context of the statutory framework in California

2020Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230 [“various parts of a statutory enactment must be harmonized by considering the particular clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole”].) The plain language of section 236.1(b) does not require a defendant to have induced another person to complete a commercial sex act to be guilty of human trafficking.

2018Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222 , 230, 110 Cal.Rptr. 144 , 514 P.2d 1224 ["the various parts of a statutory enactment must be harmonized by considering the particular clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole"].) In short, we hold that the Act does not permit class action claims except when those claims address solely the incorporation into the home of a defective component other than a product that is completely manufactured offsite.

2025J., dissenting statute’s words, giving them a plain and commonsense meaning. [Citation.] We do not, however, consider the statutory language ‘in isolation.’ [Citation.] Rather, we look to ‘the entire substance of the statute . . . in order to determine the scope and purpose of the provision . . . . [Citation.]’ [Citation.] That is, we construe the words in question ‘ “in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the statute . . . .” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] We must harmonize ‘the various parts of a statutory enactment . . . by considering the particular clause or section in th

2024Assn. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1504 .) “We begin by examining the statute’s words, giving them a plain and commonsense meaning. [Citation.] We do not, however, consider the statutory language ‘in isolation.’ [Citation.] Rather, we look to ‘the entire substance of the statute . . . in order to determine the scope and purpose of the provision. . . . [Citation.]’ [Citation.] That is, we construe the words in question ‘“in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the statute . . . .” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] We must harmonize ‘the various parts of a statutory enactment . . .

2023“We are required to give effect to statutes ‘according to the usual, ordinary import of the language employed in framing them.’ [Citations.]” [Citations.] “ ‘If possible, significance should be given to every word, phrase, sentence and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose.’ [Citation.] . . . . ‘When used in a statute [words] must be construed in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the statute where they appear.’ [Citations.] Moreover, the various parts of a statutory enactment must be harmonized by considering the particular clause or section in the con

2023“We are required to give effect to statutes ‘according to the usual, ordinary import of the language employed in framing them.’ [Citations.]” [Citations.] “ ‘If possible, significance should be given to every word, phrase, sentence and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose.’ [Citation.] . . . . ‘When used in a statute [words] must be construed in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the statute where they appear.’ [Citations.] Moreover, the various parts of a statutory enactment must be harmonized by considering the particular clause or section in the con

2026We do not examine that language in isolation, but in the context of the statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its scope and purpose 14 In enacting the state SDWA, the Legislature found and declared, “It is the policy of the state to reduce to the lowest level feasible all concentrations of toxic chemicals that, when present in drinking water, may cause cancer, birth defects, and other chronic diseases.” (§ 116270, subd. (d).) The Legislature stated its intent “to improve laws governing drinking water quality, to improve upon the minimum requirements of the federal [SDWA], to est

2025We do not examine that language in isolation, but in the context of the statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its scope and purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the enactment.” (Coalition of Concerned Communities, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 34 Cal.4th 733, 737 .) “If the language is clear, [we] must generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend.” (Ibid.)7 Under a plain and commonsense meaning, withholding money due under a contract is not the payment of “wages.” While Anton’s

2021Appeals Bd. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 382, 388 [“ ‘the various parts of a statutory enactment must be harmonized by considering the particular clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole’ ”].) And although it was certainly within the court’s discretion to grant a continuance so that Arden might gather evidence of financial need, Arden did not request one, even after the court made clear at the outset of the hearing that it viewed the lack of a financial statement as fatal to Arden’s claims.

2016Appeals Bd. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 382, 387-388 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 523 , 853 P.2d 978 ].) “ ‘ “ ‘When used in a statute [words] must be construed in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the statute where they appear.’ [Citations.] Moreover, the various parts of a statutory enactment must be harmonized by considering the particular clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole.” ’ ” (Phelps v. Stostad (1997) 16 Cal.4th 23, 32 [ 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 360 , 939 P.2d 760 ].) ‘“In interpreting a statute (or a constitutional provision), we are called upon to avoid abs

2002The dissent’s construction is consistent with the requirement “[significance, if possible, should be attributed to every word, phrase, sentence and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose, as ‘the various parts of a statutory enactment must be harmonized by considering the particular clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole.’” (DeYoung v. City of San Diego (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 11, 18 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 722 ], overruled on other grounds in Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1, 15 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 960 P.2d 1031 ].

