17 Massachusetts opinions name it 3 courts 1978–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Arrigo v. Planning Board of Franklingreen2 sentences2015L. c. 40A, § 10.” 14 Arrigo, 12 Mass. App. Ct. at 808 . 2012For example, whereas almost one-half of the south side of the old house came close to meeting the sideyard setback requirement (eight and one-half feet instead of the required ten), the entirety of that side of the new house now extends all the way to the lot line. 16 Regardless of whether such changes might ultimately be approvable, 17 they cannot be ignored as “de minimis.” 18 See Arrigo v. Planning Bd. of Franklin, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 802, 804 (1981) (rejecting argument that a 6.68 percent deviation from a frontage requirement was de minimis). | 1 | 2 |
Steamboat Realty, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appealgreen1 sentence2012See also Steamboat Realty, 70 Mass. App. Ct. at 602 n.4, 606 (height differential of “at least four feet” not de minimis). | 1 | 1 |
Lingle v. Chevron U. S. A. Inc.green1 sentence2006Nor has Chiancola proved that he has been denied “ ‘all economically beneficial us[e]’ of [the] property.” Lingle v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2081 (2005), quoting from Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, supra at 1019. | 1 | 1 |
Gove v. Zoning Board of Appealsgreen1 sentence2006It is untenable that a frontage requirement by which a municipality seeks to ensure emergency access to residences “bears no ‘reasonable relation to the State’s legitimate purpose.’ ” Gove v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Chatham, 444 Mass. 754, 760 (2005), quoting from Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 125 (1978). | 1 | 1 |
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Councilgreen1 sentence2006Nor has Chiancola proved that he has been denied “ ‘all economically beneficial us[e]’ of [the] property.” Lingle v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2081 (2005), quoting from Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, supra at 1019. | 1 | 1 |
Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Marylandgreen1 sentence2006It is untenable that a frontage requirement by which a municipality seeks to ensure emergency access to residences “bears no ‘reasonable relation to the State’s legitimate purpose.’ ” Gove v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Chatham, 444 Mass. 754, 760 (2005), quoting from Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 125 (1978). | 1 | 1 |
Warren v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Amherstgreen1 sentence2005The Board uses circular logic to conclude that hardship would result from enforcement of the frontage requirement “because the lot in question is a back lot with no frontage . . . owing to unique circumstances relating to the shape of the land the lot is 100 percent land locked.” The same argument was denied in Warren v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 383 Mass. 1,11 (1981): It seems clear from the decisions of the board and of the judge that the only circumstance ‘especially affecting [the lot in question] but not affecting generally the zoning district in which it is located,’ is the fact that [the | 1 | 1 |
Inhabitants of Cohasset v. Moorsgreen1 sentence2003See, e.g., Inhabitants of Cohasset v. Moors, 204 Mass. 173, 175-176 (1910) (alteration of county highway automatically discontinues portion of former layout that is not contained within new layout). | 1 | 1 |
McCarthy v. Planning Board of Edgartowngreen1 sentence2000In a similar vein, McCarthy v. Planning Bd. of Edgartown, 381 Mass. 86, 87-88 (1980), held that lots with 100 feet of frontage on a public way (Herring Creek Road), which satisfied the frontage requirement of the Edgartown zoning by-law, did not entitle the owner to an ANR endorsement because a superseding regulation of the Martha’s Vineyard Commission permitted vehicular access only at 1,000-foot intervals. | 1 | 1 |
Haynes v. Grassogreen2 sentences1992See Haynes v. Grasso, 353 Mass. 731, 733-734 [1968].” In the Adams case, however, as in Haynes v. Grasso , the zoning by-law contained no fixed frontage requirement for the type of project contemplated, leaving the frontage to be fixed by special permit. 2 Only in those special cases where the frontage requirement is fixed by special permit do the words of § 81L (“frontage . . . of at least such distance as is then required by zoning or other ordinance or by-law”) refer to the frontage fixed by the board. 1992This was not a variance from the by-law, but a special application of its terms.” Haynes v. Grasso, 353 Mass. at 734 . | 1 | 1 |
Canter v. Planning Board of Westboroughgreen2 sentences1981L. c. 41, § 81M; Canter v. Planning Bd. of Westborough, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 306, 308 [1976]); and those rules and regulations may not impose a frontage requirement independent of that required by the zoning by-law. 1981The portion of § 81U quoted in Canter v. Planning Bd. of Westborough, 4 Mass. App. Ct. at 308, indicates that disapproval of the plan may be based not only on noncompliance with the rules or regulations of the planning board or the recommendations of the board of health but also on noncompliance with any requirement of the Subdivision Control Law itself. 5 In keeping with that view, § 81R is to be read as giving the planning board the power to waive strict compliance with the frontage requirement of § 81L, whether that be the frontage specified in the zoning by-law or the twenty-foot minimum a | 1 | 1 |
