civil traffic violation in Kentucky

2026“It should be noted with regard to the traffic stop, that an officer -5- who has probable cause to believe a civil traffic violation has occurred may stop a vehicle regardless of his or her subjective motivation in doing so.” Greer, 514 S.W.3d at 569 (quoting Wilson v. Commonwealth, 37 S.W.3d 745, 749 (Ky. 2001)); see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 , 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 , 135 L.

2026While this broad principle applies to many situations, Terry did not involve a motor vehicle stop but rather an interaction with individuals standing on a street. “[A]n officer who has probable cause to believe a civil traffic violation has occurred may stop a vehicle regardless of his or her subjective motivation in doing so.” Wilson v. Commonwealth, 37 S.W.3d 745, 749 (Ky. 2001) (citations omitted).

2020Davis v. Commonwealth, 484 S.W.3d 288, 290 (Ky. 2016) (citing Simpson v. 3 Commonwealth, 474 S.W.3d 544, 547 (Ky. 2015)). 4 Turley v. Commonwealth, 399 S.W.3d 412, 417 (Ky. 2013). 4 violation has occurred.”5 Furthermore, an officer’s subjective motivations for the stop are not relevant, “[a]s long as an officer ‘has probable cause to believe a civil traffic violation has occurred[.]’”6 While officers may detain a vehicle and its occupants to conduct an ordinary stop, such actions may not be excessively intrusive and must be reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the initial seizure

2020“It has long been considered reasonable for an officer to conduct a traffic stop if he or she has probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.”6 Furthermore, an officer’s subjective motivations for the stop are not relevant, “[a]s long as an officer ‘has probable cause to believe a civil traffic violation has occurred[.]”7 While officers may detain a vehicle and its occupants to conduct an ordinary stop, such actions may not be excessively intrusive and must be reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the initial seizure.8 The Supreme Court in Rodriguez v. United

2026“It should be noted with regard to the traffic stop, that an officer -5- who has probable cause to believe a civil traffic violation has occurred may stop a vehicle regardless of his or her subjective motivation in doing so.” Greer, 514 S.W.3d at 569 (quoting Wilson v. Commonwealth, 37 S.W.3d 745, 749 (Ky. 2001)); see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 , 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 , 135 L.

2026“It should be noted with regard to the traffic stop, that an officer -5- who has probable cause to believe a civil traffic violation has occurred may stop a vehicle regardless of his or her subjective motivation in doing so.” Greer, 514 S.W.3d at 569 (quoting Wilson v. Commonwealth, 37 S.W.3d 745, 749 (Ky. 2001)); see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 , 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 , 135 L.

2020As long as an officer “has probable cause to believe a civil traffic violation has occurred, [he] may stop [the] vehicle regardless of his or her subjective motivation in doing so,” Id. (quoting Wilson, 37 S.W.3d at 749 ); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)[.] Davis, 484 S.W.3d at 291 .

2020As long as an officer “has probable cause to believe a civil traffic violation has occurred, [he] may stop [the] vehicle regardless of his or her subjective motivation in doing so,” Id. (quoting Wilson, 37 S.W.3d at 749 ); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)[.] Davis, 484 S.W.3d at 291 .

2023See Wilson v. 27 Commonwealth, 37 S.W.3d 745, 749 (Ky. 2001) (“[A]n officer who has probable cause to believe a civil traffic violation has occurred may stop a vehicle regardless of his or her subjective motivation in doing so.”) (citing United States v. Akram, 165 F.3d 452, 455 (6th Cir. 1999); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996)).

2023See Wilson v. 27 Commonwealth, 37 S.W.3d 745, 749 (Ky. 2001) (“[A]n officer who has probable cause to believe a civil traffic violation has occurred may stop a vehicle regardless of his or her subjective motivation in doing so.”) (citing United States v. Akram, 165 F.3d 452, 455 (6th Cir. 1999); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996)).