2002The dissent’s construction is consistent with the requirement “[significance, if possible, should be attributed to every word, phrase, sentence and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose, as ‘the various parts of a statutory enactment must be harmonized by considering the particular clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole.’” (DeYoung v. City of San Diego (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 11, 18 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 722 ], overruled on other grounds in Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1, 15 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 960 P.2d 1031 ].

2014Savings & Loan Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1995) 11 Cal.4th 342, 349 .) "[S]tatutory language is generally the most reliable indicator of legislative intent." (Hassan v. Mercy American River Hospital (2003) 31 Cal.4th 709, 715 .) "When used in a statute[,] words must be construed in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the statute where they appear, and the various parts of a statutory enactment must be harmonized by considering the particular clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole." (People v. Black (1982) 32 Cal.3d 1, 5 .) In the contex

2010Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 432 [ 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 200 , 11 P.3d 956 ].) In construing a statute, “[t]he fundamental rule is that a court ‘should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.’ ” (People v. Black (1982) 32 Cal.3d 1, 5 [ 184 Cal.Rptr. 454 , 648 P.2d 104 ].) In making this determination, the court considers the words of the statute in the context of the statutory framework, giving “ ‘significance ... to every word, phrase, sentence^] and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose,’ ” and avoiding a construc

2026(See Lorenzo, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p. 279.) 21 context, and harmonize the various parts of an enactment by considering the provision at issue in the context of the statutory framework as a whole.” (Cummins, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 478, 487 .) “ ‘If the language is unambiguous, “then the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the language governs.” ’ ” (Niedermeier v. FCA US LLC (2024) 15 Cal.5th 792 , 804.) Under section 98.2, a party may appeal an award of the Labor Commissioner to the superior court “where the appeal shall be heard

2026(Cummins, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 478, 487 .) We “look first to the words of the statute, which are the most reliable indications of the Legislature’s intent.” (Ibid.) We do not construe those words in a vacuum but rather consider them in the context of the statutory framework as a whole.

2010We must consider the words of the statute in the context of the statutory framework, giving "`significance ... to every word, phrase, sentence[,] and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose.'" ( People v. Black (1982) 32 Cal.3d 1 , *1047 5 [ 184 Cal.Rptr. 454 , 648 P.2d 104 ], quoting Select Base Materials v. Board of Equal. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 640, 645 [ 335 P.2d 672 ].) Accordingly, we must give independent effect to both the requirement that the project occur "within city limits" and the final criterion in Guidelines section 15332, subdivision (b) that the project be "substantia

2010We must consider the words of the statute in the context of the statutory framework, giving "`significance ... to every word, phrase, sentence[,] and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose.'" ( People v. Black (1982) 32 Cal.3d 1 , *1047 5 [ 184 Cal.Rptr. 454 , 648 P.2d 104 ], quoting Select Base Materials v. Board of Equal. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 640, 645 [ 335 P.2d 672 ].) Accordingly, we must give independent effect to both the requirement that the project occur "within city limits" and the final criterion in Guidelines section 15332, subdivision (b) that the project be "substantia

2025Co. (2021) 12 Cal.5th 213, 227 ; accord, Jarman v. HCR ManorCare, Inc. (2020) 10 Cal.5th 375, 381 .) “We first consider the words of the statutes, as statutory language is generally the most reliable indicator of legislation’s intended purpose. [Citation.] We consider the ordinary meaning of the relevant terms, related provisions, terms used in other parts of the statute, and the structure of the statutory scheme.” (McHugh, at p. 227; accord, Jarman, at p. 381 [“‘We do not examine that language in isolation, but in the context of the statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its sco

