Latimore standard in Massachusetts

2026We again employ the Latimore standard, 378 Mass. at 677-678 , and we again disagree.

2026We again employ the Latimore standard, 378 Mass. at 677-678 , and we again disagree.

2024We review a challenge to the sufficiency under the familiar Latimore standard: "[t]he question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979), quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-319 (1979).

2024We review a challenge to the sufficiency under the familiar Latimore standard: "[t]he question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979), quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-319 (1979).

2026Under the Latimore standard, "we do not weigh the supporting evidence against conflicting evidence." Commonwealth v. Semedo, 456 Mass. 1, 8 (2010).

2026Under the Latimore standard, "we do not weigh the supporting evidence against conflicting evidence." Commonwealth v. Semedo, 456 Mass. 1, 8 (2010).

2024And while the defendant highlights the opinion of his own qualified examiner, Dr. Kriegman, that the defendant does not currently meet the criteria for sexual dangerousness, under the Latimore standard "we do not weigh the supporting evidence against conflicting evidence." Commonwealth v. Rarick, 87 Mass. App. 7 Ct. 349, 351 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Merry, 453 Mass. 653, 660 (2009).

2024And while the defendant highlights the opinion of his own qualified examiner, Dr. Kriegman, that the defendant does not currently meet the criteria for sexual dangerousness, under the Latimore standard "we do not weigh the supporting evidence against conflicting evidence." Commonwealth v. Rarick, 87 Mass. App. 7 Ct. 349, 351 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Merry, 453 Mass. 653, 660 (2009).

2026Contrary to the defendant's argument, the Latimore standard is 2 applied "without reference" to the "weight of the evidence." Commonwealth v. Doucette, 408 Mass. 454, 457 (1990).

2026Contrary to the defendant's argument, the Latimore standard is 2 applied "without reference" to the "weight of the evidence." Commonwealth v. Doucette, 408 Mass. 454, 457 (1990).

2025The Latimore standard requires the evidence to be "sufficient . . . to permit the jury to infer the existence of the essential elements of the crime charged." Latimore, supra at 677 , quoting Commonwealth v. Sandler, 368 Mass. 729, 740 (1975).

2025The Latimore standard requires the evidence to be "sufficient . . . to permit the jury to infer the existence of the essential elements of the crime charged." Latimore, supra at 677 , quoting Commonwealth v. Sandler, 368 Mass. 729, 740 (1975).

2024In any event, sufficiency under the Latimore standard "is to be measured upon that which was admitted in evidence without regard to the propriety of the admission." Commonwealth v. Farnsworth, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 87, 98 (2010). 6 of the defendant's location on the roadside near the crashed and damaged vehicle, his need of medical assistance, and importantly, the absence of any evidence that another person was driving the vehicle.

2024In any event, sufficiency under the Latimore standard "is to be measured upon that which was admitted in evidence without regard to the propriety of the admission." Commonwealth v. Farnsworth, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 87, 98 (2010). 6 of the defendant's location on the roadside near the crashed and damaged vehicle, his need of medical assistance, and importantly, the absence of any evidence that another person was driving the vehicle.

2021A motion for a required finding of not guilty is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jones, 432 Mass. 623, 625 (2000), and we review the judge's ruling under the Latimore standard, "viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and ask[ing] whether the evidence and inferences reasonably drawn therefrom were 'sufficient to persuade a rational jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every element of the crime charged.'" Commonwealth v. Squires, 476 Mass. 703, 708 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Lao, 443 Mass. 770, 779 (2005

2021A motion for a required finding of not guilty is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jones, 432 Mass. 623, 625 (2000), and we review the judge's ruling under the Latimore standard, "viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and ask[ing] whether the evidence and inferences reasonably drawn therefrom were 'sufficient to persuade a rational jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every element of the crime charged.'" Commonwealth v. Squires, 476 Mass. 703, 708 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Lao, 443 Mass. 770, 779 (2005

2025"Additionally, the evidence and the inferences permitted to be drawn therefrom must be 'of sufficient force to bring minds of ordinary intelligence and sagacity to the persuasion of [guilt] beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Latimore, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Cooper, 264 Mass. 368, 373 (1928).

2025"Additionally, the evidence and the inferences permitted to be drawn therefrom must be 'of sufficient force to bring minds of ordinary intelligence and sagacity to the persuasion of [guilt] beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Latimore, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Cooper, 264 Mass. 368, 373 (1928).

2025The mere fact that the Commonwealth's evidence may support more than one plausible explanation for the accident is "not of legal significance so long as each [explanation] is legally supportable under the Latimore standard." Commonwealth v. Miranda, 458 Mass. 100, 114 (2010).

2025The mere fact that the Commonwealth's evidence may support more than one plausible explanation for the accident is "not of legal significance so long as each [explanation] is legally supportable under the Latimore standard." Commonwealth v. Miranda, 458 Mass. 100, 114 (2010).