Golden v. Board of Selectmen of Falmouthgreen1 sentence1978See MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 347 Mass. 690 (1964), S.C., 356 Mass. 635 (1970), 369 Mass. 512 (1976); Brady v. Board of Appeals of Westport, 348 Mass. 515, 524 (1965); Crawford v. Building Inspector of Barnstable, 356 Mass. 174, 179, 181 (1969); Golden v. Selectmen of Falmouth, 358 Mass. 519, 522-523 (1970); S. Volpe & Co. v. Board of Appeals of Wareham, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 357, 360 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxburygreen1 sentence1978See MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 347 Mass. 690 (1964), S.C., 356 Mass. 635 (1970), 369 Mass. 512 (1976); Brady v. Board of Appeals of Westport, 348 Mass. 515, 524 (1965); Crawford v. Building Inspector of Barnstable, 356 Mass. 174, 179, 181 (1969); Golden v. Selectmen of Falmouth, 358 Mass. 519, 522-523 (1970); S. Volpe & Co. v. Board of Appeals of Wareham, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 357, 360 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
S. Volpe & Co. v. Board of Appeals of Warehamgreen1 sentence1978See MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 347 Mass. 690 (1964), S.C., 356 Mass. 635 (1970), 369 Mass. 512 (1976); Brady v. Board of Appeals of Westport, 348 Mass. 515, 524 (1965); Crawford v. Building Inspector of Barnstable, 356 Mass. 174, 179, 181 (1969); Golden v. Selectmen of Falmouth, 358 Mass. 519, 522-523 (1970); S. Volpe & Co. v. Board of Appeals of Wareham, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 357, 360 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxburygreen1 sentence1978See MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 347 Mass. 690 (1964), S.C., 356 Mass. 635 (1970), 369 Mass. 512 (1976); Brady v. Board of Appeals of Westport, 348 Mass. 515, 524 (1965); Crawford v. Building Inspector of Barnstable, 356 Mass. 174, 179, 181 (1969); Golden v. Selectmen of Falmouth, 358 Mass. 519, 522-523 (1970); S. Volpe & Co. v. Board of Appeals of Wareham, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 357, 360 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
Crawford v. Building Inspector of Barnstablegreen1 sentence1978See MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 347 Mass. 690 (1964), S.C., 356 Mass. 635 (1970), 369 Mass. 512 (1976); Brady v. Board of Appeals of Westport, 348 Mass. 515, 524 (1965); Crawford v. Building Inspector of Barnstable, 356 Mass. 174, 179, 181 (1969); Golden v. Selectmen of Falmouth, 358 Mass. 519, 522-523 (1970); S. Volpe & Co. v. Board of Appeals of Wareham, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 357, 360 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
Brady v. Board of Appeals of Westportgreen1 sentence1978See MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 347 Mass. 690 (1964), S.C., 356 Mass. 635 (1970), 369 Mass. 512 (1976); Brady v. Board of Appeals of Westport, 348 Mass. 515, 524 (1965); Crawford v. Building Inspector of Barnstable, 356 Mass. 174, 179, 181 (1969); Golden v. Selectmen of Falmouth, 358 Mass. 519, 522-523 (1970); S. Volpe & Co. v. Board of Appeals of Wareham, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 357, 360 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
Mitchell v. Morrisgreen1 sentence1978If the purpose of a frontage requirement is to make certain that each lot "may be reached by the fire department, police department, and other agencies charged with the responsibility of protecting the public peace, safety and welfare” (Mitchell v. Morris, 94 Cal. App. 2d 446, 448-449 [1949]), then in the plan at bar frontage fails conspicuously to perform its intended purpose, and the master and the judge were right to see the plan as an attempted evasion of the duty to comply with the regulations of the planning board. 8 The measure of the case was indicated by the master (and by counsel at | 1 | 1 |
MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxburygreen1 sentence1978See MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 347 Mass. 690 (1964), S.C., 356 Mass. 635 (1970), 369 Mass. 512 (1976); Brady v. Board of Appeals of Westport, 348 Mass. 515, 524 (1965); Crawford v. Building Inspector of Barnstable, 356 Mass. 174, 179, 181 (1969); Golden v. Selectmen of Falmouth, 358 Mass. 519, 522-523 (1970); S. Volpe & Co. v. Board of Appeals of Wareham, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 357, 360 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gordon v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Lee
green
1 sentence1996Similarly in Gordon , the applicant seeking the variance to allow the construction of a single family dwelling and garage on land of some five acres with less than the minimum 125 feet frontage on a public way required by a zoning by-law did not prevail on his claim that compliance with the frontage requirement would compel an uneconomic use of the land “since the land could not be sold without a variance.” Gordon, supra at 350 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Seguin v. Planning Board
green
1 sentence1995Such frontage shall be of at least such distance as is then required by zoning or other ordinance or by-law, if any, of said city or town for erection of a building on such lot, and if no distance is so required, such frontage shall be of at least twenty feet.” Sequin v. Planning Bd. of Upton, 33 Mass. App. Ct. at 375 , treats a plan showing a division of land into two parcels, one of which did not meet the frontage requirement of the applicable zoning by-law, as showing a subdivision and thus requiring planning board approval. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Nasca v. Board of Appeals