2020Davis v. Commonwealth, 484 S.W.3d 288, 290 (Ky. 2016) (citing Simpson v. 3 Commonwealth, 474 S.W.3d 544, 547 (Ky. 2015)). 4 Turley v. Commonwealth, 399 S.W.3d 412, 417 (Ky. 2013). 4 violation has occurred.”5 Furthermore, an officer’s subjective motivations for the stop are not relevant, “[a]s long as an officer ‘has probable cause to believe a civil traffic violation has occurred[.]’”6 While officers may detain a vehicle and its occupants to conduct an ordinary stop, such actions may not be excessively intrusive and must be reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the initial seizure

2020Davis v. Commonwealth, 484 S.W.3d 288, 290 (Ky. 2016) (citing Simpson v. 3 Commonwealth, 474 S.W.3d 544, 547 (Ky. 2015)). 4 Turley v. Commonwealth, 399 S.W.3d 412, 417 (Ky. 2013). 4 violation has occurred.”5 Furthermore, an officer’s subjective motivations for the stop are not relevant, “[a]s long as an officer ‘has probable cause to believe a civil traffic violation has occurred[.]’”6 While officers may detain a vehicle and its occupants to conduct an ordinary stop, such actions may not be excessively intrusive and must be reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the initial seizure

2020As long as an officer “has probable cause to believe a civil traffic violation has occurred, [he] may stop [the] vehicle regardless of his or her subjective motivation in doing so,” Id. (quoting Wilson, 37 S.W.3d at 749 ); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)[.] Davis, 484 S.W.3d at 291 .

2020As long as an officer “has probable cause to believe a civil traffic violation has occurred, [he] may stop [the] vehicle regardless of his or her subjective motivation in doing so,” Id. (quoting Wilson, 37 S.W.3d at 749 ); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)[.] Davis, 484 S.W.3d at 291 .

2020Davis v. Commonwealth, 484 S.W.3d 288, 290 (Ky. 2016) (citing Simpson v. 3 Commonwealth, 474 S.W.3d 544, 547 (Ky. 2015)). 4 Turley v. Commonwealth, 399 S.W.3d 412, 417 (Ky. 2013). 4 violation has occurred.”5 Furthermore, an officer’s subjective motivations for the stop are not relevant, “[a]s long as an officer ‘has probable cause to believe a civil traffic violation has occurred[.]’”6 While officers may detain a vehicle and its occupants to conduct an ordinary stop, such actions may not be excessively intrusive and must be reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the initial seizure

2020Davis v. Commonwealth, 484 S.W.3d 288, 290 (Ky. 2016) (citing Simpson v. 3 Commonwealth, 474 S.W.3d 544, 547 (Ky. 2015)). 4 Turley v. Commonwealth, 399 S.W.3d 412, 417 (Ky. 2013). 4 violation has occurred.”5 Furthermore, an officer’s subjective motivations for the stop are not relevant, “[a]s long as an officer ‘has probable cause to believe a civil traffic violation has occurred[.]’”6 While officers may detain a vehicle and its occupants to conduct an ordinary stop, such actions may not be excessively intrusive and must be reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the initial seizure

2020Davis v. Commonwealth, 484 S.W.3d 288, 290 (Ky. 2016) (citing Simpson v. 3 Commonwealth, 474 S.W.3d 544, 547 (Ky. 2015)). 4 Turley v. Commonwealth, 399 S.W.3d 412, 417 (Ky. 2013). 4 violation has occurred.”5 Furthermore, an officer’s subjective motivations for the stop are not relevant, “[a]s long as an officer ‘has probable cause to believe a civil traffic violation has occurred[.]’”6 While officers may detain a vehicle and its occupants to conduct an ordinary stop, such actions may not be excessively intrusive and must be reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the initial seizure

2013Length of Detention A lawful stop may nevertheless encroach on an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights “if its manner of execution unreasonably infringes interests protected by the Constitution.” Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 , 125 S.Ct. 834 , 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005).