2023Co. (2021) 12 Cal.5th 213, 227 (McHugh); accord, Jarman v. HCR ManorCare, Inc. (2020) 10 Cal.5th 375, 81 (Jarman).) ‘We first consider the words of the statutes, as statutory language is generally the most reliable indicator of legislation’s intended purpose. [Citation.] We consider the ordinary meaning of the relevant terms, related provisions, terms used in other parts of the statute, and the structure of the statutory scheme.’ (McHugh, at p. 227; accord, Jarman, at p. 381 [‘ “We do not examine that language in isolation, but in the context of the statutory framework as a whole in order to d

2001(See Craft, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 560 [“ ‘[T]he various parts of a statutory enactment must be harmonized by considering the particular clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole’ ”].) 2 Appellant in his argument takes this analysis one step further, suggesting that the Legislature’s intent was not just to reduce simple possession of Valium from a felony under the Health and Safety Code to a misdemeanor under section 4060, but instead that the Legislature actually intended to decriminalize the simple possession of Valium entirely, so as to not make it punishable ev

1992Moreover, ‘the various parts of a statutory *687 enactment must be harmonized by considering the particular clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole.’ [Citation.] Similarly, a statute should not be given a construction that results in rendering one of its provisions nugatory. [Citations.] Finally, we keep in mind that ‘ “[t]he defendant is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt, whether it arise out of a question of fact, or as to the true interpretation of words or the construction of language used in a statute.” ’ [Citations.]” (People v. Craft (1986)

2024In interpreting statutes, our primary objective is to “ ‘ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute.’ ” (Carmack v. Reynolds (2017) 2 Cal.5th 844, 849 , quoting Day v. City of Fontana (2001) 25 Cal.4th 268, 272 .) To determine that intent, “[w]e look first to ‘ “the language of the statute, affording the words their ordinary and usual meaning and viewing them in their statutory context.” ’ ” (People v. Jimenez (2020) 9 Cal.5th 53, 61 .) In addition, “ ‘[w]e do not examine that language in isolation, but in the context of the statutory framework as a wh

2024In interpreting statutes, our primary objective is to “ ‘ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute.’ ” (Carmack v. Reynolds (2017) 2 Cal.5th 844, 849 , quoting Day v. City of Fontana (2001) 25 Cal.4th 268, 272 .) To determine that intent, “[w]e look first to ‘ “the language of the statute, affording the words their ordinary and usual meaning and viewing them in their statutory context.” ’ ” (People v. Jimenez (2020) 9 Cal.5th 53, 61 .) In addition, “ ‘[w]e do not examine that language in isolation, but in the context of the statutory framework as a wh

2023Beginning with the plain language of the statute, “we construe the words in question in context, keeping in mind the statutes’ nature and obvious purposes. [Citation.] We must harmonize the various parts of the enactments by considering them in the context of the statutory framework as a whole.” (People v. Cole (2006) 38 Cal.4th 964, 975 (Cole).) Although section 1387 generally bars further prosecution if there have been two terminations, the Legislature has prescribed exceptions to this general rule.

2022(People v. Prunty (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59, 71 .) When interpreting a statute, “ ‘our fundamental task . . . is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Cornett (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1261, 1265 .) Beginning with the plain language of the statute, “we construe the words in question in context, keeping in mind the statutes’ nature and obvious purposes. [Citation.] We must harmonize the various parts of the enactments by considering them in the context of the statutory framework as a whole.” (People v. Cole (2006) 38 Cal.4th 964, 975 (Cole).)

2007Dist. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 650, 659 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 359 , 580 P.2d 1155 ] [“[T]he various parts of a statutory enactment must be harmonized by considering the particular clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole”].) Although we rely on the plain meaning of the statute, other recognized interpretive devices are consistent with our interpretation.

