2008 |
In Re Jennifer P.
green
2 sentences1987III Discussion Three reported decisions have developed the law pertaining to dependency jurisdiction over a nonoffending parent: In re Nicole B. (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 874 [ 155 Cal.Rptr. 916 ]; In re La Shonda B. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 593 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 280 ]; and In re Jennifer P. (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 322 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 909 ]. 1987III Discussion Three reported decisions have developed the law pertaining to dependency jurisdiction over a nonoffending parent: In re Nicole B. (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 874 [ 155 Cal.Rptr. 916 ]; In re La Shonda B. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 593 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 280 ]; and In re Jennifer P. (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 322 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 909 ]. | 2 | 1987–1987 |
In Re Nicole B.
green
2 sentences1987III Discussion Three reported decisions have developed the law pertaining to dependency jurisdiction over a nonoffending parent: In re Nicole B. (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 874 [ 155 Cal.Rptr. 916 ]; In re La Shonda B. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 593 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 280 ]; and In re Jennifer P. (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 322 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 909 ]. 1987III Discussion Three reported decisions have developed the law pertaining to dependency jurisdiction over a nonoffending parent: In re Nicole B. (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 874 [ 155 Cal.Rptr. 916 ]; In re La Shonda B. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 593 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 280 ]; and In re Jennifer P. (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 322 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 909 ]. | 2 | 1987–1987 |
In Re La Shonda B.
green
2 sentences1987III Discussion Three reported decisions have developed the law pertaining to dependency jurisdiction over a nonoffending parent: In re Nicole B. (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 874 [ 155 Cal.Rptr. 916 ]; In re La Shonda B. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 593 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 280 ]; and In re Jennifer P. (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 322 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 909 ]. 1987III Discussion Three reported decisions have developed the law pertaining to dependency jurisdiction over a nonoffending parent: In re Nicole B. (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 874 [ 155 Cal.Rptr. 916 ]; In re La Shonda B. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 593 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 280 ]; and In re Jennifer P. (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 322 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 909 ]. | 2 | 1987–1987 |
Harris v. Sandro
green
1 sentence2022The Judicial Review Clause, If Interpreted as Monschein Urges, Does Not Cure the Procedural and Substantive Unconscionability Identified Monschein contends the trial court erred in finding the judicial review clause within the arbitration provision is “insufficient to ‘ensure the arbitrator complie[s] with statutory requirements.’” The clause at issue reads, “the arbitrator’s decision shall not be subject to judicial review except for fraud or similar misconduct or unless an error appears on the face of the award, or the award causes substantial injustice.” Monschein contends the term “substan | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Major v. Memorial Hospitals Assn.
green
2 sentences2020Citing Lewin, the court in Hay stated, “[W]here the physician has had privileges denied or curtailed because of the implementation of a ‘policy’ of the hospital, the administrative action is classified as ‘quasi-legislative’ and reviewable by traditional mandamus.” (Hay, supra, 183 Cal.App.3d at p. 758 .) The court discussed the reasoning behind the hospital’s requirement for specific qualifications, and found that it was “not irrational for a hospital to require [certain] training as a minimum qualification for all obstetrical-gynecological surgeries.” (Id. at p. 761.) The court concluded tha 2020Citing Lewin, the court in Hay stated, “[W]here the physician has had privileges denied or curtailed because of the implementation of a ‘policy’ of the hospital, the administrative action is classified as ‘quasi-legislative’ and reviewable by traditional mandamus.” (Hay, supra, 183 Cal.App.3d at p. 758 .) The court discussed the reasoning behind the hospital’s requirement for specific qualifications, and found that it was “not irrational for a hospital to require [certain] training as a minimum qualification for all obstetrical-gynecological surgeries.” (Id. at p. 761.) The court concluded tha | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Hay v. Scripps Memoirial Hospital-La Jolla
green