2016The executive director of the East Boston YMCA testified that the center enrolled ninety-three children of younger than elementary school age; that the center was staffed by teachers with educational capabilities; and that the center was accredited by a national association for early childhood education. 8 See Commonwealth v. Casale, 381 Mass. 167, 173 (1980) (“inferences drawn by the jury need only be reasonable and possible and need not be necessary or inescapable”); Commonwealth v. Laro, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 556, 560 (2007) (“Although the jury were not required to find that the [parochial inst

2016The executive director of the East Boston YMCA testified that the center enrolled ninety-three children of younger than elementary school age; that the center was staffed by teachers with educational capabilities; and that the center was accredited by a national association for early childhood education. 8 See Commonwealth v. Casale, 381 Mass. 167, 173 (1980) (“inferences drawn by the jury need only be reasonable and possible and need not be necessary or inescapable”); Commonwealth v. Laro, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 556, 560 (2007) (“Although the jury were not required to find that the [parochial inst

2026Moreover, "[i]n assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, the analysis is not a static dissection of factors in isolation but an evaluation informed by the dynamic fullness of the totality of the circumstances." Commonwealth v. Sylvia, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 340, 342 (2015).

2026Moreover, "[i]n assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, the analysis is not a static dissection of factors in isolation but an evaluation informed by the dynamic fullness of the totality of the circumstances." Commonwealth v. Sylvia, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 340, 342 (2015).

2025See Commonwealth v. Santos, 454 Mass. 770, 777 (2009).

2025See Commonwealth v. Santos, 454 Mass. 770, 777 (2009).

2025Contrast Aucella v. Commonwealth, 406 Mass. 415, 418 (1990), quoting Callahan v. Lach, 338 Mass. 233, 235 (1958) ("The mere happening of an accident" is insufficient to prove 6 Additionally, we note that, although the statute only requires proof that the defendant "might have endangered the safety of the public," Commonwealth v. Teixeira, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 367, 369 (2019), in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the defendant's conduct here actually did put other drivers at risk. 6 driver's negligence).

2025Contrast Aucella v. Commonwealth, 406 Mass. 415, 418 (1990), quoting Callahan v. Lach, 338 Mass. 233, 235 (1958) ("The mere happening of an accident" is insufficient to prove 6 Additionally, we note that, although the statute only requires proof that the defendant "might have endangered the safety of the public," Commonwealth v. Teixeira, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 367, 369 (2019), in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the defendant's conduct here actually did put other drivers at risk. 6 driver's negligence).

2025Commonwealth v. Merola, 405 Mass. 529, 533 (1989).

2025Commonwealth v. Merola, 405 Mass. 529, 533 (1989).

2025Applying the Latimore standard, we are satisfied that the evidence of the defendant "los[ing] control" of his car, striking a bridge abutment, leveling a light pole, and swerving off of the road before stopping on a median, all while intoxicated by alcohol, is sufficient to satisfy that element.6 See Commonwealth v. Zagwyn, 482 Mass. 1020, 1021-1022 (2019); Ross, 92 Mass. App. Ct. at 380; Commonwealth v. Duffy, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 921 , 922- 923 (2004).

2025Applying the Latimore standard, we are satisfied that the evidence of the defendant "los[ing] control" of his car, striking a bridge abutment, leveling a light pole, and swerving off of the road before stopping on a median, all while intoxicated by alcohol, is sufficient to satisfy that element.6 See Commonwealth v. Zagwyn, 482 Mass. 1020, 1021-1022 (2019); Ross, 92 Mass. App. Ct. at 380; Commonwealth v. Duffy, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 921 , 922- 923 (2004).

2025Contrast Aucella v. Commonwealth, 406 Mass. 415, 418 (1990), quoting Callahan v. Lach, 338 Mass. 233, 235 (1958) ("The mere happening of an accident" is insufficient to prove 6 Additionally, we note that, although the statute only requires proof that the defendant "might have endangered the safety of the public," Commonwealth v. Teixeira, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 367, 369 (2019), in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the defendant's conduct here actually did put other drivers at risk. 6 driver's negligence).

2025Contrast Aucella v. Commonwealth, 406 Mass. 415, 418 (1990), quoting Callahan v. Lach, 338 Mass. 233, 235 (1958) ("The mere happening of an accident" is insufficient to prove 6 Additionally, we note that, although the statute only requires proof that the defendant "might have endangered the safety of the public," Commonwealth v. Teixeira, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 367, 369 (2019), in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the defendant's conduct here actually did put other drivers at risk. 6 driver's negligence).

2025See Buttimer, 482 Mass. at 764 (evidence taken together "formed a mosaic of evidence" sufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt that defendant was shooter [citation omitted]).

