attack defense in Maryland

1999Ultimately, the Court of Special Appeals held “under the totality of the circumstances, the attack on defense counsel in front of the jury was reversible error because it denied appellant a fair trial.” Id. at 78 , 543 A.2d at 855 .

1999Ultimately, the Court of Special Appeals held “under the totality of the circumstances, the attack on defense counsel in front of the jury was reversible error because it denied appellant a fair trial.” Id. at 78 , 543 A.2d at 855 .

1988Cf. Ferrell v. State, 73 Md.App. 627 , 536 A.2d 99 , cert. granted, 312 Md. 427 , 540 A.2d 489 (1988); McMillian v. State, 65 Md.App. 21 , 499 A.2d 192 (1985).

1988Cf. Ferrell v. State, 73 Md.App. 627 , 536 A.2d 99 , cert. granted, 312 Md. 427 , 540 A.2d 489 (1988); McMillian v. State, 65 Md.App. 21 , 499 A.2d 192 (1985).

1988Cf. Ferrell v. State, 73 Md.App. 627 , 536 A.2d 99 , cert. granted, 312 Md. 427 , 540 A.2d 489 (1988); McMillian v. State, 65 Md.App. 21 , 499 A.2d 192 (1985).

1988Cf. Ferrell v. State, 73 Md.App. 627 , 536 A.2d 99 , cert. granted, 312 Md. 427 , 540 A.2d 489 (1988); McMillian v. State, 65 Md.App. 21 , 499 A.2d 192 (1985).

1984In a normal contest as to the validity of an enactment through declaratory judgment procedure, a suit is brought by a person, often a taxpayer, with standing to mount such an attack and then the defense is supplied through counsel for the municipality or county or, in the case of the State, by the Attorney General.” 280 Md. at 85-86 , 371 A.2d at 432 .

1984In a normal contest as to the validity of an enactment through declaratory judgment procedure, a suit is brought by a person, often a taxpayer, with standing to mount such an attack and then the defense is supplied through counsel for the municipality or county or, in the case of the State, by the Attorney General.” 280 Md. at 85-86 , 371 A.2d at 432 .

1982Recently, in Stevenson v. State, 289 Md. 167 (1980), the Court of Appeals had occasion to review the scope of Article 23 of the Declaration of Rights to the Maryland Constitution, that unique provision declaring that in "the trial of all criminal cases, the jury shall be Judges of law, as well as of fact.” Reaffirming (in part) past decisions, the Court stated: "[I]t is incumbent upon a trial judge to carefully delineate for the jury the following dichotomy: (i) that the jury, under Article 23, is the final arbiter of disputes as to the substantive 'law of the crime,’ as well as the 'legal eff

1982Recently, in Stevenson v. State, 289 Md. 167 (1980), the Court of Appeals had occasion to review the scope of Article 23 of the Declaration of Rights to the Maryland Constitution, that unique provision declaring that in "the trial of all criminal cases, the jury shall be Judges of law, as well as of fact.” Reaffirming (in part) past decisions, the Court stated: "[I]t is incumbent upon a trial judge to carefully delineate for the jury the following dichotomy: (i) that the jury, under Article 23, is the final arbiter of disputes as to the substantive 'law of the crime,’ as well as the 'legal eff

1977The procedure here is in sharp contrast with that existing in Harford County v. Board, supra, 272 Md. 33 , where the Board of Supervisors of Elections of Harford County filed the bill for a declaratory judgment and the County as well as two individuals who had filed for election to the County Council from an altered councilmanic district were named as parties defendant.

1969See, e.g., Crawford v. Commonwealth, 136 S.W.2d 754 (Ky.) ; People v. Means, 225 P. 2d 279 (Cal.).