1 sentence2020Citing Lewin, the court in Hay stated, “[W]here the physician has had privileges denied or curtailed because of the implementation of a ‘policy’ of the hospital, the administrative action is classified as ‘quasi-legislative’ and reviewable by traditional mandamus.” (Hay, supra, 183 Cal.App.3d at p. 758 .) The court discussed the reasoning behind the hospital’s requirement for specific qualifications, and found that it was “not irrational for a hospital to require [certain] training as a minimum qualification for all obstetrical-gynecological surgeries.” (Id. at p. 761.) The court concluded tha | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Mileikowsky v. West Hills Hospital & Medical Center
green
1 sentence2013It might even do so because it wishes “to remove a physician from a hospital staff for reasons having no bearing on quality of care.” (Mileikowsky, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1272 .) But where, as here, the medical staff has left to the hospital’s governing body the task of selecting the participants in the judicial review hearing, we are not persuaded that we must presume any hearing officer or panel member appointed by the governing body is likely to be biased. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles
green
1 sentence2006(See No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 74 , *1375 fn. 3; City of South Gate v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1416, 1423-1424 [ 229 Cal.Rptr. 568 ] (South Gate); Dehne v. County of Santa Clara (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 827, 835-836 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 753 ].) Judicial review of such challenges is governed by well-established rules. a. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
In Re Smith
green
1 sentence2005The court first held that ‘the judicial branch is authorized to review the factual basis of a decision of the Board denying parole in order to ensure that the decision comports with the requirements of due process of law, but that in conducting such a review, the court may inquire only whether some evidence in the record before the Board supports the decision to deny parole, based on the factors specified by statute and regulation.’ (Id. at p. 658, italics added.)” (Smith, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 361 .) “[U]nder California law the factual basis for a Board decision granting or denying par | 1 | 2005–2005 |
In Re James Q.
green
2 sentences2002The first case, In re James Q. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 255 [ 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 595 ], addressed whether a trial court could require a parent to make an offer of proof before holding a judicial review hearing pursuant to section 366.21, subdivision (e) on the issue of termination of reunification services. 2002The first case, In re James Q. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 255 [ 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 595 ], addressed whether a trial court could require a parent to make an offer of proof before holding a judicial review hearing pursuant to section 366.21, subdivision (e) on the issue of termination of reunification services. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
In Re Powell
green
2 sentences2002Although this court has not previously had occasion to address the judicial review standard that applies to a Board decision granting or denying parole, we specifically have held that the "some evidence" standard *137 of review applies to a Board decision rescinding a parole date ( Powell, supra, 45 Cal.3d 894, 903-904 , 248 Cal.Rptr. 431 , 755 P.2d 881 ), and a number of recent Court of Appeal decisions have determined that this same standard also applies to a Board decision granting or denying parole. 2002Although this court has not previously had occasion to address the judicial review standard that applies to a Board decision granting or denying parole, we specifically have held that the "some evidence" standard *137 of review applies to a Board decision rescinding a parole date ( Powell, supra, 45 Cal.3d 894, 903-904 , 248 Cal.Rptr. 431 , 755 P.2d 881 ), and a number of recent Court of Appeal decisions have determined that this same standard also applies to a Board decision granting or denying parole. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Jeanette V. v. Jerry V.
green
1 sentence2002The appellate court concluded “[a]s a matter of statutory construction and constitutional due process, ... the juvenile court cannot require a party to a review hearing to tender an offer of proof as a condition to obtaining a contested hearing.” (James Q., supra, at p. 266 .) The appellate court distinguished our earlier decision in In re Jeannette V., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th 811 , on the basis it involved a hearing conducted following the expiration of the reunification period. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Williams v. Coombs
green
1 sentence1994There is no controversy “about what defendant did or didn’t do, or about what he knew or didn’t know. . . . [T]he question of whether those facts, including their reasonableness, gave rise to probable cause was a legal one for the court.” (Williams v. Coombs, supra, 179 Cal.App.3d at pp. 637-638.) *1670 Appellant’s evidence does not support the legal conclusion that the September 22, 1987, decision to delete his privileges was objectively unreasonable, for even some of appellant’s experts found areas of concern with appellant’s performance. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.