2025See Buttimer, 482 Mass. at 764 (evidence taken together "formed a mosaic of evidence" sufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt that defendant was shooter [citation omitted]).

2024Indeed, when reviewing for sufficiency of the evidence we must "disregard contrary evidence presented by the defendant including the testimony of a defense expert, unless the contrary evidence demonstrates that the Commonwealth's evidence . . . is 'conclusively incorrect.'" Commonwealth v. Lawson, 475 Mass. 806, 817 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. O'Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 204 (2006).

2024Indeed, when reviewing for sufficiency of the evidence we must "disregard contrary evidence presented by the defendant including the testimony of a defense expert, unless the contrary evidence demonstrates that the Commonwealth's evidence . . . is 'conclusively incorrect.'" Commonwealth v. Lawson, 475 Mass. 806, 817 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. O'Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 204 (2006).

2024Indeed, when reviewing for sufficiency of the evidence we must "disregard contrary evidence presented by the defendant including the testimony of a defense expert, unless the contrary evidence demonstrates that the Commonwealth's evidence . . . is 'conclusively incorrect.'" Commonwealth v. Lawson, 475 Mass. 806, 817 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. O'Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 204 (2006).

2024Indeed, when reviewing for sufficiency of the evidence we must "disregard contrary evidence presented by the defendant including the testimony of a defense expert, unless the contrary evidence demonstrates that the Commonwealth's evidence . . . is 'conclusively incorrect.'" Commonwealth v. Lawson, 475 Mass. 806, 817 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. O'Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 204 (2006).

2024Moreover, in light of the evidence surrounding the victim's murder, including the bloodstains on the inside of the lockbox where she stored her drugs, the defendant's theory concerning the pill bottle simply "ignore[s] that, under the Latimore standard, we are to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution." Commonwealth v. Sylvia, 456 Mass. 182, 191 (2010), citing Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979).

2024Moreover, in light of the evidence surrounding the victim's murder, including the bloodstains on the inside of the lockbox where she stored her drugs, the defendant's theory concerning the pill bottle simply "ignore[s] that, under the Latimore standard, we are to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution." Commonwealth v. Sylvia, 456 Mass. 182, 191 (2010), citing Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979).

2023See Cramer v. Commonwealth, 419 Mass. 106, 112 (1994).

2023See Cramer v. Commonwealth, 419 Mass. 106, 112 (1994).

2023She also testified that she heard Tyler excitedly yelling, "gun, gun." To the extent that the defendant argues that Brooks' testimony was unreliable because she was not wearing her glasses, "questions of credibility belong properly to the trier of fact." See Commonwealth v. Martin, 467 Mass. 291, 315 (2014); see also Commonwealth v. Semedo, 456 Mass. 1, 8 (2010) (reviewing court does not consider credibility of witnesses in Latimore analysis).

2023"The inferences that support a conviction 'need only be reasonable and possible; [they] need not be necessary or inescapable.'" Commonwealth v. Waller, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 295, 303 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Woods, 466 Mass. 707, 713 (2014). "[T]o convict the defendant of unlicensed carrying of a firearm outside his residence or place of business, the Commonwealth was required to prove that he 'knowingly ha[d] in his possession; or knowingly ha[d] under his control in a vehicle; a firearm, loaded or unloaded, as defined in section one hundred and twenty-one of chapter one hundred and forty.

2023"The inferences that support a conviction 'need only be reasonable and possible; [they] need not be necessary or inescapable.'" Commonwealth v. Waller, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 295, 303 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Woods, 466 Mass. 707, 713 (2014). "[T]o convict the defendant of unlicensed carrying of a firearm outside his residence or place of business, the Commonwealth was required to prove that he 'knowingly ha[d] in his possession; or knowingly ha[d] under his control in a vehicle; a firearm, loaded or unloaded, as defined in section one hundred and twenty-one of chapter one hundred and forty.

2023"The inferences that support a conviction 'need only be reasonable and possible; [they] need not be necessary or inescapable.'" Commonwealth v. Waller, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 295, 303 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Woods, 466 Mass. 707, 713 (2014). "[T]o convict the defendant of unlicensed carrying of a firearm outside his residence or place of business, the Commonwealth was required to prove that he 'knowingly ha[d] in his possession; or knowingly ha[d] under his control in a vehicle; a firearm, loaded or unloaded, as defined in section one hundred and twenty-one of chapter one hundred and forty.

2023"The inferences that support a conviction 'need only be reasonable and possible; [they] need not be necessary or inescapable.'" Commonwealth v. Waller, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 295, 303 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Woods, 466 Mass. 707, 713 (2014). "[T]o convict the defendant of unlicensed carrying of a firearm outside his residence or place of business, the Commonwealth was required to prove that he 'knowingly ha[d] in his possession; or knowingly ha[d] under his control in a vehicle; a firearm, loaded or unloaded, as defined in section one hundred and twenty-one of chapter one hundred and forty.