2020Davis v. Commonwealth, 484 S.W.3d 288, 290 (Ky. 2016) (citing Simpson v. 3 Commonwealth, 474 S.W.3d 544, 547 (Ky. 2015)). 4 Turley v. Commonwealth, 399 S.W.3d 412, 417 (Ky. 2013). 4 violation has occurred.”5 Furthermore, an officer’s subjective motivations for the stop are not relevant, “[a]s long as an officer ‘has probable cause to believe a civil traffic violation has occurred[.]’”6 While officers may detain a vehicle and its occupants to conduct an ordinary stop, such actions may not be excessively intrusive and must be reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the initial seizure

2020Davis v. Commonwealth, 484 S.W.3d 288, 290 (Ky. 2016) (citing Simpson v. 3 Commonwealth, 474 S.W.3d 544, 547 (Ky. 2015)). 4 Turley v. Commonwealth, 399 S.W.3d 412, 417 (Ky. 2013). 4 violation has occurred.”5 Furthermore, an officer’s subjective motivations for the stop are not relevant, “[a]s long as an officer ‘has probable cause to believe a civil traffic violation has occurred[.]’”6 While officers may detain a vehicle and its occupants to conduct an ordinary stop, such actions may not be excessively intrusive and must be reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the initial seizure

2020Davis v. Commonwealth, 484 S.W.3d 288, 290 (Ky. 2016) (citing Simpson v. 3 Commonwealth, 474 S.W.3d 544, 547 (Ky. 2015)). 4 Turley v. Commonwealth, 399 S.W.3d 412, 417 (Ky. 2013). 4 violation has occurred.”5 Furthermore, an officer’s subjective motivations for the stop are not relevant, “[a]s long as an officer ‘has probable cause to believe a civil traffic violation has occurred[.]’”6 While officers may detain a vehicle and its occupants to conduct an ordinary stop, such actions may not be excessively intrusive and must be reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the initial seizure

2020Davis v. Commonwealth, 484 S.W.3d 288, 290 (Ky. 2016) (citing Simpson v. 3 Commonwealth, 474 S.W.3d 544, 547 (Ky. 2015)). 4 Turley v. Commonwealth, 399 S.W.3d 412, 417 (Ky. 2013). 4 violation has occurred.”5 Furthermore, an officer’s subjective motivations for the stop are not relevant, “[a]s long as an officer ‘has probable cause to believe a civil traffic violation has occurred[.]’”6 While officers may detain a vehicle and its occupants to conduct an ordinary stop, such actions may not be excessively intrusive and must be reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the initial seizure

2020Davis v. Commonwealth, 484 S.W.3d 288, 290 (Ky. 2016) (citing Simpson v. 3 Commonwealth, 474 S.W.3d 544, 547 (Ky. 2015)). 4 Turley v. Commonwealth, 399 S.W.3d 412, 417 (Ky. 2013). 4 violation has occurred.”5 Furthermore, an officer’s subjective motivations for the stop are not relevant, “[a]s long as an officer ‘has probable cause to believe a civil traffic violation has occurred[.]’”6 While officers may detain a vehicle and its occupants to conduct an ordinary stop, such actions may not be excessively intrusive and must be reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the initial seizure

2020Davis v. Commonwealth, 484 S.W.3d 288, 290 (Ky. 2016) (citing Simpson v. 3 Commonwealth, 474 S.W.3d 544, 547 (Ky. 2015)). 4 Turley v. Commonwealth, 399 S.W.3d 412, 417 (Ky. 2013). 4 violation has occurred.”5 Furthermore, an officer’s subjective motivations for the stop are not relevant, “[a]s long as an officer ‘has probable cause to believe a civil traffic violation has occurred[.]’”6 While officers may detain a vehicle and its occupants to conduct an ordinary stop, such actions may not be excessively intrusive and must be reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the initial seizure

2017Greer urges us to “reconsider[] the Commonwealth’s adherence to Whren.” We believe such a departure from United States Supreme Court precedent would not be in keeping with our own Supreme Court precedents, which have found that “Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution provides no greater protection than does the federal Fourth Amendment.” Chavies v. Commonwealth, 354 S.W.3d 103, 107 (Ky. 2011) (quoting LaFollette v. Commonwealth, 915 S.W.2d 747, 748 (Ky. 1996)).

2017Greer urges us to “reconsider[] the Commonwealth’s adherence to Whren.” We believe such a departure from United States Supreme Court precedent would not be in keeping with our own Supreme Court precedents, which have found that “Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution provides no greater protection than does the federal Fourth Amendment.” Chavies v. Commonwealth, 354 S.W.3d 103, 107 (Ky. 2011) (quoting LaFollette v. Commonwealth, 915 S.W.2d 747, 748 (Ky. 1996)).