2007Dist. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 650, 659 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 359 , 580 P.2d 1155 ] [“[T]he various parts of a statutory enactment must be harmonized by considering the particular clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole”].) Although we rely on the plain meaning of the statute, other recognized interpretive devices are consistent with our interpretation.

2025A. Standard of Review “The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law we review de novo.” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961 .) Our fundamental task in construing a statute “is to ascertain the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. [Citation.] We begin our inquiry by examining the statute’s words, giving them a plain and commonsense meaning.” (People v. Mendoza (2000) 23 Cal.4th 896, 907 .) “[W]e look to ‘the entire substance of the statute . . . in order to determine the scope and purpose of the provision . . . . [Citation.]’” (Id. at pp. 907-908.)

2025A. Standard of Review “The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law we review de novo.” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 , 961.) Our fundamental task in construing a statute “is to ascertain the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. [Citation.] We begin our inquiry by examining the statute’s words, giving them a plain and commonsense meaning.” (People v. Mendoza (2000) 23 Cal.4th 896, 907 .) “[W]e look to ‘the entire substance of the statute . . . in order to determine the scope and purpose of the provision . . . . [Citation.]’” (Id. at pp. 907-908.)

2024(People v. Cota (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 318 , 335 (Cota); People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287 , 294 (Mendoza).) “ ‘[O]ur fundamental task . . . is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose.’ [Citation.] We begin by examining the statutory language because the words of a statute are generally the most reliable indicator of legislative intent. [Citations.] We give the words of the statute their ordinary and usual meaning and view them in their statutory context. [Citation.] We harmonize the various parts of the enactment by considering them in the context

2019We look first to the statute's plain language as "the best indicators of [the Legislature's] intent." ( *831 Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. Orange County Employees Retirement System (1993) 6 Cal.4th 821 , 826, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 148 , 863 P.2d 218 .) We seek to "harmonize 'the various parts of a statutory enactment ... by considering [the language of subdivision (a) ] in the context of the statutory framework as a whole' " ( People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136 , 142, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 387 , 19 P.3d 1129 ), rather than "in isolation." ( Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727 , 735, 248 Cal.Rptr.

2025Co. (2021) 12 Cal.5th 213, 227 ; accord, Jarman v. HCR ManorCare, Inc. (2020) 10 Cal.5th 375, 381 .) “We first consider the words of the statutes, as statutory language is generally the most reliable indicator of legislation’s intended purpose. [Citation.] We consider the ordinary meaning of the relevant terms, related provisions, terms used in other parts of the statute, and the structure of the statutory scheme.” (McHugh, at p. 227; accord, Jarman, at p. 381 [“‘We do not examine that language in isolation, but in the context of the statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its sco

2023Co. (2021) 12 Cal.5th 213, 227 (McHugh); accord, Jarman v. HCR ManorCare, Inc. (2020) 10 Cal.5th 375, 81 (Jarman).) ‘We first consider the words of the statutes, as statutory language is generally the most reliable indicator of legislation’s intended purpose. [Citation.] We consider the ordinary meaning of the relevant terms, related provisions, terms used in other parts of the statute, and the structure of the statutory scheme.’ (McHugh, at p. 227; accord, Jarman, at p. 381 [‘ “We do not examine that language in isolation, but in the context of the statutory framework as a whole in order to d

2017Both the legislative history of the statute and the wider historical circumstances of its enactment may be considered in ascertaining the legislative intent.’ ” (Kane v. Hurley (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 859, 862 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 809 ], quoting Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1386-1387 [ 241 Cal.Rptr. 67 , 743 P.2d 1323 ].) In addition, “ ‘[w]e must harmonize “the various parts of a statutory enactment ... by considering the particular clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole.” [Citations.] We must also avoid a construction that

2017Both the legislative history of the statute and the wider historical circumstances of its enactment may be considered in ascertaining the legislative intent.’ ” (Kane v. Hurley (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 859, 862 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 809 ], quoting Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1386-1387 [ 241 Cal.Rptr. 67 , 743 P.2d 1323 ].) In addition, “ ‘[w]e must harmonize “the various parts of a statutory enactment ... by considering the particular clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole.” [Citations.] We must also avoid a construction that

