9 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1989–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Clarkgreen1 sentence2023Our obligation is to review the entire record for reversible error, State v. Clark, 196 Ariz. 530, 537, ¶ 30 (App. 1999), viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the conviction and resolving all reasonable inferences against Mello, State v. Guerra, 161 Ariz. 289, 293 (1989). ¶2 In May 2018, Mello was a passenger in a car that was stopped by police for having inoperable license plate lamps, which is a civil traffic violation. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Guerragreen1 sentence2023Our obligation is to review the entire record for reversible error, State v. Clark, 196 Ariz. 530, 537, ¶ 30 (App. 1999), viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the conviction and resolving all reasonable inferences against Mello, State v. Guerra, 161 Ariz. 289, 293 (1989). ¶2 In May 2018, Mello was a passenger in a car that was stopped by police for having inoperable license plate lamps, which is a civil traffic violation. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Poligreen1 sentence2018Its application 1 The posted speed limit on the roadway was fifty-five miles per hour. 2 STATE v. PETERS Decision of the Court to the specific facts of [a] case is beyond our review.”); State v. Poli, 161 Ariz. 151, 153 (App. 1989) (concluding “this court lacks jurisdiction to review a civil traffic violation adjudication”). | 1 | 1 |
Welsh v. Wisconsingreen2 sentences2017See Welsh, 466 U.S. at 754 , 104 S.Ct. 2091 (statute is “best indication of the State’s interest in precipitating an arrest, and is one that can be easily identified both by the courts and by officers faced with a decision to arrest”). ¶ 27 In sum, Hernandez’s attempt to elude law enforcement by entering a private driveway constituted probable cause that he was attempting to flee, despite the fact that the reason for the stop was a civil traffic violation. 2017See Welsh, 466 U.S. at 754 , 104 S.Ct. 2091 (statute is “best indication of the State’s interest in precipitating an arrest, and is one that can be easily identified both by the courts and by officers faced with a decision to arrest”). ¶ 27 In sum, Hernandez’s attempt to elude law enforcement by entering a private driveway constituted probable cause that he was attempting to flee, despite the fact that the reason for the stop was a civil traffic violation. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Sheehangreen2 sentences2014In State v. Sheehan, this court evaluated whether a probation condition requiring defendant to “obey all laws” justified revocation based on a civil traffic violation. 167 Ariz. 370, 372 , 807 P.2d 538, 540 (App. 1991). 2014In State v. Sheehan, this court evaluated whether a probation condition requiring defendant to “obey all laws” justified revocation based on a civil traffic violation. 167 Ariz. 370, 372 , 807 P.2d 538, 540 (App. 1991). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lynchgreen2 sentences2014And State v. Lynch considered whether probation could be revoked based on adultery where the statutory requirements for prosecution of that crime had not been met. 115 Ariz. 19, 24 , 562 P.2d 1386, 1391 (App. 1977). 2014And State v. Lynch considered whether probation could be revoked based on adultery where the statutory requirements for prosecution of that crime had not been met. 115 Ariz. 19, 24 , 562 P.2d 1386, 1391 (App. 1977). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Collovagreen2 sentences2007See also State v. Collova, 79 Wis.2d 473 , 255 N.W.2d 581, 588 (1977) (imposing duty of due diligence on accused with respect to knowledge of facts relating to status of his driving privilege). 4 ¶ 19 The approach advocated by the State would permit the trier-of-fact to find that a defendant lacking actual knowledge of his license suspension nonetheless had reason to know of the suspension based on mere evidence showing that he failed to notify the Department of a change of address within ten days as required by § 28-448(A), which is a civil traffic violation. 2007See also State v. Collova, 79 Wis.2d 473 , 255 N.W.2d 581, 588 (1977) (imposing duty of due diligence on accused with respect to knowledge of facts relating to status of his driving privilege). 4 ¶ 19 The approach advocated by the State would permit the trier-of-fact to find that a defendant lacking actual knowledge of his license suspension nonetheless had reason to know of the suspension based on mere evidence showing that he failed to notify the Department of a change of address within ten days as required by § 28-448(A), which is a civil traffic violation. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Walkergreen2 sentences1991A.R.S. § 28-1076(C). 159 Ariz. 506, 508 , 768 P.2d 668, 670 (App. 1989). 1991A.R.S. § 28-1076(C). 159 Ariz. 506, 508 , 768 P.2d 668, 670 (App. 1989). | 1 | 1 |