green
1 sentence1993The amendment was inartis-tically drawn; to give it effect, the court read “a way . . . shown on a plan approved by the [planning [bjoard” to include “a way approved by the planning board.” Id. at 49-54 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Sorenti v. Board of Appeals of Wellesley
green
1 sentence1989The rationale of such a provision is that an owner who has or has had adjacent land has it within his power, by adding such land to the substandard lot, to comply with the frontage requirement, or, at least, to make the frontage less substandard .... [T]he owner cannot avail himself of the nonconforming exemption unless he includes his adjacent land in order to minimize the nonconformity.” 345 Mass. at 353 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Paulding v. Bruins
green
2 sentences1986The slope of the locus carries off water creating a "water condition at the bottom of the slope nearest Fairview Street." The shape, topography, and soil conditions affecting the locus do "not affect the zoning district generally." If the variance were not granted, the "only alternative available to the owner would be to construct an acceptable road from Fairview Street to his property." To construct such a road to serve a single home would involve a "prohibitive expense." Compliance with the frontage requirement would "compel an uneconomic use of the land and would force a substantial hardshi 1986The slope of the locus carries off water creating a “water condition at the bottom of the slope nearest Fairview Street.” The shape, topography, and soil conditions affecting the locus do “not affect the zoning district generally.” If the variance were not granted, the “only alternative available to the owner would be to construct an acceptable road from Fairview Street to his property.” To construct such a road to serve a single home would involve a “prohibitive expense.” Compliance with the frontage requirement would “compel an uneconomic use of the land and would force a substantial hardshi | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Schlaiker v. Board of Assessors of Great Barrington
green
1 sentence1983Where the taxpayer introduces no persuasive evidence of overvaluation, “a conclusion that a presumptively valid assessment must stand is by its nature not such an affirmative finding as to require substantial evidence to support it.” Schlaiker v. Assessors of Great Barrington, 365 Mass. 243 , 245 n.2 (1974). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Wilson v. Town of Sherborn
green
2 sentences1981The judge relied on factors generally associated with minimum area requirements (i.e., water and sewage problems) to support a minimum frontage requirement, reasoning that requirements for both are “largely intertwined.” We disagree. 1 In making her ruling, the Land Court judge cited Wilson v. Sherborn, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 237 (1975), where, in a footnote, this court pointed out: “No separate issue is made of the frontage requirement by the judge or the parties. 1981It was apparently assumed that this requirement stood or fell with the acreage requirement, and we treat the case on this footing.” Id. at 237-238 n.1. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Barney & Carey Co. v. Town of Milton
green
2 sentences1981In failing to acknowledge this, the Land Court also failed to resolve issues central to the instant case: (1) whether factors relating to area requirements provide adequate support for upholding strict compliance with a frontage requirement; and (2) whether “imposition of the zoning regulation in [this] instance has [any] real or substantial relation to the public safety, public health or public welfare.” Barney & Carey Co. v. Milton, 324 Mass. at 445 . 1981In failing to acknowledge this, the Land Court also failed to resolve issues central to the instant case: (1) whether factors relating to area requirements provide adequate support for upholding strict compliance with a frontage requirement; and (2) whether “imposition of the zoning regulation in [this] instance has [any] real or substantial relation to the public safety, public health or public welfare.” Barney & Carey Co. v. Milton, 324 Mass. at 445 . | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Gifford v. Planning Board
green
1 sentence1981In Gifford v. Planning Bd. of Nantucket, 376 Mass. 801 (1978), the Supreme Judicial Court discussed frontage requirements as they related to subdivision control under G. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Metzger v. Town of Brentwood
green
2 sentences1981In Metzger v. Brentwood, 117 N.H. 497 (1977), the New Hampshire Supreme Court noted that “[u]sually frontage requirements can be justified on the basis that they are a method of determining lot size to prevent overcrowding [or] . . . that there must be access for fire trucks, police cars, ambulances and school busses.” Id. at 502 . 1981In Metzger v. Brentwood, 117 N.H. 497 (1977), the New Hampshire Supreme Court noted that “[u]sually frontage requirements can be justified on the basis that they are a method of determining lot size to prevent overcrowding [or] . . . that there must be access for fire trucks, police cars, ambulances and school busses.” Id. at 502 . | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.