2025We do not examine [statutory] language in isolation, but in the context of the statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its scope and purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the enactment.” (Bruns v. E-Commerce Exchange, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 717, 724 .) “If the terms of the statute are unambiguous, . . . the plain meaning of the language governs. [Citations.] If there is ambiguity, however, we may then look to extrinsic sources, including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative history.” (Estate of Griswold (2001) 25 Cal.4th 904, 911 (Griswold).) We must “

2024In interpreting statutes, our primary objective is to “ ‘ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute.’ ” (Carmack v. Reynolds (2017) 2 Cal.5th 844, 849 , quoting Day v. City of Fontana (2001) 25 Cal.4th 268, 272 .) To determine that intent, “[w]e look first to ‘ “the language of the statute, affording the words their ordinary and usual meaning and viewing them in their statutory context.” ’ ” (People v. Jimenez (2020) 9 Cal.5th 53, 61 .) In addition, “ ‘[w]e do not examine that language in isolation, but in the context of the statutory framework as a wh

2025Co. (2021) 12 Cal.5th 213, 227 ; accord, Jarman v. HCR ManorCare, Inc. (2020) 10 Cal.5th 375, 381 .) “We first consider the words of the statutes, as statutory language is generally the most reliable indicator of legislation’s intended purpose. [Citation.] We consider the ordinary meaning of the relevant terms, related provisions, terms used in other parts of the statute, and the structure of the statutory scheme.” (McHugh, at p. 227; accord, Jarman, at p. 381 [“‘We do not examine that language in isolation, but in the context of the statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its sco

2025The courts in Sipe and Gonzales correctly construed the determination clause, consistent with the principle that “[w]e do not examine [statutory] language in isolation, but in the context of the statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its scope and purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the enactment.” (City of San Jose v. Superior Court (2017) 2 Cal.5th 608, 616 .) It is evident from the full text of section 667(d)(1) that the determination clause is intended to preserve the felony character of a prior conviction if it was a felony at the time of conviction, notwithstandin

2022(See Akella, supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at p. 818 [in interpreting a provision of law a court is to interpret law “as a whole”]; accord Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority v. Alameda Produce Market, LLC (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1100, 1107 [“We must harmonize the statute’s various parts by considering it in the context of the statutory framework as a whole”].) Statedly differently, we decline to interpret the Panel’s authority to determine the admissibility of evidence as a license to eviscerate the right to cross-examination provided in the immediately preceding sentence of the Proced

2021(Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority v. Alameda Produce Market, LLC (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1100, 1107 .) “We must harmonize the statute’s various parts by considering it in the context of the statutory framework as a whole.” (Ibid.) Another canon “generally preclude[s] judicial construction that renders part of the statute ‘meaningless or inoperative.’ ” (Hassan v. Mercy American River Hospital (2003) 31 Cal.4th 709 , 715–716 (Hassan).) With these tenets in mind, we cannot agree that an office expressly categorized as a discretionary voter registration agency must nonetheless b

2017The board shall report to the Governor." ( § 3044, subd. (b).) The fact that the statute is bookended by directives to BPH provides context for its procedural provisions. " '[W]e look to **19 "the entire substance of the statute ... in order to determine the scope and purpose of the provision.... [Citation.]" [Citation.] That is, we construe the words in question " 'in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the statute....' [Citation.]" [Citation.] We must harmonize "the various parts of a statutory enactment ... by considering the particular clause or section in the contex

2017The board shall report to the Governor." ( § 3044, subd. (b).) The fact that the statute is bookended by directives to BPH provides context for its procedural provisions. " '[W]e look to **19 "the entire substance of the statute ... in order to determine the scope and purpose of the provision.... [Citation.]" [Citation.] That is, we construe the words in question " 'in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the statute....' [Citation.]" [Citation.] We must harmonize "the various parts of a statutory enactment ... by considering the particular clause or section in the contex