Todd v. Toddgreen2 sentences1989See Todd v. Todd, 137 Ariz. 404 , 670 P.2d 1228 (App. 1983); Baca v. Don, 130 Ariz 222, 635 P.2d 510 (App.1981); Crouch v. Justice of the Peace Court, 7 Ariz.App. 460 , 440 P.2d 1000 (1968); see also Berry v. Superior Court, Ariz., 29 Ariz.Adv.Rep. 25 (Ct.App.March 7, 1989). 1989See Todd v. Todd, 137 Ariz. 404 , 670 P.2d 1228 (App. 1983); Baca v. Don, 130 Ariz 222, 635 P.2d 510 (App.1981); Crouch v. Justice of the Peace Court, 7 Ariz.App. 460 , 440 P.2d 1000 (1968); see also Berry v. Superior Court, Ariz., 29 Ariz.Adv.Rep. 25 (Ct.App.March 7, 1989). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ratliffgreen2 sentences1989See State v. Ratliff, 304 Or. 254 , 744 P.2d 247 (1987). *508 We need not address the state’s arguments that collateral estoppel cannot apply when the lack of a record precludes a determination of what the dispositive fact issue was in the first forum. 1989See State v. Ratliff, 304 Or. 254 , 744 P.2d 247 (1987). *508 We need not address the state’s arguments that collateral estoppel cannot apply when the lack of a record precludes a determination of what the dispositive fact issue was in the first forum. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Rodriguez v. United States
green
1 sentence2018In Rodriguez , the defendant was entitled to release after he had been cited for a civil traffic violation and neither reasonable suspicion nor probable cause supported any further delay. 135 S.Ct. at 1612 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Wear
green
2 sentences2017The Fourth Amendment does not require that the deputies must “shrug [their] shoulders and go obtain a warrant” when the initial violation was for a minor offense. 12 Wear, 311 Ill.Dec. 41 , 867 N.E.2d at 60 . 2017The Fourth Amendment does not require that the deputies must “shrug [their] shoulders and go obtain a warrant” when the initial violation was for a minor offense. 12 Wear, 311 Ill.Dec. 41 , 867 N.E.2d at 60 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Lavoyne M.
green
1 sentence2017Id. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Crouch v. Justice of the Peace Court of the Sixth Precinct
green
2 sentences1989See Todd v. Todd, 137 Ariz. 404 , 670 P.2d 1228 (App. 1983); Baca v. Don, 130 Ariz 222, 635 P.2d 510 (App.1981); Crouch v. Justice of the Peace Court, 7 Ariz.App. 460 , 440 P.2d 1000 (1968); see also Berry v. Superior Court, Ariz., 29 Ariz.Adv.Rep. 25 (Ct.App.March 7, 1989). 1989See Todd v. Todd, 137 Ariz. 404 , 670 P.2d 1228 (App. 1983); Baca v. Don, 130 Ariz 222, 635 P.2d 510 (App.1981); Crouch v. Justice of the Peace Court, 7 Ariz.App. 460 , 440 P.2d 1000 (1968); see also Berry v. Superior Court, Ariz., 29 Ariz.Adv.Rep. 25 (Ct.App.March 7, 1989). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Baca v. Don
green
1 sentence1989See Todd v. Todd, 137 Ariz. 404 , 670 P.2d 1228 (App. 1983); Baca v. Don, 130 Ariz 222, 635 P.2d 510 (App.1981); Crouch v. Justice of the Peace Court, 7 Ariz.App. 460 , 440 P.2d 1000 (1968); see also Berry v. Superior Court, Ariz., 29 Ariz.Adv.Rep. 25 (Ct.App.March 7, 1989). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Ashe v. Swenson
green
2 sentences1989The municipal court citation was disposed of first and the city magistrate found him “not responsible.” In superior court, defendant moved to dismiss the felony charges, claiming that, under Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970), the state was precluded from prosecuting him on the felonies because he had been found “not responsible” on the civil traffic complaint. 1989The municipal court citation was disposed of first and the city magistrate found him “not responsible.” In superior court, defendant moved to dismiss the felony charges, claiming that, under Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970), the state was precluded from prosecuting him on the felonies because he had been found “not responsible” on the civil traffic complaint. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.