17 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 1966–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Blankenshipgreen2 sentences1993State v. Blankenship, 830 S.W.2d 1, 13 [14] (Mo. banc 1992). 1993State v. Blankenship, 830 S.W.2d 1, 13 [14] (Mo. banc 1992). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Wardgreen2 sentences2003The court in Crews contrasted these cases with State v. Ward, 807 S.W.2d 225, 226 (Mo.App.1991) and State v. Petary, 781 S.W.2d 534, 541 (Mo. banc 1989). 4 In [Ward], the prosecutor’s comments that defense counsel was resorting to trickery were not improper because the comments were merely an attack on defense counsel’s methods, rather than an attack on defense counsel’s character and integrity. 1996In State v. Ward, 807 S.W.2d 225, 226 (Mo.App.1991) the prosecutor’s comments that defense counsel was resorting to trickery were not improper because the comments were merely an attack on defense counsel’s methods, rather than an attack on defense counsel’s character and integrity. | 2 | 3 |
State v. Petarygreen2 sentences2003The court in Crews contrasted these cases with State v. Ward, 807 S.W.2d 225, 226 (Mo.App.1991) and State v. Petary, 781 S.W.2d 534, 541 (Mo. banc 1989). 4 In [Ward], the prosecutor’s comments that defense counsel was resorting to trickery were not improper because the comments were merely an attack on defense counsel’s methods, rather than an attack on defense counsel’s character and integrity. 1996Further, in State v. Petary, 781 S.W.2d 534, 541 (Mo. banc 1989) 3 prosecutorial comments that defense counsel told the jury a “story” and that the jury would have to be a “magician” to believe defense counsel were considered proper because the comments merely suggested that the defense theory was not supported by the evidence and thus did not constitute an improper attack on the integrity of defense counsel. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Reyesgreen2 sentences2023“However, if the statement is characterized as an attack on the defense’s technique or trial tactics, ‘rather than counsel’s integrity or character[,]’ the argument is permissible.” Id. (quoting State v. Reyes, 108 S.W.3d 161, 170 (Mo. App. W.D. 2003)). 2010However, if the statement is characterized as an attack on the defense’s technique or trial tactics, “ ‘rather than counsel’s integrity or character[,]’ the argument is permissible.” Id. (quoting State v. O’Haver, 33 S.W.3d 555, 563 (Mo.App.2000)). | 1 | 2 |
State v. O'HAVERgreen1 sentence2010However, if the statement is characterized as an attack on the defense’s technique or trial tactics, “ ‘rather than counsel’s integrity or character[,]’ the argument is permissible.” Id. (quoting State v. O’Haver, 33 S.W.3d 555, 563 (Mo.App.2000)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Burnettgreen1 sentence2005A prosecutor may “comment on the credibility of the defendant as a witness and assert the improbability and untruthfulness of his testimony.” State v. Burnett, 931 S.W.2d 871, 875 (Mo.App. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Rathgreen1 sentence2005See State v. Rath, 46 S.W.3d at 604, 609 (Mo.App. | 1 | 1 |
Ford v. Director of Revenuegreen1 sentence2001Dean argues that McNally went astray when it misinterpreted dictum from Ford v. Director of Revenue, 11 S.W.3d 106, 110 (Mo.App.2000). | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. Dennogreen2 sentences1971Insofar as appellant’s point is an attack on the instruction itself, suffice to say it is not a required instruction and its purpose is favorable to defendant because “once the confession is properly found to be voluntary by the judge, reconsideration * * * by the jury does not, of course, improperly affect the jury’s determination of the credibility or probativeness of the confession or its ultimate determination of guilt or innocence.” Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 378, fn. 8 , 84 S.Ct. 1774, 1781 , 12 L.Ed.2d 908 . 1971Insofar as appellant’s point is an attack on the instruction itself, suffice to say it is not a required instruction and its purpose is favorable to defendant because “once the confession is properly found to be voluntary by the judge, reconsideration * * * by the jury does not, of course, improperly affect the jury’s determination of the credibility or probativeness of the confession or its ultimate determination of guilt or innocence.” Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 378, fn. 8 , 84 S.Ct. 1774, 1781 , 12 L.Ed.2d 908 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Steele
green
2 sentences2023“However, if the statement is characterized as an attack on the defense’s technique or trial tactics, ‘rather than counsel’s integrity or character[,]’ the argument is permissible.” Id. (quoting State v. Reyes, 108 S.W.3d 161, 170 (Mo. App. W.D. 2003)). 2015“However, if the statement is characterized as an attack on the defense’s technique or trial tactics, *194 rather than counsel’s integrity or character, the argument is permissible.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). | 3 | 2015–2023 |
State v. Burnfin
green
1 sentence1999Greene, 820 S.W.2d at 347 ; Burnfin, 771 S.W.2d at 912-13 ; Harris, 662 S.W.2d at 277 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
State v. Greene
green
1 sentence1999Greene, 820 S.W.2d at 347 ; Burnfin, 771 S.W.2d at 912-13 ; Harris, 662 S.W.2d at 277 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
State v. Harris
green
1 sentence1999Greene, 820 S.W.2d at 347 ; Burnfin, 771 S.W.2d at 912-13 ; Harris, 662 S.W.2d at 277 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Cage v. Louisiana
green
2 sentences1993We next consider point III, which avers the trial court committed plain error in giving Instruction 4 (MAI-CR3d 302.04) in that the instruction’s definition of “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” allowed the jury to find Appellant guilty on a degree of proof “below that required by the due process clause.” Appellant bases his attack on Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 , 111 5.Ct. 328, 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990). 5 The Supreme Court of Missouri has rejected this identical attack on the instruction. 1993We next consider point III, which avers the trial court committed plain error in giving Instruction 4 (MAI-CR3d 302.04) in that the instruction’s definition of “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” allowed the jury to find Appellant guilty on a degree of proof “below that required by the due process clause.” Appellant bases his attack on Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 , 111 5.Ct. 328, 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990). 5 The Supreme Court of Missouri has rejected this identical attack on the instruction. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
State v. Bell
green
1 sentence1980For the reasons more fully stated in State v. Tessy Bell, supra, the judgment is affirmed. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
State of Arizona v. Pierce
green
2 sentences1977The Supreme Court of Arizona in State v. Pierce, 59 Ariz. 411 , 129 P.2d 916 (1942), considered an attack on its rule authorizing joinder of different offenses under separate counts, charging it was violative of a defendant’s substantive right in a criminal proceeding. 1977The Supreme Court of Arizona in State v. Pierce, 59 Ariz. 411 , 129 P.2d 916 (1942), considered an attack on its rule authorizing joinder of different offenses under separate counts, charging it was violative of a defendant’s substantive right in a criminal proceeding. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
McElroy v. Mathews
green
1 sentence1966Defendant’s contributory negligence instruction, after hypothesizing the matters relied upon, stated: “(T)he court instructs you that plaintiff * * * cannot recover under Instruction No. 1, and your verdict will be in favor of the defendant, * * In discussing the attack on the instruction, the court stated ( 263 S.W.2d 1 . c. 373): “The question then is whether instructions A and B, respectively, did in fact ignore plaintiff’s hypothesized recovery on her respective primary and humanitarian negligence submission. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.